[redacted]

From: Elaina Smouha [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, 13 January 2011 4:52 PM
To: Allen Peter; pborrows@[redacted] Reilly Bob; [redacted] Humphrys Gary [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Cooper Flood Mitigation Manual review
Attachments: Scan 1.pdf; Brian Cooper - final report.docx; Brian Cooper - final report attachment.xlsx; Wivenhoe Dam Background_Briefing_Jan_2011[1].docx

Dear All

Attached is a copy of the letter and accompanying reports to Minister Robertson regarding operations against the Flood Mitigation Manual.

Regards

Elaina

Elaina Smouha
Director, Governance and Regulatory Compliance
SEQ Water Grid Manager
[redacted]
Visit: Level 15, 53 Albert Street Brisbane
Post: PO Box 16205, City East QLD 4002
ABN: 14783 317 630

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: **Elaina Smouha** <[redacted]
Date: Thu, Jan 13, 2011 at 4:45 PM
Subject: Flood Mitigation Manual review
To: tim.watts[redacted]
Cc: john.bradley[redacted] ken.smith[redacted]
barry.dennien[redacted]

Tim,

Attached is the independent review of Somerset and Wivenhoe Dam operations against the Flood Mitigation Manual and a briefing note from Seqwater on the development of the Manual.

Kind regards

Elaina

Elaina Smouha
Director, Governance and Regulatory Compliance
SEQ Water Grid Manager
[redacted]
Visit: Level 15, 53 Albert Street Brisbane
Post: PO Box 16205, City East QLD 4002
ABN: 14783 317 630

SEQ Water Grid manager

Secure and efficient water through partnership and innovation

13 January 2011

The Honourable Stephen Robertson MP
Minister for Natural Resources, Mines and Energy
and Minister for Trade
PO Box 15216
Brisbane QLD 4002

Dear Minister

Independent review of Somerset and Wivenhoe Dam operations against the *Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam*

Attached is a final report from Mr Brian Cooper, Brian Cooper Consulting, on an independent review of the operation of Somerset and Wivenhoe Dams for compliance against Seqwater's *Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam* (Flood Mitigation Manual) during the current flood event.

Mr Cooper concludes that:

"The strategies as set out in the Flood Mitigation Manual have been followed, allowing for the discretion given to making variations in order to maximise flood mitigation effects. The actions taken and decisions made during the Flood Event appear to have been prudent and appropriate in the context of the available knowledge available to those responsible for flood operations and the way events unfolded."

Given the circumstances, we endeavoured to provide him with as much information as possible to enable a sufficient compliance review against the Flood Mitigation Manual. Mr Cooper identifies some Flood Mitigation Manual requirements where further information of compliance is required. In relation to these matters, Mr Cooper states:

"There are a number of requirements where there was insufficient time given the urgency of this review, to source the necessary information for me to demonstrate compliance. However, satisfaction or otherwise of these requirements would have had little impact on the operation of the two dams during this particular Flood Event. It is intended that they be audited when time permits, after the Flood Event."

Also, attached is a summary from Mr Barton Maher, Seqwater, on the development history of the Flood Mitigation Manual, and in particular, the extensive peer review to which both the Flood Mitigation Manual and studies that fed the development of it were subject. For example:

- the Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Study underwent an internal review by the Water Resources Group and then went to an independent review panel comprising of Professor Colin Apelt, Head of Department, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Queensland; and Mr Eric Lesleighter, Principal Hydraulic Engineer and Chief Engineer Water Resources, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation
- the 2005/2006 Brisbane Valley Flood Damage Minimisation Study involved a Project Technical Review Group involving SEQWater Corporation, the Bureau of Meteorology, SunWater, Department of Natural Resources, Mining and Water Dam Safety Regulator and WRM Consultants
- the most recent 2009 review of the Flood Mitigation Manual was subject to an expert review panel comprising of The Bureau of Meteorology; SunWater (as operator of the Flood Control Centre); the Department of Environment and Resource Management Dam Safety Regulator and Brisbane City Council. The minor changes to the Flood Mitigation Manual were extensively tested to ensure that the flood mitigation outcomes were not compromised.

I hope this proves to be of assistance.

If you have any questions, please contact me on [redacted] or via email at barry.dennien[redacted]

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

Barry Dennien [redacted]
Chief Executive Officer

Cc: Mr John Bradley
Director-General
Department of Environment and Resource Management

[redacted]
ABN: 56154707619

brian cooper consulting

12 January 2011

Mr. Barry Dennien
CEO, SEQ Water Grid Manager
PO Box 16205
City East QLD 4002

Dear Barry,

This letter report:

- presents my final findings on a review of the operation of Wivenhoe Dam (including controlled releases) for compliance against the Flood Mitigation Manual for the period 12 December 2010 to date (Flood Event), and;
- provides advice on the prudence and appropriateness of the decisions and actions taken during the Flood Event regarding the operation of Wivenhoe Dam in light of the Flood Mitigation Manual's requirements and the circumstances of the Flood Event.

