

SUBMISSIONS FOR STATE OF QUEENSLAND**04 APRIL 2011****Queensland Police Service
(QPS)****A. The preparation and planning by federal, state and local governments; emergency services and the community for the 2010/2011 floods in Queensland**

Detailed information concerning preparation, planning and training by the Queensland Police Service (QPS) for the 2010/2011 floods has been addressed in the submission previously forwarded to the Commission of Inquiry on behalf of the State of Queensland. This submission will in part address the philosophy behind the QPS planning activities and the specific qualities or aspects of the QPS, as an organisation which results in a constant level of QPS preparedness to respond to disaster events. Federal arrangements for the provision of assistance will also be canvassed as an aspect of preparation and planning, along with specific instances of QPS response such as the implementation of the Police Operations Centre (POC) to supplement the operation of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (DMA) structure.

This submission also includes information concerning issues arising during tropical cyclone Yasi. Whilst this is outside of the terms of reference for the Commission of Inquiry, it is included to demonstrate issues that can arise during the preparation, planning, response and recovery of a disaster. More information has now been collated since the QPS's first submission.

The all hazards policy

The 'all hazards' approach concerns arrangements for managing the large range of possible effects of risks and emergencies. This concept is useful to the extent that a large range of risks can cause similar problems and such measures as warning, evacuation, medical services and community recovery will be required during and

following emergencies.

The philosophy underpinning the all hazards approach stems from the need for emergency management arrangements and programs to be able to deal with the wide variety and scale of hazards that may affect Australian communities. Such hazards may originate from natural, technological, biological or social agents or result from an interaction between agents in any of these fields. The all hazards arrangements and programs must also provide for the performance of humanitarian tasks, which may be required to protect the population from the potential dangers arising from hostilities, to provide the conditions necessary for individual and community survival in such circumstances, and to help the community recover from the immediate effects of hostile action. These humanitarian or civil defence tasks are prescribed in the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Australia is a signatory (retrieved from <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb>).

The all hazards approach to national security and disaster management is now reflected in every Australian jurisdiction. The all hazards approach outlines that events should be managed in accordance with:

- Strategic policy framework;
- The State Disaster Management Plan; and
- Any guidelines issued under s.63 DMA.

The State level framework, Plan and guidelines assist government agencies to address the risk management issues systematically in terms of capabilities for preparedness, prevention, response and recovery. To enable this, an understanding of risk (including modes of 'threat') is required to develop those capabilities.

In 1995, a new joint Australian and New Zealand Standard for risk management was agreed upon. The Standard is generic and designed for widespread application. The peak body in Australian Emergency Management, the National Emergency Management Committee (NEMC), endorsed a later version of the Standard for application to emergency management in Australia and required that the Standard's principles and processes be adopted.

Basically, adoption of the standard's principles and processes in the field of emergency management endorses the comprehensive and integrated approach to disaster management.

Importantly these principles and processes supported a move away from simply treating hazards to a more holistic approach of dealing effectively with risks to the Australian community. This has required more attention being given to the vulnerability of communities to hazards, recognising that effective emergency management strategies needed to be built upon actions to reduce susceptibility and increase resilience in response to hazards, as well as upon actions to eliminate or modify hazards.

The risk management process, when applied in the emergency management context, incorporates the following steps:

- Risks to community safety are identified, analysed and evaluated in terms of hazard potential and community vulnerability;
- Evaluated risks are referred to relevant policy-makers for assessment and ranking;
- If it is decided that risks shall not be treated, then they are monitored and regularly reviewed in conjunction with their existing control measures;
- Where it is decided that risks will be treated, then treatment strategies are developed and implemented to reduce the risks by modifying the characteristics of hazards, the community and the environment. Risk reduction may affect vulnerability, likelihood or consequence; and
- Risks, which remain after practicable prevention/mitigation strategies have been developed ('residual risks'), are then assessed and appropriate preparedness, response and recovery plans and arrangements are prepared to deal with them.

The QPS consistently applies the all hazards policy across arrangements for managing the large range of possible consequences of risks and emergencies. This concept is useful to the extent that a large range of risks can cause similar issues and measures such as warning, evacuation, medical services and community recovery will be required during and following emergencies. The QPS recognises many risks will,

however, require specific response and recovery measures together with specific prevention and mitigation measures.

The introduction of amendments to the DMA which commenced in November 2010, placed the QPS in a broader role of leadership and coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of a disaster response. It should be noted that the 'traditional' QPS role in a multi-agency response has been to provide the coordination aspect that enables, or facilitates, other agencies to perform their agency specialisation.

Federal assistance

The State of Queensland develops disaster management policy and operational coordination with the Australian Government through the Federal Attorney-General's Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Liaison with the Australian Government and other States and Territories for disaster management purposes is the responsibility of Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ).

The means by which Federal assistance may be obtained, in response to a disaster event, is detailed in the State Disaster Management Plan and relevant QPS policy and procedure.

During disaster operations, the interface with the Australian Government and other States is through the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC). The SDCC processes all requests for Australian Government and interstate support during disasters. An exception to this process is Defence Aid to the Civil Community (DACC) category one requests, which can be passed by District Disaster Coordinators (DDCs) to local commanders of Australian Defence Force (ADF) units within their district.

The Defence Assistance to the Civil Community – Policy and Procedures document published by the Department of Defence in 2004, attached and marked 'QPS-01' defines DACC as:

“The provision of Defence resources, in response to a request for assistance, for the performance of tasks that are primarily the responsibility of the civil community or other government organisations.”

The following excerpt from Defence Assistance to the Civil Community – Policy and Procedures document describes the policy behind the provision of DACC.

“4. As a general principle, the provision of DACC should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. Defence resources are intended to be used for Defence purposes only. Requests for DACC may receive favourable consideration if there is no suitable alternative source of assistance particularly in instances of emergency...

5. Before DACC is provided, it is to be formally requested, offered and accepted.”

QPS internal policy recognises the potential support available from the ADF in responding to incidents.

The QPS Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) Chapter 11.14 “Commonwealth support and Australian Defence Force assistance and aid”, attached and marked ‘QPS-02’ provides that:

“DACC is the provision of ADF personnel, equipment, facilities or capabilities to perform tasks that are primarily the responsibility of civil authorities or organisations, and for which the civilian community lacks the necessary equipment or resources. It includes assistance in counter disaster training. Such assistance is not automatic, except where a local ADF commander may authorise assistance in civil emergencies where immediate action is necessary to save the lives or property of people in imminent danger and where local civilian resources are inadequate or unavailable.”

Chapter 11.14 of the OPM further stipulates:

“request for DACC made under the State Counter Disaster arrangements is to be made by the relevant Disaster District Coordinator through the State Counter Disaster Organisation”.

A request for DACC at other times is made in accordance with local arrangements or localised Standing Operating Procedures to the commanding officer or nominated delegate of the relevant ADF establishment.

In terms of the practicalities of the Federal assistance interface, when a particular outcome is identified as being required at a local level, (for example the need to evacuate 400 residents from a particular location within 24 hours) and the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) does not have capacity to perform the task, a request for assistance (RFA) is made to the District Disaster Management Group (DDMG). If the capacity cannot be managed at DDMG level, it is progressed to the State level - the SDCC. If the State does not have the capacity to provide the requested assistance, the request is then forwarded to Emergency Management Australia (EMA). A request for assistance typically does not contain recommendations about who should perform the task as this is a matter for EMA to determine. While these formal arrangements can be time consuming, in practice they are informally expedited. The QPS maintains an excellent relationship with the relevant parties in this regard.

Flexibility of organisational structure and community acknowledgment

The nature of the incident management training undertaken by Constables, Senior Constables, Non-Commissioned Officers, Commissioned Officers and the QPS Senior Executive Officers was described in the QPS submissions of 11 March 2011.


The QPS also has policing units such as the Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch that can assist in preparation for and response to events such as the 2010-2011 floods. As part of the functions of the Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch a number of complementary activities involving presentations on disaster and emergency management to forums including Assistant Commissioner's conferences, District Officer conferences, Incident Command System Courses (ICS), supervisors courses and Regional Management conferences were conducted prior to the flood events. In addition to this, members of the Branch spent significant portions of 2010 working on the implementation of the DMA review, both internally and in

consultation with EMQ. State-wide training for new QPS DDMG Executive Officers was also conducted prior to the flood events. The QPS enjoys a sound relationship with EMQ, who provide police with training in emergency management at the Australian Emergency Management Institute (Mt Macedon). This is paid for by the QPS.

In the Report on A Review of Disaster Management Legislation and Policy in Queensland by Jim O'Sullivan, AC, APM and the Consultancy Bureau Pty Ltd in August 2009 the QPS was recognised as the primary agency that the community turns during distress. This, coupled with the expansive network of resources across the State and the local knowledge of officers, meant that the QPS was the appropriate organisation from which to draw leaders for senior roles including Executive Officer of the DDMGs. Currently the QPS Executive Officer to a DDMG is likely to be a Sergeant or Senior Sergeant. Providing someone experienced in command and control, incident management, human resource management and supervision is essential for this role and it is desirable that they are or become well known to the local community. The officer will also possess a level of understanding and a close relationship with other government and non-government agencies. Combined, this aids in the efficient management of disaster events locally and support the QPS's capacity to be in a state of constant preparedness for disaster response.


The QPS also has a high level of community integration in their policing environments. This includes integration in many rural and remote areas. The QPS has, in addition, formed relationships with varying levels of government and non-government agencies across the State. These recognised and established relationships, which continue to be enhanced further adds to the QPS capacity to respond to disasters.

Under the DMA, a chain of command exists which is different to normal QPS organisational structures. During the 2010/2011 flood events these two structures operated in parallel providing flexibility which in turn allowed resources to be efficiently deployed and or redeployed. The diagram below is representative of the interrelationship between the two structures.



The flexibility of the organisation's structure was demonstrated in both Southern, Northern and Far Northern Regions where the current QPS structure was altered to ensure core policing business and disaster management were co-ordinated. The diagram below describes the adaptations made to QPS command structures during the events.

Southern Region Response & Recovery Command Framework



Another example of the QPS's ability to structurally adapt with efficiency and flexibility in response to disaster events is the establishment of the Police Operations Centre (POC) in Brisbane during the flood events.

The POC

The POC is a command centre that exercises control and coordination for police when reacting to a crisis. The POC has its origins in the established national security arrangements and is generally activated in circumstances of a cross jurisdictional or multi-agency response to a crisis.

Although the POC concept was originally intended for directing a multi-agency response in the traditional security paradigm, it has also proved itself as being adaptable as a multi-agency and agency specific coordination centre in supporting the flood crisis response. The adaptability of the POC in this new role was evident in the manner in which it provided leadership in:

- Prioritising QPS resources in support of regional police operations;
- The high level of cooperation with other response agencies; and

- Jointly facilitating support to the police regions and the affected communities.

The introduction of the POC in supporting the QPS response was due to the unprecedented scale of the events and the need to manage resources across the agency from a location close to the central QPS administrative functions, systems and capabilities.

Relationship to the Disaster Management Framework

In terms of the broader response to the flood crisis, the purpose and function of the POC was primarily to service and coordinate the needs of the QPS agency response. While the SDCC performed the role of whole of government coordination the POC activity operates independently.

The functions of the QPS in terms of core policing including the preservation of public safety and the maintenance of law and order in flood affected areas are parallel but sometimes intertwined policing functions with those in the Disaster Management Framework (i.e. the role of the DDCs and District Officer). The POC was primarily established to serve the core policing effort in coordination with the network of DDCs and the SDC.

Senior police officers have key roles in the SDMG (Executive Officer), SDCG (Chair) and in the role of the SDC (as performed by the Deputy Commissioner, Regional Operations). These key roles in the Disaster Management Framework, had minimal direct operational impact on the activity in the POC but it does serve to highlight the concurrent and overlapping spheres of external coordination of government operational activity and internal coordination of agency support activity.

The term, 'POC', was used to differentiate this unit from other policing units established such as major incident rooms and police forward command posts in affected police regions. The POC designation would be easily identifiable as coordinating state-wide QPS support operations. The POC is established in QPS operational policy through the Operational Procedures Manual and in national security policy through the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook. In the event of a

national security crisis, the POC is a critical link to the State Crisis Centre. The State Crisis Centre liaises with its national level counter-part, the Crisis Coordination Centre in Canberra.

As part of the primary role of coordination, command was exercised at the POC in terms of managing the functions of specific cells that make up the POC (described later in this submission), prioritising the requests for assistance and regulating the provision of assistance to the affected regions. This can be evidenced in the services provided during the search and rescue operations in the Lockyer Valley, the staff deployments to disaster affected regions throughout the State and the provision of air support/re-supply taskings to priority locations in Queensland.

The trigger to POC activation

In the period leading up to the activation of the SDCC and the POC, Central Region was supported by neighbouring regions in terms of the provision of additional staff and other resources.

Prior to the establishment of the POC, the QPS Logistic Cell at the Kedron SDCC was responsible for the coordination of staff deployments and rotations.

As the scale of the crisis became broader and more complex, the key QPS members involved in planning the logistical effort at the SDCC moved to the major incident room at QPS headquarters. Establishing the POC at QPS Headquarters was important due to its accessibility to central logistical and supply functions of the Service and as it was an agency specific function.

The trigger for establishing the POC occurred following the sudden onset of the events in the Toowoomba area in particular the events in Grantham and Murphy's Creek communities. Prior to this time Assistant Commissioner Henderson had been supporting the SDC from the EMQ Kedron facility. By agreement between these officers and at the instigation of Assistant Commissioner Henderson the POC was formally established.

These events in Grantham and Murphy’s Creek communities changed the complexion and tempo of the event from a geographically wide spread disaster to that requiring a focused crisis response. This had previously occurred during the flooding event at Theodore.

Events on 10 January 2011 presented new significant issues including:

- Potentially a large number of dead and missing persons in the Lockyer Valley;
- A complex search and rescue operation for survivors;
- The management and coordination of private, State Government and ADF rotor aircraft assets in the Lockyer Valley; and
- The emerging threat to the Ipswich and the Brisbane metropolitan areas due to flooding.

The POC system and cell functions

The National Counter-Terrorism Committee Incident Command and Control System (ICCS) and the QPS Incident Command System (ICS), utilises cell functions that are dependent on the needs of a particular operation or crisis. The POC operates by not rigidly adhering to cell structures and the structures evolve and change according to events. This ensures adaptability and flexibility in meeting the needs of the crisis.

The below table represents how the conventional POC ICCS configuration of cell functions is compared to the manner in which the POC was configured during the recent flood crisis:

ICCS configuration	Flood crisis adaptation
<u>Command</u>	<u>Command</u>
The command cell is led by a Police Commander. The Police Commander (PC) is typically a QPS Assistant Commissioner and is responsible for the management of the incident. For a terrorist incident the PC reports to the State Crisis and Communication Centre (SC3) through a SC3 Police Liaison Group.	During the flood crisis a Police Commander (PC) led the POC cell functions and was responsible for the delivery of support to regional police operations. The PC reported to the Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Operations) – noting that the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) was the State Disaster Coordinator.

The PC may request guidance on the Government position during the response phase, the acquisition of extra resources, strategic decisions, requests for ADF support etc.

Where the QPS is unable to obtain or acquire a resource for an element of the response and is unable to use existing powers to take control of a resource (e.g. a resource available in another jurisdiction) the PC may make requests for additional state level resources to the SDCC.

In a 'directing' role the PC forms a 'Commander's Intent' which is the strategic objective of the response to the 'incident'. The Commander's Intent is composed of a purpose method and end-state. To facilitate the movement toward the objective the PC develops operational objectives.

In a 'coordinating' role the PC also forms an 'Intent' – the difference being in the operational objectives which is more concerned with supporting the regional police operations.

The following roles may also be present in the Command Cell to provide support to the PC:

- Deputy Commander
- Staff officer
- Legal Advisor
- Tactical Advisor
- Chief of Staff

The following roles were utilised in the command cell in support of the PC:

- Deputy Commander
- Staff officer – the staff officer completed a commander's log detailing decisions made and reasoning etc.

Operations

The Operations function is responsible for developing initial Incident Action Plans for the first operating period. The function will then assign duties to staff, provide briefings, deploy and monitor staff deployed to the operational response. The Operations Cell:

- maintains a log of the operational response; and ensures that all decisions, actions, communications, briefings and personnel deployment are recorded; and
- develops a regular SitRep.

The Operations Cell members should debrief staff concluding duties and ensure that any relevant information is forwarded to the planning or intelligence cells as required.

The Operations Cell incorporates the Communications Cell. This cell is the single point of contact for the relevant Command Post and provides a process to record all information entering and leaving the PFCP/POC.

Planning

The planning cell is responsible for developing Courses of Action (COA) for the management of future operational periods. These COA are

Operations

The Operations function was not responsible for developing Incident Action Plans. This responsibility lies with the regional MIRs. The primary responsibility of the cell was to:

- monitor and track incoming/outgoing tasks in to the POC;
- prioritise, manage and arrange air support taskings in conjunction with ADF liaison officers -(including an initial record of demand and a running log of tasks);
- maintain a log of occurrences/tasks; and
- maintain a SitRep (issued at 0600, 1200, 1600 and 2400 hrs).

The Operations Cell debriefed other incoming/outgoing staff as required. It should be noted that there was not a substantial planning cell function in operation and there no need to incorporate an intelligence cell.

The Operations Cell was not required to utilise a communications function with PFCP.

The Operations Cell had direct links to the ADF, QAS, QFRS, DVI and Water Police (SARMC) Liaison Officers.

Planning

The planning cell was engaged in current planning activities as opposed to future planning. As the role of the POC was one of 'support' to

approved by the Police Commander, which is then developed into a broad plan. The plan is further developed into subordinate incident action plans. Upon approval of the IAP it can be delivered to the Operations Cell for execution. It is important that there is close liaison between the Planning Cell and other cells in the system to ensure that there is sufficient staff available to execute the plan and that as the situation develops any changes to the operating environment are incorporated into the plan.

The Planning Cell at the Operational level (POC) may be supported by the formation of a Multi Agency Threat Assessment Team (MATAT).

The MATAT is composed of a panel of qualified and experienced members of responding agencies. It is responsible for the development of threat assessment briefings to the Police Commander regarding environmental threats. It should be noted that the MATAT will not develop a security threat assessment. Security Threat Assessments are the responsibility of the Intelligence function.

The Planning function may be supported by a member of the QPS Geographical Information Service (GIS). GIS can produce maps and aerial photographs and plot locations of significant interest on these products, including transport infrastructure, public services etc.

the police regions the main effort focused on the immediate planning to assist the affected regions. The Planning Cell was diverted to Operation Safeguard and other whole of government planning at the Executive Building. The bulk of the planning activities in the POC centred on the logistical support and staff deployment planning of the Administration and Logistics Cell.

There was no need for a MATAT to be established. Inter-agency cooperation was facilitated through liaison officers – ADF, QFRS and QAS as required.

GIS provided the POC with some overall situation awareness but was not active in the planning function.

C. All aspects of the response to the 2010/2011 flood events, particularly measures taken to inform the community and measures to protect life and private and public property (including immediate management, response and recovery; resourcing, overall coordination and deployment of personnel and equipment; adequacy of equipment and communications systems; and the adequacy of the community's response)

Early severe weather forecasts

The Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) issued severe weather forecasts in the later part of 2010 specifically in reference to the La Niña event which had dominated the Australian climate for the six months preceding the flood event. The BOM forecasted severe weather patterns not dissimilar to weather events of 1974 and in particular, forecasted a likelihood of an increase in tropical cyclones. Cyclone numbers are typically higher than normal during the November to April period, with February and March the peak. As a result the eastern region was expected to experience a higher than average number of tropical cyclones, with about 6-7 tropical cyclones being forecast (the average value is 4 tropical cyclones).

In early November 2010, as a result of the BOM forecasts, the Queensland Government held a 'CEO Leadership Team Meeting' involving the Directors-General of all departments to specifically identify strategies for the severe weather predictions. The QPS Commissioner attended this meeting.

On 8 November 2010, the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) forwarded a memorandum to the eight regional Assistant Commissioners across the State and provided an update on the advice from BOM. Subsequently, the implications and preparedness of the Regions and Commands was discussed by the Deputy Commissioner Regional Operations, the Deputy Commissioner Specialist Operations and Regional Assistant Commissioners during regular video/teleconferences.

A number of meetings were held between the QPS and EMQ at the Kedron Park facility to ensure procedures between various agencies were understood and key

relationships were established. This was facilitated by the QPS Operations Support Command and in particular by the co-chair of the State Disaster Coordination Group, Chief Superintendent Alistair Dawson who was supported by Assistant Commissioners Pointing and Henderson. A number of discussion exercises were developed and conducted by EMQ.

QPS response – State Disaster Coordinator

On 24 December 2010, the State Disaster Coordinator (SDC) Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart was appointed and began operations as the SDC at EMQ's facilities at Kedron Park.

A number of experienced officers from Operations Support Command were identified to support the State Disaster Coordinator and the chair of the State Disaster Coordination Group, for the provision of advice and assistance in terms of coordination and consultation with other agencies in the manner as required under the DMA. From 9 September 2010 to 8 November 2010, Chief Superintendent Dawson from Operations Support Command assisted in the implementation of the revised DMA and provided formal training courses for new QPS DDMG Executive Officers. In particular Assistant Commissioner Henderson was installed as the informal Deputy to the SDC and managed much of the business of the police response through the SDCC. Subsequently, Assistant Commissioner Henderson also provided support to the SDCG and SDMG when the SDC (Deputy Commissioner Stewart) was gaining situational awareness and personally supporting affected DDCs and local governments. This structure worked particularly effectively by ensuring that the SDC remained briefed on all aspects of the operation of the SDCG and the SDCC. In turn the SDC was able to regularly brief senior government members both during and outside the SDMG meetings. The level of confidence this provided government members cannot be underestimated.

Initially the roles of staff attached to the State Disaster Coordination Centre were in support of the State Disaster Coordination Group; however, it was quickly identified a structured approach similar to the manner in which major incidents are currently managed within the QPS was essential. This led to staff being assigned to 'specific

cells' including: secretariat; operational; logistical; and planning.

The scale and longevity of the flood emergency highlighted a necessity for a cadre of appropriately trained and experienced officers readily deployable at short notice to provide relief and support. Subsequently, Deputy Commissioner Barnett arranged for approximately 100 police at the ranks of Inspector, Senior Sergeant and Sergeant from across South-East Queensland to be deployed to perform roles in the Centre and this capability in terms of expertise and resource depth proved to be extremely valuable during the state wide response.

This resource depth provided for 'shadowing' of officers not already trained in disaster management to work with the more experienced police ensuring professional consistency. This unique QPS ability extends also into areas of administration and is accessible at short notice.

QPS support to the State Disaster Coordination Centre

Senior Police Executives of the rank of Assistant Commissioner and Chief Superintendent were present at the State Disaster Coordination Centre for extended periods of time.

The QPS also chairs the State Disaster Coordination Group during operations and senior officers were supported by a team of QPS support staff.

Initially the role of police was to support the State Disaster Coordination Group. However, as the events spread through Queensland a larger contingent of QPS members were deployed within the SDCC. Members were embedded into specific cells including secretariat, logistical/planning and intelligence. Officer/s maintained a presence within the intelligence cell on a 24 hour basis. This enhanced the ability to communicate easily with DDCs and DDMG Executive Officers which enabled the efficient gathering and dissemination of timely intelligence.

A commissioned officer was initially present in the logistical/planning cell until midnight each shift and this extended to a 24 hour basis during the more critical

periods of the weather events. The commissioned officer presence provided a direct physical representative of the QPS, performing liaison roles with stakeholders. The Commissioned Officers also administered the preparation of detailed QPS briefings provided to the SDC each morning (prior to 0600 hours) and at other times which ensured the SDC remained currently of all known incidents. The QPS continually assessed the needs of the SDCC and provided resources when necessary.

State overview – period from 23 December 2010

- **23 December 2010** - Meetings at State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility regarding the rain events over the Christmas and New Year period;
- **24 December 2010** - Conference at Police Headquarters in relation to disaster arrangements. No major issues were identified. State Disaster Management Group Meeting at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility, chaired by the Director-General, Department of the Premier and Cabinet Mr Ken Smith, regarding the possible cyclone identified off Cairns. Deputy Commissioner Stewart was appointed as the State Disaster Coordinator;
- **25 December 2010** - Meeting was held at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility. Deputy Premier Paul Lucas and Police Minister Roberts were in attendance. Category 1 cyclone 'Tasha' had crossed the coast south of Cairns at 0530 hours tracking South/West in-land. Heavy rain was predicted for Rockhampton and inland. Briefings were obtained from the District Disaster Coordinators of those affected areas;
- **27 December 2010** – A meeting conducted at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility - areas of concern identified by the Gladstone District Disaster Coordinator: Town of 1770 became isolated; Taroom, Theodore, St George and Dalby were also areas of concern. Toowoomba had local flooding. Theodore - 350 residents moved to higher ground within Theodore. The Rockhampton District Disaster Coordinator advised indications were that in one week the Fitzroy River would be at 8 metres and that at 8.5 metres the Bruce Highway would be cut. At 8.9 metres, the airport would be closed. Emerald reported that 300 homes were preparing to evacuate and the river under Vince Lester Bridge was at 12.2 metres;

- **28 December 2010** - Meeting was held at State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility - Areas of concern were: Bundaberg - Burnett River; Fitzroy River was rising; Emerald - anticipated that Nagoa River would rise from 11.6 metres to 14 metres on Thursday and that the Vince Lester Bridge would go under water. Major issues were identified including: evacuation of Theodore; flooding in Bundaberg; resupply issue for Roma due to roads cut by water; Jericho and Alpha had sewerage issues. At 1245 hours, Theodore was evacuated to a mine located in Moura - 483 people air-lifted by helicopter. The river was at 14.6 metres and was expected to rise to 15 metres. Impact on the coal mines was identified;
- **29 December 2010** - Preparations were made regarding the expected closure of the Vince Lester Bridge. Emerald - prepared for evacuations; Dalby: water treatment plant was closed; Alpha and Jericho affected by flooding; Further evacuations in Bundaberg, Chinchilla and Dalby. Roma was now isolated by road and rail;
- **30 December 2010** - Emerald – the Nagoa River was still rising and rail services closed; Rockhampton – the Dawson River was still rising and was expected to exceed 8.5 metres and 140 houses inundated above floor height with a further 1,000 house yards flooded. The University of Central Queensland nominated as the evacuation centre; St George – the river was increasing in height; Theodore - police remain in the town to provide a security presence;
- **31 December 2010** - Emerald – the Nagoa River reached 16.5 metres;
- **1 January 2011** - Bundaberg - Burnett River dropping; Emerald 1,000 houses inundated, 500 people evacuated, Rail and Highway was cut; Surat - significant flooding; Dalby - water supply issues continued; and St George – the river continued rising with the peak predicted in mid-January;
- **2 January 2011** - Emerald - 474 people in evacuation centres; Dalby - 31 persons in evacuation centres; Bundaberg - 47 people in evacuation centres. QPS provided police personnel to assist;
- **3 January 2011** - St George - river still rising; Emerald - transition into recovery, Vince Lester Bridge had one lane open; Rockhampton - rail and airport closed, highway south was closed whilst the highway north remained open. Police patrolled waterways in boats to prevent looting. Gladstone, Bundaberg and

Longreach moved into the recovery phase; Surat and St George continued to prepare for flood. Water Police personnel were sent to St George; Dalby - evacuees returned home; Condamine - health issues identified i.e. septic tanks and foot rot;

- **4 January 2011** – Surat River Peaks;
- **5 January 2011** - Rockhampton - flood peak; Major General Mick Slater appointed to lead the Queensland Flood Recovery Taskforce;
- **6 January 2011** - Dalby - water trucks providing water; Emerald - resupply continuing; Theodore - transition into recovery phase;
- **7 January 2011** – 3,720 evacuees registered State Wide; Emerald - 59 persons in evacuation centres; Rockhampton - 350 persons in evacuation centres; Chinchilla - 24 persons in evacuation centres; Dalby - 26 persons in evacuation Centres; St George - 35 persons in evacuation centres; Theodore - all residents remained in the evacuation centre; and Rockhampton airport remained inundated; Surat moved to the recovery process;
- **9 January 2011** – Rockhampton - river levels steady at 9.15 metres; St George - Balonne River peaked; Dirranbandi - river reached record high level at 5.3 metres with levy banks holding;
- **10 January 2011** – Toowoomba and Lockyer Valley - significant event with confirmed fatalities. Areas impacted included Toowoomba, Murphy's Creek, Postman's Ridge, Withcott, Helidon, Grantham, Gatton, and Laidley; Police Operations Centre established at Police HQ. Special Emergency Response Team and Public Safety Response Team members deployed to support the Southern Region;
- **11 January 2011** - Operations conducted in affected areas of Lockyer Valley. Police Operations Centre was established to support affected regions. Co-ordinated helicopter operations regarding evacuations in Grantham, Murphy's Creek and Forrest Hill organised. 60 Academy Recruits were on standby. Operations conducted from Southern Region with the mission to minimise loss of life. Caboolture - reporting flash flooding in Kilcoy and Woodford areas; Ipswich - experiencing flooding, 20 extra personnel deployed to support Ipswich. Brisbane - preparing for major flooding in next 48 hours. Brisbane - RNA evacuation centre opens in preparation for high tide at about 0300 hours

Wednesday 12 January. Esk and Toogoolawah isolated. Ipswich: evacuation centre open; Laidley - 250/300 evacuees, Forrest Hill – 200/300 evacuations to Gatton. Search and recovery commenced in Murphy's Creek;

- **12 January 2011** - Brisbane and Ipswich experience major flooding. Brisbane River to peak at 5.2 metres at 0400 hours Thursday 13 January 2011. Team of investigators (Taskforce Galaxy) deployed to Toowoomba to support Coronial Investigations. Consideration given to damage to significant marine infrastructure including the 'The Drift' floating restaurant, the Moggill Ferry, the Riverside Walk, Dockside Marina and private piers and jetties. Further efforts were made to secure Island Barge at West End. There were 3,000 evacuees at Brisbane Exhibition RNA Grounds and 1,300 evacuees at QE2 Stadium;
- **13 January 2011** - Brisbane – 1,336 persons in evacuation centres; Ipswich 1,995 persons in evacuation centres. Cyclone identified off Coral Sea with 50% chance of impacting on Queensland;
- **14 January 2011** – Search and recovery continues in Lockyer Valley. 16 persons confirmed deceased. Brisbane Evacuation Centres – 1,326 persons; Ipswich Evacuation Centres - 881 persons. 192 police moved to Central Region to support recovery operations and 159 to Southern Region to support recovery operations;
- **15 January 2011** - 16 confirmed deceased. Brisbane River levels slowly returning to normal levels. Brisbane evacuation centres – 1,108 persons; Ipswich evacuation centres – 617 persons;
- **16 January 2011** - 18 people confirmed deceased. Brisbane evacuation centres - 589 persons; Ipswich evacuation centres – 261 persons;
- **17 January 2011** - 20 people confirmed deceased. Brisbane and Ipswich transition into recovery; Operation 'Safeguard' - contingent of 100 NSW, SA and Victoria Police conduct joint looting patrols with QPS officers for next 3 weeks;
- **21 January 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart's appointment as SDC terminated at 1700 hours;
- **28 January 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart appointed as the SDC in preparation for the response to cyclones Anthony and Yasi;
- **31 January 2011** - Cyclone Watch – tropical cyclone Anthony - Cooktown to Yeppoon;

- **1-2 February 2011** – Police Operations Centre established in Brisbane in preparation for cyclone Yasi. Public Safety Response Team personnel and Chief Superintendent deployed to Far Northern Region in support of Cairns. A second Chief Superintendent was deployed to Townsville to support Townsville operations. Additional police from the south-east corner were made available for rapid deployment to support Northern and Far Northern Regions. Preparations for Yasi to cross the Queensland coast continued with self and mandatory evacuations commenced;
- **3 February 2011** – 0430 hours Category 5 tropical cyclone Yasi crossed the coast between Cairns and Townsville. Mission Beach and Cardwell severely impacted. Police Operations Centre commenced and additional police deployed to the region;
- **4 February 2011** – District Disaster Coordinator for Cairns indicates Cairns city to be fully operational by Monday 7 February 2011. Far Northern and Northern Police Regions move to recovery operations: and
- **11 February 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart's appointment as the State Disaster Coordinator (SDC) terminated at 1700 hours.

