

### Third Statement of Colin David Jensen

I, **Colin David Jensen**, Chief Executive Officer, of [REDACTED]  
Brisbane, in the State of Queensland, state on oath as follows:

- A. I refer to my first Statement dated 25 March 2011 and provided to the Commission on that day (**First Statement**).
- B. Attachment "**CDJ-14**" is a copy of a notice from the Commissioner of the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (**Commission**) dated 7 April 2011 requiring me to provide certain information to the Commission in the form of a statement by 19 April 2011 (**Notice**). This Statement is provided in response to the Notice.
- C. For the purposes of responding to the Notice and preparing this Statement I have, in my position as Chief Executive Officer of the Brisbane City Council (**Council**), had access to:
- (a) the business records of Council; and
  - (b) Council officers,
- to obtain information to provide a response to the Notice. Unless otherwise stated, the matters set out in this Statement are based on my own knowledge and the information derived from the above sources.
- D. I set out below my responses to each of the questions set out in the Notice. I have sought to group information and documents relating to that question by reference to various relevant sources including:
- (a) Local Disaster Management Group (**LDMG**) meeting notes;
  - (b) Situation Reports issued by the Local Disaster Coordination Centre (**LDCC**);
  - (c) the LDCC operations log for the period 10 January 2011 to 1 February 2011 (**LDCC Log**);
  - (d) Council email correspondence; and
  - (e) other data retained by Council (including for example, Facebook posts, tweets and community announcements).

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- E. The documents from the above sources and attached to this Statement have been collated by Council officers under my instruction.
- F. As Local Disaster Coordinator (**LDC**), I attended all LDMG meetings during the flood event in Brisbane in January of 2011 (**January 2011 Flood Event**). The LDMG meeting notes briefly record, in summary form, key topics discussed at those meetings. These notes are not a transcript of the meetings and were designed to be an action summary list. Attachment "**CDJ - 15**" is a bundle of LDMG meeting notes relevant to the Notice. I do not comment further on these notes in this statement as they speak for themselves.
- G. The LDCC prepared and produced a number of Situation Reports throughout the January 2011 Flood Event. Attachment "**CDJ-16**" is a copy of LDCC Situation Reports relevant to the Notice.
- H. The LDCC Log is maintained by the LDCC and updated by administrative staff on an ongoing basis during an event. The information used to create the LDCC Log is sourced from requests to and from the LDCC during the January 2011 Flood Event as well as being a record of the actions taken and information gathered by the LDCC during that period. Although every effort was made to accurately maintain the LDCC Log, given the large number of communications and the circumstances under which the LDCC was operating during January 2011 Flood Event, the LDCC Log may not include all LDCC activities during that period. The extracts from the LDCC Log that appears as attachments to this statement all have the date "10 January 2011" as part of the heading of that document. This is because it is an event log and the LDCC commenced its operations on 10 January 2011. The LDCC Log is a running log that covers the period 10 January 2011 to 1 February 2011. However, individual dates do not appear as part of the log. Where they exist, relevant extracts from the LDCC Log for each question in the Notice will form a separate attachment under each question.
- I. The relevant Council email correspondence and other data is bundled according to each question (set out below) and, where such emails and data exist, will form a separate attachment under each question.
- J. Council, through the LDCC, obtained information from a large number of different sources including, but not limited to:

(a) the public;



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- (b) the State Emergency Services (SES);
- (c) other State government agencies;
- (d) certain media reports;
- (e) utility providers;
- (f) the District Disaster Co-ordinator (DDC);
- (g) the Australian Defence Force (ADF);
- (h) Council officers; and
- (i) local and state government members.

K. This information was processed by the LDCC and actioned.

L. The LDMG was responsible for the overall management of the response for the Brisbane District and, where necessary, directed the response through the LDCC or other members of the LDMG as required.

M. Questions 1 to 4 of the Notice request that I provide any recommendations on topics the subject of that question. As set out in my first statement, Council's Flood Response Review Board (FRRB) is due to release its report in May of 2011 (which will be delivered to the Commission). Accordingly, unless specifically mentioned below, I do not intend, at this early stage, to provide suggested recommendations, unless those recommendations may fall outside the scope of the FRRB Report.

1. **Moggill/Bellbowrie/Karana Downs/Mt Crosby (Far Western Suburbs)**

1.1 Attachment "CDJ-17" is a copy of extracts from the LDCC Log, relevant to question 1 of the Notice.

1.2 Attachment "CDJ-18" is a copy of a bundle of emails, relevant to question 1 of the Notice.

(a) *Details of the information received by the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) and/or Local Disaster Coordinator (LDC) regarding the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the far western suburbs, including the source/s of that information and when it was received.*

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- 1.3 The information received by the LDCC and the LDMG revealed that a number of suburbs in the far west were physically isolated for a period of approximately 2 days. Whilst there was flooding in these areas, compared to other areas in Brisbane it involved the inundation of relatively few properties. There was sufficient communication with this area to ensure that Council was aware of the difficulties being experienced by residents and to ensure that Council's response was appropriately prioritised across the City.
- 1.4 There was no known threat of loss of life or serious injury associated with the flood in the Far Western Suburbs.
- 1.5 Table 1 below is a summary of the information relevant to 1(a) of the Notice (as set out in full in the attachments to this Statement) and the source of that information (which is generally apparent from the document itself).
- 1.6 LDCC - Situation Reports