The report follows on from my preliminary report sent to you earlier today. The findings and advice are provided on the basis of information provided by SEQ Water Grid Manager which comprised the Flood Mitigation Manual and Technical Situation Reports. The latter were daily (sometimes twice daily) reports for the subject period. They gave a log of rainfall over the dam catchments and the downstream river (Lockyer Ck. and Bremer R.) catchments; inflows to Somerset and Wivenhoe Dams; storage levels; releases from the dams; details of the operation of gates and other outlets (gate openings/discharges); proposed changes in operating strategies and impacts on the various access crossings downstream of Wivenhoe Dam. In reviewing the Technical Situation Reports, I prepared a spreadsheet (see separate attachment of Excel spreadsheet *Tech Reports – Summary*, summarising the reports so that a timeline of the Flood Event could be seen at a glance. This provided a good overview of the Flood Event as it unfolded and showed what information may or may not have been included in a particular report. The Queensland Director Dam Safety (Water Supply) informed me that the Flood Operation Logs contain much more detailed information including details of the communications that were carried out and some of the more detailed information that is not necessarily included in the Technical Situation Reports. I have been provided with a draft of the "*Protocol for the Communication of Flooding Information for the Brisbane River Catchment – Including Floodwater Releases from Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams*" developed in October/November last year and currently being used. The Technical Situation Reports appear to have been an outcome of that Protocol.

The various requirements and required actions detailed in the Flood Mitigation Manual are summarised in the Table given in Attachment A. The Table also gives my comments (where appropriate) on whether there is evidence from the information presented to me, that there is satisfactory compliance with these requirements and actions.

The main aspects of the Flood Mitigation Manual are the various strategies for operating Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam as well as a number of requirements relating to flood operations personnel, flood preparedness and flood training.

At Wivenhoe Dam there are four main strategies for operating the dam (W1 to W4) and at Dam there are three (S1 to S3). These strategies are hierarchical and are based on a number of flood objectives. These in descending order of importance, are:

- Ensure the structural safety of the dams;
- Provide optimum protection of urbanised areas from inundation;
- Minimise disruption to rural life in the valleys of the Brisbane and Stanley Rivers;
- Retain the storage at Full Supply Level (FSL) at the conclusion of the Flood Event, and;
- Minimise impacts to riparian flora and fauna during the drain down phase of the Flood Event.

Normal procedures require a return to FSL within 7 days of the flood event peak passing through the dams so that the potential effects of closely spaced Flood Events can be allowed for.

It is apparent from the Technical Situation Reports that emphasis has been given to communicating changes in flood operations strategies with local authorities and the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM).

Until the last day or so, Wivenhoe Dam has been below EL74.0 and accordingly, would be operating under Strategy W1 i.e. make releases such that bridges downstream of the dam do not have to be closed prematurely. For a few days at the end of December and for the last day or so before yesterday's big rise, Strategy W2 would be in place (restrain releases from Wivenhoe Dam such that Brisbane River flows are maintained within the upper limit of non-damaging floods at Lowood (3,500 m3/s)). At various times during the Flood Event some of the downstream bridges have been closed. However, it is evident that action has been taken to vary dam releases such that various bridges could be re-opened as soon as possible. This appears to have been done in accordance with the flood operating strategies. The operations then moved onto Strategy W4 when the storage in Wivenhoe Dam reached about EL 73.5 (before the W4 trigger level of EL 74) when yesterday's heavy rain came on and it was assessed that there was a chance that the first (central) fuse plug could be triggered. It was then a matter of juggling the radial gate openings in an attempt to circumvent any fuse plug triggering. A graph of storage levels for Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams (from information taken from the Technical Situation Reports) showing the limits for the various Wivenhoe Dam flood strategies is given in Attachment A. It is apparent from this graph, that the appropriate flood operation strategies were adopted. The Technical Situation Reports indicate that proposed changes in strategy were appropriately communicated with appropriate authorities in accordance with the new Communication Protocol.

Summary:

The Technical Situation Reports comply with the requirements of the new Communication Protocol. However, I feel that there could be more consistency in the information presented. There seem to be gaps in information presented such as storage levels (see spreadsheet and graph in Attachment A). It would be useful to specify the minimum information required to be presented in the Technical Situation Reports (storage levels, inflows, recent/current rainfall, forecast rainfall, releases from dams, estimated flows from downstream tributaries, current flood operating strategy for each dam and proposed change in strategy, gate and regulator operations, state of downstream road crossings etc). Most of the minimum information is already given, but not in a consistent manner. As a means of reviewing processes followed during a flood, it would be useful to present a timeline of the flood event showing graphs of storage levels and other data that can be easily presented in a graphical manner.

I am informed by the Queensland Director Dam Safety (Water Supply) that the various requirements of the Flood Mitigation Manual relating to requirements for flood operations personnel, flood preparedness and flood training have been adhered to. There are a number of other requirements however, that I am not able to say whether they were satisfied as I had insufficient information. These requirements (see Table in Attachment A) should be subject to a separate audit.

It appears to me that the decision to implement Strategy W4 was a prudent one. While it would cause some damage in the Brisbane River downstream, its implementation, considering forecast rainfalls and projected flows in Lockyer Ck. And the Bremer River, would allow reduction of the storage level in

Wivenhoe Dam. This reduction in storage level would hopefully provide a sufficient buffer that would minimise the chance of a fuse plug triggering in the auxiliary spillway. Triggering of the first (central) fuse plug would cause a sudden increase of flow of some 2,000m^3/s from Wivenhoe Dam. This increase in flow would cause significantly more flooding in the lower Brisbane River than that caused by early implementation of Strategy W4.

Conclusions:

The strategies as set out in the Flood Mitigation Manual have been followed, allowing for the discretion given to making variations in order to maximise flood mitigation effects. The actions taken and decisions made during the Flood Event appear to have been prudent and appropriate in the context of the available knowledge available to those responsible for flood operations and the way events unfolded.

There are a number of requirements where there was insufficient time given the urgency of this review, to source the necessary information for me to demonstrate compliance. However, satisfaction or otherwise of these requirements would have had little impact on the operation of the two dams during this particular Flood Event. It is intended that they be audited when time permits, after the Flood Event.

There are aspects of the Technical Situation Reports that could be improved and these have been discussed above.