Immediate management, response and recovery

The QPS is the primary law enforcement agency for the State of Queensland. The functions of the QPS are stated in section 2.3 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*. The major functions of the QPS are the preservation of peace and good order and the prevention and detection of crime. In particular, section 2.3 (g) of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* states the police service is responsible for the provision of services and the rendering of help in an emergency or otherwise. During the large scale flood events of 2010/2011 the QPS adapted its operations to ensure its core business was maintained along with the management of the disaster events. To achieve this, the QPS worked closely with other agencies and the private sector, as well as stretching QPS business units, to fit into this new operating environment.

Evacuation centres / places of safety

The Queensland State Disaster Management System is a whole-of-Government system, driven from the local level upwards and requiring commitment from all levels

in order to deliver a response to community needs, including the establishment of Evacuation Centres. The QPS found that there were concerns surrounding the management of evacuation centres and places of safety.

During the events Evacuation Centres accommodated the following:

Between Tuesday 30 November 2010 to Sunday 23 January 2011

- Number of Evacuation Centres established – 73; and
- Number of persons in Evacuation Centres – 6051.

Between Monday 10 January 2011 to Friday 21 January 2011

- Evacuation Centres – 3; and
- Number of persons in Evacuation Centres – 761.

Evacuation Centres (and Places of Safety) must be a safe and secure environment capable of handling large numbers of people. Some places (for example several of the shopping centres and halls) were not suitable shelters or places of safety for people.

One issue experienced in Far Northern Region during tropical cyclone Yasi was brought about by personnel ceasing work and returning home prior to the impact of the cyclone. This left some centres under managed, requiring the QPS (as an agency providing 24 hour presence and response capability) to control these centres.

QPS supplied staff to all evacuation centres albeit some smaller ones (for example Bundaberg) had officers provide spot checks.

In some areas, for example the Ipswich Centre at the showgrounds, personnel from a range agencies were working very long hours with little experience in the management of a centre. Some areas, for example the Banana LDMG did an outstanding job in organising and managing the evacuation centres. The Banana LDMG utilised the Anglo Coal facilities which were already established and efficiently operated. Areas where the Red Cross were managing centres were generally well prepared and administered.

The policing presence of evacuation centres had a positive effect on the public and provided a sense of security and certainty to the affected communities.

Resourcing, overall coordination and deployment of personnel and equipment

The QPS recognised during planning processes for 2010-2011 that one of the key challenges facing the Service would be, amongst other issues, *climate change and the risk of more natural disasters and human and animal contagions*. Accordingly the QPS has invested significantly in infrastructure, technology and resources. These investments are well planned which laid a foundation that enabled the QPS to respond to the flood events. For example, the QPS capital programs for 2010-11 include capital works, information technology and other essential equipment. Program highlights include:

- Construction of the new, refurbished and upgraded facilities across the State to ensure the QPS remains well positioned now and into the future;
- Information and communication technology including Computer Aided Dispatch, Technology Refresh and new systems; and
- Purchase of new and upgrade operational equipment including vehicles, traffic cameras and marine vessels.

The QPS delivers a 24 hour-a-day policing response to over four million Queensland residents across approximately one quarter of Australia's land mass. Under the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) there are eight police regions (Far Northern, Northern, Central, North Coast, Southern, South Eastern, Metropolitan South and Metropolitan North).

Under the Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Operations) there are three specialist commands (Ethical Standards, Operations Support and State Crime Operations) as well as the Crime and Misconduct Commission (police group), Media and Public Affairs Branch and the Office of the QPS Solicitor.

Under the Deputy Chief Executive (Resource Management) there are five corporate service functions (Administration, Education and Training, Finance, Human Resources as well as Information and Communications Technology).

Thirty one (31) operational police districts exist across the state (including 23 disaster districts), which manage 337 police divisions, 58 neighbourhood police beats and 45 police beat shopfronts. This enables the QPS to react efficiently to events as they occur and importantly facilitates effective communication and command infrastructure across the State and into the remote parts of Queensland.

As at 1 January 2011 QPS had 10,406 police officers, 4,169 administration officers and 353 recruits. These members are able to be and were deployed across the State. During the recent events, the QPS deployed 64 members to the Brisbane area, 120 members to the Ipswich area, 367 to the Rockhampton area and 397 to the Toowoomba area. One hundred and ninety (190) recruits were also deployed to various locations.

The QPS also has a variety of specialist groups, including water police, search and rescue officers, detectives and Public Safety and Response Team members. These officers are able to be and were rapidly deployed in times of need. As an example the Search and Rescue specialists worked in the Grantham and Murphy's Creek area from 10 January 2011 to 2 February 2011. During this time:

- 24 coordinators worked a combined total of approximately 1,824 hours;
- Nine divers searched creeks and dams for over 1,884 hours;
- 15 water police officers conducted 1,100 hours patrolling the Brisbane and Bremer rivers and Lockyer Creek; and
- Police searched with Australian Defence Force and Australian Federal Police members for a combined total of approximately 22,700 hours.

Operation Safeguard

With large areas of the Brisbane Metropolitan area and Ipswich becoming uninhabitable due to inundation it was feared that significant amounts of looting may occur (as was the anecdotal evidence from the 1974 Brisbane floods). Due to previous flooding across the vast majority of Queensland and the deployment of QPS personnel to assist in those areas a formal request was made for interstate police to assist QPS personnel to provide an enhanced policing response to combat looting.

On 13 January 2011 planning commenced for the operation which was code named 'Operation Safeguard' with the mission to protect property and prevent crime in the flood affected areas utilising a high visibility policing presence. This included establishing a multijurisdictional taskforce which would include New South Wales Police (NSWPOL), Victoria Police (VICPOL) and South Australia Police (SAPOL). The operational plan including the following policing strategies:

- Officers working on a one-to-one basis (one QPS to one interstate officer);
- Officers working on a 24/7 shift roster; and
- Directed patrols covering 50 sectors that had been identified in flood affected areas of Metropolitan South Region, Metropolitan North Region and Ipswich District.

To enable the interstate officers to use police powers within Queensland, six special constable induction ceremonies were conducted. Together with the induction, training was provided to inform the officers of the legislative requirements within Queensland and an officer from the Ethical Standards Command also provided a presentation.

In total 386 sworn police officers (NSWPOL 154; VICPOL 84; SAPOL 24; QPS 124) were involved in the operation. The operation commenced at 0800hrs on 18 January 2011 with patrols of the flood affected areas ceasing at 2400hrs on 6 February 2011.

Taskforce Galaxy

Taskforce Galaxy is a joint operation comprising of investigators from State Crime Operations Command and Southern Region. The Detective Superintendent responsible for the Homicide Group, overviews the Taskforce and reports to the Assistant Commissioners, State Crime Operations Command and Southern Region. Taskforce Galaxy was established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the loss of life associated with the flood events in the Toowoomba and Lockyer Valley areas. In consultation with the State Coroner it was determined that the Taskforce would investigate the circumstances surrounding each fatality pursuant to the provisions of section 45 of the *Coroners Act 2003*. These matters are still under

investigation by the Taskforce.

Adequacy of equipment and communications systems

The QPS was able to deploy significant resources to assist disaster response operations.

During the floods five Police Air Wing aircraft were deployed in transporting QPS personnel and equipment to the affected regions. The QPS aircrafts completed 344 flight hours and travelled 101,369km, moving 1,366 passengers and 30,267kg of equipment and specialised cargo.

The QPS Fleet Management Branch was also able to rapidly support disaster operations. Over a two week period the Branch enabled an additional 88 vehicles to be deployed:

- Rockhampton Police were provided with an additional 10 police vehicles (sedan and 4wd vehicles) as well 12 additional 4wd vehicles being sourced from Rockhampton QFleet (on a 'loan basis');
- 43 QPS vehicles were provided to Operation Safeguard;
- 3 high clearance 4wd vehicles (provided by the Isuzu Corporation) and a 10 4wd vehicles (provided by Toyota) were sourced and supplied;
- 31 QPS general duty general duty vehicles (sedans and 4wd vehicles) were distributed across the affected disaster districts; and
- 2 Fleet Management Branch workshop vehicles (including staff) were also deployed in clean up and recovery duties around the Brisbane Metropolitan area.

Some resources were required to be purchased. The QPS was able to source and purchase necessary equipment which included:

- equipment at emergency management facilities at Kedron and 200 Mary Street, Brisbane;
- portable generators; and
- satellite kits.

Once purchased or sourced, equipment was efficiently deployed to the regions.

PoliceLink

PoliceLink is the newly established Police Contact Centre and operates from the Joint Contact Centre facility located at Zillmere. This Centre facilitates enhanced customer service and strengthens existing business continuity and service provision. It enables the QPS to improve response management by providing a central telephone number that can be used anywhere in the State to contact police for non-urgent matters, thereby releasing frontline police officers to attend urgent calls for assistance. The multi-channel contact centre allows the public to interact with QPS on a range of non-urgent matters.

During the floods the Centre provided a vital, efficient service to police and the community. The Centre established two special event lines:

- 1300993191 – This service was initially established to handle evacuation registrations and enquiries but evolved into the main enquiry line for the disaster response; and
- 1800442182 – This service was established specifically to support Toowoomba Station. Telstra call data shows that 2,526 calls were received via this service.

The type of services provided to callers included:

- Evacuee registration;
- Welfare enquiries from family and friends;
- General enquiries on all aspects of the disaster response;
- Road status enquiries;
- SES requests; and
- Requests for urgent assistance.

The following is a snap shot of the scope and services provided by the Centre:

- From the time the major events lines were activated in response to events at Toowoomba and in the Lockyer Valley until the recession of flooding in Brisbane and Ipswich, Policelink answered 16,570 calls received via the special event lines;

- The majority of major event calls were received between 11 and 16 January 2011 inclusive. During this period the centre answered 29,030 calls in total (includes business as usual services) of which 15,905 were received through the major event services. Core business activities during this period were maintained at a degraded service level;
- Over 7,600 hours of labour were performed by Client Service Officers between 11 and 16 January 2011 to meet service demands;
- The Centre handled redirected calls from 10 stations/establishments experiencing telephone faults or difficulties at varying times. The following establishments were supported until normal telephony services were restored:
 - Capalaba;
 - Surfers Paradise;
 - Petrie;
 - Hendra;
 - Fortitude Valley;
 - City;
 - Upper Mount Gravatt;
 - Sandgate;
 - Ferny Grove; and
 - Alderley Depot and Metropolitan North Regional Office;
- A total of 17,968 calls made to the major event lines between 11 and 16 January were abandoned. The high abandonment rate can be attributed to: (a) the inordinate number of calls directed to the service when it was first published; and (b) the on-hold message that was implemented on the second day of operations which detailed the Red Cross, SES and road enquiries numbers and associated websites. In respect to the second point it is apparent that a significant number of callers terminated their call and redirected their enquiry when the information sought was supplied through the on-hold message; and
- As with all policing services, core duties were still maintained during the floods. In respect to business-as-usual channels, the Centre was able to provide degraded but acceptable grades of services between 11 and 16 January 2011. The table below highlights the calls for core business functions:

<u>Queue</u>	<u>Calls Entered</u>
Crime Stoppers	921
HoonLine	110
Police Headquarters switch	4,457
Police Reporting	6,893
PoliceLink 131444	5,566

Public Safety Network

Another infrastructure item that assisted police operations during the flood event was the newly implemented Public Safety Network (PSN). The PSN Initiative is a collaborative approach to the specification, acquisition, implementation, and ongoing management of a data network service that is shared by the QPS and the Departments of Corrective Services and Justice and Attorney-General. It delivers significant whole-of-life efficiencies compared to previous arrangements where each agency pursues its data network service requirements individually. The PSN provides the capability to connect people, sites, processes, systems and data, and is a foundation service that supports the QPS ICT service delivery role. In the near future, the PSN will play a major role in supporting the delivery of substantial portions of Mobile Services, State-wide Digital Communications, and Telephony technologies, and will provide a medium for convergence of these technologies, for example, in the Radio over IP (RoIP) project, where radio communications are being supplemented, enhanced, and provided with greater flexibility and operational control by use of the PSN as a linking technology (as opposed to traditional radio linking technologies).

During the flood event, some QPS PSN sites lost connectivity as the result of loss of, or damage to mains power supply, loss of or damage to data carriage services, or damage to PSNMC managed network hardware. The majority of these sites were returned to service within a few days with the exception of Suncorp Stadium and Southbank as these sites suffered structural damage that required repairs to electrical

cabling.

State-wide digital communications strategy

The QPS's current analogue-based radio communication network is dated and some elements require tactical replacement. Due to rapid advances in technology, the market is becoming predominantly digital, and the provision of support and spare parts for the current analogue-based equipment is becoming more difficult to acquire. Digital technology offers enhanced information encryption capabilities and greater functionality and product efficiency than do analogue networks, and is necessary to provide data and communication convergence with the QPRIME, CAD and mobile services projects. It is also foreseeable that the marketplace may see the analogue environment withdrawn in the future in favour of the digital environment.

Transferring to a digital communication network has many advantages in terms of information security and data convergence, and will provide a more effective and efficient communication platform. As a result, with the Department of Community Safety and Department of Public Works, the QPS has commenced a strategy to develop implementation of a sophisticated digital trunked communications network across the State with a mobile data capability. Metropolitan Brisbane areas are utilising basic digital networks, however this does cause confusion with members where neighbouring police districts are still on analogue systems.

Emergency services from all over Australia have assisted in various jurisdictions in times of disasters. In 1974 services travelled to Darwin to provide assistance following Cyclone Tracy and again throughout NSW in 1994, 1999 and 2001, Canberra in 2003 and Victoria in 2009 to assist in major bushfires. In each case, the visiting units found it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve interoperability with local units using current analogue and digital radio systems operating in the 450-520 MHz spectrum.

More recently it was identified in the Victorian bushfires that the use of mobile data and broadband applications and specifically geospatial information management applications would have provided greater situational awareness for frontline police,

Police Operations Centres and the ability to share information between Emergency Services.

Today's modern communications comprises voice (radio) and data including video capabilities for all frontline policing and emergency services. The use of data applications allows police and emergency services to despatch crews, distribute maps and images, automatically locate vehicles, operate in-car video and provide visual assessment of disaster scenes that contribute to situational awareness.

During the Queensland floods the QPS Geographic Information Services (GIS) prepared and generated over 1000 (hard copy) maps for operational use and a smaller number intended for direct support for future/pending coronial investigations that were specifically focused on the Grantham area. All maps prepared by GIS were physically printed and transported (including via police aircraft) to affected areas for use by police forward command posts. Physical maps were also utilised in the Brisbane POC.

The use of electronic GIS applications and mobile data terminals in the field would have enabled the instant transfer of maps to affected areas. The use of such technology would also have enabled live images of disaster scenes to be overlaid on maps so that police forward command posts have a greater situational awareness of the event. The use of broadband communications, or higher frequency spectrum than is currently used, is required for these such applications.

The Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management – Police Senior Officer Group (SOG) is supportive of seeking an allocation of spectrum from the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) that all jurisdictions could operate broadband applications within. This provides a basis to use current and future opportunities, including the current review of government spectrum allocation to address shortfalls in emergency communications that exist.

Bandwidth within the spectrum is managed and allocated by ACMA for various communications and media applications. ACMA is currently planning the

reallocation of spectrum in the 700 MHz frequency band, commonly referred to as the 700 MHz spectrum or digital dividend. The actual frequency range is 694-820 MHz. This spectrum will be made available from next year due to the phasing out of analog television in Australia.

Opportunity exists for users, including telecommunications companies, to utilise part of the 700 MHz spectrum. ACMA is currently considering whether or not, and if so, how, the needs of law enforcement and emergency management are to be met in the process of allocating the freed-up [126 MHz of the 700 MHz Digital Dividend.

The Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) requires the Australia Media and Communications Authority (ACMA) to 'make adequate provision of the spectrum for use by agencies involved in the defence or national security of Australia, law enforcement or the provision of emergency services'.

The Queensland Police Service is represented in all dealings associated with the 700 MHz spectrum by the Law Enforcement and Security Radio Spectrum Committee (LESRSC) and the National Coordinating Committee for Government Radiocommunications (NCCGR). Both of these organisations have made submissions to the Australian Communications and Media Authority.

At this stage ACMA has not agreed to provide this spectrum. The collective law enforcement and emergency services community agree that 20 MHz of the 700 MHz spectrum (2 x 10 MHz) is needed for mobile broadband communications featuring high reliability and guaranteed access. Such an allocation could accommodate all present and future QPS mobile data requirements, including, video streaming, and high-speed broadband communications needs that can be used for daily operation as well as during the response phase to disasters and major public events such as New Year's Eve celebrations and international events like Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).

This nomination of 20 MHz is the same amount of the 700 MHz spectrum recently allocated to public safety agencies in the USA and Canada and is also proposed in Europe.

Media

The Queensland floods were the first time that QPS Media and Public Affairs made use of its social media channels to provide information directly to the people of Queensland. This was done in addition to more traditional relationships with mainstream media.

The QPS Facebook page quickly became one of the major sources of up to date information for both mainstream media, and the public, and “likes” jumped from about 7,000 at the beginning of December to 165,000 in the 24 hours after the Toowoomba / Grantham weather events.

At the height of the flooding crisis, the QPS Facebook page received more than 39 million story views in a 24 hour period, the equivalent of 450 views per second and updates were being provided on the Facebook page and Twitter every 10 minutes.

QPS used the Facebook page to provide the latest updates from around the State, and livestream all (with the exception of one) press conferences on the event. These conferences were viewed by up to 35,000 people per conference live, and then again thousands of times on QPS Youtube channel. The QPS also did regular digital recordings on regional updates from District police to provide people with local information.

In the same time period, police media answered about 900 calls in the 24 hour media room.

The use of social media provided the people of Queensland unprecedented access to information on developing events. People stranded on flooded roads reported watching livestreamed press conferences on the Facebook page from their smart phones rather than relying on media filtering information. This enabled the public to

access a huge amount of information on the situation/s as issues developed.

Mainstream media also reported that the use of social media dramatically improved their ability to report on the events unfolding across Queensland, and kept them abreast of the latest developments. ABC radio, which broadcast disaster information live into the affected areas, relied heavily on the information provided on QPS sites. Regional and international media were able to watch the press conferences live or on Youtube, and access vision and voice grabs for their broadcasts as needed.

Misinformation circulating on Twitter was quickly addressed and corrected by the #Mythbuster tweets which helped reduce community uncertainty and fear, and ensured these untruths did not make it into the mainstream media, or, if they did, that they were quickly removed.

The adequacy of the community's response.

Police officers operated during the flood events under a raft of legislative powers including the *Disaster Management Act 2003*, *Police Service Administration Act 1990*, *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000*, and various transport and criminal laws.

These pieces of legislation provide police with general powers which can ultimately control movement, evacuate people, enter places, commandeer equipment, destroy animals or property and the like during disasters. Generally speaking this provides sufficient powers for police to ensure the community is protected.

During the flood events police officers found that the members of the community were generally prepared (in areas where warnings were available) and that police met little resistance to advices given to the community. Police were not required to forcibly evacuate any member of the community during the mandatory evacuation phases however at times used police negotiators to defuse potentially volatile situations. In some isolated incidents, police were required to invoke legislative disaster powers and gave formal directions for person to evacuate their premises.

To date, the only area of concern regarding the community response is the ability of police to prevent community members from driving through flooded waters.

Where a roadway is affected by flooding, temporary closure of the road to vehicular traffic is achieved by the placement of an "Road Closed" official traffic sign.

Generally QPS requests local councils or the Department of Transport and Main Roads to install the official traffic sign at the flooded road. These agencies have a store of official traffic signs for the general traffic control and management of the roadways. Due to the unprecedented amount of road closures during the flood events, there were insufficient signs available. Some unofficial traffic signs were also utilised due to the large number of road closures.

Notwithstanding the presence of official traffic signage, motorists were driving through floodwaters.

The option of QPS physically manning all road blocks is resource intensive and impracticable.

Incidents of motorists driving through floodwaters are investigated and where the evidence is sufficient and the public interest warrants it, action can be taken against the person through the issuing of a Traffic Infringement Notice or commencing court proceedings. The offences that can be considered are:

Section 74 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) (TORUM)
'Contravention of official traffic sign an offence'

The essential elements to consider before commencing action in relation to this offence are:

The official traffic sign was installed by, or under authority of, the Chief Executive (Department of Transport and Main Roads), a QPS Superintendent of Traffic or the Chief Executive Officer of a local government; and

The official traffic sign (sign, marking, light of device) has been installed in

accordance with provisions of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

Police can issue a Traffic Infringement Notice (\$40 penalty) where a person contravenes an official traffic sign. Alternatively, breach action (action determined by a Court) can be taken when the circumstances of the offending behaviour warrant a more significant penalty (maximum penalty – 40 penalty units (\$400) or 6 months imprisonment).

During the event, official traffic signs were not always available to stop people from driving into flooded waterways. Without these official signs police are unable to prosecute offenders for this offence.

Section 83 TORUM 'Careless driving of motor vehicle'.

Police can take action for this offence where the offending behaviour involves a lack of care and attention or consideration for other persons using the road giving the prevailing conditions. These conditions would include matters such as type of vehicle, road type, water heights, water movement and level of danger to any person as a result of driving through the hazard. The installation of an official traffic sign is not an element to prove in relation to this offence.

Section 328A Criminal Code -'Dangerous operation of a vehicle'

Police can take action for this offence where the offending behaviour involves the operation of a vehicle in a manner which is dangerous to the public (including passengers). The installation of an official traffic sign is not an element to prove in relation to this offence.

During the flood events 9 people died as a result of vehicles driving in flooded waters. The QPS is currently considering any necessary changes that may need to occur. This includes the installation of physical barriers such as road blocks or boom gates on roadways that are prone to flooding and any necessary legislative changes.

The following précis of the QPS activity is intended to provide an overview of the response in the flood crisis.

Brief précis of ‘Response’ - per relevant police region

It should also be noted that the QPS response to flood related incidents was in addition to its day-to-day core functions and calls for service across the State. While responding to any incident including a disaster event, the QPS prioritises the allocation of its available human and physical resources based upon the following:

- Preservation of life;
- Maintenance of law and order;
- Protection of property; and
- Effective traffic management.

For ease of reference, the following overview is structured by reference to police region/district and provides a chronology of events where relevant. The below information is drawn from Situation Reports and other information provided by District Disaster Coordinators and Disaster Management Groups.

Mackay Disaster District

- The Mackay Disaster District encompasses an area of 68,479 square kilometres with a population of approximately 130,000. The district has three (3) Local Disaster Management Groups – the Mackay Regional Council, Isaac Regional Council and Whitsunday Regional Council. The Whitsunday Regional Council is the most northern part of the district covering the major population centres of Airlie Beach, Proserpine and the Whitsunday Island Group. The towns of Bowen and Collinsville are the most northern population centres in the district. Both Bowen and Collinsville are situated in the Townsville Police District. The DDCs for Mackay and Townsville have an agreement for providing assistance to the Whitsunday LDMG in times of disaster. The Isaac Regional Council covers the southern and western sections of the district. The most southerly community in the disaster district is the coastal community of St Lawrence. The most Western major population is the community of Clermont. The Mackay Regional Council is the major population base within the disaster district covering the city of

Mackay and the township of Sarina;

- Acting Superintendent Rohan Burke was the DDC and Chairperson to the Mackay DDMG for the period up until 30 January 2011. In this capacity Acting Superintendent Burke managed the response to localised flooding within the Mackay District in the months of December and January;
- On 28 January 2011, Acting Superintendent Graham Coleman commenced duty as the Mackay DDC and Chairperson to the DDMG by virtue of his appointment as QPS District Officer for Mackay Police District;
- Flooding (December 2010 - January 2011) - Minor flooding occurred in the Mackay District during the months of December and January. The extent of damage was minor in nature with roads being cut. Local government and SES were able to manage the calls for service and respond to localised flooding events. The extent of flooding was consistent with the normal rainfall events occurring in the wet season. Local government along with police and other emergency services staff were deployed to Rockhampton and Emerald to assist with disaster management operations in the Rockhampton disaster district;
- Cyclones (February 2011) - Cyclone Anthony and Cyclone Yasi affected the far northern section of the disaster district in early February 2011. Both cyclones caused only minor structural damage to awnings and sheds in the townships of Bowen and Airlie Beach. The cyclones caused a number of trees to be uprooted and minor localised flooding;
- Both the Mackay and Whitsundays LDMG activated their Local Disaster Coordination Centres and provided advice to communities potentially affected by the predicted storm surge. The Mackay Regional Council provided advice to aged care facilities on the threat posed by Tropical Cyclone Yasi. As a result of this information aged care facilities self evacuated. All issues arising from the cyclones were managed by the LDMGs with assistance provided by SES and police as required;
- The DDMG was activated on 31 January 2011 and maintained a status of leaning forward in response to both Tropical Cyclones Anthony and Yasi. The Mackay DDCC was operational from 1 to 3 February 2011;
- At 1200 hours on 30 January 2011, in response to potential threats posed by cyclone Anthony, DDC Superintendent Coleman declared a disaster situation

(district level) for the Mackay Disaster District, such declaration being subject to the approval of the Minister. At 1335 hours on 30 January 2011, Assistant Commissioner Brett Pointing, the Executive Officer, SDMG recommended this declaration be approved by the Minister. At 1415 hours on 30 January 2011, the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service approved the declaration of the disaster situation for the Mackay Disaster District. This district declaration expired at 1415 hours on 13 February 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the District level declaration (section 71 of DMA);

- In response to Tropical Cyclone Yasi, a state level disaster situation for the Mackay Disaster District was declared by the Premier at 0900 hours on 1 February 2011. This state declaration of disaster situation expired at 0900 hours on 15 February 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the State level declaration (section 71 of DMA); and
- The District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC) was activated on 1 February 2011 and operated until 4 February 2011. The primary functions of the DDCC included forward planning, resource management and information management. The Mackay DDCC provided prompt and relevant information to both SDCC and LDCC concerning the events occurring within the disaster district. Twice daily situation reports were forwarded to SDCC during formal activation of the DDCC. Other work included: preparation of district level disaster declaration paperwork; briefing preparation and participation in SDMG daily teleconferences; coordination and chairing of DDMG meetings conducted throughout the event; liaison and provision of media interviews and briefings; monitoring DDC Mackay email accounts and provision of responses where required; maintenance of situation boards, operations log and other DDCC administrative duties.