**Table 1**

SITREP number	DATE		COMMENTS	SOURCE
1	08.01.2011	0600	Floodwise flooded roads includes Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby. All crossings downstream of Wivenhoe will be adversely impacted.	Floodwise / Flood Information Centre ( <b>FIC</b> )
1	08.01.2011	0600	Moggill Ferry remains closed	Brisbane Metropolitan Transport Management Centre ( <b>BMTMC</b> )
2	08.01.2011	1500	Floodwise flooded roads includes Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby. All crossings downstream of Wivenhoe will be adversely impacted.	Floodwise / FIC
2	08.01.2011	1500	Moggill Ferry remains closed	BMTMC

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3	09.01.2011	0600	Floodwise flooded roads includes Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby. All low level crossings downstream of Wivenhoe will be adversely impacted. If falls are greater than forecast, releases from Wivenhoe may need to adversely impact Mt Crosby Weir Bridge (1,900m <sup>3</sup> /s).	Floodwise / FIC
3	09.01.2011	0600	Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby closed due to Wivenhoe releases.	BMTMC
4	09.01.2011	1500	Floodwise flooded roads includes Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby.	Floodwise / FIC
4	09.01.2011	1500	Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby closed due to Wivenhoe Dam release.	BMTMC
7	10.01.2011	0600	Colleges Crossing and Mt Crosby Weir, Mt Crosby, closed	Floodwise / FIC
7	10.01.2011	0600	Mt Crosby Weir closed between Allawah Rd and Stumers Rd, Colleges Crossing closed due to Wivenhoe releases, Moggill Ferry is out of service.	BMTMC
8	10.01.2011	1530	Mt Crosby Weir Bridge inundated and closed	Floodwise / FIC
8	10.01.2011	1530	Kangaroo Gully Road, Bellbowrie closed due to heavy rain	BMTMC
8	10.01.2011	1530	All crossings downstream of Wivenhoe closed including Colleges Crossing and Mt Crosby	Floodwise / FIC

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			Weir	
9	10.01.2011	2200	Lowest rainfall of 40mm occurring at Moggill.	FIC
9	10.01.2011	2200	River crossings downstream of Wivenhoe will be adversely impacted including Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing.	FIC
9	10.01.2011	2200	Floodwise flooded roads include Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby.	Floodwise / FIC
10	11.01.2011	0200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Bellbowrie	FIC
10	11.01.200	0200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Karana Downs	FIC
10	11.01.2011	0200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Moggill and Mt Crosby	FIC
11	11.01.2011	0800	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Bellbowrie	FIC
11	11.01.2011	0800	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Karana Downs	FIC
11	11.01.2011	0800	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Moggill and Mt Crosby	FIC
12	11.01.2011	1530	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Bellbowrie	FIC



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12	11.01.2011	1530	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Karana Downs	FIC
12	11.01.2011	1530	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Mt Crosby and Moggill	FIC
12	11.01.2011	1530	Road Closure - Kangaroo Gully Road, Bellbowrie	
13	11.01.2011	2200	RRG ( <b>Rapid Response Group</b> ) list of property inspections includes Bellbowrie and Milton	RRG
13	11.01.2011	2200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Moggill	FIC
13	11.01.2011	2200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Bellbowrie and Mt Crosby	FIC
13	11.01.2011	2200	List of streets potentially affected by floods - includes streets in Karana Downs	FIC
13	11.01.2011	2200	SES Moggill Group isolated, with members confined to Karana Downs and Mt Crosby areas. Some Moggill SES members are stranded in Bellbowrie or otherwise unable to return to their group or their home.	SES
15	12.01.2011	0600	Road closures as a result of flooding affecting Kangaroo Gully Road, Bellbowrie and Tanderra Way, Karana Downs	BMTMC

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16	12.01.2011	1530	Evacuation centre updates including unauthorised centres such as Moggill Uniting Church.	Evacuation Centres
16	12.01.2011	1530	List of streets potentially affected by floods if flow rates reach 12,000m <sup>3</sup> /s include streets in Bellbowrie, Karana Downs, Moggill and Mt Crosby	
16	12.01.2011	1530	List of streets potentially affected by floods if flow rates reach 9,500m <sup>3</sup> /s include streets in Bellbowrie and Karana Downs	
16	12.01.2011	1530	4 water pumps without power including Bellbowrie.	QUU
16	12.01.2011	1530	3 major wastewater treatment plants flooded including at Karana Downs. Expected that Karana Downs treatment plant will be flooded and not operating.	QUU
16	12.01.2011	1530	Road closures as a result of flooding in Brisbane suburbs including Karana Downs and Bellbowrie	
16	12.01.2011	1530	Evacuation centre updates including unauthorised centres such as Moggill Uniting Church.	
17	12.01.2011	2200	All roads West and North of Brisbane are said to be impacted.	
17	12.01.2011	2200	Optus Communications - possible outage includes	