Regards,

Brian Cooper

ATTACHMENT A

Action Requirements extracted from the Flood Mitigation Manual:

Action	Comment
The Flood Mitigation Manual contains the operational procedures for Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam for the purposes of flood mitigation and must be used for the operation of the dams during flood events.	Appears to have been done
Sufficient numbers of suitably qualified personnel are available to operate the dams if a Flood Event occurs.	Director of Dam Safety is satisfied
The level of flooding as a result of emptying stored floodwaters after the peak has passed is to be less than the flood peak unless accelerated release is necessary to reduce the risk of overtopping.	See Note 1
A regular process of internal audit and management review must be maintained by Seqwater to achieve improvements in the operation of the RTFM.	See Note 1
Seqwater must maintain a log of the performance of the data collection network. The log must include all revised field calibrations and changes to the number, type and locations of gauges. Senior Flood Operations and Flood Operations Engineers are to be notified of all significant changes to the Log.	See Note 1
Seqwater must maintain a log of the performance of the RTFM. Any faults to the computer hardware or software are to be noted and promptly and appropriately attend to.	See Note 1
Seqwater must ensure that all available data and other documentation is appropriately collected and catalogued for future use.	See Note 1
Seqwater must ensure that information relevant to the calibration of its field stations is shared with appropriate agencies.	See Note 1
Seqwater must liaise and consult with these agencies with a view to ensuring all information relative to the flood event is consistent and used in accordance with agreed responsibilities: • Bureau of Meteorology (issue of flood warnings for Brisbane River basin); • De partment of Environment and Resource Management (review of flood and discretionary powers); • Somerset Regional Council (flood level information for upstream of Somerset Dam and upstream and downstream of Wivenhoe Dam); • Ipswich City Council (flood level information for Ipswich), and; • Brisbane City Council (flood level information for Brisbane City).	Required also by draft of Communications Protocol. Technical Situation Reports infer compliance
Seqwater must report to the Chief Executive by 30 September each year on the training and state of preparedness of operations personnel.	See Note 1
Seqwater must provide a report to the Chief Executive by 30 September each year on the state of the Flood Monitoring and Forecasting System and Communication Networks.	See Note 1

Action	Comment
After each significant flood event, Seqwater must report to the Chief Executive on the effectiveness of the operational procedures contained in this manual.	It is too early for this action to be implemented. Will be implemented when the Flood Event is finished
Prior to the expiry of the approval period, Seqwater must review the Manual pursuant to provisions of the Act.	It is too early for this action to be implemented
Strategies are changed in response to changing rainfall forecasts and stream flow conditions to maximise the flood mitigation benefits of the dams.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that this is done
When determining dam outflows within all strategies, peak outflow should generally not exceed peak inflow.	Information from Seqwater indicates that the requirement was satisfied
Protocol for use of discretionary powers (i.e. who gets told)	Director of Dam Safety is satisfied – I don't know whether Seqwater CEO or Chairperson approved – See Note 1

Note1: For a number of the above actions, given the short time frame for the review on compliance of actual flood operations with the Flood Mitigation Manual, it was not possible to source some of the information required to confirm that requirements had been fulfilled. These actions will be audited separately, when time permits.

Action	Comment
Flood Strategies for Wivenhoe Dam:	
The intent of Strategy W1 is to not to submerge the bridges downstream of the dam prematurely (see Appendix I). The limiting condition for Strategy W1 is the submergence of Mt Crosby Weir Bridge that occurs at approximately 1,900 m^3/s . For situations where flood rains are occurring on the catchment upstream of Wivenhoe Dam and only minor rainfall is occurring downstream of the dam, releases are to be regulated to limit, as much as appropriate in the circumstances, downstream flooding.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that every attempt was made to keep the specified road crossings open
The intent of Strategy W2 is limit the flow in the Brisbane River to less than the naturally occurring peaks at Lowood and Moggill, while remaining within the upper limit of non-damaging floods at Lowood (3,500 m^3/s). In these instances, the combined peak river flows should not exceed those shown in the following table:	Technical Situation Reports indicate that Wivenhoe Dam releases were made considering concurrent flows in the Bremer River & Lockyer Ck. To delay damaging floods as long as possible
The intent of Strategy W3 is to limit the flow in the Brisbane River at Moggill to less than 4000 m^3/s, noting that 4000 m^3/s at Moggill is the upper limit of non-damaging floods downstream. The combined peak river flow targets for Strategy W3 are shown in the following table. In relation to these targets, it should be noted that depending on natural flows from the Lockyer and Bremer catchments, it may not be possible to limit the flow at Moggill to below 4000 m^3/s. In these instances, the flow at Moggill is to be kept as low as possible.	
The intent of Strategy W4 is to ensure the safety of the dam while limiting downstream impacts as much as possible. This strategy normally comes into effect when the water level in Wivenhoe Dam reaches EL74.0 m AHD. However the Senior Flood Operations Engineer may seek to invoke the discretionary powers of Section 2.8 if earlier commencement is able to prevent triggering of a fuse plug. There are no restrictions on gate opening increments or gate operating frequency once the storage level exceeds EL74.0 AHD, as the safety of the dam is of primary concern at these storage levels.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that Wivenhoe Dam releases were such as to delay adopting this strategy as long as possible
Where possible, total releases during closure should not produce greater flood levels downstream than occurred during the flood event.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that this requirement was satisfied
The aim should always be to empty stored floodwaters stored above EL 67.0m within seven days after the flood peak has passed through the dams.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that