Recovery

There were no key issues identified in the recovery to the flooding or cyclone events.

Gladstone Disaster District

- Local Government reform in March 2008 resulted in the Gladstone District Disaster area encompassing two Local Disaster Management Groups – Gladstone

and Banana;

- The Gladstone Disaster District covers an area of approximately 39,065 square kilometres. The Gladstone Regional Council area, as created following local government reform, comprises an area of 10,488 square kilometres. This represents 0.6 per cent of the State's area (1,734,190 square kilometres). The area is bounded on the west, south and east by various coastal ranges and includes the whole of the catchment of the Calliope River and over 90% of the catchment of the Boyne River. The area is made of the townships of Rosedale, Agnes Water, Seventeen Seventy, Miriam Vale, Many Peaks, Tannum Sands, Boyne Island, Gladstone, Calliope, and Mount Larcom. The area includes the Capricorn Bunker group of islands, most notably Heron Island as well as Lady Musgrave and Lady Elliot Island. The Banana Shire Council area consists topographically of the Dawson and Callide Valleys included in the Dawson River Catchment areas and the Shire boundaries take in an area of 28,577 square kilometres, made up of the townships of Biloela, Moura, Theodore, Baralaba, Thangool, Wowan, Banana, Jambin, Goovigen, Dululu, Cracow, and following the reforms, Taroom;
- On 28 December 2010, Inspector Marcus Hill commenced relieving duties as the Gladstone District Officer due to the movement on promotion of Superintendent Graham Coleman from the district. By virtue of his appointment as District Officer, Inspector Hill commenced duty as the Gladstone District Disaster Coordinator on 5 January 2011 after a short transitional period prior to Superintendent Graham Coleman leaving Gladstone District;
- The Gladstone DDCC began a watching brief on 4 December 2010, maintaining a status of leaning forward in response to the initial flooding event impacting the Banana Shire. The DDC also monitored the Awoonga Dam levels in the Gladstone Regional Council area. The Gladstone DDMG formally stood up and was activated from 27 December 2010 to 17 January 2011;
- On 3 December 2010, the Banana Shire Council began experiencing minor flooding issues as heavier than expected rainfall combined with very wet land conditions caused flash flooding in the Dawson River catchment in the Taroom area. At this time, the activation status of the Banana LDCC and Gladstone DDCC was that of leaning forwarding with the LDCCs monitoring the situation;

- On 4 December 2010, the Dawson River at Taroom rose to 6.8 metres and Taroom was isolated from the north and west. At the rate of rise of the river, the township was expected to be isolated from the south. A river height of 7.5 metres had been determined as the level which water would ingress into the township of Taroom. Media releases were regularly provided for public advising of developments;
- On 6 December 2010, the Banana LDCC was considering strategies for resupply to outlying properties from Taroom as the township was isolated and inaccessible due to flood water inundation. Authorities were also monitoring levels as flood waters proceeded towards Theodore. Calls for service were adequately handled at agency level;
- On 10 December 2010, the Banana LDCC moved from the status of leaning forward to standing up to provide a coordinated response to the flood waters. No issues were encountered with evacuation or resupply. It was anticipated that response would be handled at local level with no need for assistance from DDCC unless circumstances dramatically changed. The Gladstone DDCC remained at leaning forward status;
- On 11 December 2010, the Banana LDCC reported that river levels were steady and some falling, however there was rain received in the upper catchments of the Dawson River during the day with significant rises at Utopia, Tarana, and Jundah Creek. BOM Hydrologists forecasted that the rises in Juandah Creek alone would cause the Dawson River at Taroom to rise above 7.0 metres. It was anticipated that due to this rain that levels would rise in Taroom area and may cause major flooding in the following days. During the evening, the township of Wowan experienced flash flooding, however the flood waters quickly receded;
- On 12 December 2010, there were extensive road closures in the Banana Shire due to flood waters. Road closures were also experienced in the Gladstone Regional Council area with the Fingerboard Road between Miriam Vale and Agnes Water closed. The Bruce Highway at House Creek was closed during the morning due to the heavy rain. As the rainfall was not as severe as expected in the Banana Shire, calls for service were dealt with at agency level;
- On 13 December 2010, the Dawson River at Taroom flooded 24 hours earlier than expected and at 0600 hours reached 7.1 metres and appeared to be still

rising. The highway south to Miles from Taroom was closed due to road damage. Banana LDCC later advised that flood levels were levelling out and in line with BOM predictions. Water levels were continued to be monitored especially with regards to Theodore and Baralaba and road closures still in place. Local community was kept up to date with regular media broadcasts. There were no calls for service received regarding inundation or supply issues. Banana LDCC reverted back to status of leaning forward. Situation Reports to the SDCC regarding minor flooding in the Rockhampton Disaster District ceased;

- On 16 December 2010, the Banana LDCC advised that no calls for service had been received. The Banana LDCC maintained a watching brief. Flood levels were not expected to reach threshold levels where inundation or other problems were likely to occur but the LDCC believed levels will exceed BOM prediction of 11.5 metres and may reach 12 metres in Theodore. The Awoonga Dam was at capacity but there were no immediate concern. Roads in Agnes Water and Miriam Vale began to open to traffic. The Gladstone LDCC maintained a watching brief;
- On 19 December 2010, a localised rain event in the Dawson River catchment area was expected to impact on the Banana Shire. Taroom was already experiencing rising water levels and roads were expected to be closed due to flooding during the evening. It was anticipated that flooding would increase later in the week as water systems proceed towards Taroom and Theodore. The Banana LDCC and Gladstone DDCC were at status of leaning forward and maintaining a watching brief;
- On 20 December 2010, creeks in Taroom area were still running and the Dawson River at Taroom was 6.98 metres at 0700 hours. Taroom was isolated from all directions with road closures, however the Taroom airstrip was open. Significant flows were being monitored in every creek coming into the river system and water was still rising at Taroom. Significant impact was expected on Theodore if these levels continued to rise. Taroom was expected to remain isolated for at least the day. Theodore was operating normally but significant overnight rain had heightened concerns of river heights exceed predictions which would result in prolonged isolation. It was identified that resupply issues would need to be addressed if Theodore experienced major flooding and extended isolation;

- On 21 December 2010, the road south of Taroom was opened allowing for resupply to the township. The Gladstone DDCC was in readiness for activation. A teleconference conducted with BOM predicted rain would impact the district, with the intensity of downpour dictating the extent of the impact. Southern police divisions were advised of BOM advice and of the Gladstone Regional Council responses;
- On 23 December 2010, Theodore roads were closed in all directions. Further rain was received in the area, with a prediction of 13.2 metres at Theodore on 24 December. Minor flooding was experienced in Wowan but receded with inundation in yards only, not dwellings. The Banana LDCC moved to the status of standing up as prediction raised to 13.5 metres;
- On 24 December 2010, the Theodore River was 13.33 metres with all roads in and out of Theodore closed to all traffic. An emergency supply loader worked through flood water at northern end of Leichhardt Highway, authorised by Main Roads for emergency town supplies only. The Banana LDCC commenced resupply of isolated property by air. The Gladstone LDCC coordinated a letter box drop pamphlets to residents in Benaraby, Tannum Sands, Boyne Island, Pikes Crossing and areas along Bruce Highway who may be impacted by Awoonga Dam if capacity reaches 1 in 100 year levels;
- On 26 December 2010, the Gladstone DDCC status changed to standing up. Moura was isolated by flood waters. Flood waters continued to rise and arrangements for additional police and QPS assets were also arranged to assist in the Banana Shire especially at Theodore;
- On 27 December 2010, localised flooding was experienced in southern policing divisions of Rosedale, Miriam Vale and Agnes Water. Murray Bridge was closed to all traffic isolating Rosedale to the north. Awoonga Dam levels were monitored as it exceeded capacity (2.7 metres over wall). The Wowan SES and evacuation centre were activated due to water levels impacting on the township. At 0700 hours, the Dawson River was at 13.74 metres and rising at approximately 200 mm per hour. SES tasked to evacuate a retirement village and sandbag the hospital. The majority of the community self evacuated with some staying in their homes. At this stage, 148 houses were affected by water inundation. A town meeting was conducted to make residents aware of

evacuation points in the town. Flood boats were utilised by police and SES to remove people isolated on Leichardt Highway and conveyed to the RSL Hall. A request for assistance was made for transportation by helicopter of four (4) high dependency patients from Theodore Hospital. The Dawson River at Theodore continued to rise throughout the day and into the night;

- At 0015 hours on 28 December 2010, in response to flooding in the area, DDC Superintendent Coleman declared a disaster situation (district level) for the Gladstone Disaster District, such declaration being subject to the approval of the Minister. At 0035 hours on 28 December 2010, Assistant Commissioner Brett Pointing, the Executive Officer, SDMG recommended this declaration be approved by the Minister. At 0046 hours on 28 December 2010, the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service approved the declaration of the disaster situation for the Gladstone Disaster District. A request for assistance was made for the evacuation of Theodore township. Rotary wing air assets were utilised to facilitate the evacuation of Theodore township throughout the day. Police are flown into Theodore to facilitate ground operations. 358 persons registered for evacuation in Theodore and by 1715 hours, 278 persons had been evacuated. An additional 21 persons subsequently appeared from houses who had not been registered. Evacuation operations ceased for the night and were resumed in the morning. The township of Baralaba lost telephone contact. Wowan advised that flood waters receding and four (4) residences inundated. Access to Rockhampton to the north was still available. Gladstone Area Water Board Emergency action plan 1.2 activated as the Awoonga Dam spillway exceeded 4 metres. The townships of Agnes Water, Baffle Creek and Rosedale areas were isolated by flood waters;
- On 29 December 2010, evacuation operations were completed. Police remained in the township of Theodore to secure properties and monitor the situation. Formal direction given to seven people who refused to evacuate. In the Banana LDCC, the townships of Baralaba, Jambin, Taroom, Theodore, Moura were isolated. In the Gladstone LDCC, the townships of Agnes Water, Rosedale, Baffle Creek, Many Peaks were isolated. The Awoonga Dam spillway height begins to recede. By afternoon discussions with Banana LDCC regarding recovery commenced to ensure that plans are in place when waters receded to

facilitate repatriation of community as soon as possible. The numbers of people located at evacuation centres are as follows: 11 to Biloela Settlers Motel, 19 to Moura Van Park, 170 to Dawson Village (Anglo Coal Facility), 67 to Moura Motel, 79 relocated to private residences in Moura at their request, 1 relocated to private residences in Moura at their request, 14 transferred from aged care facility to Biloela Hospital, 3 high dependency patients to Biloela Hospital, and 1 to Rockhampton Hospital (palliative care patient);

- On 30 December 2010, Agnes Water is no longer isolated as Fingerboard Road had been reopened to traffic. Roads within the Banana Shire and surrounding districts heavily impacted by flood waters with the majority closed. The Dawson River heights continued to rise. Police remain in Theodore to safeguard property;
- On 4 January 2011, recovery operations commence. Banana Shire Council staff, emergency and essential services personnel are conveyed into Theodore to commence conducting inspections and assessments. The sewerage treatment plant in Theodore has been switched off and the plant is isolated. Some sewage overflows and health concerns are an issue with increased water levels. Theodore remains isolated. All roads except the highway to the south of Taroom are closed to all traffic. Extensive road closures remain in place;
- On 6 January 2011, recovery operations continue with the ADF flying in a water purification plant to Theodore for the local government to commission generators for water in readiness for the return of residents over the following days. The pumps at Theodore service station have shorted out and are inoperable. The Theodore IGA shopping centre had been cleaned and ready for operation. Other buildings also operating at limited capacity due to lack of fresh water supplies;
- Due to the protracted nature of the event and the subsequent need to maintain the exercise of powers under section 77 of the DMA to ensure public safety and health of the community, an application to extend the district level disaster situation under regulation was applied for on 7 January 2011 in accordance with section 67 of the DMA. The declaration extension which was to be endorsed by the 11 January 2011 was subsequently not required due to a State level disaster situation declaration (including the Gladstone Disaster District) being declared by the Premier on 11 January 2011. The disaster situation subsequently ended on

25 January 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the State level declaration (section 71 of DMA);

- The Gladstone DDCC began a watching brief on 4 December 2010 with a leaning forward status through the initial flooding event impacting on the Banana Shire, maintaining regular contact with the LDMG;
- During this period the Banana Shire Council LDMG stood up on 10 December 2010 and reverted back to leaning forward status on 13 December 2010. The Banana LDMG maintained their watching brief until 24 December 2010 when they stood up again primarily in relation to flood water heights impacting on Theodore;
- The Gladstone LDCC maintained a watching brief and only activated on 28 December 2010 for the one day in response to the predicted rainfall for the catchment and its expected impact on the Awoonga Dam height levels which were already exceeding capacity and nearing the 1 in 100 year level;
- The Gladstone DDCC maintained their watching brief and maintained contact with the Gladstone Regional Council and Banana Shire Council throughout the event and formally stood up on 27 December 2010 and stood down on the 17 January 2011;
- The primary functions of the DDCC included forward planning, resource management and information management. In particular, the DDCC provided prompt and relevant information to both State and Local Disaster Coordination Centres concerning the flooding events occurring within the Gladstone Disaster District, facilitated the implementation of operational decisions of the DDC, and coordinated, allocated local and state resources in support of the local government responses;
- Situation reports were forwarded to the SDCC both during and prior to formal activation of the DDCC. A total of 24 DDCC situation reports were completed in relation to the flooding event; and
- The DDCC facilitated the receipt and processing of RFAs from LDCCs. A total of 34 RFAs were received from the Banana LDCC. Although the event also affected the Gladstone Regional Council area, the calls for service in that area and resupply issues dealt with at an agency level with assistance from local police in Gladstone, Tannum Sands, Rosedale and Agnes Water.

Longreach Disaster District

- The Longreach Disaster District encompasses the council areas of Longreach Regional Council, Blackall Tambo Regional Council, Barcaldine Regional Council, Winton Shire Council and Barcoo Shire Council;
- Inspector Michael Keys was the DDC and Chairperson to the Longreach DDMG for the period to 30 January 2011. In this capacity Inspector Keys managed the response to localised flooding within the Longreach District;
- Flood inundation occurred to 95% of the township of Jericho on 24 December 2010 and again on 27 December 2010; 70% of the township of Alpha on 26 December 2010; and minor flooding to the township of Barcaldine. Many outlying properties were also flooded during the period;
- Evacuations were undertaken to the entire town of Jericho and most of Alpha that lasted 9 days;
- The DDMG was activated on 26 January 2011; and
- At 1810 hours on 27 January 2011, in response to flooding in the Longreach Disaster District, DDC Inspector Keys declared a disaster situation (district level) for the Longreach Disaster District, such declaration being subject to the approval of the Minister. At 0046 hours on 28 January 2011, the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service approved the declaration of the disaster situation for the Longreach Disaster District. This district declaration of disaster situation expired on 4 February 2011.

Rockhampton Disaster District

- Local Government reform resulted in the Rockhampton Disaster District having three Local Disaster Management Groups – Rockhampton, Central Highlands and Woorabinda. The Rockhampton Disaster District covers an area of approximately 75,090 square kilometres, extending from a point just south of St Lawrence (in the north) to a point just south of Marmor, to the Drummond Range west of Anakie and to the east including off shore islands;
- Acting Superintendent David Peff was the DDC and Chairperson to the Rockhampton DDMG commencing on 27 December 2010 and was the DDC for the duration of the disaster declarations up until 31 January 2011 when Acting

Superintendent Van Saane took over. The Deputy Chairperson for this event was Inspector Peter Flanders from Mackay District for the period 30 December 2010 to 10 January 2011;

- On 31 January 2011, Acting Superintendent Ron Van Saane commenced duty as the Rockhampton District Disaster Coordinator and Chairperson to the DDMG by virtue of his appointment as District Officer, Rockhampton;
- The Executive Officer to the DDMG was Senior Sergeant Rebecca Martin who was formally appointed on 8 November 2010;
- The Rockhampton DDMG stood up on 28 December 2010. The Central Highlands LDMG activated on 27 December 2010 and the Rockhampton LDMG activated on 28 December 2010. The Woorabinda LDMG did not formally activate during this event;
- At 0900 hours on 29 December 2010, in response to flooding of the Disaster District, DDC Acting Superintendent Peff declared a disaster situation (district level) for the Rockhampton Disaster District, such declaration being subject to the approval of the Minister. At 0935 hours on 29 December 2010, Assistant Commissioner Brett Pointing, the Executive Officer, SDMG recommended this declaration be approved by the Minister. At 1412 hours on 29 December 2010, the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service approved the declaration of the disaster situation for the Rockhampton Disaster District;
- Due to the protracted nature of the event an application to extend the district level disaster situation under regulation was applied for on 4 January 2011 in accordance with section 67 of the DMA. The declaration extension which was to be endorsed by Executive Council on 11 January 2011 was subsequently not required due to a State level disaster situation declaration (including the Rockhampton Disaster District) which was declared by the Premier at 1012 hours on 11 January 2011. The State level declaration was made due to continued flooding and expected rainfall across a large area of the State. The disaster situation subsequently ended on 25 January 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the State level declaration (section 71 of DMA);
- On 3 December 2010, heavy rain caused flashing flooding in the Gemfields and other areas of the Central Highlands. The localised flooding event was caused by the heavier than expected rainfall combined with very wet land conditions. The

Nogoa River was 9.2 metres and rising. Sections of the Capricorn Highway west of Duaringa were closed along with the Bruce Highway at Marlborough;

- By 6 December 2010, many of the main highways in the Central Highlands area were inaccessible due to flood water inundation. Rolleston was isolated due to rainfall during the preceding days. At Rockhampton, the Fitzroy River was 4.8 metres and falling and Fairbairn Dam was steady at 1.87 metres over the spillway;
- On 10 December 2010, forecasted rainfall of up to 100mm was expected across Central Highlands and Capricornia. The Fitzroy River was 6.06m and rising slowly;
- On 11 December 2010, the Rockhampton Local Disaster Coordination Centre was activated, operating from 1200 hours to 1700 hours and on 12 December 2010 operating from 0900 hours to 1700 hours to manage public enquiries. The forecasted rain event over the weekend left the Central Highlands area relatively unscathed and the Central Highlands Local Disaster Management Group continued recovery operations;
- On 13 December 2010, the Rockhampton City river gauge was at a height of 7.15 metres (minor flood level). Rockhampton LDMG met at 0800 hours and decided the LDCC would not be activated at that stage;
- On 15 December 2010, the Central Highlands LDMG continued with recovery arrangements. The Rockhampton City river gauge was 7.55 metres and steady. BOM maintained predictions of a peak up to 7.8 metres (moderate flood level) at the Rockhampton gauge was probable by 16 December 2010 with levels remaining at above 7 metres until at least 21 December 2010;
- On 16 December 2010, the peak was reached at a level of 7.65 metres. DDMG situation reports to the State Disaster Coordination Centre regarding minor flooding in the Rockhampton Disaster District ceased;
- On 27 December 2010, the Central Highlands LDMG activated with the LDCC operating for 24 hours a day due to the Fairbairn Dam being 1.92 metres over the spillway. A minor flood level of 3.3 metres at Fairbairn Dam and 14 metres in Emerald was expected during the next 72 hours. These levels did not include forecasted heavy rainfall over the next 24-48 hours. The Fitzroy River had already reached minor flood level and was at 7.2 metres. Flooding predictions

- for the Fitzroy River continued to be monitored by the Rockhampton LDMG;
- On 28 December 2010, the DDMG moved from alert status and stood up. Four requests for assistance were received from the Central Highlands LDMG. Predictions indicated the Nogoa River would reach 14.5 metres by late Wednesday 29 December 2010, which would cut the Vince Lester Bridge in Emerald. Floodwaters in Rolleston area appeared to be the highest on record. The Comet River was expected to close the Capricorn Highway mid-afternoon and possibly the railway line. The Nogoa River continued rising with a predicted flood height of 4.5 metres over the spillway at Fairbairn Dam. The Vince Lester Bridge was likely to close at around 1800 hours on 29 December 2010. Fairbairn Dam was currently 2.32 metres over the spillway. The Rockhampton LDMG was activated at 0800 hours. Significant rainfall in the Mt Morgan area had created flash flooding overnight. The Rockhampton City river gauge was 7.75 metres and rising. BOM predictions indicated the Fitzroy River would reach 8 metres at the Rockhampton Gauge later that week and would continue rising. Major flood levels (of 8.5 metres) were possible early the following week;
 - On 29 December 2010, the DDMG met at 1300 hours. The Premier, Minister for Police and Corrective and Emergency Services, Deputy Commissioner Stewart and Honourable Robert Schwarten attended the DDMG meeting. The Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Services signed the Disaster Declaration for the Rockhampton Disaster District including the Woorabinda Aboriginal Shire Council, Central Highlands Regional Council and Rockhampton Regional Council at 1412 hours. The Fairbairn Dam was projected to reach 5 metres over the spillway. The Nogoa River was due to peak at Emerald at midday on Friday, 31 December 2010. The Vince Lester Bridge was expected to be cut at 1700 hours. The rail bridge from one side of Emerald to the other would be cut by midday Friday, 31 December 2010. Emergency Alert messages were distributed. Central Highlands LDMG continued modelling and planning based on flood levels 300 mm greater than the 2008 flood. Two evacuations centres had opened at the Agricultural College and Town Hall. BOM predicted major flood levels in excess of 8.5 metres and up to 9 metres were expected early the following week at Rockhampton. At 9 metres, 150 homes were expected to be inundated and over 1,000 houses impacted by yard

water;

- On 30 December 2010, three evacuation centres were established in Emerald. The Central Highlands LDMG were in the process of setting up two (2) further evacuation centres at schools on the western side of the river. At least 2,500 people were expected to be evacuated based on currently modelling. Current predictions indicated at least 80% of the town would be impacted by water at varying levels. Emerald consists of approximately 13,000 to 14,000 people but it was unsure how many people were actually in town over the holiday break. At that stage there were no concerns with utilities - power, sewerage and water. Rail across Nogoa River had closed at approximately 0800 hours that morning. Road access was open north to Capella for 4WD and high vehicles. The airport was still open and was not likely to be threatened. Central Highlands LDMG were expecting a peak of 16.2 metres;
- In Rockhampton an evacuation centre at Central Queensland University was being established and would be advertised to the public from 31 December 2010. This facility could hold 600 people comfortably and up to 1,200. Current predictions were indicating a 9.4 metres or higher height for the Fitzroy River. Road access to the airport would be restricted at 8.5 metres and the airport would be closed at 8.6 metres. Alternate sites for helicopter landings were identified for when the airport closed;
- On 31 December 2010, the Nogoa River peaked in Emerald at 16.05 metres. Fairbairn Dam peaked at 5.65 metres over the spillway. All roads in and out of the Central Highlands region were closed. Approximately 80% of buildings in Emerald were inundated in some way. There was approximately 100 mm of water through Woolworths Supermarket and the hospital was evacuated. The Rockhampton LDMG was planning for a 10 metres plus flood and mapping for 10.5 metres. The group planned for evacuations and a lengthy period of isolation. Weather was expected to deteriorate over the weekend producing showers and some isolated thunderstorms which would not impact on river levels;
- On 1 January 2011, the Nogoa River had dropped to 15.7 metres. The spillway at Fairbairn Dam had dropped 13 cm from its peak. Water over Vince Lester Bridge has dropped 10 cm from its peak. The total number of people in

evacuation centres was 508. Increases in evacuations were not expected at this stage. Approximately 1,000 houses suffered inundation at various levels. Approximately 3,000 houses had water in their yards. 100% of industrial properties had suffered partial or full water inundation. The Fitzroy River was 8.5 metres and was expected to be 9.4 metres by Wednesday 5 January 2011. The Bruce Highway south closed at 1940 hours to all traffic. There were 16 persons in CQU evacuation centre and the airport ceased general and passenger movements as at 1430 hours. The airport remained available for emergency air operations. Floodwaters were moving quickly into flood plains surrounding Capricorn Highway;

- On 2 January 2011, Central Highlands LDMG began to assess the damage as floodwaters receded. A 250 metre washout was evident on the western approach to a railway bridge which would require a substantial amount of restorative work before the railway bridge line would be serviceable again. QR National advised the line was predicted to be opened within 48 hours of waters receding. The Vince Lester Bridge was inspected and it was considered to be able to be opened the following day with a weight limit and only a limited number of vehicles being able to cross at any one time. The Dawson River on Capricorn Highway was still 3.2 metres over bridge with the peak still expected. The Fitzroy River was currently at 8.7 metres with the Bruce and Capricorn Highways closed at the Yeppoon Roundabout with 500 mm of water over the road surface. The Bruce Highway north was open, having 900 mm clearance. The airport was closed with the secondary runway half covered with water and the main runway having water at both ends. The airport was anticipated to be closed for up to 3 weeks;
- On 5 January 2011, the Central Highlands area had moved well into clean up and recovery operations. The Central Highlands LDCC had now deactivated. There were still 224 persons in evacuation centres overnight and the Central Highlands LDMG were monitoring resupply in outlying areas. The Fairbairn Dam spillway had reduced to 1.92 metres. The river level at Emerald was 11.2 metres. A severe weather warning was issued at 1110 hours for heavy rainfall leading to localised flash flooding and potentially worsening the existing river flood situation for areas of Queensland. The Fitzroy River peaked at 9.2 metres and the Bruce Highway south remained closed but the northern highway remained

- open. There were 97 persons in the CQU evacuation centre;
- On 7 January 2011, there were 61 persons in Emerald evacuation centres. Rail access to Emerald was delayed for some time due to significant damage to rail lines. Capricorn Highway Emerald to Dingo was open. The road from Emerald north to Capella and beyond were open. Resupply of rural properties in the Duaringa and Dingo localities was continuing under the direction of EMQ. In Rockhampton, water levels remain high (9.15 metres) with levels predicted to exceed the major flood level of 8.5 metres for up to seven days. The Bruce Highway north remained open. Major General Michael Slater attended Rockhampton for a tour of the area with Mayor Carter;
 - Five days later, on 12 January 2011, the Fairbairn Dam had dropped to 1.02 metres above the spillway. There were still 36 persons in the remaining evacuation centre at the Agricultural College. Transport and Main Roads Department were undertaking repairs to the Dawson River Bridge on the Capricorn Highway east of Duaringa and expected the bridge to open by midday. The Fitzroy River had dropped to 8.9 metres;
 - The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin front page article, 'Where will our food come from', caused renewed bouts of panic buying of food and fuel in Rockhampton. Panic buying created some resupply issues for local stores in Rockhampton, Gracemere, Yeppoon and Mt Morgan;
 - On 14 January 2011, the Central Highlands was in full recovery mode and the cleanup was continuing. The Fitzroy River had dropped to 8.5 metres at 1300 hours and the Bruce Highway south at Yeppen Crossing was opened to all traffic at 1600 hours. The airport was expected to open from 24 January for emergency services and fully operational by 28 January;
 - On 16 January 2011, there were 29 persons in Agricultural College evacuation centre. The evacuation centre cease operations with rental accommodation and other facilities around Emerald sourced for all remaining evacuees. The Capricorn Highway at Gracemere remained closed until repairs could be completed to road surface;
 - On 17 January 2011, the final response Situation Reports were completed with two (2) recovery situation reports completed on 18 and 19 January 2011. In Emerald a total of 1,060 residences had floorboard inundation. Clean up and

recovery operations are continuing in each local government area;

- The DDCC was activated on 28 December 2010. The primary functions of the DDCC included forward planning, resource management and information management. In particular the DDCC facilitated the implementation of operational decisions of the DDC, coordinated allocated local and State resources in support of the local government responses, and provided prompt and relevant information to both State and Local Disaster Coordination Centres concerning the flooding events occurring within the disaster district. Daily situation reports were forwarded to SDCC both during and prior to formal activation of the DDCC. A total of 33 DDMG situation reports were completed in relation to the flooding event;
- The DDCC facilitated the receipt and processing of RFAs from LDMGs. A total of 24 RFAs were received from Central Highlands LDMG. Fifteen RFAs were received from Rockhampton LDMG and 4 RFAs were addressed in the Woorabinda LDMG area; and
- Other work included (but is not limited to): preparation of district level disaster declaration paperwork; briefing preparation and participation in SDMG daily teleconferences; coordination and chairing of DDMG meetings conducted throughout the event; preparation of dot point briefings as requested; liaison and provision of media interviews and briefings; monitoring DDC Rockhampton email accounts and provision of responses where required; status reports to DDMG members; liaison with EMQ regarding Resupply issues; and maintenance of situation boards, operations log and other DDCC administrative duties.