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			Karana Downs	
18	13.01.2011	0200	Predictions that water levels will subside in the most upstream suburbs first including Bellbowrie	FIC
18	13.01.2011	0200	5 water pump stations without power - including Bellbowrie and Karana Downs. 3 major wastewater treatment plants flooded including Karana Downs. 4 major wastewater treatment plant anticipated to be flooded and not operating, including Karana Downs.	QUU
19	13.01.2011	0600	Predictions that water levels will subside in the most upstream suburbs first including Bellbowrie	FIC
19	13.01.2011	0600	Evacuation centre updates including unauthorised centres such as Moggill Uniting Church.	
19	13.01.2011	0600	Annexure Energex affected suburbs including Bellbowrie and Moggill	Energex
19	13.01.2011	0600	3 major wastewater treatment plants are flooded and 1 is without access to power and access due to flood. All 4 are not operational including Karana Downs.	QUU
20	13.01.2011	1530	2 water pump stations without power, including Bellbowrie.	QUU

  
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20	13.01.2011	1530	3 major wastewater treatment plants are flooded and 1 is without access to power and access due to flood. All 4 are not operational including Karana Downs.	QUU
20	13.01.2011	1530	Evacuation centre update includes Moggill Uniting Church	
21	13.01.2011	2200	Evacuation centre update including Moggill Uniting Church	
22	14.01.2011	0200	Limited food supplies at various locations including Moggill Uniting Church and Mt Crosby State School and numbers of evacuees.	
22	14.01.2011	0200	3 major wastewater treatment plants are flooded and 1 is without access to power and access due to flood. All 4 are not operational including Karana Downs.	QUU
23	14.01.2011	0600	Limited food supplies at various locations including Moggill Uniting Church and Mt Crosby State School and numbers of evacuees.	
23	14.01.2011	0600	Total predicted flooded properties including Bellbowrie and Karana Downs (0 properties).	
24	14.01.2011	1530	Unable to establish requirement for bottled water in Karana Downs, Bellbowrie and Moggill.	
25	14.01.2011	2200	Energex percentage restoration across the city refers to Bellbowrie	Energex

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26	15.01.2011	0200	Major wastewater treatment plants (including Karana Downs) are flooded and not operating	QUU
27	15.01.2011	0600	Annexure B Energex list of affected suburbs includes Bellbowrie and Moggill	Energex
27	15.01.2011	0600	Major wastewater treatment plants (Karana Downs, Oxley, Fairfield, Wacol) are flooded and not operating	QUU
28	15.01.2011	1530	Numbers of streets cleared in the west (specifically excluding Bellbowrie).	RMIT
28	15.01.2011	1530	450 ADF soldiers operating north of the river, including Bellbowrie, Moggill. Working in Sector T.	ADF
28	15.01.2011	1530	Major wastewater treatment plants including Karana Downs are flooded and not operating	QUU
28	15.01.2011	1530	Annexure A skip bin locations - Bellbowrie Plaza	City Waste Services
28	15.01.2011	1530	Annexure B Energex list of affected suburbs includes Bellbowrie and Moggill	Energex
30	16.01.2011	0200	3 wastewater treatment plants have been flooded and are not operating including Karana Downs.	QUU
31	16.01.2011	0600	List of suburbs affected by electricity outages includes Bellbowrie and	Energex

  
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			Moggill.	
31	16.01.2011	0600	3 wastewater treatment plants have been flooded and are not operating including Karana Downs.	QUU
32	16.01.2011	1530	Summary of deployment to priority locations including includes Bellbowrie - Moggill Primary School, Cnr Kangaroo Gully and Moggill Road	
32	16.01.2011	1530	3 wastewater treatment plants have been flooded and are not operating including Karana Downs.	QUU
32	16.01.2011	1530	Annexure B Energex list of affected suburbs includes Bellbowrie and Moggill.	Energex
33	16.01.2011	2200	Sectors used by Council and other agencies - references sector S (Bellbowrie) and T (Moggill and Mt Crosby)	
33	16.01.2011	2200	List of suburbs affected by electricity outages including Bellbowrie and Moggill.	Energex
34	17.01.2011	0200	Mt Crosby water treatment plant at full supply, major wastewater treatment plants still not operating (including Karana Downs).	QUU
35	17.01.2011	0600	Mt Crosby water treatment plant at full supply, major wastewater treatment plants still not operating (including Karana	QUU



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			Downs).	
36	17.01.2011	1530	ADF handed back sector T - Moggill and Bellbowrie back to Council	ADF
36	17.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operating	QUU
36	17.01.2011	1530	List of suburbs affected by electricity outages including Bellbowrie, Moggill, Karana Downs	Energex
37	17.01.2011	2200	Sectors used by Council and other agencies - references sector S (Bellbowrie) and T (Moggill and Mt Crosby)	
39	18.01.2011	0600	Energex affected suburbs including Bellbowrie and Moggill	Energex
40	18.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operating	QUU
40	18.01.2011	1530	Energex affected suburbs including Bellbowrie	Energex
42	19.01.2011	0200	Energex affected suburbs including Bellbowrie	Energex
43	19.01.2011	0600	Energex affected suburbs including Bellbowrie	Energex
44	19.01.2011	1530	List of partially flooded suburbs -includes Karana Downs, Bellbowrie and Mt Crosby	FIC update

  
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44	19.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operational	QUU
44	19.01.2011	1530	Moggill Ferry out of service until further notice	
47	20.01.2011	0600	Energex list of affected suburbs includes Bellbowrie	Energex
48	20.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operational	QUU
			Affected parks	
52	21.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operational - cleanup underway.	QUU
53	21.01.2011	2200	Additional water in the Lockyer Creek likely to keep Colleges Crossing inundated	FIC
53	21.01.2011	2200	ADF has handed back Sector T (Moggill and Bellbowrie) to Council	
56	22.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant operational - primary treatment only	QUU
57	22.01.2011	2200	Karana Downs water treatment plant operational - primary treatment only	QUU
60	23.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant operational - primary treatment only	QUU
60	23.01.2011	1530	Aerial assessment estimates various suburbs including Bellbowrie to be 97-98% clean	DERM