Action	Comment
	emphasis was given to satisfying this requirement
Flow in the spillway to be as symmetrical as possible with the centre gates opened first.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that this was done
The bottom edge of the radial gates must always be at least 500mm below the release flow surface.	See Note 1 above

Action	Comment
Flood Strategies for Somerset Dam:	
The intent of Strategy S1 (Somerset Dam Level expected to exceed EL 99.0 and Wivenhoe Dam not expected to reach EL 67.0 (FSL) during the course of the Flood Event) is to return the dam to full supply level while minimising the impact on rural life upstream of the dam. Consideration is also given to minimising the downstream environmental impacts from the release.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that this was done
The intent of Strategy S2 (Somerset Dam Level expected to exceed EL 99.0 and Wivenhoe Dam level expected to exceed EL 67.0 (FSL) but not exceed EL 75.5 (fuse plug initiation) during the course of the Flood Event). This to maximise the benefits of the flood storage capabilities of the dam while protecting the structural safety of both dams. The Flood Mitigation Manual contains a graph that shows the intended interaction of the Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam storage levels.	Technical Situation Reports indicate that this was done – little information on the operation of the radial gates at Somerset Dam. How the graph was followed not really demonstrated
The intent of Strategy S3 (Somerset Dam Level expected to exceed EL 99.0 and Wivenhoe Dam level expected to exceed EL 75.5 (fuse plug initiation) during the course of the Flood Event) is to maximise the benefits of the flood storage capabilities of the dam while protecting the structural safety of both dams.	Not relevant at this stage
The safety of Somerset Dam is the primary consideration and cannot be compromised and its peak level cannot exceed EL 109.7.	Maximum level only EL103.3

Wivenhoe & Somerset Dams – Storage Level Behaviour (as presented in Technical Situation Reports)



Date	Time	TSR	Wivenhoe Dam Release (m^3/s)				Gate No.	Opening (m)	Storage Level	Rainfall (mm)
			Regulators	Hydro	Gates	Total				
12/12/2010	1400	W1								
13/12/2010	1300	W2		10	290	300				
15/12/2010	1800	W3								
16/12/2010	1600	W4			0					
17/12/2010	1200	W5								Large storms yesterday pm and night; 20-50 forecast tonight
17/12/2010	1800	W6	Closed		Opening Op. Initiated					20-50 forecast o/n
	1830			13	50	63	3	0.5		
18/12/2010	0700	W7								40-50 since 16/12/2010
19/12/2010	0700	W8			350	350	3	3.5		20-30 upper Brisbane R.
19/12/2010	1800	W9			300	300	3	3		
20/12/2010	0700	W10								
20/12/2010	0900	W11							68 expected this afternoon	
20/12/2010	0900	W12							peak 68.24 (0400); currently 68.22 (112% cap.) falling slowly	
21/12/2010	0730	W13			peak 1,280 (0500)				currently @ 67.61 (107% cap.) falling slowly	
22/12/2010	0830	W14							to finish just>FSL	none since 300 on 20/12/2010
22/12/2010	1600	W15		Closing sequence					When gates closed, will be 67.2 (0.2m > FSL) & 50mm <gate opening trigger level	
23/12/2010	0800	W16		All gates expected to be closed by 1500						10-30 in CA over last 24 hrs.; further heavy rain expected to start on 29/12/2010
23/12/2010	1430	W17			350		3	3.5	67.23	
24/12/2010	0630	W18		All gates expected to be closed by 1300					67.07 expected when all gates closed	little or no rainfall
24/12/2010	1330	W19	4,200Ml/day from reg. & Hydro	Radial gate ops ceased @ 1300			3 zero			
25/12/2010	0930	W20								10-20 over last 24 hrs

26/12/2010	0800	W21					Rel. minor over last 24 hrs.
27/12/2010	0800	W22					40-50 over dam CA last 24 hrs.
28/12/2010	0700	W23	347 (initially) then back to 46				20-40 over dam CA's ;ast 24 hrs
29/12/2010	0700	W24				69.26 (@ 0600) - aim is to return to FSL by 2/1/2011	No/very little in last 24 hrs.
30/12/2010	0700	W25	Wivenhoe+Lockyer = 1,600m^3/s			69.33 peak yesterday @ 1200 (2.3m > FSL) 69.07 this am	No/very little in last 24 hrs.
31/12/2010	0700	W26 W27	Wivenhoe+Lockyer = 1,600m^3/s			68.4 @ 0500	No/very little in last 24 hrs.
6/01/2011	1200	W28	Commence opening RG @ 1800 & ramp up to 300m^3/s by 2200			67.31 @ 0700	20-30 widespread with up to 50 on dam CA's
7/01/2011	0700	W29				67.64 @ 0600	30-50 with isolated falls up to 75; signif. Rain on Lock. Ck.
7/01/2011	1500	W30	Release started 1500 to be incr. slowly to ~1,200m^3/s by 1400 tomorrow				
8/01/2011	0700	W31	~890		All (5) RG's open	68.45 @ 0600 rising steadily	Widespread rain 20-40 over dam CA's since 0900 yesterday; further high rainfall predicted for next 4 days
9/01/2011	0700	W32 W33		1,343		Currently 68.58 (falling slowly)	For last 12 hrs. av. of 40 for Somerset CA & <10 for Wivenhoe CA
9/01/2011	2100	W34		1,400		Currently @ 69.1;	Very heavy rainfall -totals for 24 hrs 100 - 300; Severe weather warning for heavy rainfall

		W35					
		W36					
		W37					
11/01/2011	0630	W38	2,750 since 1930 on 10/1/2011		All (5) gates	73.51 rising @ 25mm/hr.	20-60 last 12 hrs in Lockyer CA; 30 in Bremer R.; Isol. Falls of 125 in upper Brisbane R. & widespread falls of 40 - 70 in Somerset CA
11/01/2011	1200	W39		3,970		74.1 (179.5% cap.) rising @ 25mm/hr.	