Roma Disaster District

- The Roma Disaster District boundaries are aligned with the following Police Divisions: North:- Injune division; West :- Mungallala division; East:- Yuleba division; South:- Mungindi, Dirranbandi and Bollon divisions. Inside these boundaries are the following townships: Roma, Mitchell, Surat, St George, Thallon and Wallumbilla. Note that the following divisions whilst in the Roma Police District come under the following DDC areas: Taroom division comes under the Banana Shire Council; Dulacca, Miles, Condamine and Wandoan divisions come under the Western Downs Regional Council;

- The DDMG consists of Chairperson (DDC), Inspector Roger Whyte (at the time: Inspector Mark Stiles); Deputy DDC, Senior Sergeant Jim Fenton; and Executive Officer, Sergeant Rusty McKee; Maranoa Regional Council –LDMG Chair Stephen Mow and Robert Loughnan; Balonne Shire Council – LDMG chair Scott Norman, Steven Mizen and Donna Stewart;
- The DDMG was activated on 27 December 2010 and the Disaster Situation was declaration at 0046 hours on 28 December 2010. The declaration expired at 10.12 am on 11 January 2011;
- Heavy rains in the Roma Disaster District catchment area in March 2010 had local creeks and water ways and dams full. The December 2010/January 2011 rains added to these levels. Heavy rain that fell in the Warwick, Toowoomba, Dalby and Chinchilla areas flowed into the Condamine River system. This river makes it way west through the towns of Condamine then changes name to the Balonne River as it passes through Surat and down to St George and Dirranbandi;
- The March 2010 Roma monsoonal flooding event was a much more emergent and dynamic event which tested local resources. Lessons learnt from the debrief of that event allowed police and LDMGs to polish their responses and respond to the December/January event in a much more effective and timely manner;
- The Roma DDC was operational on 2 January 2011, processing RFAs from both the Balonne and Maranoa LDMG and providing daily Situation Reports to the SDCC. Regular meetings were held with DDMG members who provided updated information on flood mapping and possible inundation areas. This allowed for prior warning on evacuations and the placement of resources where needed;
- Information provided daily from the BOM on river heights as the water made its way west allowed the LDMGs to predict flood heights in their respective community. This information was provided to the DDC and allowed for prior planning in the response to the arrival of the water; and
- The response to this event extended over a number of weeks due to the slow movement on the main body of water. Surat was the first division to be inundated with minimal disruption to the community. St George residents had approximately 7 days to build levy banks to protect dwellings and infrastructure.

Dirranbandi was protected by a levy bank which was built around the entire town. This community remained isolated for approximately 6 weeks.

Recovery

Recovery centres were established in both St George and Surat with support provided by Red Cross and Department of Communities. All communities within the disaster district were resupplied with adequate food, water, insect repellent and medical supplies in a timely manner. Once the flood waters receded, all communities returned to business as usual.

Warwick Disaster District

- The Warwick Disaster District is quite diverse and comprises the major provincial cities of Warwick, Stanthorpe and Goondiwindi. The District's total land mass is approximately 27,780 square kilometres. A significant portion of the Warwick Disaster District borders New South Wales. The main features of the District is that five Major Highways traverse the District these being the Cunningham Highway, New England Highway; Leichardt Highway, Gore Highway and Barwon Highway. All highways are single lane carriage-ways in each direction. There is a rail line running between Toowoomba through to Talwood within the Warwick District. Light aircraft airstrips are located at Warwick, Stanthorpe and Goondiwindi. There are restrictions on the types of aircraft which each strip can accommodate;
- The DDMG consists of: Chairperson and DDC, Inspector Greg Morrow; Deputy DDC, Inspector Richard McIntosh; and Executive Officer, Senior Sergeant Andrew Grafton. DDMG Members included Southern Downs Regional Council Mayor Ron Bellingham and CEO Rod Ferguson and Goondiwindi Regional Council Mayor Graham Scheu and CEO Peter Stewart;
- The DDMG activated on 11 January 2011 with a declaration of disaster situation declared at 0800 hours. A State level declaration was made at 1000 hours on the same date;
- There were two flooding episodes: 28 to 29 December 2010 at Southern Downs Regional Council area; and 10 to 16 January 2011 in the Southern Downs and Goondiwindi Regional Council areas;

- (28 to 29 December 2010) Flooding occurred in the Warwick area during this time. Small communities were isolated with evacuations occurring in Warwick and Allora. The LDMG was activated with the DDMG in a monitoring role. No requests for assistance were received from LDMG. Road closures were experienced. Two (2) evacuations centres were established in Warwick township which catered for approximately 200 persons. There was water inundation to numerous homes in Warwick; and
- (10 to 16 January 2011) Wide spread flooding occurred throughout the Warwick District in particular in Stanthorpe, Warwick, Texas and Goondiwindi townships. Both Regional Council LDMGs were activated. DDMG found it difficult to meet together due to the isolation however DDC maintained contact and closely monitored events and LDMG activities. Evacuations occurred in each of these centres. River rises caused inundation to numerous homes and properties in each of these communities to various degrees. No injuries or loss of life was experienced. A small number of requests were processed through the DDCC from Goondiwindi Regional Council LDMG.

Dalby Disaster District

- The Dalby Disaster District is contained within the operational area of the Dalby Police District. The Dalby Disaster District encompasses an area of 32,145 square kilometres with a population of approximately 43,000. The Dalby Disaster District is contained within the operational area of the Dalby Police District. The area includes the police divisions of Bell, Dalby, Cecil Plains, Chinchilla, Cooyar, Jandowae, Meandarra, Millmerran, Peranga, Tara, Warra and Yarraman. The District comprises the local authorities of Dalby Town, Wambo, Chinchilla, Tara, and Millmerran Shires. It also takes in part of the Rosalie Shire which is within the Toowoomba Disaster District;
- The DDMG consists of Chairperson and DDC, Inspector Michael Bianchi; Deputy DDC, Senior Sergeant Simon Chase; and Executive Officer, Sergeant Mark Collier. The Western Downs Regional Council Chairperson is Phil Berting. It should be noted that there is only one LDMG in the Disaster District;
- The DDMG was activated on 27 December 2010. A declaration of disaster situation declared at 1246 hours on 28 December 2010. The declaration expired

at 1012 hours on 11 January 2011;

- The DDCC activated and operated from Dalby District headquarters, staffed by DDC, Executive Officer, Deputy Executive Officer and administrative staff. The LDCC activated and operated from Western Downs Regional Council office, with local emergency co-ordination centres at council offices in Chinchilla, Miles and Tara; and additional emergency response staff (QPS, QAS, QFRS and SES) provided from other districts;
- The main events that took place in this period included: Flooding in Myall Creek, Dalby, causing major house and business inundation on two occasions; Flooding in Charleys Creek, Chinchilla, causing house and business inundation on two occasions; Flooding in Condamine River, Condamine, causing major evacuation of the township and house and business inundation on two occasions; Significant damage to Western Downs Regional Council infrastructure, including Dalby water treatment plant, roads and bridges;
- Brief overview of work conducted in the district during disaster include: response to inundations in the towns of Dalby, Chinchilla and Condamine on two separate occasions; response to inundations in towns of Warra and Jandowae on one occasion; and resupply of rural properties in the Dalby, Tara and Chinchilla areas; and
- On 30 December 2010, Western Downs Regional Council advised that damage had been caused to the Dalby water treatment plant due to inundation of water. Emergency supplies were sourced from Red Cross Water Treatment facility and water was also transported by tanker from Oakey, Jandowae and Bell. The pressure to the town water supply was halved to reduce usage. It was assessed that the Council had access to 3 days of water at current usage before becoming critical. Repairs to the water treatment plant were to take one week to rectify depending on damage to electrical components and other damage. Convoys of trucks carrying water were used and the necessary repairs were affected.

Toowoomba Disaster District

- The Toowoomba Disaster District is classified as subtropical/temperate, with most of the rainfall occurring in the summer months. The Great Dividing Range dissects the District. Agricultural areas to the east of the district such as Gatton

and Laidley are described as alluvial forest plains and are subject to flooding by run-off from the mountain ranges. This consequential flooding can adversely affect the population in these areas;

- Toowoomba City and areas to the west of the Great Dividing Range differ in geography from mountainous, heavy rain forest, through black soil plains and basalt uplands. These areas are subject to localised flooding from time to time, however the impact on local populations is less severe. The district is subject to bushfires and storms including hail storms – normally during the hotter months;
- The district is serviced by three main roads namely the Warrego, New England and Gore highways. The Warrego Highway bisects the district laterally. The New England Highway links the northern and southern parts of the district. The Gore Highway links Toowoomba City with the districts west. Local and interstate traffic including heavy transport vehicles travel through the city of Toowoomba. A railway freight line connects the western parts of the state with the south east corner with lines running through the district. Freight can include dangerous goods including fuels, fertilizers and other chemicals;
- The Toowoomba DDMG boundary is comprised of the Toowoomba and Lockyer Valley Regional Council areas;
- The DDMG consisted of Chairperson and DDC, Superintendent Andy Morrow; Deputy DDC, Inspector Brett Schafferius performing DDC role during December 2010 and January 2011 as Acting Superintendent DDC. Members include Lockyer Valley LDMG Chair, Steve Jones (Mayor); and Toowoomba LDMG Chair, Noel Strohfeld (Councillor);
- The DDMG activated prior to 10 January 2011, with the DDMG leaning forward. Activation occurred on 10 January 2011 ending at midnight 9 February 2011;
- On 27 and 28 December 2010, flooding was experienced in the Lockyer Valley and western parts of the Toowoomba LDMG area. No evacuations were required in the Lockyer Valley, however substantial road and bridge infrastructure damage was recorded. A total of 3 residences were evacuated in the Millmerran, Pittsworth and Cecil Plains area. Again, substantial road damage was recorded;
- A State level Disaster Declaration was declared by the Premier on 11 January 2011 effective until midnight on 25 January 2011. A further Disaster Declaration was declared by Acting Superintendent Schafferius, Toowoomba DDC

- commencing at 0001 hours on 26 January 2011 until midnight 9 February 2011;
- On the afternoon of 10 January 2011, very heavy rainfall was experienced in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley. This caused major flash flooding in Toowoomba CBD which is within the Toowoomba LDMG area. Two people were drowned during this event;
- On the same date, as a result of this rain event, major flash flooding was also experienced in areas of the Lockyer Valley including Spring Bluff, Murphy's Creek, Postman's Ridge, Withcott, Helidon and Grantham. As a result of the flooding 19 people have been found deceased. A further 3 persons cannot be located and it is believed that they are also deceased;
- The deceased and missing were from: 2 at Toowoomba; 1 at Brymaroo; 2 at Spring Bluff; 2 at Murphy's Creek; 2 at Postman's Ridge; 1 at Helidon (still missing); and 12 at Grantham (10 located deceased and 2 still missing);
- Heavy rain continued to fall on the evening of 10 January 2011 and morning of 11 January 2011. This created further flooding in the Lockyer Valley. Approximately 270 people were evacuated by helicopter from Forest Hill. A further 700 evacuations to centres in Laidley were recorded on the same day;
- Flooding also occurred in Oakey Creek resulting in 49 evacuations from Oakey and Jondaryan. Approximately 1,118 homes and businesses were inundated. Approximately 820 motor vehicles were washed away/destroyed during the events on 10 January 2011;
- On 11 January 2011, evacuations occurred in Forest Hill, Laidley, Oakey and Jondaryan;
- Following the event, the township of Grantham was sealed by police until Tuesday 18 January 2011 to allow for the searching for victims of the flooding. Major recovery efforts have occurred and continue to occur in the Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba areas;
- Air rescue operations were severely hampered by heavy rain and fog on the Toowoomba Range on 10 January 2011 and in the Lockyer Valley on 11 January 2011. This resulted in no air assets being able to fly for periods when they were needed;
- Initial response was focused on the rescue of persons within the Toowoomba CBD. This was quickly expanded to incorporate search and rescue operations

within the areas of Spring Bluff, Murphy's Creek, Postman's Ridge, Withcott, Helidon and Grantham on the afternoon and evening of 10 January 2011;

- Air assets were requested and accessed to assist in rescue and evacuation operations. Assistance was also sought and provided by QPS Special Emergency Response Team and QPS Public Safety Response Team, SES, QFRS and other section and organisations.;
- A Major Incident Room was established at Southern Region Office to coordinate all facets of the search and recovery operations also encompassing a missing persons section;
- A Police Forward Command Post was established at the hardest hit centre of Grantham as the command centre for the search operation. Defence Force personnel, police and SES conducted the search over a three week period to recover deceased persons. This search is continuing in a targeted capacity;
- The town of Grantham was restricted to emergency services only during the early stages of the search operation with residents being permitted to return once the township was cleared on 18 January 2011;
- The town remained closed to the general public through road closures pending the finalisation of the search operation. A permanent 24 hour police presence was maintained in the township with the assistance of the AFP in conjunction with police personnel from Toowoomba and Gatton. This police presence will continue in a modified form for the next 6 months; and
- Regular briefings were held with the affected community through appointed liaison officers of commissioned officer rank. Essential services and counsellors were represented in temporary demountable buildings and offices within Grantham, Helidon and Gatton.

Ipswich Disaster District

- The area administered by Ipswich Disaster District covers an area of approximately 5,705 square kilometres, consisting of the local government areas of Somerset Regional and Ipswich City Councils. There are some anomalies between the Ipswich Police District and the Disaster District. The northern areas of the Somerset Regional Council include a significant portion of the North Coast Police Region including the Kilcoy and Moore Police Divisions. The Southern

Divisions of the Ipswich Police District including Harrisville, Kalbar and Boonah are within the Scenic Rim Regional Council which is included in the Logan District Disaster area. The suburb of Karana Downs located in the police division of Karana Downs in the Ipswich Police District is within the Brisbane City Council area and therefore in the Brisbane Disaster District. There are currently agreed arrangements between the DDCs of these areas to coordinate responses to events in these areas;

- The DDMG consists of Chair and DDC, Superintendent Garth Pitman; Deputy DDC, Inspector David Preston; and Executive Officer, Senior Sergeant Robert Goodger. Other members include Trevor Nardi from the Ipswich City Council (Chair of LDMG) and Graeme Lehmann of Somerset Regional Council (Chair of LDMG);
- The DDMG activated on 10 January 2011 and the declaration for a disaster situation (State level) was made at 1000 hours on 11 January 2011. The DDMG and DDCC stood down at 1200 hours on 21 January 2011;
- In the Somerset Regional Council area, significant rainfall in the Somerset Regional Council area resulted in flooding and isolation of the townships of Kilcoy, Moore, Linville, Toogoolawah, Esk, Coominya, Lowood and Fernvale. A number of properties in the Kilcoy and Moore areas were also isolated as a result of bridges being washed away during the flooding. The major feeder roads including the Brisbane Valley and D'Aguilar Highways were cut for a number of days causing significant resupply issues. Power and water supplies to all these areas were also cut with major disruptions to power caused by major poles and lines being washed away in the flooding. There were 472 homes and 22 businesses impacted by flooding in the Somerset Regional Council area. Evacuation centres were set up in Fernvale, Esk, Lowood, Toogoolawah, Coominya and Kilcoy; and
- In the Ipswich City Council area, the Ipswich area was impacted by flooding of the Bremer River and impacted by the level of water in the Brisbane River. There were 7,221 premises impacted by the flooding with over 1,000 homes inundated and 766 roads and streets impacted. An estimated 1,000 businesses and four (4) schools were also impacted. Twelve (12) evacuation centres were opened by both council and community groups with the main

evacuation/recovery centre located at the Ipswich Show Grounds. In the Ipswich City area the major impact was caused to the Ipswich CBD, Leichhardt, East Ipswich, Basin Pocket and Goodna areas.

Recovery

Somerset Region Recovery Centres were established at Lowood, Fernvale and Esk. Ipswich City Recovery Centres were set up in Goodna, Rosewood, and the Ipswich Show Grounds. The event significantly stretched the resources of the local recovery agencies and required assistance to support the community e.g. Red Cross, Life Line and Department of Communities staff. The large number of volunteers that assisted in the clean up also caused logistical issues for the Ipswich and Somerset Council, in how to direct the large number of people and resources to best effect.

North Coast Region

Bundaberg Disaster District

- The Bundaberg Disaster District encompasses the local government areas of Bundaberg Regional Council and North Burnett Regional Council. The Bundaberg Regional Council consists of several main townships being Bargara, Bundaberg City, Childers, Elliott Heads, Gin Gin, Moore Park, South Kolan, and Woodgate. The North Burnett Regional Council consists of several main townships being Biggenden, Eidsvold, Gayndah, Monto, Mt Perry and Mundubbera;
- Superintendent Rowan Bond is the Bundaberg District Disaster Coordinator and Chairperson to the DDMG by virtue of his appointment as District Officer, Bundaberg. Superintendent Bond was DDC for the duration of the disaster declarations during January 2011. The Deputy Chairperson for the Bundaberg flood event was Inspector Kevin Guteridge. The Executive Officer to the DDMG was Sergeant Grant Marcus;
- Two separate flood disaster events occurred in the Bundaberg Disaster District. The first occurred between 27 December 2010 and 1 January 2011, impacting both the North Burnett Regional Council and Bundaberg Regional Council areas. The second occurred between 12 January 2011 and 15 January 2011 and affected the Bundaberg Regional Council area only;

- On 26 December 2010, the Bundaberg District suffered damage to minor roads. Minor local flooding was experienced in the Bundaberg City but no issues of significance were experienced. In the North Burnett District, there was minor damage to roads however response was adequately addressed at a local council level. Gayndah town water supply pumps were damaged and the North Burnett LDMG attempted to source additional back up pump. Gayndah was placed on level 2 water restrictions due to the water supply issues. Health Notices were distributed due to discoloration in town water;
- On 27 December 2010, BOM hydrology modelling indicated river heights in the North Burnett area to be 50 cm to 100 cm below 'major' classifications in the following days if no further rain fell. North Burnett LDMG closely monitored this situation and prepared to respond if further rain fell and associated water levels increased. Approximately 75 properties surrounding Munduberra were isolated for approximately eight (8) days due to flooding;
- On 28 December 2010, Bundaberg DDMG activated and both North Burnett and Bundaberg Regional Council LDMGs activated as well. Munduberra was completely isolated. Gayndah required urgent medical resupply issues for outlying properties. Council and SES investigated air resupply or QAS medivacs. In Bundaberg City, Burnett River heights increased with some further evacuations occurring. The Bundaberg LDMG produced flood evacuations maps based on information provided;
- On 29 December 2010, due to increased river height forecast of 7.8 metres, further houses had to be evacuated in Bundaberg City. A formal Disaster Declaration was made for the Bundaberg Disaster District at 1050 hours on 29 December 2010. This declaration expired on 12 January 2011, though the Premier's Disaster Declaration continued past this date. Both Bundaberg Regional Council and North Burnett Regional Council regions were covered in the disaster declaration. Temporary emergency centre including QPS, QFRS, and QAS was established at the Hinkler Hall of Aviation, North Bundaberg due to the likelihood of North Bundaberg being completely isolated. The Premier and Police Minister both attended Bundaberg and viewed local evacuation centres and flood affected houses;

- On 31 December 2010, as water levels commenced to fall, a review of the recovery progress commenced. Bundaberg DDMG was still activated in stand up phase, but was expected to return to the leaning forward level sometime the following day. As a result of the direction of the Chair SDMG, the LDMG advised shopping centres that stores selling groceries and essential goods were able to open on Sunday 2 and Monday 3 January 2011. This information was provided to the public through LDMG media releases. Police undertook four (4) urgent medivacs on behalf of QAS and also delivered three (3) urgent medical deliveries. Police accompanied QAS staff to an air evacuation job due to the suspected mental condition of the evacuee;
- On 1 January 2011, the Police Commissioner and Treasurer visited Bundaberg and attended the DDMG, viewing flooded areas in East Bundaberg and Bundaberg CBD. After the Bundaberg DDCC reviewed its operations, it was determined that the status will change from stand up to leaning forward at the conclusion of the day's operations. The DDC and Deputy DDC made arrangements to travel to Gayndah and Munduberra on 2 January 2011 to meet with LDMG members and enhance situational awareness;
- By 5 January 2011, the vast majority of the North Burnett region flooding no longer existed with all major townships fully into the clean up and recovery phase. There were a number of outlining properties that are still isolated due to flooded roads but they are self sufficient and are expected to be reconnected to community in the near future. A full DDMG meeting was conducted to discuss any exceptions with regards to the response phase and also to progress the recovery phase for both regional councils and lead agencies. Both local councils are well into the recovery phase with the Bundaberg Regional Council having already compiled their recovery initiation plan. The DDMG will no longer conduct formal response meetings, however arrangements are in place for DDMG recovery committee meetings to occur. Due to the expectation of further rain and possible inundation, the Bundaberg DDCC remained in the leaning forward level (1) phase;
- On 6 January 2011, Bundaberg Mayor Piefynch returned to Bundaberg from an overseas trip and met with the DDC and LDMG members. A full briefing was provided regarding the response and current status of recovery operations.

Whilst consideration was made to request to end the disaster declaration operating for Bundaberg Disaster District, recent BOM forecasting indicated a further substantial rain event occurring over the next 4 days. In consideration of that advice, the declaration remained in place in expectation of further use of powers;

- On 8 January 2011, due to local rain overnight the Goodnight Scrub area again was isolated from the Gin Gin community. Approximately 300 people live in this area, but most are resilient and able to effect resupply using a small boat. This situation will be monitored. RFAs were processed for additional sandbags as a preparation for possible minor flooding from localized storms;
- On 12 January 2011, increased Burnett River levels in Bundaberg City commenced with minor flooding occurring in the CBD area. In the North Burnett region, parts of Gayndah and Mundubbera received minor flooding with affected property owners being advised prior to this occurring. This flooding was due to high water levels in the Burnett River from heavy rain in the upper Burnett catchment area. Both the Bundaberg Regional Council and North Burnett Regional Council are well into the recovery phase, with the majority of clean up completed. LDMG meetings were conducted in both regions, with the focus on planning and preparations for increased flooding over the next 24 to 48 hours. Due to flooding in surrounding regions, roads into Bundaberg and North Burnett Regional Councils have been cut off with resupply of food and other goods being hampered. Inquiries conducted by both regional councils identifying urgent perishable supplies required, with a request for these to be forwarded to Bundaberg DDC;
- On 13 January 2011, the parts of Gayndah and Mundubbera that received minor flooding yesterday are no longer affected due to flood levels subsiding. Some communities in this region are still isolated by flood and damaged roads. A local helicopter drop was conducted to supply food and generator fuel to properties in the Monto area. Recovery efforts, including vector control and major road repairs are re-commencing. In relation to the current flooding at Bundaberg, approximately 10 businesses were inundated and about 20 properties have external flooding. No houses have reported internal flooding at this time. Door knocks were conducted to advise affected residents prior to flooding occurring.

- Most persons affected have self evacuated. No evacuation centre has been opened. LDMG meetings were conducted in both regions, with the focus on re-supply of urgent foods. Air and road arrangements for resupply were conducted today. There were 27 semi-trailers utilized a police controlled detour around Gympie and four (4) ADF Hercules C130 aircraft drops were conducted; and
- On 14 January 2011, the Bundaberg DDMG, Bundaberg and North Burnett LDMGs were in the leaning forward (Level 1) disaster phase. By 21 January 2011, the North Burnett LDMG Recovery Committee was in place with a Recovery Plan formalized. The North Burnett LDMG is in the leaning forward (level 1) disaster phase but is expected to stand down early the next week. The Bundaberg LDMG Recovery Committee was in place with a Recovery Plan formalized. The Bundaberg LDMG is in the leaning forward (Level 1) disaster phase but will formally stand down on 24 January 2011. Planning is underway for the Queensland Governor and her husband to visit Bundaberg on 25 January 2011. The Bundaberg DDMG will remain in the leaning forward (level 1) disaster phase but following the Governor's visit will formally stand down.

Maryborough Disaster District

- The Maryborough Disaster District covers an area of some 7,125 square kilometres stretching from the east coast of Fraser Island to the Great Divide in the west. The topography of the area in the eastern section of the district is dominated by typical coastal lowlands, whilst to the west the area is flat to undulating. The dominant features of the area are the Mary River, Fraser Island and the coastal landscapes. This district incorporates Fraser Island – consisting mainly of oceanic and organic sands. The topography of Fraser Island varies from low foreshore dunes and mangrove swamps to high forested dunes in the centre. The major water supplies in the district are Lenthalls Dam and Teddington Weir. Away from the coastal area, the district is comprised of undulating plains with a combination of native bushland and farmed land;
- Maryborough and Hervey Bay are the major cities in the district with a combined population of 86,800 residents. The remaining populations are scattered through smaller towns and communities in the area. There are a number of small coastal communities such as Burrum Heads, River Heads, Maaroom, Boonooroo, Poona

and Tinnanbar. There are also permanent residential communities situated on Fraser Island. There are a number of small townships and rural communities scattered throughout the inland area. Various centres experience a dramatic increase in population at different times of the year. Hervey Bay and Fraser Island can attract up to 30,000 more residents during school holidays, whale season and the annual migration of older people from southern states;

- Superintendent Steve Wardrope was the Maryborough District Disaster Coordinator and Chairperson to the DDMG by virtue of his appointment as District Officer, Maryborough. Superintendent Wardrope was DDC for the duration of the disaster declarations during January 2011. The Deputy Chairperson for the Maryborough flood event was Inspector Daryl Powell. The Executive Officer to the DDMG was Sergeant Paul Behne who was formally appointed on 1 November 2010;
- The Chairperson for the local disaster management group is the Mayor of the Fraser Coast Regional Council Mick Kruger;
- Heavy rainfalls across the entire Maryborough Disaster District particularly the Mary River catchment required a response from the disaster management groups. Heavy rainfall during the afternoon and evening of 7 January 2011 caused initial flash flooding of the Mary River and Tinana Creek at Maryborough. As a result the southern approach to the Granville Bridge flooded, isolating the suburb of Granville. The Lamington Bridge was also inundated isolating the southern suburb of Tinana from Maryborough proper. Police were initially deployed to monitor the rising flood waters and close roads as required. The Fraser Coast Regional Council were advised and activated their Council Operation Team in an effort to action their internal flood procedures guides. The rapid nature of the flooding prevented the Fraser Coast Regional Council and other agencies to deploy assets to Granville and other outlying areas as per their emergency arrangements;
- Further rainfall in the catchment area of the Mary River during 8 January 2011 provided high water levels to enter the Mary River which gradually made its way down to Maryborough peaking at 8.2 metres on 9 January 2011. The Granville Bridge was inundated at 8.1 metres;

- An overview and summary of the impact of the flooding for the Maryborough District is as follows: Flooding caused by the Mary River isolated the suburb of Granville from late in the evening 7 to 14 January 2011. Flooding at Gympie disrupted the supply of foodstuffs in transit from the south. This led to a shortage of staple food items at all major food stores in the Maryborough District. Although a number of communities at Bidwell, Little Tinana, and along the Cooloola Coast Road were isolated, there was no widespread inundation of residences or businesses. No evacuation centres were established;
- On 8 January 2011, the Maryborough LDMG was activated. The Maryborough DDMG did not formally activate. Core members of the DDMG commenced to lean forward Level 2 disaster phase on 8 January 2011. On 10 January 2011, a DDMG meeting was conducted;
- A District level Disaster Situation for the Maryborough Disaster District was declared by the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service on 10 January 2011;
- A declaration extension was not required due to a State level Disaster Situation Declaration which was declared by the Premier at 1012 hours on 11 January 2011. The State level declaration was made due to continued flooding and expected rainfall across a large area of the State. The disaster situation subsequently ended on 24 January 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the State level declaration (section 71 of DMA);
- On 8 January 2011, the LDCC was activated. The primary functions of the LDCC included forward planning, resource management and information management. In particular the LDCC facilitated the implementation of operational decisions of the LDC. The DDC, Deputy DDC and Executive Officer maintained a presence in the LDCC and provided advice, guidance and assistance as required. The LDCC provided Situation Reports to the DDC and the DDC subsequently provided Situation Reports to the SDCC. The DDC sent a total of five (5) Situation Reports to the SDCC in relation to the flooding event; and
- Other Work Included: attending meetings with the LDMG to prepare for rises and flooding in Mary River and associated tributaries; liaising daily with the Mayor to address preparedness and response of flooding and flash flooding in various locations; liaising regularly with other DDMG members to ensure preparedness

and responses and assistance as required to LDMG; conducting regular Situation Reports to SDCC of events and projections across DDMG area; obtaining, collating, prioritising and forwarding regular requests for assistance and resupply to the SDCC; and providing regular updates to FCRC LDMG concerning police response, projected risk areas, resupply status, and recovery statistics.