  
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60	23.01.2011	1530	Landslip at Bellbowrie, geotechnical assessment undertaken	
60	23.01.2011	1530	Bellbowrie shopping centre used as temporary disposal site	
61	23.01.2011	2200	Karana Downs water treatment plant operational - primary treatment only	QUU
61	23.01.2011	2200	Reports of subsidence at various suburbs including Bellbowrie	DERM
63	24.01.2011	0600	Moggill Ferry out of service until further notice	
64	24.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs water treatment plant operational - primary treatment only	QUU
64	24.01.2011	1530	Minor tree clearing works at Karana Downs	
72	27.01.2011	1530	Kookaburra Park West, Karana downs remains partially closed.	
24	14.01.2011	1530	Priority cleaning of transport routes including Moggill Road.	
28	15.01.2011	1530	Food drops have been discontinued to Mt Crosby as 12 tonnes already delivered, roads are open and there are no known isolated properties.	

  
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73	28.01.2011	0600	Possible wastewater contamination in several parks including the Park next to Illawong Reserve and Burrum Park (Karana Downs). Karana Downs Country Club Golf Link advised to cease using waterways and recycled water for irrigation due to contamination.
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*(b) Details of the action/s taken by the LDMG/LDC in response to the 2010/2011 flood events in the far western suburbs to protect life and private and public property, including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.*

- 1.7 The residents of the Far Western Suburbs were given the same level of consideration as residents of other locations in the City of Brisbane. The details of Council's response are outlined in Council's Initial Submission to the Commission dated 11 March 2011 (**Initial Submission**) as well as in my First Statement.
- 1.8 Relevantly, the priorities of the LDMG and LDCC were to:
- (a) prevent loss of life;
  - (b) prevent serious injury;
  - (c) minimise damage to private property;
  - (d) minimise damage to infrastructure and maintain the provision of essential services; and
  - (e) minimise damage to public property.
- 1.9 The LDMG and LDCC prioritised the allocation of resources as soon as they became available. The initial focus was to allocate resources to the immediate response needs. As the response progressed, additional resources became available and were allocated as required.
- 1.10 I detail below certain matters specific to these suburbs. However, in the course of responding to the flood, the Council engaged in many activities designed to best manage, respond and recover from the flood that assisted or were advantageous to particular suburbs without specifically having that geographic location in mind. They were many in number, some major

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and some minor. The sole criteria for the allocation of resources was Council's assessment of relative need.

1.11 The details of the response are summarised in Table 2 below, however, in particular:

- (a) the LDCC began receiving requests for food and supplies to be delivered to Mt Crosby prior to 2:00am on 13 January 2011. These requests were received just prior to the flood peak in Brisbane City at 2:57am on 13 January 2011;
- (b) in response to requests for food, medical supplies and other essential items, the LDCC sourced the items and arranged for the delivery of those items (through the DDC and, in turn, the State Disaster Coordinator) by the ADF to the isolated residents in the Far Western Suburbs. These items were transported by:
  - (i) six deliveries by ADF medium-lift all-terrain vehicles each with a capacity of 5-tonne; and
  - (ii) a Black Hawk helicopter.
- (c) in addition, Council subsequently made further deliveries with its own trucks;
- (d) normal road access to the Far Western Suburbs commenced to be open from approximately 1:45pm on Friday, 14 January 2011.

1.12 The response was based on knowledge of prior events (such as the 1974 floods) and modelling, which indicated that the flood waters may take a few days to recede. Accordingly, the supply was provided in a timely manner through the use of ADF transport assets. Ultimately however, the flood waters receded a lot quicker than anticipated and normal road access was progressively resumed sooner.

1.13 LDCC Situation Reports

**Table 2**

SITREP number	DATE		COMMENTS	SOURCE
13	11.01.2011	2200	Suburb inspections include Bellbowrie and Moggill. Road Closures in Karana Downs.	Reported to LDCC via RRG (Rapid Response Group)

  
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18	13.01.2011	0200	RFA for food to Mt Crosby for potential air transport of food and supplies has been escalated to the DDC.	
21	13.01.2011	2200	RFA - food to be delivered to Bellbowrie. ADF are delivering food. Request being finalised.	
22	14.01.2011	0200	Mt Crosby food drop will take place tomorrow morning by ADF.	
22	14.01.2011	0200	APS advise that 1 ADF MOG vehicle arrived at Moggill Uniting Church. 8 ADF personnel will remain at Bellbowrie Shopping Village to undertake security. 5 x ADF MOGS will deliver the rest of the food tonight.	ADF
23	14.01.2011	0600	at 0300hrs, LDCC was advised that 30 soldiers would deliver 5 truck loads of supplies to Moggill Evacuation Centre. Limited food supplies available at Moggill and Mt Crosby. Update on evacuation centres (232).	ADF
24	14.01.2011	1530	Mt Crosby was supplied via air drop with provisions today at approximately 1330.	
28	15.01.2011	1530	450 ADF soldiers operating north of the river, including Bellbowrie, Moggill. Working in Sector T.	ADF
30	16.01.2011	200	Moggill Primary School in Bellbowrie selected as one of the drop off points to be used in the volunteer clean up.	