Comments	Crossing Closures
45,000Ml from Somerset; WL|Somerset to peak at 99.7 on 13/12/2010; 150m^3/s expected through Brisbane; 30,000Ml expected into Wivenhoe from upper Brisbane R.; peak WL in Wivenhoe expected to be 67.6; Releases expected from Wivenhoe on afternoon of 13/12/2010 ramping up to 300m^3/s; Reg. will be closed & Gate 3 opened to 3m to get WL back to 67.25; Incr. release will impact on 3 crossings; Dam Regulator informed	
138m^3/s from Somerset;	Gate release will impact on 3 crossings
Releases from Wivenhoe will cease on 16/12/2010; Hydro will continue during fish recovery ops.	
Gate closed 1000	
Decision to commence a release tonight was made this am by Duty Flood Engineers to provide as much notice to impacted Councils as possible; 60,000Ml needs to be released from Wivenhoe & Somerset to maintain FSL	
Need to release >60,000Ml from Wivenhoe & Somerset to achieve FSL	
Releases could increase to 300m^3/s;	Would impact Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing
100,000Ml to be drained in next 4 days; Q|Brisbane R. to be maintained at 300-350m^3/s;Transfer from Somerset via 2 reg.; Wivenhoe Q incr. to 150m^3/s o/n; Will incr. further to 300m^3/s as Q|Lock.Ck. Subside over next 24 hrs.; Q|Lock.Ck. Currently 130m^3/s	Twin Bridges & Savages Crossing currently closed; Colleges Crossing to be impacted in afternoon
12,000Ml/day from Somerset; Release expected until 22/12/2010;	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing currently closed
Somerset rel. steady (Q|reg.=140m^3/s); Q}Wivenhoe to be maintained at 300m^3/s (Lock.Ck. Permitting) to allow Burtons Bridge to remain open; WL|Wivenhoe expected to incr. to 67.4 over next 2 days;	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing and Colleges Crossing are closed; closing of Burtons Bridge and Kholo Bridge will be considered if more rain or inflows
Somerset risen to 100.2 - sluice gate releases to be made until am of 22/12/2010 when FSL expected; WL|Wivenhoe at 68 expected this pm; Q|Wivenhoe expected to be >1,200m^3/s - discuss with impacted Cncls.- strategy decision by 10000; Wivenhoe inflows excl. Q|Somerset peak tomorrow at 1800m^3/s	Both Burtons and Kholo bridges likely to be inundated
Inflow to Somerset to peak today at 700m^3/s; Somerset & Wivenhoe currently storing 140,000Ml above FSL; further inflows occurring; releases to be incr. o/n to ~1,200m^3/s; various Cncls. Given heads up; BOM advised	Wivenhoe releases reduced slightly to keep Burtons Bridge open - then incr. releases after Somerset RegnlCncl inform residents affected by Burtons Bridge
Same as W11	
410m^3/s from Somerset sluice gates; Somerset peaked @100.43 (1300 on 20/12/2010), currently @ 100.23 (114% of cap.); 110,700Ml Inflow to Somerset,67,500Ml discharged into Wivenhoe; Wivenhoe inflow (excl. Somerset releases) = 157,900Ml, 103,000Ml released; Total Inflow to both dams ~310,000Ml; Continued gate operations may be necessary if forecast rainfall results in subsequent river rises	Kholo Bridge is also expected to be inundated by mid-morning ; In accordance with the adopted operational strategy these bridges should be back in service by late Thursday and all bridges (with the possible exception of Twin Bridges) should be trafficable for Christmas providing no further rainfall occurs.
410m^3/s from Somerset sluice gates; Somerset currently @ 99.68 (108% cap.); 121,500Ml inflow to Somerset, 103,000Ml released to Wivenhoe; Gate Ops. @ Wivenhoe; High tides expected to coincide with peak levels in Brisbane R.	Burtons Bridge & Kholo Bridge expected to be back in service by 23-24/12/2010; All bridges expected to be trafficable by Xmas provided no further rain
BOM aware of all releases	Gate closing sequence to allow bridges to be accessible
1 sluice open @ Somerset to be closed @ 0900 - WL will be 0.1m> FSL; Est. Inflow to Somerset 135,000ML, majority discharged into Wivenhoe; Gate closure ops @ Wivenhoe in progress; Wivenhoe inflow (excl. Somerset inflow) = 204,000Ml; A total of 324,000Ml has been released; Contd. gate ops may be necessary if forecast rain results in river rises; Gate closure ops sequence to be reviewed	Projected crossing openings: Burtons Bridge – 18:00 Thursday 23 December 2010. Savages Crossing – 19:00 Thursday 23 December 2010 Kholo Bridge – 21:00 Thursday 23 December 2010 Colleges Crossing – 08:00 Friday 23 December 2010
Somerset gate ops ceased @ 0900, WL @ 99.1; Gate closure sequence extended to pm of 24/12/2010; Contd. Gate ops may be necessary if forecast rainfall gives incr. river levels	Projected crossing openings: Burtons Bridge – 18:00 Thursday 23 December 2010, Kholo Bridge - 21:00 Thursday 23 December 2010; Other bridges expected to remain closed until Xmas Day
Gate ops @ Somerset ceased yesterday, reg. to be opened to bring lake to FSL; Gate ops continuing @ Wivenhoe -1 gate incr. every 5-6 hrs to ensure Brisbane R. Q not incr. due to incr. Lock. Ck. Outflows & maintain Burtons Bridge open;	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing and Colleges Crossing are currently closed and should remain so for some time due in part to current outflows into the Brisbane River from Lockyer Creek that will peak in excess of 200 cumecs late today.
Flood Centre to monitor o/n & consider options tomorrow am based on inflows & rainfall; further gate ops may be necessary in coming days	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing and Colleges Crossing may still be affected by flows from the Lockyer.
Somerset WL incr. from 99.18 yesterday @ 0600 to 99.33 @ 0730 today; 99.5 tomorrow if no gate ops.; Wivenhoe currently 4,200Ml through hydro & reg.; 15,00Ml expected just from upper Brisbane R. in next few days; WL cont. to fall in Lock. Ck; Small rises expected in Bremer & Warrill systems; WL in Wivenhoe incr. to 67.28 @ 600	Twin Bridges, Savages and Colleges Crossing remain impacted by Wivenhoe releases and Lockyer and local runoff. Burtons and Kholo Bridges would be currently unaffected. Kholo will no doubt still be closed by Council regarding repairs.