Gympie Disaster District

- The Gympie Disaster District covers an area of some 23,337 square kilometres, which is broken into two distinct regions by the Jimna and Coastal Ranges. The townships of Gympie, Imbil, Kilkivan and Goomeri in the east being known as the Cooloola Region are within the Gympie Regional Council boundaries while the western region containing the Murgon, Wondai, Kingaroy and Nanango townships are known as the South Burnett and are located within the South Burnett Regional Council boundaries. Cherbourg also in the western region is within the boundaries of the Cherbourg Aboriginal Shire Council;
- Local Government reform resulted in the Gympie Disaster District having three Local Disaster Management Groups: Gympie, South Burnett and Cherbourg;
- On 24 January 2011, Acting Superintendent Steve Maney commenced duty as the Acting Gympie District Disaster Coordinator and Chairperson to the DDMG by virtue of his appointment as Acting District Officer, Gympie;
- Acting Superintendent Ron Van Saane was the DDC and Chairperson to the Gympie DDMG commencing on 7 January 2011 and was the DDC for the duration of the disaster declarations up until 24 January 2011 when the declaration lapsed. Acting Superintendent Van Saane subsequently relocated on transfer to Rockhampton and Acting Superintendent Maney took over the role as Acting District Officer and DDC for the Gympie Disaster District. The Deputy Chairperson for this event was Acting Inspector Duane Frank from Gympie District for the period 7 January 2011 to 24 January 2011. The Executive Officer to the DDMG was Acting Senior Sergeant Scott Poole who was formally appointed on 8 January 2011;
- The LDMG Chairpersons are the Mayors for each respective local government area: Gympie Regional Council, Acting Mayor Tony Perrett, South Burnett Regional Council, Mayor David Carter, and Cherbourg Aboriginal Council,

Mayor Sam Murray;

- Extreme and heavy rainfalls across the entire Gympie Disaster District required a response from the disaster management groups. Heavy rainfall on 7 January 2011 caused initial flash flooding of locations and creeks in Kilkivan, Woolooga and Goomeri areas. Those events required deployment of police and SES staff to provide assistance and rescue stranded and isolated motorists and campers;
- Further rainfall in the catchment area of the Mary River during 8 January 2011 in and around the communities of Imbil, Kandanga, Dagon and Amamoor, caused flash flooding and high river and creek levels in those communities, and provided high water levels to enter the Mary River;
- During this period, very high rainfalls in the South Burnett communities of Nanango, Kingaroy and Murgon, caused flash flooding at Nanango and a number of small communities on the fringes of Kingaroy. This rainfall also ultimately caused high rises in Krebs and Barambah Creeks, leading to total isolation of the Cherbourg and Murgon townships. These locations were isolated from 7 January 2011 to 14 January 2011;
- An overview and summary of the impact of the flooding for each of the three local authorities within the Gympie Disaster District is as follows;
- Gympie Regional Council: Flooding was caused by Mary River to Gympie, Imbil, Dagon, Amamoor and flash flooding of Wide Bay Creek at Kilkivan and Goomeri. The community was totally isolated due to the Bruce Highway being cut south at Cobbs Gully (Jackass Creek) at Kybong from 10 January 2011 to 14 January 2011. The Bruce Highway was cut north at Jane Street from 10 January 2011 to 13 January 2011 and west at Wide Bay Highway at Bells Bridge from 7 January 2011 to 13 January 2011. There were 58 persons who accessed evacuation centres;
- South Burnett Regional Council: Low level flooding and community isolation suffered at Murgon was caused by Barambah Creek and Krebs Creek. Murgon was totally isolated from 8 January 2011 to 13 January 2011. Flash flooding at Kingaroy was caused by Barkers Creek, Stuart River & Barambah Creek. Flash flooding at Nanango was caused by Meandu Creek and Sandy Creek; and closure of Blackbutt Range (D'Aguilar Highway) was due to landslide and severe erosion. There were 54 persons who accessed evacuation centres;

- Cherbourg Shire Council: Low level flooding and total isolation of community was caused by the rise of the Barambah Creek. The community was isolated from 7 January 2011 to 13 January 2011. On 8 January 2011, one female adult drowned while swimming in flooded Barambah Creek at Frank 'Big Shot' Fisher Bridge;
- On 7 January 2011, the both Gympie and South Burnett LDMG activated. The Cherbourg LDMG did not formally activate during this event;
- On 10 January 2011, the Gympie DDMG stood up and activated. The primary functions of the DDCC included forward planning, resource management and information management. In particular, the DDCC facilitated the implementation of operational decisions of the DDC, coordinated allocated local and State resources in support of the local government responses, and provided prompt and relevant information to both State and Local disaster coordination centres concerning the flooding events occurring within the disaster district;
- A District level disaster situation for the Gympie Disaster District was declared by the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Service at 1305 hours on 10 January 2011. The declaration extension was not required due to a State level disaster situation declaration (including the Gympie disaster district) which was declared by the Premier at 1012 hours on 11 January 2011. The State level declaration was made due to continued flooding and expected rainfall across a large area of the State. The disaster situation subsequently ended on 24 January 2011 with the expiration of the 14 day period for the State level declaration (section 71 of DMA);
- Once daily situation reports were forwarded to SDCC both during and prior to formal activation of the DDCC. A total of seven (7) DDMG situation reports were completed in relation to the flooding event; and
- Other Work Included: Attending meetings with Gympie LDMG to prepare for rises and flooding in Mary River and associated tributaries; Liaising daily by telephone with South Burnett Mayor concerning preparedness and response of flooding and flash flooding in various locations; Liaising daily by telephone with Cherbourg Mayor concerning preparedness and response of flooding within community; Liaising regularly with other DDMG members to ensure preparedness and responses and assistance as required to LDMG; Conducting

regular Situation Reports to SDCC of events and projections across DDMG area; Obtaining, collating, prioritising and forwarding regular requests for assistance and resupply to the SDCC; Providing regular updates to Gympie and South Burnett LDMG concerning police response, projected risk areas, resupply status, recovery statistics.

Sunshine Coast Disaster District

- The Sunshine Coast Disaster District encompasses and aligns with the Sunshine Coast Regional Council Boundaries. The southern boundary is the Beerwah Police Division and to the north, Noosa Heads Police Division which borders the Cooloolool Shire;
- Superintendent Ben Hanbridge was the DDC and Chairperson to the Sunshine Coast DDMG. In this capacity Superintendent Hanbridge managed the response to localised flooding within the Sunshine Coast Disaster District;
- The extent of the disaster in the Sunshine Coast District during the heavy rains of January 2011 was limited to moderate flooding and land slips. Major arterial roads were cut to the north and south however this was short term. Some major arterial roads within the Sunshine Coast District were also cut and there were some incidents of cars driving through and becoming trapped on the flooded roadways. Some swift water rescues were carried out on persons ignoring the dangers and entering flooded waterways and roadways;
- The work conducted in the Sunshine Coast District mainly related to the policing and monitoring of road closures. There were a small number of evacuations relating to landslips in the Buderim and Nambour areas. Police assisted in the voluntary evacuation of persons without the need to enforce special powers;
- One fatality was recorded on 9 December 2010 at Wappa Falls however this was prior to the disaster declaration in January 2011;
- The LDCC stood up on 9 January 2011. On 11 January 2011, the LDMG, DDCC and DDMG stood up. On 12 January, the DDCC, LDCC and LDMG stood down and remained on alert; and
- Recovery of displaced persons occurred within 24 hours. State and council infrastructure damage (roads) continues to be tasked through the relevant departments. No requests have been made to the DDMG.

Redcliffe/Caboolture Disaster District

- The Redcliffe Disaster District encompasses and aligns with the Moreton Bay Regional Council Boundaries;
- Superintendent Pat Ryan was the DDC and Chairperson to the Redcliffe DDMG. In this capacity Superintendent Ryan managed the response to localised flooding within the Redcliffe Disaster District;
- The extent of the disaster in the Redcliffe Disaster District during the heavy rains of January 2011 resulted in flooding of local rivers and creeks throughout the low lying areas of Caboolture, Burpengary, Morayfield, Narangba, Lawnton, Dayboro and Beachmere;
- There were 295 residences and 41 business inundated across the Moreton Bay Council Region;
- Numerous causeways and secondary bridges were washed out and there was delamination of road surfaces across Moreton Council area;
- On 11 January 2011, there were 124 evacuations across the District;
- The Redcliffe DDMG was activated from 11 to 13 January 2011; and
- No formal disaster declaration was made for the Redcliffe Disaster District. However, the Moreton Bay Regional Council was included within the Premier's Disaster Declaration of 11 January 2011.

Brisbane Disaster District (incorporates Metropolitan North and South Regions)

- The Brisbane DDMG boundary is comprised of two local government authorities being the Brisbane City and Redland City Councils. There are two police regions (Metropolitan North Region and Metropolitan South Region) within the boundary;
- As the traditional storm season approached in 2010 there were widespread predictions of significant rainfall and possible flooding events throughout Queensland. As a result, the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group underwent extensive consultation and planning with the Brisbane Local Disaster Management Group and the Redland Local Disaster Management Group for response should a significant event arise;

- Extensive heavy rainfall occurred as predicted from October 2010, with a number of instances of local flooding resulting in activations of the Brisbane Local Disaster Coordination Centre. Water levels in the Wivenhoe Dam were in excess of 100% capacity and controlled releases were conducted throughout this period. Heavy rainfall continued throughout December 2010 and January 2011 across the catchment areas for the Wivenhoe Dam as well as the Bremer and Brisbane Rivers;
- On 10 January 2011, it was determined the Wivenhoe Dam was at 140% (maximum 225% including flood mitigation compartment) and the Somerset Dam was at 150%. Both levels were rising fast and expected to continue to do so. Continued releases were required both to ensure dam integrity and for flood mitigation;
- Flood warnings were issued for the Lockyer, Bremer, Warrill and Brisbane Rivers below the Wivenhoe including the greater Brisbane area. On 10 January 2011, BOM advised a river level of 2.1 metres was expected on high tide on Tuesday 11 January 2011 and was expected to peak at 3 metres on Wednesday 12 January 2011 resulting in moderate flooding in the Brisbane area;
- The Brisbane LDMG activated the BLDCC on 10 January 2011. The DDCC was established at Police Headquarters at Brisbane and all members of the BDDMG were notified accordingly. On 11 January 2011, the Redland LDMG activated an Emergency Coordination Centre to identify hazards, coordinate support and report on current issues;
- The DDMG consisted of: Chairperson and DDC, Assistant Commissioner Peter Martin; Deputy DDC, Superintendent Brent Carter; Executive Officers, Senior Sergeants David Morganti and Darren Madgewick. Members included EMQ Acting Regional Directors, Shane Wood and Mike Shapland; Brisbane City Council, Disaster Operations Manager, Jason Cameron; and Redland City Council, General Manager Customer Services, Nick Clarke;
- On 11 January 2011, there were widespread reports across Brisbane of localised flooding and urban inundation with major roads being cut and damage to critical infrastructure. It was predicted the floodwater would potentially directly affect 8,759 premises (residential and commercial) with a further 22,000 impacted. A disaster situation was declared by the Premier;

- It was determined up to 3,500 premises may be required to be evacuated and evacuation plans were initiated including community notification for self-evacuation and establishment of evacuation centres;
- Further predictions from BOM stated the expected river peak on 12 January 2011 was 4.2 metres resulting in potential inundation for 6,500 properties;
- On 12 January 2011, floodwaters peaked as predicted presenting a number of issues including: inundation of large numbers of homes and commercial properties; numerous major arterial roads were cut; numbers of evacuees continued to rise at evacuation centres presenting resupply issues as well as provision of numerous community and welfare services; reports of compromised electricity and telephone supply; large amounts of debris in the Brisbane River;
- The flowing water presented a number of incidents requiring critical decision making including the threats from: 'The Drift' Restaurant breaking its moorings; 'The Island' barge breaking its moorings; Moggill Ferry becoming insecure; Riverside Walkway breaking its moorings; and the Dockside pontoons breaking their moorings. Each incident represented a high level potential threat to personal safety and property including critical infrastructure;
- On 13 January 2011, the recovery phase was commenced. Additional resources were engaged including Australian Defence Forces to assist in a range of areas. Coordinated resupplies were required to affected and isolated areas as well as to evacuation centres which were now holding large numbers of evacuees;
- A new priority was identified where security was now required for inundated and evacuated areas resulting in the commencement of Operation Safeguard;
- A fatality was recorded when a male person entered floodwater at Durack and was subsequently drowned;
- Consideration was given to providing emergency mooring for vessels still in the Brisbane River and actions required to re-establish shipping channels;
- Over the next several days, widespread plans for the initial clearing of affected properties and facilities were commenced. A number of issues arose including public health, clearing of roadways including major arterials, ongoing resupplies and support to evacuation centres including cash supplies for evacuees;
- The DDCC was deactivated on 16 January 2011; and

- The recovery efforts are ongoing and there were no issues in the transition process.

Although information continues to be collated by these Regions, the immense scale of the QPS operations can be gleaned from the above chronology of events and as stated earlier, police operations are still continuing in these regions.

A more detailed overview of events is contained in the Situation Reports that were completed throughout the flood event. Copies of the 'Situation Reports' have previously been provided.

D. The measures to manage the supply of essential services such as power, water and communications during the 2010/2011 flood events

While the QPS had minimal issues regarding the supply of essential services during the flood events significant discussions occurred that involved the SDC and various providers of essential services to access their infrastructure. The SDMG strongly endorsed this strategy. In many Disaster Districts there are representatives from suppliers or providers of services on the Management Group. Below are some accounts from districts regarding this issue.

Brisbane District Disaster Management Group

Telstra and Energex were engaged as key advisors to the DDMG. While decisions such as whether to isolate power to affected areas remained under carriage of Energex, the representation within the group allowed Assistant Commissioner Martin (DDC) to receive accurate and timely briefings on all outages.

Through the benefit of these networks, Assistant Commissioner Martin was in a position, as DDC, to ensure all resources of the DDMG were made available to assist the suppliers of essential services to:

- Mitigate any risks to human life;
- Provide access to affected areas for workers in essential services where required;

- Provide a safe work environment for workers in essential services where required; and
- Provide any necessary assistance to improve the reconnection timeframes for all areas.

Gympie District Disaster Management Group (Cherbourg township)

There was a real threat of water and sewerage system failures due to one of the existing pumps being washed away and destroyed by the floods, and the remaining pump requiring repair.

A RFA was received from the Cherbourg Mayor for 1 large generator suitable to power the systems, with the outcome:

- The RFA submitted for one 150kva generator;
- A generator was sourced;
- A helicopter was sourced to carry the generator into the isolated town; and
- A helicopter delivered the generator and it was installed by community electricians and plumbers.

As a result the community did not have any period without running water or working sewerage.

Ipswich District Disaster Management Group

The Ipswich DDMG includes Telstra, Energex, SEQ Water and Local Councils. As a result the DDC was able to obtain updates on threats to the essential services and options to be taken should they be lost due to the flooding event.

A major loss of power to the Fernvale area was caused by loss of major tower structures which collapsed due to flood water. Energex provided two large generators to the town as soon as possible after road access was available.

Telstra services were also significantly disrupted in the Lowood and Fernvale areas due to power loss and damage to equipment. These services were restored in a timely fashion.

Water supply to the Somerset Regional Council areas was significantly impacted however coordination through the Council and SEQ Water saw both tanker deliveries to the reservoir and bottled water supplies delivered to isolated areas by helicopter.

Toowoomba District Disaster Management Group

It was identified that the supply of water within the Lockyer Valley was likely to cease. While the Queensland Urban Utilities undertook repairs to pipelines and water plants the Lockyer Valley Local Disaster Management Group and District Disaster Management Group made arrangements for the cartage of water using local providers. The SDMG also made arrangements for Australian Defence Force (ADF) to provide additional water cartage assets.

Water cartage in the Lockyer Valley continued until Saturday 15 January 2011. On that date, the infrastructure supporting the normal water supply was restored to all but a few isolated residents who continued to receive carted water for some days.

Southern Region (remaining districts)

Ensuring the supply of essential services was managed by the District Disaster Coordinators through the LDMGs, DDMGs and requests to the SDMG. In all instances, representation and advice was sought and received from Local Council, Ergon Energy, Telstra and local water authorities.

Power

The power for each town or locality was maintained until inundation was imminent. Where power was not able to be maintained, alternative power sources (generators) were obtained and supplied at the earliest and safest possible times.

Communications

All possible precautions were undertaken to protect exchanges and communication facilities during the floods. Where this was not possible, alternative arrangements were made to ensure communications were returned to communities at the earliest available opportunity.

Water

Water treatment plants at various locations were affected by the floods. In these instances arrangements were made via LDMGs, DDMGs and requests to the SDMG to have water tankers and bottled water supplies delivered to affected communities. The ADF assisted in this regard after appropriate requests had been made.

Sewerage

Flood waters inundated several septic tanks in Condamine. Arrangements were made via the LDMG to have local contractors empty the affected septic tanks, the community equipped with personal protection equipment and advisories issued in relation to the concerns.

E. Adequacy of forecasts and early warning systems particularly as they related to the flooding events in Toowoomba, and the Lockyer and Brisbane Valleys

Brisbane Disaster District

The early warning provided to the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group by the presentation from Jim Davidson from the Bureau of Meteorology at the Commonwealth Pre-Season Briefing at Emergency Management Queensland on 12 November 2010 was of great value in planning and preparing for the coming storm season. Assistant Commissioner Martin ensured all warnings regarding the impending wet season from this briefing were delivered across both the operational environment and to all DDMG members.

The short term forecasts which followed from BOM as part of normal business were also of great benefit and overall found to be fairly accurate. The forecasts and early

warning systems made available to the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group were of benefit in the overall disaster management of the district.

Some areas across the State have cited issues with the early warning text messages that are automatically dispatched. In some areas the text messages were sent out unbeknown to Local Disaster Management Groups and District Disaster Management Groups. For example in the Cassowary Coast Region the messages were sent out unbeknown to Local and District Disaster Management Groups. Both DDMG and LDMGs received some reports that the messages caused undue concern and angst amongst the community and in particular the elderly but this could be contributed to the timing that the message was sent (in the late evening).

Another example occurred in Redcliffe. Advice was given by Bureau of Meteorology Hydrologists that an alert should be issued due to pending flooding. An Emergency Alert was issued. It is the opinion of police that the wording of the alert was too generic, ordering immediate evacuation of certain post codes. It did not contain information on current impact and safe evacuation routes. This may also be due to the fact that each message can only contain 160 characters.

Southern Region

During the events of December and January BOM made many forecasts and provided accurate warnings and predictions. The sudden and significant rainfall on 9 and 10 January 2011 and the impacts across the area were not predicted. BOM provided a warning for thunderstorms and flash flooding on 10 January for the Toowoomba area. However these types of warnings are commonplace in all parts of the State during summer and generally, even if they are heard, have limited impact. What transpired however was not commonplace. Despite the ensuing effects impacting a broader area, the weather event occurred in a reasonably confined geographical location with unique topography that includes disconnected water catchments with water courses that feed into different areas.

Local predications and planning of weather events from the Disaster Management Groups are difficult, especially without the expertise of specialists. Some planning

may have been hampered by Councils and others by not having accurate accounts of all geographical features in an area. Many small creeks and the like were not registered and so their combined impact was not easily referenced. This was especially illustrated in the flooding of the main Esk township area.

The combination of dams in and surrounding the Ipswich Disaster District (11 in total), when in overflow and/or release mode do increase water flows and potential flood height predictions. The specifics of these impacts **may** have assisted, if available, in alerting some communities in the flood plain areas.

The information in forecasts obtained from BOM was the information the Councils used to map the flood impacts. In some areas Councils were hampered in this regard. For example the Somerset Council does not have a responsive mapping capacity and Ipswich City Council has a capacity but the response timeliness is limited when under high demand.

Generally the BOM information was often provided in a large forum with numerous stake holders. The precise information needed for specific rivers, creeks, flood plains or combinations of all three was competitive in that setting.

G. All aspects of land use planning through local and regional planning systems to minimise infrastructure and property impacts from floods

Land use planning through local and regional planning systems involves a community consultation process driven by the relevant planning body. The QPS involvement is limited to this community consultation process. The QPS Property and Facilities Branch receive invitations to engage in the community consultation process. The issues generally canvassed by the Service in community consultation with land use planning bodies involve operational issues such as:

- Density - potential future demand for policing in any particular development; and
- Access – are there any design issues that impede access.

The QPS has no role in the ultimate decision making process with regard to land use planning.

Index of documents attached to
QPS

Exhibit	Description
QPS-01	Defence Assistance to the Civil Community – Policy and Procedures 2004
QPS-02	QPS Operational Procedures Manual Chapter 11.14 “Commonwealth support and Australian Defence Force assistance and aid”

4 April 2011 Submissions

'QPS-01'



Australian Government

Department of Defence

DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS (GENERAL)

Department of Defence
CANBERRA ACT 2600

16 March 2004

Amendments to Defence Instruction (General) OPS 05-1 are issued pursuant to section 9A of the *Defence Act 1903*.

R.C. SMITH, AO, PSM
Secretary

P.J. COSGROVE, AC, MC
General
Chief of the Defence Force

LIST B—ISSUE NO OPS B/2/2004

Amendment

OPS 05-1 *Defence Assistance to the Civil Community—policy and procedures*
AMDT NO 9
Complete Revision

Single Service filing instructions

This instruction should be filed as:

1. NAVY OPS 11-2
2. ARMY OPS 49-1
3. AIR FORCE OPS 1-2

Cancellation

DI(G) OPS 05-1 pages 1 to 10, annexes A to G ISSUE NO OPS B/1/92 of 9 APR 92 (AL3), annex I and appendix 1 ISSUE NO OPS B/5/2002 of 19 JUN 2002 (AL8), annex J and appendixes 1 and 2, annex K ISSUE NO OPS B/1/92 of 9 APR 92 (AL3), annex L ISSUE NO OPS B/4/2002 of 8 MAR 2002 (AL7), annex M and appendix 1, annex N and appendixes 1 and 2 and annexes O and P ISSUE NO OPS B/1/92 of 9 APR 92 (AL3) is cancelled.

Note

This is a **reprint** of the issue cover sheet only as the cancellation information was omitted. Replace with this revised issue cover sheet.

DI(G) OPS 05-1
 File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
 (ARMY OPS 49-1
 (AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
 (Complete Revision)

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY—POLICY AND PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

1. There are two distinct types of Defence assistance provided to civil authorities and organisations, namely:

- a. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC); and
- b. Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authorities (DFACA).

2. This instruction, which is sponsored by Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), addresses the policy and procedures applicable to DACC and supersedes the previous Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) OPS 05-1—*Defence Assistance to the Civil Community policy and procedures*. In addition to these instructions, the Government or the Minister may approve alternative policy or procedures in particular instances. Policy on DFACA is contained in DI(G) OPS 01-1—*Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power—Policy and Procedures*.

AIM

3. The aim of this instruction is to promulgate Australian Defence Force (ADF) policy and procedures for DACC.

POLICY

General

4. As a general principle, the provision of DACC should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. Defence resources are intended to be used for Defence purposes only. Requests for DACC may receive favourable consideration if there is no suitable alternative source of assistance particularly in instances of emergency and for other requests where worthwhile training or public affairs benefits will accrue to Defence as a result of the provision of assistance. All DACC tasks, especially Category 4 tasks, that are justified, in part or full, on their public affairs value require the active involvement of Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications (HPACC) in the decision making process. HPACC will consider relevant research and Defence priorities in the assessment of such requests.

5. Before DACC is provided, it is to be formally requested, offered and accepted. A flow chart to determine the correct DACC category assessment is in [annex A](#). In non-emergency situations, where life and/or property are not threatened, the conditions governing the provision of assistance are to be specified, the resources required accurately detailed and the recipient clearly identified. An application for non-emergency assistance is to be recorded on the pro forma provided in [annex B](#) and accompanied by the required supporting documentation. The pro forma indicates the minimum information required to process the DACC request.

6. **Guidance on classification.** The types of assistance mentioned specifically in this instruction do not constitute a definitive list of DACC tasks. Guidance from Headquarters Australian Theatre (HCAST) (J34) is to be sought by Local Commanders/Administrators if doubt exists as to the classification or category of a request for assistance.

OPS B/2/2004
16 MAR 2004

7. **Participation in advertising campaigns.** As a general rule, Defence is not to participate in commercial advertising campaigns, either by providing uniformed personnel or unique Service venues. Sponsorship by commercial enterprises may however be acceptable in some instances for special public relations activities and events, excluding those associated with alcoholic beverages or tobacco products. All requests for DACC that include involvement in advertising campaigns or activities are to be referred to HQAST (J34) for processing. HQAST will then consult with HPACC. In all cases, requests for assistance from media organisations, including producers of commercials, television programs, documentaries and films, must be referred to HPACC using the procedures in DI(G) ADMIN 17-3—*Policy and Procedures for Use of Defence Resources in Support of Public Information Activities*.

DEFINITIONS

8. For the purpose of this instruction, the following definitions apply:

- a. **DACC.** The provision of Defence resources, in response to a request for assistance, for the performance of tasks that are primarily the responsibility of the civil community or other government organisations.
- b. **Ceremonial activities.** Ceremonial activities are occasions of national or State significance such as ANZAC Day and Australia Day, where Defence has a national obligation, or is directed, to support such activities.
- c. **Defence resources.** Includes personnel, equipment, stores, supplies and facilities, and expenditure from Defence outlay on administration, personnel support, equipment operation, repair and maintenance.
- d. **Civil community.** Includes Commonwealth and State/Territory Government departments, agencies and authorities, including law enforcement agencies and emergency services, and the Australian community at large, including clubs, organisations and commercial enterprises.
- e. **Local Commander/Administrator.** Includes unit, ship, base or formation commanders of all three Services, Managers of Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centres (CSIC) and Defence Science and Technology Organisation Laboratory Directors.

9. DACC includes Defence assistance to State/Territory Governments during emergencies/disasters, for events of public significance and civil counter disaster training. DACC also includes assistance to Commonwealth or State/Territory Governments and their civil authorities in the performance of law enforcement related tasks, where there is no likelihood that Defence personnel will be required to use force. It also includes the provision of training assistance to Federal/State/Territory police forces and other Government agencies and organisations.

Note

where there is any possibility that force may be required to be used by Defence personnel, the activity is defined as DFACA.

Associated instructions

10. Additional policy documents which should be read in conjunction with this instruction are:

- a. DI(G) OPS 01-3—*Policy and Procedures for Department of Defence Response to Overseas Disasters*.
- b. DI(G) OPS 03-1—*Special Aeromedical Evacuation*.
- c. DI(G) OPS 05-2—*Flypasts and Flying Displays*.
- d. DI(G) OPS 31-1—*Provision of Support to Commemorative Activities Associated with Past Wars*.

- e. *National Search and Rescue Manual*—which provides detail on ADF support to Search and Rescue operations.
- f. DI(G) ADMIN 17-3. (Defence participation in advertising campaigns is addressed in this instruction).
- g. DI(G) ADMIN 35-1—*Procedures for the Use of Defence Estate Assets by non-Defence Organisations or Individuals Including Commercial Contractors*.
- h. DI(G) LOG 07-13—*Hire and Loan of Defence Stores and Equipment*.
- i. DI(G) PERS 28-1—*Defence Force Participation in Work Experience Programs for School Students*.
- j. DI(G) PERS 46-1—*Tri-Service Ceremonial Guards of Honour*.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE

Counter disaster and emergency assistance

11. The Australian States/Territories have Constitutional responsibility for the protection of the lives and property of personnel within their boundaries. Where a disaster is actually or potentially of such a magnitude that State or Territory resources are inadequate, unavailable or cannot be mobilised quickly, the Commonwealth accepts a responsibility for providing support when requested.