  
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31	16.01.2011	600	Priority locations for clean up identified - including Bellbowrie - Moggill Primary School, Cnr Kangaroo Gully and Moggill Road	Forward Planning Group - LDCC
33	16.01.2011	2200	Current Skip Bin Location - Bellbowrie, Karana Downs, Mt Crosby.	City Waste Services
33	16.01.2011	2200	Removal of waste from Chicken Farm at Moggill.	
33	16.01.2011	2200	Sites where bins will soon be delivered - Karana Downs, Moggill.	
36	17.01.2011	1530	Ongoing investigation into the Moggill Chicken Farm	CARS EHO's
37	17.01.2011	2200	Aerial recon undertaken upstream to Moggill Creek.	
40	18.01.2011	1530	Monitoring/check points for mosquito and pest control to be established at a number of locations including Bellbowrie.	RMIT - LAS
40	18.01.2011	1530	ADF confirmed first pass of various sectors including sector t - Moggill and Bellbowrie	ADF
			RMIT west identified suburbs they were working in including Bellbowrie	RMIT
42	19.01.2011	0200	SES groups activated to various areas including Moggill.	SES
44	19.01.2011	1530	Monitoring/check points for mosquito and pest control yet to be established at a number of locations including Bellbowrie.	RMIT -LAS
48	20.01.2011	1530	Temporary Disposal sites - Bellbowrie (closed),	City Waste Services



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			Karana Downs (Closed),	
49	20.01.2011	2200	Review found that Karana Downs was not positioned in any of the recovery sectors. West RMIT advised that the work in this area had been completed. It was recommended that the sectorisation of the affected areas did not change.	
49	20.01.2011	2200	ADF has handed back Sector T to Council	
53	21.01.2011	2200	Bridge assessment including Colleges Crossing, Mt Crosby Weir Bridge. Rainfall (lowest at Mt Crosby).	
53	21.01.2011		Karana Downs water treatment plant still not operational - cleanup underway. Advice received that Mt Crosby WTP may have to reduce output over the next 24 hrs due to turbidity. QUU has begun filling reservoirs as a precaution.	QUU
57	22.01.2011	2200	Aerial assessment undertaken to determine volunteer efforts in parks, and provide a status update as well as to investigate debris grounded on private property adjacent to the river. Assessment undertaken from Bulimba to Moggill.	
54	22.01.2011	0200	Adopt a Park - Illawong Reserve Sports Club, Karana Downs, Booker Place Park, Bellbowrie	

  
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60	23.01.2011	1530	Aerial Assessment - Bellbowrie and other suburbs of Brisbane	
60	23.01.2011	1530	Landslips - Priors Pocket Road - Moggill, Atkinson Drive and Illawong Way - Karana Downs, Birkin Road and Hawkesbury Road - Bellbowrie. Geotechnical assessments.	
60	23.01.2011	1530	Temporary Disposal sites - Illawong Way - Karana Downs, Bellbowrie Shopping Centre.	City Waste Services
60	23.01.2011	1530	ADF advised they were commencing tree removal in Sector E and Karana Downs (no sector).	ADF
61	23.01.2011	2200	Aerial assessment undertaken to confirm street assessments, update Council temporary disposal sites and investigate illegal dumping including suburb of Bellbowrie. Subsidence was identified along the river (including at Moggill and Bellbowrie).	
61	23.01.2011	2200	Focus for kerbside collections is on priority locations (Sector T and Bellbowrie identified).	
64	24.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs, Kookaburra Park minor tree clearing works commenced.	ADF


  
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65	24.01.2011	2200	Aerial Assessment identified parks that had sustained significant damage - Kookaburra Park West (Karana Downs) and Mt Crosby Sports Ground (Mt Crosby). Found to be unusable for Australia Day celebrations.	
65	24.01.2011	2200	Council Environmental Health officers undertaking inspections of premises with ERA's and FCC's (including Bellbowrie).	
68	24.01.2011	1530	Karana Downs, Kookaburra Park minor tree clearing works to be completed by COB.	
24			Priority cleaning of transport routes including Moggill road.	
28	15.01.2011		Food drops have been discontinued to Mt Crosby as 12 tonnes already delivered, roads are open and there are no known isolated properties.	
73	28.01.2011	0600	Possible wastewater contamination in several parks including the Park next to Illawong Reserve and Burrum Park (Karana Downs). Karana Downs Country Club Golf Link advised to cease using waterways and recycled water for irrigation due to contamination.	

**(c) Details and timing of any requests for assistance received in relation to the far western suburbs**

1.14 The details and timing of requests received in relation to the Far Western Suburbs are:

set out in emails forming Attachment CDJ-18 to this Statement ;

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Witness

- (b) set out in the LDCC Log Extract at BCC.047.0065 within Attachment CDJ-17;
- (c) mentioned in Situation Reports 17, 20 and 22 (forming part of Attachment CDJ-16).

1.15 Some key issues responded to by the LDCC and Council include:

- (a) secure disposal of medical waste;
- (b) mosquito control;
- (c) road safety inspections (Mt Crosby Weir);
- (d) assistance with evacuation by ambulance;
- (e) delivery of food, water, toiletries, essential items (e.g. gas, batteries and generators) and medical supplies;
- (f) provision of waste disposal skips;
- (g) kerbside waste collection; and
- (h) assistance with clean-up of the Moggill Chicken Farm, including removal of chicken carcasses.