BOM issued severe weather warning @ 0 445; Somerset WL incr. to 99.46 (0.46m> FSL) - 2 regs. To be opened today (140m^3/s); Wivenhoe WL incr. to 67.37 (0.37m > FSL); RG to be opened later today following discussions with local authorities; further gate ops may be necessary if rainfall incr. river levels	Crossings downstream of the dam are currently impacted primarily by non-controlled river flows only (no RG releases from Wivenhoe). Lockyer Creek outflows into the Brisbane River are currently in the order of 60m^3/s. Twin Bridges, Savages and Colleges Crossings will be inundated but the plan is to release around 300-350m^3/s depending on flows downstream so as to not impact Burtons Bridge.
BOM continues with severe weather warning & widespread rainfall over dam CA's; 2 regs. @ Somerset giving 139m^3/s release, lake contd. To rise to 99.6 (0.6m> FSL); RG ops @ Wivenhoe commenced yesterday @ 0900, WL contd. To rise to 67.57 (0.57m > FSL);Q|Wivenhoe reduced o/n because of incr. Q|Lockyer to ensure Burtons Bridge remains open; RG @ Wivenhoe wound back as Q|Lockyer incr. > 250m^3/s; Q|Lockyer expected to peak>500m^3/s later today/tomorrow - will innundate Burtons Bridge;When this happens, Q|Wivenhoe will be incr. to get WL back to FSL; further gate ops may be necessary in coming days	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing and Colleges Crossing currently closed; Burtons Bridge is currently open, but will be closed later today/tomorrow; Kholo Bridge remains unserviceable due to flood damage; No current expectation that either Mt Crosby Weir Bridge or Fernvale Bridge will be impacted by the current event; An updated estimate of the time of closure of Burtons Bridge this afternoon will be provided to Council RG discharge dropped back to 46m3/s to ensure Burtons Bridge can remain open; Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing, Burtons Bridge and Kholo Bridge are currently closed; No current expectation that either Mt Crosby Weir Bridge or Fernvale Bridge will be impacted by the current event; Lockyer Creek outflows being closely monitored and may come close to impacting upon the Mt Crosby Weir Bridge; England Creek access is not impacted yet
Sever weather warning no longer current; Somerset release through regs' ~ 208m^3/s;WL|Somerset incr. to 99.96 (0.96m>FSL) - inflows decreasing; RG opening dependent on Q|Lockyer; Wivenhoe WL currently @ 68.55 (1.55m > FSL); Inflows to Wivenhoe decr.	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing, Burtons Bridge and Kholo Bridge are currently closed; no current expectation that Mt Crosby Weir Bridge or Fernvale Bridge will be impacted by current event. At this stage, estimated that the flow at Burtons Bridge will fall below the bridge deck on Sunday morning.
Further 2 sluices opened @ Somerset; WL @ Somerset 99.83 & falling slowly, 2 sluices to be closed @ 1200; Intended to incr. Wivenhoe releases so Q|Wivenhoe+Q|Lockyer maintained @ 1,600m^3/s (similar Q to mid Oct &mid Dec 2010)	
2 sluices @ Somerset remain open (405m^3/s) - FSL expected by 6/1/2011; RG closing sequence expected to start mid tomorrow- RG expected to be closed on 2/1/2011	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing, Burtons Bridge and Kholo Bridge are currently closed
WL @ Somerset 99.01 (falling from peak of 100.0 - 1200 28/12/2010) - currently 2 regs;	Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Colleges Crossing, Burtons Bridge and Kholo Bridge are currently closed due to inundation
	Not included
Somerset @ 99.34 (0.34m > FSL) & rising slowly; Wivenhoe 67.31 (0.31m > FSL) & rising slowly; Gates will be opened in next 24 hrs; Lockyer Ck peak of about 100m3/s Friday afternoon	Lockyer Ck peak of about 100m3/s Friday afternoon. This will take out Twin Bridges and nearly inundate Savages Crossing. Colleges Crossing could be taken out by a combined Lockyer and local runoff. Current strategy is to keep Burton Bridge free. Gate release would limit mid-Brisbane Q to 400m^3/s ((Burtons capacity 450m^3/s).
100-200mm rain forecast for SE Qld next 5 days; Somerset WL @ 99.58 (0.59m > FSL) rising slowly - currently releasing 35m^3/s; Wivenhoe WL @ 67.64 (0.64m > FSL & > gate trigger level) rising slowly; u/s of dam river levels peaked @ Linville and Gregors Ck gauges; A peak of about 470 cumecs is expected from Lockyer Creek by mid-afternoon; Wivenhoe gate releases will occur after the impact of Lockyer flows on Burtons Bridge has been ascertained and flood levels in the lower Lockyer subside Q|Wivenhoe may be as high as 1,200m^3/s	Q|Lockyer may be of sufficient magnitude to inundate Burtons Bridge; Somerset Regional Council, Ipswich City Council and Brisbane City Council have been advised of the potential for gate operations during the next 24 hours; The relatively high Lockyer flows will adversely impact upon Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, and Colleges Crossing for several days, may also later impact upon Burtons Bridge & Kholo Bridge; not expected to be any adverse impacts upon Fernvale Bridge or Mt Crosby Weir Bridge; Councils have been advised of this strategy and are contacting residents
Somerset releasing 35m^3/s; 50,000Ml into Somerset; Gate release @ Wivenhoe - strategy to be reviewed tomorrow (dependent on further rainfall)	All of the crossings downstream of Wivenhoe with the exception of Fernvale and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge will be adversely impacted; Councils have been advised of this strategy and are contacting residents
Somerset WL @100.42 & rising (0500) - 1 open sluice gate; Water temp. held in Wivenhoe - strategy may need to be reviewed (depend. On confidence in estimates of Wivenhoe inflows); Intended to ramp Wivenhoe up to 1,200m^3/s by 1200 - likely to be incr. next week; since 2/1/2011, ~200,000Ml has flowed into Wivenhoe (incl. Somerset releases), further 180,000Ml expected based on recorded rainfall; ~ 50,000Ml released via reg. & hydro (@50m^3/s)	The projected Wivenhoe release of 1,200m3/s combined with Lockyer flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted for several days. At this stage Fernvale and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge are not expected to be affected but they could potentially be affected if the predicted rainfall totals eventuate. The current Wivenhoe Dam release combined with Lockyer flows and local runoff will mean that all low level crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Wednesday 12 January. At this stage Fernvale and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge are not expected to be affected, but this may be revised if the predicted rainfall totals eventuate and higher releases from Wivenhoe Dam are considered necessary. Cncls advised of Wivenhoe op. strategy
Somerset currently @ 100.27 - 60mm rain in last 2 hrs will cause significant inflow later today; 405m^3/s being released into Wivenhoe; maintain combined Q of 1,600m^3/s in mid-Brisbane R. Not included	
Somerset @ 101.68 rising quickly; 5 sluice gates open releasing ~1,100m^3/s; WL expected to reach 103.5 by am 11/1/2011; River levels u/s Wivenhoe rising fast; Q|Brisbane R. @ Gregors Ck @ 6,700m^3/s; Wivenhoe expected to reach 73.0 by 11/1/2011 - need to incr. Q|Wivenhoe am of 10/1/2011 - crank up to 2,600m^3/s by am 11/1/2011; Attempt to keep combined Q < 3,500m^3/s - < limit of urban damages in the City	The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Saturday 15 January in varying degrees; Water levels in the lower Brisbane R will be impacted by the combined flows of Lockyer Ck, Bremer River, local runoff and releases from Wivenhoe Dam