12. The principle to be applied to the provision of emergency DACC, is that the State/Territory Governments are primarily responsible for combating disasters and civil emergencies, using available State/Territory professional and volunteer services and commercially available resources. Commonwealth Government resources (including Defence assets) may be made available in situations where the State/Territory authorities are unable to react with sufficient speed, or lack the necessary resources or skills.

Categories of counter disaster and emergency assistance

13. **Category 1.** DACC Category 1 is emergency assistance for a specific task(s) provided by Local Commanders/Administrators, **from within their own resources, in localised emergency situations** when immediate action is necessary to save human life, alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent widespread loss/damage to property. Provision of DACC Category 1 assistance should not normally exceed 24 hours. The procedure for processing Category 1 requests is in [annex C](#).

14. **Category 2.** DACC Category 2 is **emergency assistance**, beyond that provided under Category 1, in a **more extensive or continuing disaster** where action is necessary to save human life or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent loss/damage to property, and when State/Territory resources are inadequate. The procedure for processing Category 2 requests is in [annex D](#).

15. **Category 3.** DACC Category 3 is assistance associated with recovery from a civil emergency or disaster, **which is not directly related to the saving of life or property**. The procedure for processing Category 3 requests is in [annex E](#).

Note

ADF procedures for assistance following disasters within Australia are also detailed in Australian Operational Concepts (AOC) SECCA and MODOS. Further information is contained in the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) sponsored *Commonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan* (COMDISPLAN) and *Australian Contingency Plan for Radioactive Space Re-Entry Debris* (AUSCONPLAN SPRED). COMAST sponsors and develops AOC. AOC are posted to the HQAST (Defence Secret Network) web site.

Defence assistance to overseas disasters

16. Policy and procedures for the provision of Defence assistance following overseas disasters are detailed in DI(G) OPS 01–3, AOC VALENT, and the related EMA *Australian Government Overseas Disaster Assistance Plan* (AUSASSISTPLAN).

NON-EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

17. Requests for DACC in other than emergency situations will normally involve the use of specialist personnel or facilities and/or the loan, hire or sale of Defence stores or equipment. When examining requests for non-emergency assistance, consideration is to be given to the following factors, particularly in the context of the policy guidelines detailed in [paragraphs 4.–10.](#) of this instruction:

- a. the possibility of competing with the private sector, which may leave Defence open to criticism;
- b. the responsibility of State/Territory/Local Governments to provide the resources in the first instance for such tasks;
- c. the possibility that DACC may be seen as a substitute for the usual avenues of funding or assistance available to non-profit organisations or Government bodies;
- d. non-profit motives of charitable organisations are not in themselves sufficient reason to support such activities;
- e. the precedent set when granting assistance, which may lead to additional requests for Defence resources;
- f. the hire out of equipment should, where appropriate, be considered on a package basis, ie the equipment should be hired with a person(s) who is trained to operate the equipment; and
- g. resource implications (these considerations are further expanded in [paragraph 28.](#))

Categories of non-emergency assistance

18. **Category 4.** DACC Category 4 is **non-emergency assistance** provided to other Government departments or authorities, to State/Territory/Local Government or other authorities or organisations, commercial enterprises, non-profit organisations, or individuals or bodies in the general community. The procedure for processing Category 4 requests is in [annex F](#). Ad hoc requests from police forces for **training** assistance are to be treated as DACC Category 4 (note that **law enforcement** assistance is DACC Category 6):

- a. **Public Events of Significance (PES) (Special Category of DACC 4).** PES program is a biannual program that is submitted to the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) for the periods January–June and July–December). The PES program may include National, State or Territory events, such as the Commonwealth Games, tattoos, displays and other significant sporting or public interest events. The procedure for processing PES tasks is in annex F, [appendix 1](#).
- b. The PES concept allows the ADF to support nominated significant events in accordance with approved guidelines and also addresses the relevant cost implications. Events included in the PES program are to be costed on a direct cost basis, unlike other DACC Category 4 tasks, which are costed on a full cost basis (see annex F, [appendix 1](#)).
- c. **Participation by Service Bands.** The procedure for processing tasks for the participation of Service Bands in DACC activities is in annex F, [appendix 2](#).

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 File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
 (ARMY OPS 49-1
 (AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
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19. **Category 5.** DACC Category 5 is **non-emergency assistance of a minor nature** which can be provided to local organisations from within the resources and authority of the Local Commander/Administrator, and which does not compromise unit effectiveness or readiness. The procedure for processing Category 5 requests is in [annex G](#). The following activities are prohibited under DACC 5:

- a. **Support to media organisations.** No support is to be provided to media organisations, including producers of commercials, television programs, documentaries and films, as DACC Category 5. In all cases, requests for assistance from media organisations must be referred to HPACC in accordance with DI(G) ADMIN 17-3.
- b. **Use of aircraft.** Aircraft are not to be used for DACC 5 tasks **except that the carriage of cargo on scheduled flights** (excluding personnel, animals and dangerous cargo) on a space available basis, is permitted, in accordance with the criteria in [annex G](#).

20. **Category 6.** DACC Category 6 is support to civil authorities in the performance of non-emergency law enforcement related tasks where there is no likelihood that Defence personnel will be required to use force. The procedure for processing Category 6 requests is in [annex H](#).

21. In addition to the general DACC tasks identified above, specific tasks are addressed in detail as follows:

- a. **Special Aeromedical Evacuation (AME) of civilians.** Procedures for AME are covered in DI(G) OPS 03-1. As special AME flights for Australian citizens normally fall within DACC Category 1 or 2, cost recovery will not normally be sought. However, AME of foreign nationals to Australia, whilst not considered to be DACC, would normally be undertaken on a full cost recovery basis as if the task was DACC Category 4.
- b. **Ship visits, ceremonial support and related Sea Day activities.** The unique nature of ship operations provides the ability to assist third parties with indirect support during the conduct of normal ship transits or deployments. Such assistance can take the form of *seariders* (Fisheries and Customs officers) and familiarisation, representational or ceremonial tasks which, given flexibility within the Fleet Activity Schedule, can be accommodated within the ship's program. Such tasks entail minor additional costs as they are undertaken on an opportunity basis and subject to operational priorities. These are not to be treated as DACC but recognised as standard maritime activities and subject to the discretion of the Maritime Commander Australia. Where doubt exists over the extent of this type of support, HCAST (J34) is to be consulted.

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY APPROVING AUTHORITIES

22. The following table details the reviewing and approving authority for DACC tasking. This is a generic guide and doubts over the DACC category or concern that the request may result in public controversy should be resolved by seeking guidance from HCAST (J34):

DACC	Provider	Reviewing Authority	Approving Authority	Remarks
1	single Service	single Service Headquarters (HQ)/COMAST	Local Commander Administrator	Reviewed after 24 hours
2	single Service/Joint	COMAST/ Director-General Emergency Management Australia (DGEMA)	Parliamentary Secretary	
3	single Service/Joint	COMAST/DGEMA	Parliamentary Secretary	

DACC	Provider	Reviewing Authority	Approving Authority	Remarks
4	single Service/Joint	single Service HQ/COMAST/ Head Strategic Operations (HSO) Division	single Service HQ/ HSO Division/MINDEF	
5	single Service	single Service Headquarters	Local Commander Administrator	
6	single Service/Joint	COMAST	Chief of the Defence Force/ Secretary of Defence COMAST	

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION

Command and control

23. Command and control of DACC Categories 1, 4 and 5 will normally be effected using the HQAST/Service chain of command. Command arrangements for DACC during emergencies/disasters, or when providing non-emergency law enforcement related assistance, are no different to any other operation. Accordingly, for Category 2, 3 and 6 DACC tasks, COMAST may either:

- a. direct the operation,
- b. direct operations through one of the Theatre Component Commanders, or
- c. establish a force under the operational command of a Joint Force Commander.

Coordination

24. ADF liaison on DACC matters with State/Territory authorities on a day-to-day basis is the responsibility of the Operations Support Staff located in the major Defence CSIC except, in the case of Northern Territory, where Commander Northern Command is responsible. COMAST (via J34 HQAST) is to be kept informed of any significant DACC tasks or issues that arise.

25. EMA coordinates the provision of Commonwealth assistance to the States and Territories following a disaster or civil emergency. EMA staff will liaise directly with HQAST when provision of Commonwealth (Defence) assistance has been requested by State/Territory authorities to ascertain whether the ADF is able to provide the necessary resources. HQAST will liaise with Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) Operations (Strategic Operations Division) who will seek the approval of the Parliamentary Secretary to MINDEF for assistance. COMAST will then advise EMA and direct and coordinate the subsequent activity.

26. ADF liaison with supported civil agencies during DACC disaster relief operations (Categories 1–3) should, where appropriate and necessary, be conducted through suitably experienced Liaison Officers deployed with contingents.

FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES

General

27. The overall approach to financial and budgetary management within Commonwealth Departments and agencies reflects the Government's commitment to a more commercial approach through recovery of costs for the provision of Government services. The cost recovery requirements for each category of DACC are described below and in [annexes C–H](#). The definitions of full, direct and additional costs referred to in this instruction are in [annex I](#). It is the responsibility of the Service Chiefs to ensure that commanders are aware of and adhere to the requirements of these instructions.

RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS

28. As DACC requires the diversion of resources from normal Defence activities, the following considerations need to be addressed when considering requests:

- a. the full costs and the budgetary effects of providing DACC;
- b. the effect on Defence operational and training commitments and programs;
- c. the basis and application of cost recovery;
- d. the circumstances in which cost recovery variation or waiver may apply; and
- e. the protection of the Commonwealth (by the provision of indemnification and/or insurance) against liability for personal injury/death, property loss/damage and/or third party claims arising from the activity.

COST RECOVERY

29. The policy for cost recovery is:

- a. **Categories 1 and 2—Emergency Assistance.** No cost recovery.
- b. **Category 3—Emergency Assistance.** Full cost recovery (unless a cost waiver/variation is approved).
- c. **Category 4—Non-Emergency Assistance.** Full cost recovery (unless a cost waiver/variation is approved). HPACC is responsible for negotiating a commercial deal with the event organisers to gain maximum benefit from support provided.
- d. **Category 5—Non-Emergency Assistance of a Minor Nature (Good Neighbour activities).** No cost recovery for community or charitable groups. (Requests from commercial activities/events are to be processed as DACC Category 4.)
- e. **Category 6—Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies.** Full cost recovery (unless a cost waiver/variation is approved).

Variation/waiver of cost recovery

30. If special circumstances involved in the provision of DACC Categories 3, 4 or 6 justify variation or waiver of cost rates, the relevant appointment, listed below, with the concurrence/advice of Director-General Navy Business Management (DGNBM), Director-General Corporate Management Planning—Army (DGCMP-A), Assistant Secretary Resource Planning—Air Force (ASRP-AF), J05 HQAST (Director Business Management), or Budgets and Financial Planning Division (Costing and Analysis Section) as appropriate, may approve such variation or waiver. 'Special circumstances' could include tasks that have significant public affairs, recruiting or training value for Defence or a task of a one-off nature involving only a minor cost. First Assistant Secretary Budgets and Financial Planning (FASBFP) concurrence is mandatory before any cost waiver submission requiring Ministerial approval is referred to the Minister.

31. Appointments authorised to approve variations or waivers of cost recovery, and their financial delegations, calculated on a full cost basis are as follows:

Appointment	Financial Limit
MINDEF or Minister Assisting the MINDEF, with Minister for Finance and Administration concurrence and the requirement that officials have first consulted the FASBFP.	Unlimited
MINDEF or Minister Assisting the MINDEF and the requirement that officials have first consulted the FASBFP.	\$150 000
HSO Division with the advice of the FASBFP.	\$100 000
Deputy Chiefs of Service (Deputy Chief of Navy, Deputy Chief of Army, Deputy Chief of Air Force) with the advice of DGNBM, DGCMP-A, ASRP-AF as appropriate.	\$50 000
COMAST (for DACC Category 6 tasks only), with the advice of the HQAST J05.	\$50 000

Note: The Deputy Chiefs of Service have been delegated the responsibility, for their particular Service, for the approval of DACC Category 4 tasks, including cost waiver approvals up to the limit specified above. DACC submissions that originate in a particular Service should be progressed through the chain of command for vetting, before seeking the Deputy Chief's approval. Should any DACC request be of a sensitive or controversial nature (often with media coverage), it should be staffed through HQAST to ADHQ and the relevant Service HQ for resolution before forwarding to the Minister either for information, if resolved, or for approval. DACC Category 4 tasks involving resources from more than one Service are to be staffed to HQAST (J34) for processing.

PRO FORMA AGREEMENTS

32. No memorandum to, or agreement with, the recipient of assistance is required for DACC Categories 1 and 2. For DACC Categories 3–6, assistance to elements of the Commonwealth (ie other Commonwealth Departments or agencies under Commonwealth direction), **a memorandum in the form set out in annex J is to be completed by the party to be assisted before the commencement of the task.** In all other cases, which include Government Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises (GBE), an agreement in the form of an exchange of correspondence as set out in annex K, is to be completed before the commencement of the task. Parties are to be fully aware of the terms and conditions for Defence assistance as set out in annex K, [appendix 1](#). Each agreement is to be signed by a representative of the party to be assisted who is authorised to bind the party to be assisted.

33. The advice of the Regional Office of the Australian Government Solicitor is to be sought if any doubt exists in relation to:

- the status of the party to be assisted and whether the form in [annex J](#) or [K](#) is to be used,
- the adequacy of the terms set out in the appropriate annex and whether specific clauses are needed to cover the particular circumstances of the assistance, or
- the appropriate person to sign on behalf of the party to be assisted.

INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE

34. All Defence personnel (including Defence civilians) are covered under COMCOVER for accidents and incidents occurring during normal Defence activities. Defence participation in all categories of DACC is considered a normal Defence activity.

35. Departmental policy, in relation to the financial risks and liabilities necessarily associated with DACC Categories 3–6 (except for Special Aeromedical Evacuation (SAME) of civilians DI(G) OPS 03–1) as DACC Category 4), is that the **recipient shall be solely responsible** for personal injury, public risk

and property loss or damage and that **non-Commonwealth recipients shall indemnify the Commonwealth** against all liability arising out of the assistance, except where such liability was caused by, or arose out of, any act or omission by the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents in providing assistance. Indemnity relieves the Commonwealth from ultimate liability for claims made by recipients of DACC, or third parties, for any loss, damage or injury to any person or property arising from DACC assistance where the Commonwealth was not at fault. The procedures for arranging indemnity and insurance are detailed in annex K, [appendix 2](#) to of this instruction.

36. Recipients of Defence assistance (excluding State/Territory and Local Government recipients¹, and activities in support of dedicated ceremonial activities) for all DACC tasks in Categories 3, 4 and 6, must produce documentary evidence of having obtained appropriate insurance cover for the assistance requested, at its own expense, naming the Commonwealth as an assured party. This documentary evidence must be produced before assistance is provided. A task risk analysis may determine that under special circumstances, insurance cover for assistance to State/Territory or Local Governments may be required.

37. **Waiver of insurance requirement.** Some latitude can be applied to the insurance requirement for DACC Category 5. The decision to insist on insurance coverage to support the indemnity for Category 5 activities is a risk management decision, and whilst being mindful of the desirability of reducing the exposure of the Commonwealth to financial risk, the Local Commander/Administrator or approving authority should consider the ability of the requesting party to afford insurance coverage. However, if the insurance requirement is waived, the local Commander/Administrator or approving authority must still ensure that an indemnity form is signed by the requesting party relieving the Commonwealth from ultimate liability for claims made by recipients of DACC Category 5 assistance. Details of authorised persons approved to bind the Commonwealth through Indemnification are in *Chief Executive Instructions*, section 2.5.A—Appointments authorised to bind Commonwealth through indemnification.

Note

Insurance policies are to be scrutinised by a Defence Legal Officer to ensure that they fully meet the Department's requirements. If there is any doubt as to the adequacy of insurance cover, legal advice is to be sought from the Regional Office of the Australian Government Solicitor. Under the user pays principle, the requesting unit can expect to be charged for such advice. While these costs will have to be met from unit funds, consideration should be given to including these costs in the cost recovery calculations.

38. Specific variations to the indemnity/insurance requirements are as follows:

- a. **State/Territory and Local Governments.** For DACC Category 3, 4 and 6, and for DACC Category 5 where it has been decided not to insist on insurance, annex K, appendix 1, [paragraph 8](#). (concerning insurance), is to be deleted.
- b. DI(G) OPS 03-1 as DACC Category 4, annex K, appendix 1, [paragraphs 7. and 8.](#), (concerning indemnity and insurance), are to be deleted. Otherwise, variations to the forms in [annex K](#) are not to be agreed with the party to be assisted without prior clearance from relevant areas in the Department and from the Regional Office of the Australian Government Solicitor.

39. All agreements are to be retained indefinitely by the Regional CSIC unless disposed of in accordance with DI(G) ADMIN 27-2—*Implementation of the Access Provisions of the Archives Act 1983 in the Department of Defence*.

TASK REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

40. **Task registration.** On receipt of a request for DACC, the recipient organisation is to notify the relevant Regional Defence CSIC (for Operations Support Staff) of the details of the task. The name of the requesting agency, support requested (if confirmed) and dates requested are to be advised. The CSIC will register the request and issue a registration number that is to be used in all future correspondence.

¹ Including their Departments, Agencies and Entities, but excluding Statutory Authorities and GBE. In in doubt, contact Regional Office of Australian Government Solicitor.

41. **Task situation reports (SITREP).** SITREP and/or Operational Summaries for DACC Category 1, 2, 3 and 6 are to be forwarded to COMAST and Service HQ every 24 hours or as stipulated by COMAST. COMAST will provide daily SITREP to ADHO Operations (Strategic Operations Division) who are responsible for advising the MINDEF and Parliamentary Secretary.

42. **Post task reports.** DACC post task reports are used to quantify the resources used and to calculate the total expenditure on providing assistance to the civil community. The resources used in support of DACC are included in the Defence Annual Report and are regularly used to provide answers to questions raised during the Senate Legislative Committee Hearings.

43. A DACC post task report for **ALL** categories of assistance, including counter disaster training, is mandatory and is to be submitted on completion of the task in the format in [annex L](#). Reports are to be forwarded in accordance with the following table:

Category	Addressees
Cat 1	Command HQ/Regional Defence CSIC ^(a) /HQUEST ^(b) /HPACC.
Cat 2 and 3	Command HQ/Defence Regional CSIC ^(a) /HQUEST ^(b) /EMA ^(c) /HPACC.
Cat 4	Command HQ/Defence CSIC ^(a) /HQUEST ^(b) /HPACC.
Cat 5	Command HQ/Regional Defence CSIC ^(a) /HQUEST ^(b) /HPACC.
Cat 6	Command HQ/Regional Defence CSIC ^(a) /HQUEST ^(b) /HPACC.

Notes

- (a) Defence CSIC—for Operations Support staff.
- (b) HQUEST for J34.
- (c) EMA Message address 'Emergency Management Australia Canberra'.

44. **Annual DACC reports.** Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group is responsible for maintaining a task database that captures the information shown in [annex L](#). The integrity and accuracy of this database is dependent on full and accurate registration and reporting by units providing DACC support. By mid-July each year, this information is to be provided to Service/Command HQ, who are responsible for confirming the completeness of the reports before forwarding them, in the format shown in [annex M](#) (by no later than 01 August each year), to HQUEST (J34), Defence Improvement Division (Director Statutory Reporting and Accountability), and the relevant Service HQ. The collated reports will be summarised in the DACC section of the Defence Annual Report. Units/agencies submitting an annual DACC report are required to maintain a progressive register of DACC tasks undertaken in the format in [annex M](#), [appendix 1](#).


Annexes:

- A. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community—flow chart
- B. Pro forma Request for Non-Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community
- C. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 1
- D. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 2
- E. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 3
- F. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 4
- G. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 5
- H. Procedures for the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 6
- I. Definition of Costs
- J. Pro forma Memorandum to other Commonwealth Departments or agencies under Commonwealth Direction
- K. Pro forma Agreement
- L. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Task Report
- M. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Annual Report


Sponsor: COMAST

**ANNEX A TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY—FLOW CHART



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ANNEX B TO
 DI(G) OPS 05-1
 File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
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 (AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
 (Complete Revision)

PRO FORMA REQUEST FOR NON-EMERGENCY DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

PART A (Completed/provided by the requesting authority)

1. **Authority/Organisation Initiating Request:**
 Authority/Organisation—Name:
 Requesting Officer—Name:.....
2. **Contact Officer:** **Telephone Number:**
3. **Government Department/Commercial Enterprise/Charity/Local Organisation***
4. **Nature/Location of Assistance Required:**

5. **When assistance required (Dates):** to

PART B (Completed by Defence Agency receiving request)

6. **Accurate Description of Defence Resources required to satisfy request:****

7. **Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Reference Number:**
 To be supplied by Regional Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group office on receiving agency registering request.
8. **Request to be satisfied by Service/Civil Establishment**
 Establishment/Unit: Location:
 Establishment/Unit: Location:
 Establishment/Unit: Location:
9. **Agreement type required:** (see [paragraphs 32.–33.](#) of this instruction)
 Not applicable/Pro forma Memorandum/Pro forma Agreement/Legal Advice sought from the Regional Office of the Australian Government Solicitor.*
10. **Agreement concluded with authorised Representative of Authority/Organisation requesting DACC:** (see [paragraphs 32.–33.](#) of this instruction)
 Yes/ No * *** If No—give reason:

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11. **Insurance in support of Indemnification Obtained:** (see paragraphs 34.–39. of this instruction)

Yes/No * *** If No—give reason:

.....

12. **Cost Recovery:**

Full Cost Recovery/Cost Recovery Variation Proposed/Not Applicable
*(see paragraphs 29.–31.)

(Detailed statement to be attached to support less than full cost recovery, if proposed.)

Position Authorising Cost Waiver: Minister/Head Strategic Operations/Deputy Chief of
Navy/Deputy Chief of Army/Deputy Chief of Air Force/Commander
Australian Theatre (COMAST)*

Reference Correspondence (if applicable):

13. **Recommending Officer's details:**

Rank/Title: Name:

Appointment: Date:

Comment in support of recommendation:

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PART C (Completed/determined by the approving authority)

14. **Request Received by: (Minister/Australian Defence Headquarters/Headquarters Australian Theatre/Service Unit/Civil Establishment.) ***

Received by: Location:

15. **Aims:** Confirm requesting Authority/Organisation's aims are acceptable to Commonwealth Government (eg would provision of assistance exceed policy guidelines or cause political embarrassment?). If in doubt, refer to higher authority.

Comment:

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16. **Assessed DACC Category:**17. **Task Approved/Authorised by:**

Rank/Title: Name:

Appointment: Minister/COMAST/Service/Local Commander/

Other (specify)*

Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications consulted: YES/NO

Date:

18. **Assistance Provided: Yes/No***

If No—give reason:

.....

.....

* Delete inapplicable response/s.

** Elaborate on separate sheet if necessary.

*** When applicable, endorsement of the Agreement by the DACC recipient (including the provision of indemnification/insurance) and prepayment of assessed costs/lodgement of a bank guarantee are essential, prior to the provision of assistance.

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**ANNEX C TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
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(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
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PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 1

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 1 is emergency assistance for a specific task(s) provided by a Local Commander/Administrator, from within their own resources, when:
 - a. immediate action is necessary to save human life, alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent widespread loss/damage to property; and
 - b. local civilian resources are inadequate, unavailable or cannot be mobilised in time.
2. This category includes the provision of emergency assistance to law enforcement agencies for tasks such as the rendering safe of explosive devices that immediately threaten life and/or property. (Less immediate assistance would normally be considered DACC Category 6.)
3. Local Commanders/Administrators may authorise DACC Category 1 from their own resources on their own initiative, in response to requests from local authorities, without seeking prior approval from higher authority. DACC Category 1 is intended to be short-term in nature and all tasks should be reviewed by Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAAT) after 24 hours. If the task is likely to continue for an extended period of time or if the need for **immediate** emergency assistance no longer exists, the task is to be recategorised.
4. Whenever Defence resources are committed to a Category 1 task, the Local Commander/Administrator is to inform HQAAT (J34 or duty watchkeeper) as well as their Service Headquarters via the most expedient communications medium available. Information required includes:
 - a. organisation seeking assistance (name of person and appointment/organisation);
 - b. details of the request;
 - c. whether request was met, or is being met;
 - d. brief reasons if request was not met;
 - e. unit actioning the request;
 - f. outline of any significant issues/problems encountered in meeting the request;
 - g. Defence resources provided to date and an estimate of the resources required to complete the task; and
 - h. an assessment of whether the task is likely to extend into DACC Category 2.
5. Telephone advice is to be followed up by message through the normal chain of command as soon as possible. The relevant Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) (Operations Support Staff), Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications and Emergency Management Australia are to be included as information addressees. The Defence CSIC will provide an **identifying registration number**. Assistance is provided without recovery of cost or the requirement for indemnification/insurance coverage. Cost reporting in accordance with [annex L](#) (Task Report) is mandatory.
6. Every reasonable effort is to be made by the unit providing the assistance to recover all non-consumable Defence resources deployed on the task. Unrecovered resources are to be accounted for in accordance with extant instructions.
7. Upon review, DACC Category 1 may transition to DACC Category 2, 3 or 6. The fact that DACC Category 2, 3 or 6 is being provided does not affect the Local Commander/Administrator's authority to respond to any new Category 1 requests.

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8. HQAST will advise Australian Defence Headquarters Operations (Strategic Operations Division) of any Category 1 assistance that should be drawn to the Chief of the Defence Force/Minister's attention.

DACC Report (to be submitted no later than two weeks after the completion of the task).

9. On completion of the task, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the format in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the Regional Defence CSIC (Operations Support Staff), and HQAST (J34).

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ANNEX D TO
 DI(G) OPS 05-1
 File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
 (ARMY OPS 49-1
 (AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
 (Complete Revision)

PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 2

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 2 is assistance in a more extensive or continuing disaster, beyond that provided by Category 1, when:

- a. action, or continuing action, is necessary to save human life or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent loss/damage to property;
- b. State/Territory resources, including commercially available resources, are inadequate, not available or cannot be mobilised in time; and
- c. when the assistance required is likely to be beyond the resources of Local Commanders/Administrators.

2. When an authorised State/Territory officer determines that a task is beyond the capability of their resources, a request for Commonwealth assistance can be made to Emergency Management Australia (EMA). When the request requires Commonwealth (Defence) assistance, EMA staff will liaise directly with Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQUEST) to determine what resources are required and their availability. HQUEST will liaise with Australian Defence Headquarters Operations (Strategic Operations Division) to seek the approval of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) for Australian Defence Force (ADF) assistance. Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) will direct and coordinate the subsequent activity and will be responsible for ensuring that the **task/s are registered** with the Regional Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) for task reporting. Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications is to be advised, at an early stage, of the task.

3. Should the extent of the disaster/emergency warrant EMA's activation of the *Commonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN)*, COMAST may activate the ADF's supporting plan—Australian Operational Concept (AOC) SECCA. However, this is not essential and activation of the plan would be largely determined by the nature of the disaster/emergency and the ADF's anticipated levels of support. Conversely, COMAST may choose to activate AOC SECCA simply as a method of bringing personnel to a level of readiness in anticipation of a disaster occurring, eg the approach of an intense cyclone.

4. Agencies or persons making a request directly to Local Commanders/Administrators for emergency assistance that does not meet the requirements for DACC Category 1, are to be advised to redirect their requests to EMA through their appropriate State/Territory Emergency Services requesting authority.

5. Reserve personnel engaged in training at the time may be used in DACC Category 2. However, a Reservist may be asked if they would like to work and then be employed on a Category 2 task, provided that Reserve training days are available to that person.

6. DACC Category 2 is provided without recovery of costs or indemnification/insurance coverage. All personnel and resource costs are to be captured and reported in accordance with [annex L](#).

7. Every reasonable effort is to be made by the element(s) providing the assistance to recover all non-consumable Defence resources deployed on the task. Unrecovered resources are to be accounted for in accordance with extant instructions.

DACC Report (to be submitted no later than two weeks after the completion of the task.)

8. On completion of the operation, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the format in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the Regional Defence CSIC (Operations Support Staff), HQUEST (J34) and EMA.