**(d) Details and timing of resupply efforts to the far western suburbs**

1.16 The details of resupply efforts to the Far Western Suburbs are:

- (a) summarised in an extract from the LDCC Log at Table 3 below;
- (b) referred to in paragraph 1.15 above; and
- (c) set out in emails and other material forming part of Attachment CDJ-18.

1.17 Some key matters regarding the timing and resupply efforts (in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 1.15 above) relevant to the LDCC and Council include:

- (a) arranging an aerial survey of the River to assist in response coordination. This assisted with the confirmation of need and allocation of response (see Situation Report 25 at BCC.007.0598 within Attachment CDJ-16; and

  
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Witness

- (b) in relation to the delivery of medical supplies, Council coordinated the necessary items for isolated residents with local doctors. Some of the items to be supplied included medicine that, ordinarily, would require the provision by a doctor of a "provider number" for prescriptions. In this case the doctor could recite their provider number but did not have access to the usual documentation. There was some delay in the provision of the medical supplies (which were to be transported by Black Hawk helicopter) whilst Queensland Health authorised the supply. Ultimately, the supply was authorised on the condition that a doctor (and/or a registered nurse in the area) was responsible for the receipt, storage and distribution of the medicine.

1.18 LDCC Log Extract

**Table 3**

<b>12/01/2011</b>	
16:15	Received notification from LDCC via email advising that food drop was required to a group of isolated residents who have sought refuge at Mt Crosby State School, Mt Crosby due to isolation
16:30	DMG contacted Mt Crosby State School via phone who confirmed that they were isolated and required food and water
	DMG completed a Request for Assistance for a helicopter for food drops to Mt Crosby State School
20:40	DMG received a phone call from the GP (Mt Crosby State School) who provided a list of medical supplies required.
	DMG emailed the list of medical supplies to the LDCC advising that these were required to be dropped off with the food.
21:00	First request for both medical supplies and food drop for Mt Crosby stalled due to District declining request for medical supplies as they were unable to confirm that the doctor was a registered doctor with Queensland Health
<b>13/01/2011</b>	

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Witness

7:00	DMG tried to contact the school but no answer
	DMG received a phone call from Leanne from Karana Downs Police Station touching base to confirm that the food / helicopter had been ordered
	DMG was verbally told in passing by a member of the LDCC that the DCC has requested that the LDCC source the food and they will source the transport (helicopter).
16:15	Coles Coorparoo was contacted in relation to request for food for both Mt Crosby food drop, LDCC was advised to contact the distribution centre at Forest Lake directly as the amount required was too large for one store to supply
16:30	Coles distribution centre at Forest Lake (distribution manager Phil) was contacted by the LDCC (logistics) to arrange food request for both Mt Crosby ( School) . Both list where emailed to the distribution centre for Coles to pack
17:00	Request for assistance for a helicopter sent to District for food drop at Mt Crosby . Request for the medical supplies sent to district.
18:00	LDCC contacted District to see what was happening in relation to the helicopter for the Mt Crosby food and medical drop. EMQ was advised that the helicopter was on standby for the food drop to Mt Crosby
18:15	EMQ spoke with a rep from QLD Health and was advised that the medical supplies for Mt Crosby would not be supplied. EMQ advised LDCC



Colin David Jensen



Witness

18:15	LAVIN - (Uniting Church) Army enroute to pick up food from the Coles distribution Centre at 44 Stradbroke St, Forest Lake. Police officers at the scene are coordinating the community and will coordinate distribution. Travel time from Forest Lake to Bellbowrie is estimated at 22km (45min - 1hr). Coles will advise when Army have collected. Speak with A/SSgt Paul Brownie at the MIR/DDCC. DDCC will call when food arrives. Most people in the community took preparation. The evacuation centre is coordinating. Have cooking facilities. 8 police in the community. Only 4 people stayed overnight at the evac centre. Fuel had been siphoned from vehicles for use.
18:30	LDCC contacted District to see what time the helicopter would be ready for the delivery of the food drop for Mt Crosby and was advised that the helicopter was still outstanding
18:45	IC and Disaster Management Coordinator were advised that the helicopter was still being sourced by District and the food drop would not take place now until the morning of the 14 January 2011
19:00	LDCC spoke with Sgt Cherrie Crane from District who advised LDCC to be able to source the helicopter they would need the following information from Coles tonnage/size of the pallets of food (17)
19:10	LDCC called district and advise that the information from Coles was being gathered and Coles would advise once they had this information but it would take a couple of hours
19:15	LDCC called district and suggested that maybe a Blackhawk helicopter may be the best transport for the food drop to Mt Crosby
19:40	LAVIN - (Anglican Church) Received advice that an Army MOG had arrived at Coles Distribution Centre. There were 2 pallets of food. This was too large and had to be broken apart.
19:55	LAVIN - (Mt Crosby State School) Speak with Dr Jane Baker [REDACTED] who was at an evac centre at the Mt Crosby State School. Medical re-supply requested. Working with Dr Andrew LOK. 5 x Intravenous normal saline, 5 x IV drip tubes, 5 x Neocate, 5 x 2.5mg Zyprexa, 5 x 150mg Efexor. Speak Sgt Sherry Crane at the DDCC and pass on medication details. Arrangements made for Dr Baker to call