Not included

Not included

Not included

Somerset WL @ 103.27 & falling slowly ; currently 1,400m^3/s released to Wivenhoe- to be reduced to 500m^3/s later in the day - to ensure flood mitigation of Somerset & Wivenhoe are maximized; BOM provided advice on flash flooding in Lockyer Ck.; WL in Wivenhoe will reach 74 by evening; May need to increase Q further - may result inQ|lower Brisbane R. >5,000m^3/s

Somerset @ 103.3 & rising; Outflows into the Brisbane River from both Lockyer Creek and the Bremer River are also increasing; If no further rain, can hold @ 74.8 - aim is to prevent fuse plug triggering, situation assessed every 3 hrs.; Heavy rainfall continues throughout South East Queensland and the situation could deteriorate over the next 24 hours. The flood operation centre will continue to monitor the situation and provide situation reports every six hours until the situation stabilizes.

The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer Creek flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted; Water levels in the lower Brisbane River will be impacted by the combined flows of Lockyer Creek, Bremer River, local runoff and releases from Wivenhoe Dam.

Wivenhoe Dam – Development of Flood Operational Rules

1. Introduction

This briefing note has been prepared to detail the development of the flood operational rules for Wivenhoe and Somerset Dam and the extensive reviews undertaken for the studies.

The flood operational procedures were developed during an extensive hydrological study of the Brisbane and Pine Rivers catchments by the DPI, Water Resources between 1990 and 1994 which was reviewed by an external expert panel. Subsequently, the flood operational rules have been reviewed during the Brisbane Valley Flood Damages Minimisation Study in 2006 and the latest revision to the flood manual in 2009. Both reviews have included expert review panels comprising key stakeholders.

2. History

The Brisbane River Basin is the major water supply source for the City of Brisbane and many of the nearby local authorities. The major floods which are derived from the basin have a history of causing significant damage to the local communities.

Somerset Dam was constructed on the Stanley River over the period 1936 to 1954 and was the major regional water supply source up until the late 1970's

During the early 1970's it was identified that both the water supply and flood mitigation of Somerset Dam would need to be augmented. Shortly after the 1974 floods planning for the construction of Wivenhoe Dam began with construction commencing in 1979 and final completion being achieved in 1987.

The main functions of Wivenhoe Dam are to meet the water supply demands of the Moreton Region, provide the lower pool for the 500MW Wivenhoe Pumped Storage Project and provide flood mitigation for the cities of Brisbane and Ipswich.

Changes to the methods used to determine the rainfall for extreme events during the 1980's resulted in significant changes to the design flood for the newly constructed dam.