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PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 3

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 3 is assistance associated with recovery from a civil emergency or disaster which is not directly related to the saving of life or property. DACC Category 3 includes assistance given when the use of Defence resources is considered appropriate, although State/Territory or commercial resources also might be available. Examples include provision of temporary bridging, shelter and power supplies, restoration of roads and clean up of oil pollution.
2. Requests for DACC Category 3 following emergencies or disasters are passed to Emergency Management Australia (EMA) by the appropriate State/Territory Emergency Services authorities. Agencies or persons making requests for DACC Category 3 directly to Local Commanders/Administrators are to be advised to redirect their requests through their appropriate State/Territory Emergency Services requesting authority. On receipt of a request for assistance, which EMA subsequently determines is a valid DACC Category 3 task, EMA staff will liaise directly with Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQA) to determine what resources are required and their availability. HQA will liaise with Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) Operations (Strategic Operations Division) to seek the approval of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) for Australian Defence Force (ADF) assistance. Commander Australian Theatre will direct and coordinate the subsequent activity and will be responsible for ensuring that the **task/s are registered** with the Regional Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) for task reporting. Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications is to be advised, at an early stage, of the task.
3. Australian Maritime Safety Authority is responsible for coordinating the provision of support for marine pollution operations. Such operations are subject to the 'National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil' and civilian resources will normally be used to transport clean up equipment and materials. However, should the nature of the emergency require assistance (especially with heavy lift air transport), Australian Maritime Safety Authority will request EMA assistance in arranging that support. EMA will liaise directly with HQA to determine the availability of military resources. Once the availability of the requested resources has been determined, HQA will liaise with ADHQ Operations (Strategic Operations Division) to seek the approval of the Parliamentary Secretary to the MINDEF for assistance.
4. DACC Category 3 is provided on the basis of **full cost recovery**, unless a cost variation/waiver is approved. Before Defence assistance is provided, the party requesting assistance must meet indemnity and insurance requirements as detailed in annex K, [appendix 2](#), of this instruction. All aspects of the provision of assistance must be formalised in a memorandum or agreement, as appropriate, as detailed in this instruction and set out in [annexes J and K](#).
5. When the provision of DACC Category 3 involves the loan or hire of Defence stores or equipment, policy and procedures for such loan or hire are to be in accordance with Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) LOG 07-13—*Hire and Loan of Defence Stores and Equipment and appropriate Service Headquarters instructions*, except that a memorandum or an agreement in the form set out in [annex J](#) or [K](#), as applicable, is to be used instead of the pro forma agreement provided in DI(G) LOG 07-13, annex A.

DACC Report (to be submitted not later than two weeks after the completion of the task).

6. On completion of the task, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the format in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the Regional Defence CSIC (Operations Support Staff), Headquarters Australian Theatre (J34) and EMA. The report is to include details of the resources actually devoted to the task. Recoverable costs will then be finalised through either Director-General Navy Business Management (DGNBM), Director-General Corporate Management Planning—Army (DGCMP-A) or Assistant Secretary Resource Planning—Air Force (ASRP-AF) (as appropriate) in consultation with HQA, Budgets and Financial Planning Division, and EMA. DGNBM, DGCMP-A or ASRP-AF will advise the Issuing Authority/Charge Code to which recovered costs are to be credited.
7. Details of the task must also be added to the DACC Progressive Pro forma, shown in annex M, [appendix 1](#).

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DI(G) OPS 05-1

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2

(ARMY OPS 49-1

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PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 4

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 4 is non-emergency assistance, which is provided in response to requests received at any level of Defence or made through the Minister. The range of possible tasks is wide and may include support for significant sporting events (eg Commonwealth Games, Australian F1 Grand Prix), the loan or hire of Defence stores, equipment, facilities, or personnel, the sale of Defence stores or equipment, the use of specialist Defence resources such as engineers, aircraft or divers, and the disposal of dangerous materials (other than explosive devices). Requests from individual police forces for training assistance are also processed under this category of assistance.

Note

Requests for support by media organisations are to be forwarded to Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications in accordance with the advice contained within Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) ADMIN 17-3—*Policy and procedures for use of Defence resources in support of Public Information activities*.

2. The distinction between DACC Categories 4 and 5 lies in the amount of assistance (resources) involved and/or the possibility of public controversy or political sensitivity. Where doubt exists, requests are to be treated as DACC Category 4, and advice is to be sought from the Regional Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) or Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQA) (J34). Under no circumstances should a request be deliberately categorised as Category 5 so that cost recovery, or the need to raise an application for cost variation/waiver, is avoided. Requests for DACC Category 4 are to be carefully scrutinised to ensure they fall within the scope of the policy guidelines of this instruction.

3. **Task registration.** It is the responsibility of the unit or organisation receiving the request for assistance to ensure that the task is registered with the Regional CSIC Operations Support staff and that a task registration number is issued.

4. Requests for DACC Category 4 that involve only one Service are to be forwarded through normal channels to the relevant single Service Office for Deputy Service Chief approval. Requests which involve two or more Services, have any political or potentially controversial connotations, or involve either a temporary reduction in Defence capability or a significant diversion of Defence resources, are to be referred to HQA (J34). If Commander Australian Theatre determines that the request should be supported, appropriate Defence elements (eg Service Offices, Budgets and Financial Planning Division, Defence Science and Technology Organisation) will be consulted and ministerial, legal, financial and policy clearances obtained as necessary. DACC requests by Coastwatch Civil Surveillance Program clients that lie outside the bounds of the Program are to be directed through Coastwatch and HQA to the relevant Service.

5. **Full cost recovery** is normally required for DACC Category 4. However, where special circumstances exist and there is a quantifiable basis for variation or waiver of the full cost rates, the sponsoring Service or HQA (after consultation with the Service providing the support) may seek approval to vary cost recovery requirements. For single Service requests in particular, should a cost variation/waiver be proposed which is in excess of the Deputy Chief of Service's delegation, the DACC request may be referred to Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) for Head Strategic Operations (HSO) Division approval. A cost variation/waiver in excess of HSO delegation may be referred directly to the Minister by the relevant single Service Office or through ADHQ (HSO) if appropriate.

6. When full cost recovery is to be effected for a Category 4 request which involves only a single Service, the Component/Group commander (eg Land Commander Australia, Training Command—Army, Air Commander Australia, Training Command—Air Force) may approve the request provided that:

- a. the task falls within the policy guidelines of this instruction;
- b. no variation from full cost recovery is proposed;
- c. full costs do not exceed \$100 000;

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- d. any loan of Defence stores and equipment involved in the assistance falls within the authority of the Functional Commander;
- e. Defence capability is not reduced or significant resources diverted from primary tasks;
- f. provision of the assistance does not have any political or potentially controversial connotations; and
- g. the activity supported is not of a commercial (profit making) nature. Requests for support to profit making ventures are to be referred to Deputy Service Chief for consideration and processing.

7. Before Defence assistance is provided, the party requesting assistance must meet the indemnity and insurance requirements as detailed in annex K, [appendix 2](#), of this instruction. The provision of assistance must be formalised in a memorandum or agreement, as appropriate, as detailed in this instruction and set out in [annexes J and K](#).

8. Advance payment is to be sought and, in the case of other than Commonwealth Government agencies, insisted upon. Alternatively, the organisation being assisted may lodge a bank guarantee to the value of the estimated recoverable costs and pay the actual costs when invoiced by the Department. When all costs have been recovered, the bank guarantee will be returned to the originator. The appropriate Director-General Navy Business Management, ASCM-A or Assistant Secretary Resource Planning—Air Force (as appropriate) will advise the Issuing Authority/Charge Codes to which recovered costs are to be credited.

9. On occasions, the use of Defence resources for DACC Category 4 tasks could lead to criticism that Defence is in competition with the private sector. Accordingly, requesting authorities should provide adequate documentation to counter possible criticism and/or provide appropriate reasons why use of commercial means is not a viable option. This could include provision of documentary evidence of the views of relevant Government Departments (eg Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business) when such requests are lodged.

10. As DACC Category 4 is provided in non-emergency circumstances, sufficient time should always be allowed for the necessary authorisations and approvals to be obtained before any assistance is provided. While many Category 4 tasks can be processed quickly, as a guide, five weeks should be allowed for the processing/approval of such requests. An additional three weeks should be allowed if other than full cost recovery is proposed.

11. When the provision of DACC Category 4 involves the loan or hire of Defence stores or equipment, policy and procedures for such loan or hire are to be in accordance with DI(G) LOG 7-13—*Hire and Loan of Defence Stores and Equipment* and appropriate Service instructions, except that a memorandum or an agreement in the form set out in [annex J or K](#), as applicable, is to be used instead of the pro forma agreement provided in DI(G) LOG 7-13, annex A.

12. Where DACC Category 4 requests involve the use of Defence facilities and property, agreement to their use is to be obtained from Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group (Defence Estate) and, if agreed, will be provided on a commercial basis. Inquiries in the first instance are to be directed to the appropriate Regional Estate manager.

Exceptions to Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Category 4 Criteria

13. Australian Defence Force support provided to ANZAC Day and Australia Day ceremonies, although DACC Category 4 tasking, is provided without cost recovery. This does not apply to requests received from profit making organisations for support to activities organised for either of these two nationally significant days.

14. A flypast able to be provided in support of a community activity that is assessed as having significant public affairs or recruiting benefit, and which can be accomplished as part of a planned sortie, should generally be provided without cost recovery with the relevant cost waiver delegate approval.

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ANNEX F TO**DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
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(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
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DACC Report (to be submitted no later than two weeks after the completion of the task).

15. On completion of a Category 4 task, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the format in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the Regional Defence CSIC (Operations Support Staff) and HQAST (J34).

16. Details of the task must also be added to the DACC Progressive Pro forma, shown in annex M, [appendix 1](#).

Appendixes:

1. [Defence participation in Public Events of Significance](#)
2. [Participation by Service Bands in Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Activities](#)

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**APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
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(Complete Revision)

DEFENCE PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC EVENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

1. Defence participation in tattoos, displays and Public Events of Significance (PES) attracts public attention and may help to maintain a favourable public image for Defence. The combined benefits of an enhanced public image and any training value that may accrue must be balanced against the impact on Defence resources.

2. This annex is intended to indicate the extent to which Defence may participate in tattoos, displays and PES, that are organised by civilian authorities, including those from which the organiser intends to make a profit. Participation by Defence on a single Service basis in local community activities involving only local resources may be authorised by Local Commanders/Administrators, within the constraints in [annex G](#), as DACC Category 5. Some small-scale tattoos and displays may be covered under PES as part of a larger activity scheduled against the PES program. Any assistance with larger scale activities is Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 4 and is to be provided in accordance with the requirements of [annex F](#).

3. For the purpose of this annex, the following definitions apply:

- a. **Tattoo.** A tattoo is a public performance by the Australian Defence Force, in response to a request from a civilian authority, where the performance is managed by that authority. Tattoos are performances in their own right, normally conducted at public venues, and are essentially based upon a musical program accompanied by marching and precision drill movements. Current policy is that the ADF will generally only support tattoos with local resources. Interstate resources, such as bands, will not normally be provided.
- b. **Display.** A display is an exhibition by Defence or by a civilian organisation in association with Defence, which may be static or dynamic in nature. A display may be staged at a public venue in response to a civilian request, or at a Defence establishment for both Service and civilian spectators.
- c. **PES program.** A PES activity or event is one which is a special occasion or event of National or State/Territory significance, in which the ADF wishes to be involved because it provides substantial public affairs and/or recruiting opportunity.

4. **PES program.** The PES program is submitted to the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) on a six-monthly basis. (January to June and July to December). The PES concept allows the ADF to support nominated significant events in accordance with approved guidelines, and also addresses the relevant cost waiver implications. The PES program includes major National, State or Territory events, such as the Commonwealth Games, other significant sporting or public interest events. The contribution Defence is asked to make may involve special Defence skills, logistic or management support:

- a. Because of the public affairs/recruiting value of the PES program and, on some occasions the training value, the PES program may qualify for full or partial cost waiver that may require ministerial approval. In addition, the PES program may involve substantial resources, which dictates that the MINDEF be advised and/or concurrence sought.
- b. The PES Working Group, with membership from Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAAT) (J34-Chair), the single Service Headquarters, Budgets and Financial Planning (BFP) Division (Costing and Analysis Section), Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications and Director-General Defence Force Recruiting, is responsible for developing the PES program. The PES Working Group considers events for inclusion in the program that have been nominated by the various headquarters, Commands and Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centres (called for in March and September of each year). Following deliberations by the PES Working Group, the draft PES submission is prepared by HQAAT and forwarded to BFP Division (Costing and Analysis Section), for examination and onforwarding to the Department of Finance and Administration for working level clearance. Once clearance is obtained, the financial concurrence to the cost waiver is sought from First Assistant Secretary Budgets and Financial Planning and advised to HQAAT for finalisation of the

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PES submission. Commander Australian Theatre forwards the final submission to Australian Defence Headquarters Strategic Operations Division (Head Strategic Operations) for onforwarding to the MINDEF (two months prior to commencement of the PES program) for approval, and to the Minister for Finance and Administration for cost waiver approval (if outside the MINDEF's financial delegation).

- c. Defence participation in civilian sponsored events is to be carefully considered in respect of the policy guidelines detailed in [paragraphs 4.–10.](#) of this instruction and the following criteria:
 - (1) Indemnity, Insurance and Pro forma Agreement requirements, as detailed in [paragraphs 32.–39.](#), are to be applied to all event organisers. In addition, organisers of commercial events are to provide Defence with appropriate insurance cover for any aircraft support (eg air displays, flypasts, parachute displays etc).
 - (2) The organisers of commercial events are also to provide Defence with a written undertaking to provide Defence with the indemnity and appropriate insurance cover at least four weeks before the event. Failure to provide this undertaking will mean that the event will not be included in the PES program.
 - (3) Events included in the PES program are to be costed on a direct cost basis (unlike other DACC Category 4 tasks, which are costed on a full cost basis).
 - (4) Participation in the PES program is to be limited to special occasions of major National or State/Territory significance, with each case being decided on its merits by the PES Working Group.
 - (5) Defence should not commit itself to any particular event on a regular basis.
 - (6) The level of Defence participation should be relative to the significance of the activity. A minor event should normally attract only minor Defence involvement, whereas substantial involvement could occur for a major event.
 - (7) The civilian organisation making the request should be responsible for the management of the event.
 - (8) While Defence normally seeks a cost waiver for support under the PES program, this should not preclude the possibility for the recovery of some or all costs, especially from profit making organisations.
- d. On occasion, an event may arise at comparatively short notice which is considered to be a significant public event but which was not identified in time to be considered by the PES Working Group for the PES submission. This does not preclude the event from being considered as a stand alone DACC Category 4 task in accordance with [annex F](#) to the DACC instruction. Events considered for, but not included in, the PES program may also be considered for Defence support as a stand alone DACC Category 4 event.


Enclosure:

1. [Tattoos, Displays and Other Public Events of Significance Approval Process](#)

**ENCLOSURE 1 TO
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
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(Complete Revision)

**TATTOOS, DISPLAYS AND OTHER PUBLIC EVENTS OF
SIGNIFICANCE APPROVAL PROCESS**



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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

PARTICIPATION BY SERVICE BANDS IN DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

1. Service Bands perform a number of roles which can be broadly grouped into six areas:
 - a. provision of musical support for Australian Defence Force (ADF) and single Service sponsored activities;
 - b. provision of musical entertainment to enhance morale and esprit de corps for Service personnel both at home and abroad (including operational areas);
 - c. public performances to enhance the image of both the individual Service and the ADF;
 - d. recruiting and public relations;
 - e. provision of musical support for ceremonial activities sponsored by Federal, State and Local Governments; and
 - f. provision of musical support to non-government civilian organisations including commercial entities, schools and charitable organisations.

Note

Tasks associated with subparagraphs a., b., c. and d. above are military tasks, not Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC).

2. Requests from civilian organisations for Service Band support are to be treated in the same manner as any other DACC Category 4 request and require registration and reporting as per annex F. However, casual band performances in support of local community requests which can be accommodated or offset within the band's approved annual program and which incur minor costs can be treated as DACC Category 5 tasks.

Note

Requests are not to be incorrectly classified as Category 5 to permit the provision of support and/or the waiver of cost recovery requirements.

3. The requirements for indemnification and insurance, and the memorandum or agreements, apply to the participation of Service Bands in DACC activities in accordance with annex F, if Category 4, or annex G, if Category 5.
4. **Task registration.** All DACC tasks performed by Service Bands are to be registered with the Regional Corporate Support and Infrastructure Centre and the post task reporting requirements for DACC Category 4 and 5 (as appropriate) are to be followed.

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**ANNEX G TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
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(Complete Revision)

PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 5

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 5 is non-emergency assistance of a minor nature which, with the exception relating to Service Bands detailed in annex F, [appendix 2](#), is normally limited to assistance which does not attract additional costs and thus may be provided without recovery of costs. DACC Category 5 may be provided at the Local Commander/Administrator's discretion, without cost recovery, in response to requests from local authorities/organisations. Approval should normally be limited to minor local assistance in circumstances where the low level of resource use can be accounted for without recovery of costs and where there is no detriment to operational effectiveness or readiness. The following tasks are prohibited under DACC Category 5:

- a. The use of aircraft for DACC Category 5 tasks, **except that the carriage of cargo on scheduled flights** (excluding personnel, animals and dangerous cargo) on a space available basis and in accordance with the following criteria, is an acceptable task:
 - (1) limited to recognised charity or community organisations;
 - (2) load limit of 500 kilograms per request;
 - (3) does not involve the carriage of personnel, animals or dangerous cargo;
 - (4) support is on a space available basis on a scheduled flight; and
 - (5) all off-airfield handling (transport, customs etc) arranged by assisted party.
- b. Requests for assistance to **media organisations**, including producers of commercials, television programs, documentaries and films, are not to be approved as DACC Category 5. Any request for support from a media organisation is to be referred to Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications (see Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) ADMIN 17-3—*Policy and Procedures for Use of Defence Resources in Support of Public Information Activities*).
- c. Requests which might be considered controversial or at variance with stated Government policy are not to be approved as DACC Category 5.

Note

Tasks prohibited under [subparagraphs a.](#) and [c.](#) above are to be processed as DACC Category 4. Any doubt over the categorisation or suitability of a task is to be referred to the regional Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) Operations Support office for advice, or to Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAUST) (J34).

2. A low level of resource use, however, does not remove the obligation to consider all non-emergency DACC requests in accordance with the following general principles:

- a. DACC is an exception, not a rule;
- b. Defence resources are intended to be used for Defence purposes only;
- c. no suitable alternative assistance is available;
- d. benefits to Defence can be demonstrated;
- e. provision of assistance does not compete with the private sector;
- f. DACC is not a substitute for service responsibilities of other Government authorities;
- g. assistance does not establish a precedent to support further requests; and
- h. the aims of the requesting organisation are identified and it is appropriate for Defence assistance to be provided.

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3. Before Defence assistance is provided, the party requesting assistance must meet indemnity and insurance requirements as detailed in annex K, [appendix 2](#), of this instruction. The provision of assistance must be formalised in a memorandum or agreement, as appropriate, as detailed in this instruction and set out in [annexes J and K](#).

4. When the provision of DACC Category 5 involves the loan or hire of Defence stores or equipment, policy and procedures for such loan or hire are to be in accordance with DI(G) LOG 7-13—*Hire and Loan of Defence Stores and Equipment* and appropriate Service Headquarters instructions, except that a memorandum or an agreement in the form set out in [annex J](#) or [K](#), as applicable, is to be used instead of the pro forma agreement provided in DI(G) LOG 7-13, annex A¹.

5. Where the DACC Category 5 involves the use of Defence facilities and property, agreement to this use is to be obtained from the Defence Estate Organisation and, if agreed, will be provided on a commercial basis. Enquiries in the first instance are to be directed to the appropriate Regional Estate Manager.²

6. **Task registration.** It is the responsibility of the unit or organisation receiving the request for assistance to ensure that the task is registered with the Regional CSIC (Operations Support Office) and that a task registration number is received.

DACC Post Task Report (to be submitted no later than two weeks after the completion of the task).

7. On completion of Category 5 assistance, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the format in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the local CSIC (Operations Support Staff) and HQAST (J34).

8. Details of the task must also be added to the DACC Progressive Pro forma shown in annex M, [appendix 1](#).

1 The loan or hire of unit stores and equipment should not be considered except in exceptional circumstances. If authorised, a loan under DACC Category 5 is intended to assist community organisations contiguous to the location of the providing unit.

2 Provision of accommodation to the general public, and use of facilities by commercial or professional organisations, including professional sporting organisations, is DACC Category 4.

**ANNEX H TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
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PROCEDURES FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY 6

1. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Category 6 is limited to the provision of Defence support to civil authorities in the performance of non-emergency law enforcement related tasks where there is **no** likelihood that Defence personnel will be required to use force. If there is any possibility that force may be required to be used by Defence personnel, the activity is defined as Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authorities (DFACA), which is outside the scope of this instruction. DFACA procedures are addressed in Defence Instruction (General) OPS 01-1—*Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power—Policy and Procedures*.

Notes

Emergency assistance to law enforcement agencies, such as the rendering safe of an explosive device which is an immediate threat to life and/or property, is to be treated as DACC Category 1.

Australian Defence Force support to the Civil Surveillance Program is a Cabinet directed national task that is routine Defence activity. Support to Coastwatch and its client agencies under the Civil Surveillance Program is not DACC Category 6 or DFACA.

Force includes physical contact that simply restricts freedom of movement.

2. The use of Defence resources for DACC Category 6 tasks is to be authorised by Commander Australian Theatre as Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)/Secretary's delegate. However, where there is political sensitivity surrounding the task, significant Defence resources are required or performance of the task is likely to attract adverse publicity, the Minister's and CDF/Secretary's concurrence are to be sought through Australian Defence Headquarters Operations (Strategic Operations Division). Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications is to be advised, at an early stage, of the task.

3. The following conditions must be satisfied when DACC Category 6 is being provided:

- a. The request is made by a Police Commissioner, their delegate or a superior authority through established State/Territory/Commonwealth channels of communication. Where it is necessary to seek the Minister's approval, CDF (delegate Head Strategic Operations) is to keep the Minister informed of action taken.
- b. An assurance is given by the requesting authority that the assets available to that authority (Commonwealth, State/Territory) have been utilised to the maximum possible extent and that the only other suitable resource is available from Defence.
- c. The civil authority accepts responsibility for the provision of access to the task area and for the physical protection of Defence personnel.
- d. Defence personnel providing support are not to carry arms.
- e. personnel are to wear approved military uniform.

4. The Local Commander/Administrator is to forward situation reports to Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQA), through the chain of command, during the period that Defence personnel are involved in the provision of DACC Category 6.

5. Training assistance to Police Forces and other civil authorities is to be provided as DACC Category 4.

6. DACC Category 6 may take the following forms:

- a. non-emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal relating to commercial explosives and chemicals (disposal of explosive ordnance of military origin is a military responsibility and should not be treated as a DACC task);
- b. assistance in post-blast analysis;

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- c. surveillance (including helicopter or light aircraft);
- d. searches for hidden materials (including the use of ADF personnel, equipment and/or dogs);
- e. provision of communications and control facilities;
- f. provision of interpreters;
- g. transportation; and
- h. administrative support.

7. DACC Category 6 is provided on the basis of full cost recovery, unless a cost variation/waiver is approved. Before Defence assistance is provided, the party requesting assistance must meet indemnity and insurance requirements as detailed in annex K, [appendix 2](#) of this instruction. The provision of assistance must be formalised in a memorandum or agreement, as appropriate, as detailed in this instruction and set out in [annexes J and K](#).

8. When the provision of DACC Category 6 involves the loan or hire of Defence stores or equipment, policy and procedures for such loan or hire are to be in accordance with DI(G) LOG 07-13—*Hire and Loan of Defence Stores and Equipment* and appropriate Service Headquarters instructions except that a memorandum or an agreement in the form set out in [annex J](#) or [K](#), as applicable, is to be used instead of the pro forma agreement provided in DI(G) LOG 07-13, annex A.

9. **Task registration.** Units or organisations receiving the request for assistance are responsible for ensuring that the task is registered with the Regional Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (CSIC) (Operations Support staff) and that a task registration number is obtained.

DACC Post Task Report (to be submitted no later than two weeks after the completion of the task).

10. On completion of Category 6 assistance, a DACC Report (mandatory), in the form in [annex L](#), is to be forwarded to Command Headquarters, the local Defence CSIC (Operations Support Staff) and HQAST (J34). On occasion, the sensitivity of the task conducted may require that the DACC Report be classified.

11. Details of the task must also be added to the DACC Progressive Pro forma shown in annex L, [appendix 1](#).

**ANNEX I TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
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DEFINITION OF COSTS

Direct costs

1. Direct Costs are costs that can be attributed specifically to an activity. They include operating and maintenance costs of plant and equipment, vehicles, aircraft or vessels. Direct costs also include personnel costs (salaries, salary allowances), capital costs (depreciation of assets over the extended life of the asset), interest on capital to cover the opportunity costs to Defence, consumable stores and travel costs, etc.

Indirect Costs

2. Indirect Costs are costs or outlays that cannot be attributed specifically to an activity, and are sometimes referred to in Defence as on-costs. Indirect costs include overhead expenses for general administration (eg activity overheads and management overheads), capital costs (depreciation of assets over the expected life of the asset), interest on capital to cover the opportunity cost to Defence and costs associated with the use of buildings such as heating, cleaning, fuel, light and power, etc.

Full Cost

3. The Full Cost is the total cost of an activity determined by adding together all direct and indirect costs.

Additional Costs

4. Additional Costs are costs that are specifically attributed to an activity but exclude expenditure which would normally have been incurred whether the activity had been carried out or not. For example, Additional Costs could include expenditure directly attributed to an activity for such items as fuel, spares and maintenance, but would exclude expenditure on items such as salaries and superannuation which would have been incurred regardless of whether the activity was carried out.

Source of rates

5. Rates for Defence Service and civilian personnel are available from the Chief Finance Officer home page on the Defence Restricted Network Intranet, the *Manual of Costing, Charging and Cost Recovery* Part One *Personnel Costs and Related Overheads*.

6. Rates for ships, aircraft, vehicles etc are contained in the *Manual of Costing, Charging and Cost Recovery*, Part Two—*Schedule of Rates and Charges*.

**ANNEX J TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
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**PRO FORMA MEMORANDUM TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH
DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES UNDER
COMMONWEALTH DIRECTION**

MEMORANDUM TO PARTY TO BE ASSISTED

(Name of party to be assisted)

(Heading—'DEFENCE ASSISTANCE FOR (title of assistance requested)')

2. I refer to your request for the provision of Defence assistance for [title of assistance requested].
3. The requested assistance as detailed in the appendix to this memorandum will be provided for '* the costs detailed in the appendix' (for Categories 3, 4 and 6)/* 'free of charge' (for Category 5) (* delete whichever is inapplicable).
4. The assistance will be provided on the basis that (name of Commonwealth Department or agency) will meet any costs in addition to those outlined in the appendix arising out of the provision of the assistance—in particular, costs associated with any claims against the Commonwealth and costs of any loss of, damage to, or required cleaning of the property of this Department.

Appendix:

1. [Details of assistance to be provided](#)

**APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX J TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

DETAILS OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED

1. Details of assistance is to be provided.

**ANNEX K TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

PRO FORMA AGREEMENT

LETTER TO PARTY TO BE ASSISTED

[Name and address of party to be assisted (must be a legal entity)]

[Date]

Dear [.....]

[Heading—'DEFENCE ASSISTANCE FOR (title of assistance requested)']

I refer to your request for the provision of Defence assistance for [title of assistance requested]

The requested assistance detailed in attachment 1 to this letter will be provided by the Commonwealth to [name of party to be assisted] for '* the costs detailed in attachment 1' (for Categories 3, 4, and 6)/* free of charge' (for Category 5) [* delete whichever is inapplicable], subject to the terms and conditions in this letter and its attachments 1 and 2, which shall constitute the agreement between the parties for the provision of the assistance.

The assistance shall be provided [period of assistance—eg 'from to'] or 'during the period from the date of the acceptance by (name of party to be assisted) of the terms and conditions contained herein to'].

If the terms and conditions set out herein are acceptable to [name of party to be assisted], would you kindly attend to the execution of the attached copy of this letter and return that copy to me.

Yours faithfully

[Officer responsible]

[Name of party to be assisted] hereby accepts and agrees to the terms and conditions set out in this letter and its attachments 1 and 2¹ in respect of assistance to be provided by the Commonwealth for [title of assistance requested].