Colin David Jensen

Witness

	DDCC (Crane).
20:00	Chris Lavin from the LDCC spoke with Cherie Crane (District) who advised that the LDCC contact the doctor at Mt Crosby and ask her to contact District as Qld Health required sign off on the medical supplied that had been requested
20:30	Coles distribution called LDCC wanting to know what was happening with the helicopter for the Food drop for Mt Crosby as they where going to transport the food to the pick up zone
21:15	LDCC spoke with the doctor's husband at Mt Crosby and advised him of the requirement for QLD Health to sign off for the Medical supplied for the drop
21:20	LDCC called District for update on helicopter for the medical supplies and food drop for Mt Crosby and were advised that there was no ETA on when the helicopter would be ready
21:45	LDCC advised that the doctor from Mt Crosby was talking with a member from QLD Health to arrange medical supplied for Mt Crosby
22:15	LDCC contact District Cherie Crane to find out the ETA of the helicopter for Mt Crosby drop advised until the information from Coles was received unable to give ETA
23:00	LAVIN - Received advice from Craig Morrow at DDCC that the Army MOG had arrived at Bellbowrie (Anglican Church). Another 5 MOGS would collect remainder of the food and deliver tonight. 8 ADF personnel in the first MOG will remain overnight and conduct security of the Bellbowrie Shopping Village
22:30	Coles distribution centre advised LDCC of the tonnage, size and number of pallets to be drop to Mt Crosby
22:45	LDCC advised District of the information received from Coles in relation to the pallets of food for Mt Crosby
23:00	LDCC was advised that the doctor from Mt Crosby was still talking with QLD

  
Colin David Jensen

  
Witness

	Health for the medical supplies for Mt Crosby
<b>14/01/2011</b>	
	LDCC advised that the helicopter would be sent to Mt Crosby some time on Friday 14 January 2011 to be advised
9:45	Spoke with Margot from logistics at District who advised LDCC that the trucks where at Coles distribution centre being loaded for transport to Amberley airbase
9:30	LDCC advised that the medical supplies and food drop for Mt Crosby had left Coles distribution centre with police escort and were on route to Amberley airbase
10:45	LDCC advised that the supplies both medical and food had arrived at Amberley airbase
	DMG advised that the helicopter drop for Mt Crosby School had still not occurred. Gordana asked to manage a specific taskforce to ensure that Council is providing dedicated resources to ensure all Mt Crosby residents were taken care of. Gordana met with LDCC logistics, SES, QPS to get an update and allocated specific resources with tasks to ensure action for Mt Crosby State School, Moggill Church and individual isolated property incidents.
11:30	LDCC received call from District who advised that the drop time at Mt Crosby would be between 13:00 - 15:00 hours
1330	LDCC advised by Gayle (QPS) that choppers are in the air en route to Mt Crosby School
1337	DMG advised choppers have landed at the school
13:45	DMG advised that Moggill Road is now open to traffic

*(e) Details of any privately initiated relief efforts, including proposed aerial relief operations, and the response to such efforts and the reasons therefore.*

1.19 I do not know of any privately initiated relief efforts.

  
Colin David Jensen

  
Witness

*(f) Details of the State Emergency Service personnel and equipment available, both operable and inoperable, in the far western suburbs during the 2010/2011 flood events, including information about how such personnel and equipment were deployed and/or functioned.*

1.20 Due to the operational arrangements that exist between the Council and the State, which controls the SES, Council does not maintain a record of, or ordinarily receive, this information first hand. Accordingly, I have requested this information from the SES. Attachment "CDJ-19" is a report from Lowry Boyd, Acting Local Controller of the Brisbane City SES Unit dated 14 April 2011 which sets out the SES capability and response during the January 2011 Flood Event as it related to the Far Western Suburbs.

1.21 Whilst the operational arrangements for the SES do not directly involve the Council, both the LDCC and LDMG have liaison representatives from Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) to ensure effective coordination.

*(g) Any recommendations in relation to preparing for, and responding to, future flood events in the far western suburbs.*

1.22 I refer to my comments at paragraph M of this Statement.

2. **River hazards**

2.1 Attachment "CDJ-20" is a copy of extracts from the LDCC Log, relevant to question 2 of the Notice.

2.2 Attachment "CDJ-21" is a bundle of material in relation to topic 2 of the Notice.

*(a) Identification of those vessels or structures which became hazardous to life and private and public property (river hazards), during the 2010/2011 flood events, including in particular (i) the Riverwalk; (ii) the Moggill Ferry; (iii) the Drift Restaurant; (iv) CityCat terminals; (v) Dockside Marina; (vi) The Island; (vii) pontoons; and (viii) boats or other vessels located in the Brisbane River.*

*(b) Details of the information received by the LDMG/LDC during the 2010/2011 flood events regarding river hazards in the Brisbane River, including the source/s of that information, when it was received, the nature of the hazard identified and the risks presented thereby.*

  
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Witness

- (c) *Details of the advice received from key stakeholders, such as Maritime Safety Queensland, or other external agencies, in respect of any river hazards during the 2010/2011 flood events and when it was received.*
- (d) *Details of the action/s taken by the LDMG/LDC in response to threats posed by river hazards in the Brisbane River, including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.*