In 1990, the owners of the Dam, South East Queensland Water Board, undertook a dam safety review of the three dams owned and operated by the Board. A key component of this study was the Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Study.

3. Development of the Flood Operations Rules

In August 1990, the South East Queensland Water Board (SEQWB) commissioned the Department of Primary Industries, Water Resources Business Group (DPI,WR) to undertake the Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Study. The flood Study was initiated as part of an overall safety review of the Board's dams, Somerset Dam, Wivenhoe Dam and North Pine Dam. The need for the safety review of the dams stemmed from a number of factors including

- the emergence of new techniques for the estimation of probable maximum precipitation and subsequent flooding,
- the development of computer software capable of simulating the hydraulic behaviour of whole river basins and simulating dam failure scenarios,
- advancements in technology associated with real time weather monitoring.

The scope of the flood study was to review the hydrology for each dam and hydraulic aspects associated with the relevant flood studies and to develop real time model programmes for use in flood control operations and forecasting. Key aspects of the study were:

- hydrologic review
- flood operating procedure
- hydraulic analysis, flood studies
- dam break (failure) analysis
- flood inundation.

This study was undertaken from 1990 until 1994 and represented a thorough review of the flooding in the Brisbane and Pine Rivers and the associated role of the dams within the catchment.

i. Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Review

The Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Study comprise multiple reports, produced at the completion of each stage of the study. The reports were subject to extensive internal review by the Water Resources Group before being reviewed by an independent review panel comprising Professor Colin Apelt, Head of Department, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Queensland and Mr Eric Lesleighter, Principal Hydraulic Engineer and Chief Engineer Water Resources, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation.

ii. Real Time Flood Model

The outcome of the Brisbane River and Pine River Flood Studies were used to develop a real time flood model for the three dams. This real time flood model consists of alert stations within the catchment to provide real time rainfall and stream level data, a calibrated run off model to convert rainfall data into flows, a gate operating model to allow decisions on gate openings to be made and a downstream flood model to provide predictions on flood levels.

iii. Flood Operations Manual

The Flood Operation Manual is the key legislative document prepared by the owner of the dam and approved and gazetted by the Qld Dam Safety Regulator. The manual defines flood procedures, roles and responsibilities, staffing and operational requirements.

The manual in its current form was developed in 1992 using the operational procedures developed during the Brisbane and Pine Rivers Flood Study and a manual written in 1968 covering flood operations at Somerset Dam (Wivenhoe Dam was completed in 1984). Six revisions of the Manual have occurred since 1992 to account for updates to the Flood Alert Network and the Real Time Flood Models, the construction of an Auxiliary Spillway at Wivenhoe Dam in 2005 and to account for institutional and legislative changes.

The primary objectives of the procedures contained in the flood manual are, in order of importance:

- Ensure the structural safety of the dams;
- Provide optimum protection of urbanised areas from inundation;
- Minimise disruption to rural life in the valleys of the Brisbane and Stanley Rivers;
- Retain the storage at Full Supply Level at the conclusion of the Flood Event.
- Minimise impacts to riparian flora and fauna during the drain down phase of the Flood Event.

To meet the objectives, there are four strategies for Wivenhoe Dam defining the gate operations as a flood event unfolds. The first three strategies are focused on delivering the optimal flood mitigation outcomes based on inflows, downstream flooding and forecast rainfall. Once the water level in Wivenhoe Dam exceeds 7m above the normal operating level, the strategies shift from flood mitigation to ensuring that the dam is not overtopped.

4. Subsequent Reviews of the Flood Operational Procedures

iv. Brisbane Valley Flood Damage Minimisation Study

In 2005 and 2006, Brisbane City Council (BCC) undertook the Brisbane Valley Flood Damage Minimisation Study (BVFDMS) in conjunction with Ipswich City Council and Esk Shire Council. The study provided a flood damage assessment for Brisbane River floods. The study aimed to estimate the potential flood damage in the Brisbane Valley and then assess the flood operation rules for the Wivenhoe Dam flood gates to determine whether the current rules could be modified to reduce flood damage in the valley.

This extensive study involved detailed survey assessment of the flood damages within the Brisbane City and Ipswich City areas. A Project Technical Review Group was formed for the project involving:

- SEQWater Corporation
- The Bureau of Meteorology
- SunWater as the operator of the SEQWater Corporation Flood Control Centre
- NRM&W Dam Safety Regulator
- WRM Consultants

Key outcomes from this study for the Flood Operational Rules were:

- Confirmation of the 4,000m3/s flood adopted in the flood manual as the start of damaging flows in the Brisbane urban areas.
- Confirmation of the effectiveness of the existing flood operating rules as the optimal method of providing flood mitigation to Brisbane.

v. 2009 Review of the Flood Manual

In 2009, after the formation of the Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, a comprehensive review of the flood manual was undertaken. This review was focused on re-writing the manual and

refining the operational procedures. As part of this review Seqwater assembled an expert review panel comprising the following organisations.

- The Bureau of Meteorology
- SunWater as the operator of the Flood Control Centre
- DERM Dam Safety Regulator
- Brisbane City Council

Minor changes made to the manual were extensively tested to ensure that the flood mitigation outcomes from the operation of the dam were not compromised.

5. Conclusions

The flood operational procedures for Wivenhoe and Somerset Dam were developed by a comprehensive study undertaken by the DPI Water Resources between 1990 and 1994. These operational rules have been reviewed by independent parties to identify any opportunities to improve the flood mitigation outcomes including the Brisbane City Council.

Barton Maher [redacted])
Principal Dams & Weirs Planning
Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority trading as Seqwater