(Signature(s) (of approved recipient))

Appendixes:

1. Terms and conditions for Defence Assistance
2. Defence Assistance to the Civil Community—indemnity and insurance arrangements

¹ Attachment 1 will be a list of the assistance to be provided. Attachment 2 (appendix 1 to this annex) is the terms and conditions for Defence Assistance.

**APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX K TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
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TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR DEFENCE ASSISTANCE

1. In these terms and conditions, unless the contrary intention appears:
 - a. 'assisted party' means the party to whom the assistance is provided;
 - b. 'Commonwealth' means the Commonwealth of Australia; and
 - c. 'Department' means the Department of Defence.
2. In these terms and conditions the term:
 - a. 'assistance' includes, as appropriate, the provision of services by Commonwealth officers, employees or agents, the hire or purchase of Commonwealth equipment or stores, and the use of Commonwealth facilities; and
 - b. 'Commonwealth officers, employees or agents' includes members of the Australian Defence Force.
3. Unless otherwise mutually agreed, the assisted party shall pay to the Department the costs, detailed in attachment 1 prior to the provision of assistance.
4. The assistance provided may be varied by agreement in writing between the Commonwealth and the assisted party. If so varied, at the conclusion of the provision of assistance the Department shall calculate the costs of assistance actually provided and adjust the sum so calculated against the costs paid by the assisted party. Any costs which then remain unpaid by the assisted party shall be due and payable on notification to the assisted party by the Department, and any costs paid by the assisted party in excess of the costs calculated by the Department shall be repaid by the Department.
5. The Commonwealth does not give any assurance as to the suitability for any purpose of the assistance provided by the Commonwealth to the assisted party.
6. The assistance shall be provided only if it or any part of it is not required by the Department for other activities. In the event that the Department does not provide any part of the assistance detailed in attachment 1, the Department shall refund on a pro rata basis costs paid for that part of the assistance not provided, but the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any loss or damage suffered by the assisted party as a result of any reduction in assistance.
7. The assisted party shall indemnify the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents from and against all claims, actions, proceedings, demands, costs and expenses arising or relating to any loss, damage or injury (including death) to any person (including Commonwealth officers and employees) or property (including Commonwealth equipment) caused by or arising out of the assistance, except where such loss, damage or injury (including death) was caused by, or arose out of, any act or omission by the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents¹.
8. The assisted party shall effect and maintain insurance in respect of the indemnification in clause 7, which policies shall be endorsed with the name of the Commonwealth as loss payee. The party assisted shall provide the Commonwealth with a copy of any insurance policy or policies so effected and a certificate of currency².
9. This agreement for the provision of assistance shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State or Territory of Australia in which the largest part by cost of the assistance is provided, and the assisted party shall submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State or Territory.

1 For Special Aeromedical Evacuation as DACC Category 4, delete paragraphs 7. and 8. of appendix 1 to this annex.

2 For State/Territory and Local Governments, and for DACC Category 5 where it has been decided not to insist on insurance, delete paragraph 8. of appendix 1 to this annex.

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10. If the assistance includes the provision of Commonwealth equipment or stores, the assisted party shall nominate a person or persons, who may be a Commonwealth officer, employee or agent, as being authorised on behalf of the assisted party to collect the equipment or stores from the sites on which they are located, and to return hired equipment or hired stores to the sites from which they were collected, or other sites agreed between the parties. The assisted party shall be responsible for all equipment and stores from the time of collection of the equipment or stores. The responsibility of the assisted party for hired equipment or hired stores shall cease when the hired equipment or hired stores are returned.

11. Hired equipment and hired stores shall be returned in a clean condition to sites from where they were collected, or other sites agreed between the parties. The assisted party shall be liable for the cost of any cleaning assessed by the Department to be required for the equipment or stores and for any loss of, or damage to, the equipment or stores which is assessed by the Department to be in excess of fair wear and tear. Such assessments by the Department shall be final and binding on the parties.

**APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX K TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY—INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PROCEDURE

1. Complete [annex B](#) to this instruction, [paragraphs 1.](#) to 10., detailing requesting organisation, nature of assistance required and resources needed.
2. Assess the nature of the body seeking assistance, ie what kind of body or organisation it is. This is important in assessing whether or not the body is accepted as a 'self insurer', or whether it will be required to obtain commercial insurance in support of its indemnity provided to the in respect of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC).
3. Accepted 'self insurers' would include the following:
 - a. Commonwealth Department or Agency; or
 - b. State/Territorial/Local Government department or Agency;
4. Bodies required to obtain commercial insurance would include the following:
 - a. Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise (GBE) or Statutory Authority;
 - b. State/Territorial GBE or Statutory Authority;
 - c. private company, firm/partnership, incorporated association; and
 - d. civilian unincorporated association (such as a community group).
5. Assess the potential liability in terms of dollars in the event of misadventure, accident, loss of resources, equipment etc. The assessment may involve replacement valuation of Australian Defence Force (ADF) resources committed to the DACC task, or it may involve assessment of 'worst case scenario' damages to which the ADF might be exposed as a consequence of undertaking the DACC task. This might require consideration of the amounts commonly addressed in standard public liability coverage (eg a common figure for public liability insurance is \$20 million). Keep in mind that it might be more appropriate to undertake the task as 'hire or loan' of stores, rather than as DACC.
6. Ask whether indemnity and insurance is appropriate in the circumstances. (This requires a degree of risk management and subjective assessment.) This may entail consideration of the following issues:
 - a. the level of financial risk to the Commonwealth,
 - b. the ability of the requesting body to obtain or pay for insurance cover, and
 - c. whether it is reasonable to apply the indemnity and insurance requirement.
7. For any organisation receiving assistance, the insurance cover for the organisation must be assessed against the provided assistance to determine whether the assistance is covered by the organisation's insurance policy. Depending on the level of assistance, it may be necessary for the organisation to obtain a separate insurance policy, or the organisation may be requested to arrange with its insurer to endorse the interest of the Commonwealth as a loss payee.
8. Always apply the indemnity requirement to all DACC agreements¹. Ensure that the indemnity agreement is consistent with annex K, [appendix 1](#) of this instruction. A sample agreement, with guide to completion, is shown in [appendix 3](#) to this annex.

¹ An Agreement (and hence Indemnity) is not required for DACC Category 1 or 2.

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9. Ensure that the person signing the agreement on behalf of the civilian body is empowered and authorised to do so. If a company seal must be affixed to the agreement, ensure that this is done in addition to the signature of the authorised person or persons.
10. Ensure that the person signing the indemnity agreement on behalf of the ADF is authorised to do so (ie the properly authorised person).
11. Ensure that two identical originals of the agreement are prepared and signed. One is retained by the ADF and the other is retained by the body receiving the assistance and providing the indemnity to the ADF.
12. If in doubt about any of the steps outlined above, consult Budgets and Financial Planning Division (DC&A) and/or The Defence Legal Service.

**APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX K TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

GUIDE TO COMPLETING DEED OF INDEMNITY

GUIDE TO COMPLETING DEED OF INDEMNITY

'DRAFT' DEED FOR THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE FOR THE *[insert name of event]*

THIS DEED is made on the day of *[month]* *[year]*

BETWEEN

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (represented in this Deed by the Department of Defence) of the one part

AND

[name of assisted party], the assisted party of the other part

RECITALS

- A. The Commonwealth has been asked by the assisted party to provide the assistance described in Item 2 of the attached Reference Schedule.
- B. In providing assistance to the assisted party any Commonwealth capabilities and assets utilised to assist the assisted party always remain subject to the command and control of the Department.
- C. The Commonwealth has agreed to provide assistance to the assisted party on the terms and conditions detailed in this Deed.

NOW THIS DEED WITNESSES AS FOLLOWS:

1. In these terms and conditions, unless the contrary appears:
 - a. 'assisted party' means the party identified in Item 1 of the attached reference Schedule to whom assistance is provided;
 - b. 'Commonwealth' means the Commonwealth of Australia and includes the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force;
 - c. 'Department' means the Department of Defence and includes the Australian Defence Force;
 - d. 'Commonwealth officers, employees and agents' includes members of the Australian Defence Force; and
 - e. 'Item' means the relevant item number as set out in the Reference Schedule.
2. The costs for provision of the assistance referred to in Item 2 are waived by the Commonwealth. In accordance with Clause 12 the assistance may be varied by agreement in writing between the Commonwealth and the assisted party.²
3. Unless otherwise mutually agreed, the assisted party shall pay to the Department the costs detailed in Attachment 1, prior to the provision of the assistance. In accordance with Clause 12 the assistance may be varied by agreement in writing between the Commonwealth and the assisted party. If so varied, at the conclusion of the provision of assistance the Department shall calculate the costs of assistance actually provided and adjust the sum calculated against the costs paid by the assisted party. Any costs which then remain unpaid by the assisted party, shall be due and payable on notification to the assisted party by the Department. Any costs

² Delete as applicable. Only one of the clauses is to be used. Remove italics and reference to note 4.

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paid by the assisted party in excess of the costs calculated by the Department shall be repaid by the Department.[refer to note 4]

4. The assistance shall be provided only if it or any part of it is not required by the Department for other activities. Any Commonwealth capabilities and assets utilised by the Department in providing assistance to the assisted party under this Deed are subject to the operational requirements of the Department. The Department reserves the right to assign its capabilities and assets, and in particular military elements, at its absolute discretion and to withdraw capabilities and assets utilised in providing assistance to the assisted party if the Department considers this to be necessary.
5. The Department retains absolute discretion to not provide assistance to the assisted party under this Deed if the Department considers that it is not safe to conduct the activity constituting the assistance, as detailed in Item 2. In the event that the Department does not, for whatever reason, provide all, or any part of, the assistance detailed in Item 2, the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any loss or damage suffered by the assisted party as a result of any reduction in assistance.
6. The assisted party shall indemnify the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents from and against all claims, action, proceedings, demands, costs and expenses arising relating to any loss, damage or injury (including death) to any person (including Commonwealth officers and employees) or property (including Commonwealth equipment) caused by or arising out of the provision of the assistance, except where such loss, damage or injury (including death) was caused by, or arose out of any act or omission by the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents.
7. The assisted party shall, at its own cost, effect and maintain relevant insurance policies in respect of the indemnification at Clause 6. Such policies shall include:³
 - a. Public Liability insurance, to be issued in the name of [⁴] for the amount specified in Item 3; and
 - b. Workers Compensation insurance in respect of Clause 6.
8. The assisted party shall provide the Commonwealth with copies of insurance policies so effected and a certificate of currency on or before the execution of this Deed. All insurance policies are to be in a form acceptable to the Commonwealth.
9. If, in the provision of the assistance, any personal injury (including death) or damage to property occurs which may give rise to a claim, including a claim from a third party, as a result of any act or omission of the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents, whether such act or omission is negligent or otherwise, the assisted party shall as soon as reasonably practicable:
 - a. inform the Commonwealth of such injury (including death) or damage to property; and
 - b. if requested by the Commonwealth, provide all documentation and other information to the Commonwealth concerning such injury (including death) or damage to property.
10. The assisted party shall provide all assistance to the Commonwealth as may be necessary or reasonably required by the Commonwealth for the purpose of enforcing any rights and remedies, or of obtaining relief or indemnity from other parties to which the Commonwealth

³ Insert details of specific insurance policies here. The policies listed under clauses 7(a) and 7(b) represent the minimum requirement. Defence may seek additional insurance from an assisted party depending upon the type of DACC activity involved. Prior to approving any DACC assistance, Defence units are required to carry out detailed risk assessments in order to identify all risks, including insurable risks, associated with that DACC activity. Refer to Guide for Completing Deed of Indemnity for further details.

⁴ Insert 'the Assisted Party and the Commonwealth jointly' or 'the Assisted Party'. Where the Assisted Party is a Commercial body, the Commonwealth would normally require the Assisted Party to obtain Public Liability insurance in the name of the Commonwealth and the Assisted Party. Where this is the case insert 'the Assisted Party and the Commonwealth jointly'. Where the Assisted Party is a non-commercial body, it may be sufficient to have Public Liability insurance in the name of the Assisted Party only. Where this is the case insert 'the Assisted Party'.

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APPENDIX 3 TO

ANNEX K TO

DI(G) OPS 05-1

File as:

(NAVY OPS 11-2

(ARMY OPS 49-1

(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2

(Complete Revision)

may be subrogated, whether such assistance be required before or after the indemnification of the Commonwealth by the assisted party.

- 11 This Deed shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State or Territory of Australia in which the largest part of the assistance is provided (from a costing perspective), and the assisted party shall submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State or Territory.⁵
12. The failure by the Commonwealth at any time to enforce a provision of this Deed shall not be construed as a waiver of that provision by the Commonwealth or in any way affect the validity of this Deed or any part of it.
13. This Deed constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all prior communications, negotiations, arrangements and deeds whether oral or written between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and shall not be varied unless agreed in writing and signed by the parties hereto.
14. The address for service of notices on the Commonwealth is set out in Item 4.
15. The address for service of notices on the assisted party is set out in Item 5.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this Deed on the date first written.

SIGNED SEALED AND DELIVERED

for and on behalf of the

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

by

Authorised to act for and on behalf of the
Minister for Defence

Full Title of Position:⁶

.....
The Common Seal of

[⁸]

ACN [⁹]

Was hereunto affixed in accordance with its

Articles of Association

Secretary

Director

⁵ If assistance is delivered wholly in one State/Territory – e.g. for the NRL Grand Final in NSW, then nominate the law of that State/Territory ie *'This deed shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New South Wales, and the assisted party shall submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State'*.

⁶ Ministerial authorisation allows holders of particular positions to exercise the Minister's power on his behalf. Accordingly, authorised officers are required to provide the full title of their positions in the Deed as an evidence of their authority. (Please note that authorisations must be re-issued by successive Ministers).

⁷ The Assisted Party can insert its own signature block or alternatively, the standard signature block provided below can be used.

⁸ Insert name of the Assisted Party seeking the Deed.

⁹ Insert the ACN of the Assisted Party seeking the Deed.

¹⁰ This is a standard signature block. The Assisted Party can provide its own signature block as required by its Articles or Memorandum of Association – such as for a Common Seal to be affixed.

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Reference Schedule**Item 1** The Assisted Party is:¹¹

(refer to Clause 1)

Item 2 The following assistance will be provided:¹²

(refer to Recital A)

Item 3Amount of Insurance required:¹³

(refer to Clause 6)

Item 4 Address for service of notices on the Commonwealth:¹⁴

(refer to Clause 1)

Item 5 Address for service of notices on the Assisted Party:¹⁵

(refer to Clause 13)

¹¹ Insert name of the Assisted Party running the event – this will be the same as the signature block.

¹² Insert type of support provided.

¹³ Insert amount of insurance required – for each individual instance and in the aggregate.

¹⁴ Insert details for the service of notices upon the Commonwealth.

¹⁵ Insert details for the service of notices upon an individual representing the Assisted Party.

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**APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX K TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

NOTES ON COMPLETION OF A DEED OF INDEMNITY

CLAUSE 3

Depending on the circumstances, only one of the 'Clause 3' alternatives must be accepted.

The first Clause is used when the defence costs for the activity are to be waived/varied – such as in PES authorised events.

The second Clause is to be used when the Defence costs for the activity are to be recovered from the assisted party.

Subsequent Change to waiver/cost recovery arrangements

If using the first clause when recovery of the Defence costs are waived but it is later decided that the assistance to be provided will change and the Defence costs will be recovered:

- a. A new Deed is required which includes the second Clause 3, and
- b. A new Attachment 1 detailing the changed assistance and Defence costs.

CLAUSE 7 – INSURANCE COVERAGE

It must be determined if insurance is required to protect the interests of the Commonwealth (Defence).

The type of insurance policy required will depend upon the type of DACC activity involved. Defence units are required to carry out detailed risk assessments prior to accepting the provision of any DACC assistance. Based on this assessment, all risks including insurable risks associated with the DACC activity (for both Defence and the assisted party) are to be identified. The Defence Insurance Office is to be consulted to ensure that Defence's insurable risks are covered by existing COMCOVER insurance arrangements. Defence would require the assisted party to obtain relevant insurance policies to cover its insurable risks identified during the risk assessment process.

Risk management is able to advise on the insurance requirements of COMCOVER. The policies listed under clause 7(a) and 7(b) of the indemnity proforma are normally required.

All enquires regarding Defence's current COMCOVER insurance arrangements including the insurance limits in the Schedule of Cover should be directed to:

Defence Insurance Office
Simpson Barracks
MACLEOD VIC 3085
Telephone: 1800 990 900
E-mail: dio@defence.gov.au and cmo@defence.gov.au

Detailed information on risk assessment, indemnity and insurance can be obtained from:

Enterprise Risk Management
Organisational Effectiveness Branch
Organisational Improvement Division – CFO
Russell Offices Canberra
Telephone: (02) 6266 7654

CLAUSE 7 – PARTICULARS OF THE INSURANCE

Where the assisted party is a commercial enterprise, intending to generate profit from the DACC activity. If the assisted party is required to obtain insurance in the name of the Commonwealth and the assisted party, the following clause is to be added to the Deed to ensure that the insurance policy contains a 'cross liability' clause.

"The assisted party must ensure that the insurance policy referred to in Clause 7a:

- i. *note the Commonwealth as a named insured under the policy;*

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- ii. *include a waiver of the insured's right of subrogation against the Commonwealth; and*
- iii. *includes a cross liability clause to the effect that the insurance extends to indemnify each of the named insured separately in the same manner and to a like extent as though the policies had been issued in their separate names and in particular (without limiting the foregoing) indemnifies each of the insured in respect of claims made by the others or by employees and agents of the others.*

In circumstances where the assisted party seeks to obtain/use public liability insurance in its name only, the Defence unit involved in the provision of DACC support is to consider the following factors prior to accepting such a proposal:

- i. benefit to Defence of involvement in the activity
- ii. potential amount of financial liability in the event of accidents,
- iii. type and size on non-government organisation,
- iv. limits or special conditions on insurance offered for the activity,
- v. relevance of subrogation, and
- vi. actual effect of not including the Commonwealth as an insured party under the insurance.

If the assisted party is a government or non-profit organisation, it will usually be sufficient for the public liability insurance to be only in the name of the assisted party. In that case, insert the words '*the assisted Party*'.

Signing the Deed of Indemnity

Deeds are to be signed only by authorised persons on behalf of the Commonwealth in accordance with current Defence instruments of authorisation.

An authorised person is a member of the APS or ADF who is authorised by the Minister for Defence as shown in Chief Executive Instructions (CEI).

Enterprise Risk Management or DC&A can provide details of authorised persons approved to bind the Commonwealth through Indemnification (CEI Chapter 2 Section 2.5.A). DC&A can be contacted on:

CFO Directorate of Costing and Analysis
Department of Defence
Canberra ACT 2600
Telephone: (02) 6265 2197

In the past, there have been situations where the authority for signing indemnities under the Financial Management Act 1997 (FMA Act) have been misunderstood. The appointment of officials under the FMA Act has been incorrectly treated as a delegation of the Chief Executive and authority to sign a deed of indemnity. Although this may not necessarily invalidate a deed, the procedural rules contained in the Defence Chief Executive Instructions are to be complied with.

Item 3 Reference Schedule

The amount of insurance will vary with the assistance provided. To determine the appropriate amount of insurance for a particular activity, consideration should be given to the amount of risk or damage that could be caused by Defence assistance. As an example of the highest level of coverage required - for events such as fly-pasts, dump and burns, aerobatic displays - is provided as "Public Liability insurance not less than \$100 000 000 in the aggregate and \$25 000 000 for any one occurrence.

As a general rule, Defence should seek a minimum of \$20 000 000 in the aggregate public liability insurance cover from all assisted parties under DACC. However, consideration should be given to the type of organisation requesting assistance and their capacity to pay the extra insurance premiums. If you have any doubt as to the amount of the insurance required, advice should be sought from Enterprise Risk Management.

**ANNEX I TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY TASK REPORT

*Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Registration Number (provided by the Regional Corporate Services Infrastructure Centre)

*DACC Category (insert Category Number)

1. Brief description of task, including location.
2. Date(s) task performed. (from/to)
3. Name and address of party/organisation provided with assistance.
4. Approving/Denying authority.
5. Unit(s) and number of personnel involved (by rank); and Reserve/Regular breakdown.
6. Total mandays (in decimals) for each rank.
7. Type and number of ships/vehicles/aircraft involved.
8. Plant and equipment used (type and hours/km operated).
9. Total flying hours involved (by aircraft type).
10. Type and quantity of stores consumed.
11. Stores loaned/hired to assisted organisation.
12. Stores discrepancies.
13. Costs to be reported (as described in [annex I](#)):
 - a. Additional costs (specify)—includes consumables, allowances, etc.
 - b. Full cost (unless varied or negotiated by Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications at commercial rates).
14. Cost recovery aspects (if applicable), including details and amount (\$) of any variation or waiver of cost recovery approved.
15. Details (rank/name/position) of authority approving cost recovery variation/waiver.
16. Confirmation that indemnity and insurance, and Pro forma agreements ([annex J](#) or [K](#)) were addressed, if applicable.
17. General remarks, including public relations and/or other benefits achieved or reason for denying request.

Notes

Reports are to be forwarded in accordance with the table in [paragraphs 42.](#) and [43.](#) of this instruction.

The Report may be submitted by message.

Relevant details of this task must be transferred to the Progressive DACC Summary Sheet—see [appendix 1](#) to this annex.

All claims for costs must be capable of being supported by relevant documentation. Cost recovery cannot be made on the basis of estimates. Relevant documentation may include, but not be limited to, Resource and Output Management and Accounting Network/SDSS printouts, vouchers, receipts, log books, accounts or any document which indicates the extent/time/kilometres vehicles or machinery has been operated.

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**ANNEX M TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**
File as: (NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY ANNUAL REPORT

Unit/Organisation:

Parent Command:

Report for the period: 01 July to _____ 30 June _____

Category of Task	Number of Tasks	Direct Cost (as applicable)	Full Cost (as applicable)	Costs Recovered	Nett Cost to Defence

Appendix:

1. [Defence Assistance to the Civil Community summary sheet](#)

**APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX M TO
DI(G) OPS 05-1**

File as:
(NAVY OPS 11-2
(ARMY OPS 49-1
(AIR FORCE OPS 1-2
(Complete Revision)

**DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY
SUMMARY SHEET**

Sequence No	Task Category	DACC Registration Reference	Additional Cost (TD1)	Full Costs	Costs recovered	Nett Cost to Defence
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						
29						
30						

Notes

- (a) Task Category (CAT) = Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) Categories 1-6.
- (b) DACC Registration Reference provided by Regional Corporate Services and Infrastructure Centre (Operational Support Staff).
- (c) Additional costs calculated as shown in annex I.
- (d) Full cost used for Defence Annual Reporting
- (e) Full cost may be waived, or varied, or negotiated by Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communications at Commercial rates.

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[Previous](#) | [Manual](#) | [Chapter](#) | [Next](#)

11.14 Commonwealth support and Australian Defence Force assistance and aid

11.14.1 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations apply to this policy -

ADF - Australian Defence Force

DACC - Defence Assistance to the Civil Community

DFACA - Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority

Introduction

Standing arrangements are in place for provision of support, assistance and aid by the Commonwealth to the States and Territories for acts of terrorism, other serious acts of violence that may be beyond the capability of the State or Territory police, civil emergencies/disasters, significant Commonwealth/State anniversaries, significant cultural events, and special aeromedical evacuation.

11.14.2 Commonwealth support (includes DACC)

Emergency Management Australia (EMA) is responsible for the coordination of all Commonwealth support during periods of disaster.

PROCEDURE

The Executive Officer, Central Control Group, State Counter-Disaster Organisation (the Director), is the nominated Queensland official to request Commonwealth support from EMA in a disaster.

11.14.3 Defence Assistance to the Civil Community

DACC is the provision of ADF personnel, equipment, facilities or capabilities to perform tasks that are primarily the responsibility of civil authorities or organisations, and for which the civilian community lacks the necessary equipment or resources. It includes assistance in counter disaster training. Such assistance is not automatic, except where a local ADF commander may authorise assistance in civil emergencies where immediate action is necessary to save the lives or property of people in imminent danger and where local civilian resources are inadequate or unavailable.

The six categories of DACC

The six categories of DACC are summarised in the following paragraphs:

(i) Emergency situations:

- (a) **Category 1 DACC** is emergency assistance for a specific task(s) provided by a Local Commander/Administrator, from within his or her own resources, in localised emergency situations when immediate action is necessary to save human life, alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent widespread loss/damage to property;

(b) **Category 2 DACC** is emergency assistance, beyond that provided under Category 1, in a more extensive or continuing disaster where action is necessary to save human life or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent loss/damage to property, and when State/Territory resources are inadequate; and

(c) **Category 3 DACC** is assistance associated with a civil emergency or disaster recovery, which is not directly related to the saving of life or property; and

(ii) **Non-emergency situations:**

(a) **Category 4 DACC** is non-emergency assistance provided to other government departments or authorities, to the States or Territories, local government or other authorities or organisations, commercial enterprises, nonprofit organisations, or individuals or bodies in the general community;

(c) **Category 5 DACC** is non-emergency assistance of a minor nature, excluding flying tasks, provided to local organisations and which is within the capacity of a Local Commander/Administrator's resources and authority; and

(c) **Category 6 DACC** is assistance to civil authorities in the performance of non-emergency law enforcement related tasks where there is no likelihood that ADF personnel will be required to use force.

Call out procedure

POLICY

A request for DACC made under the State Counter Disaster arrangements is to be made by the relevant Disaster District Coordinator through the State Counter Disaster Organisation (also see ss. 17.2 Disaster management', 17.2.1: 'Disaster district coordinator', and 17.2.2: 'Declaration of a State of Disaster' of this chapter).

A request for DACC at other times should be made in accordance with local arrangements or Standing Operating Procedures to the commanding officer or nominated delegate of the relevant ADF establishment.

Cost recovery for DACC

Category 1 DACC is cost free. For Category 2 DACC, costs can be sought. For Categories 3 through to 6 DACC, full cost recovery may be made against the relevant region. All decisions on cost recovery are made by the ADF.

Requesting DACC - primary considerations

POLICY

Before any request for DACC is submitted, the following criteria should be met:

- (i) it should be demonstrated that no suitable alternative resource is available;
- (ii) there is an inability to react with sufficient speed;

- (iii) appropriate resources are not available; or
- (iv) there is a need for immediate action necessary to:
 - (a) save human life;
 - (b) alleviate suffering;
 - (c) prevent extensive loss of animal life; or
 - (d) prevent wide spread loss/damage to property.

As a general principle, the provision of DACC should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.

Requests for supplies and/or ADF equipment under DACC - additional considerations

PROCEDURE

The following factors should be considered before requesting supplies and/or equipment under DACC:

- (i) description of item(s), including any known handling restrictions (e.g. weight and dimensions if aircraft movement is involved);
- (ii) quantities required (by location);
- (iii) whether the request includes transport or whether transport arrangements have been made;
- (iv) whether the request is a loan (i.e. are items recoverable);
- (v) person or authority who will take responsibility for the supplies or equipment when delivered on site;
- (vi) address and telephone number of consignee who will accept delivery if not on site;
- (vii) urgency of request, including date and time by which delivery should be completed; and
- (viii) reasons of inability to provide or arrange for supplies/equipment from local or commercial sources.

Requests for ADF air support under DACC - additional considerations

POLICY

The following factors should be considered before requesting aircraft support under DACC:

- (i) description of types of tasks likely to be undertaken (e.g. pre-positioning of aircraft in an area for prolonged period, casualty evacuation, distributing relief supplies or reconnaissance);

- (ii) an indication of the likely commitment including anticipated radius of operation and number of tasks per day;
- (iii) person or authority who will be coordinating requests at the disaster site, including call sign and frequency;
- (iv) location of the base that aircraft will be working from and, if possible, the availability of fuel by type at the base;
- (v) current conditions of airfields and loading zones in the area;
- (vi) expected duration of task; and
- (vii) reasons alternate methods not used (e.g. commercial or other aircraft).

11.14.4 Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority

National agreements for State/Commonwealth involvement are coordinated through the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC). The Australian Defence Force (ADF) can provide assistance to civil authorities to perform their law enforcement tasks where such tasks are beyond the capability of that authority and where ADF resources may be required to use force against persons. Such assistance may be in response to terrorism or other serious acts of violence. Assistance to the Civil Authority is facilitated through the process of 'Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority' (DFACA).

Templates for the requests of ADF through DFACA are found in the QPS Terrorism Response Plan or the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook.

ORDER

Police Commanders are to adhere to the guidelines set down in the QPS Terrorism Response Plan and the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook available upon request from Counter-Terrorism Strategic Policy Branch and/or after hours to the Duty Officer, Police Communications Centre, Brisbane.

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