- 2.3 Navigation on the Brisbane River is controlled and managed by Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ).
- 2.4 Early afternoon on Monday 10 January 2011 Brisbane City Council decided to cease operation of the Ferries and CityCats on the Brisbane River. This coincided with MSQ's declaration that the River was closed and, as a result, no one was entitled to be on the River except for emergency services agencies.
- 2.5 Before and during the January 2011 Flood Event, Council maintained communications with the MSQ and other agencies such as QPS as and when required. In general, the DDC coordinated more closely with the MSQ and reported on any specific issues (such as the Island and the Moggill Ferry) at LDMG meetings or earlier as required.
- 2.6 Following the flood peak, MSQ managed contractors to remove significant hazards from the River. The Royal Australian Navy deployed assets to check whether there were any submerged hazards prior to the River being declared open.
- 2.7 Table 4 below sets out, in summary form, some of the communications with MSQ recorded as part of LDCC Situation Reports.
- 2.8 **LDCC Situation Reports Summary**

**Table 4**

SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
44	bridges	19.01.2011	371	MSQ Bridge Inspections - Maritime Services have advised LDCC that inspections of bridge	MSQ

30

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Witness

				pylons by divers would be commencing shortly, beginning with the gateway bridges and then working upstream.	
45	bridges	19.01.2011	381	MSQ Bridge Inspections - Navy divers are beginning inspections of the bridges starting with the gateway and moving upstream. Due to the difficult conditions and poor visibility, it may be several weeks before a thorough inspection can be completed.	NAVY
SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
72	MSQ	27.01.2011	515	MSQ - boaters should avoid heading out on the waterways unless necessary. The port of Brisbane is partially closed to shipping until further notice.	MSQ
SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
69	Hazards	26.01.2011	506	The Brisbane River remains closed to commercial passenger ferries and charter boats upstream of Brett's Wharf.	
69	Hazards	26.01.2011	506	A large majority of navigational hazards have been removed from the mouth of Brisbane River.	
88	Hazards	04.02.2011	558	MSQ have raised an issue regarding large trees that have been dislodged from the banks upstream or on parts of land that have slipped into the river (eg. Jindalee and upstream) posing a potential major debris issue in the	MSQ

Colin David Jensen

Witness

			future. MSQ inspected.	
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### ***The Riverwalk***

- 2.9 The Riverwalk was a floating walkway owned by Council which was located on the northern bank of the Brisbane River from the Howard Smith Wharves to New Farm and was originally about 800 metres long.
- 2.10 The Riverwalk was closed to the public on 10 January 2011.
- 2.11 During the course of the January 2011 Flood Event, the Riverwalk had the potential to become a river hazard if it was to break from its moorings. Council was aware of that risk and constantly monitored and assessed the condition of the Riverwalk. Council, through the LDCC, also put in place contingency plans (which were ultimately not required) for the orderly demolition of the Riverwalk should that have become necessary.
- 2.12 A description of this planning and the response to this issue is described in emails from BCC.047.0521 to BCC.047.0581 which form part of CDJ-20. A summary of LDCC Situation Reports dealing with this issue in Table 5 below. The key actions are as follows:
- (a) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - Council engineers advised that if the River reached a height of 4.5m AHD, the Riverwalk, being a series of interconnected pontoons, was in danger of floating off.
  - (b) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - I had a discussion with the then Lord Mayor regarding the threat posed by the Riverwalk. During that discussion the Lord Mayor and I resolved to attempt the demolition of the Riverwalk in the interests of public safety if it could be safely achieved.
  - (c) Following this discussion, the LDCC escalated this issue to the District Disaster Coordination Centre, which then escalated the issue to EMQ and ultimately the ADF to effect demolition of the floating Riverwalk if feasible;

  
Colin David Jensen

  
Witness

- (d) The DDC was also provided with some design information on the Riverwalk which was intended to be provided to the ADF. Contact details of Council's structural engineer who had knowledge of the Riverwalk design was also provided;
- (e) Ultimately the demolition was not able to be undertaken due to:
- (i) lack of immediate access to necessary demolition team;
  - (ii) onset of nightfall; and
  - (iii) rising river height made the structure an unstable platform.
- (f) Thursday 13 January 2011 - Situation Report 20 records that at approximately 4:00am the downstream section of the Riverwalk (approximately 380 metres) broke free and floated downstream;
- (g) Friday 14 January 2011 - Council field officers inspected the remaining section of the Riverwalk (approximately 400 metres) and prepared an initial report on the damage to this remaining section;
- (h) Friday 14 January 2011 - MSQ advised that four sections of the Riverwalk were beached at Nudgee Beach, were beginning to break up and may become navigation hazards. On receiving this advice, I approved the removal of these pieces of the Riverwalk by MSQ;
- (i) Saturday 15 January 2011 - MSQ advised that they would move the beached sections of Riverwalk by barge to one of two holding yards in Lytton;
- (j) Saturday 15 January 2011 - Council field officers further inspected the remaining upstream section of the Riverwalk adjoining Howard Smith Wharf and prepared a further report; and
- (k) Sunday 16 January 2011 - Council field officers and the Water Police inspected the River (by the use of a Water Police boat) for any Riverwalk segments that may cause a hazard in the River.

2.13 **LDCC Situation Reports - Summary**

**Table 5**

[Redacted Signature]

**Colin David Jensen**

[Redacted Signature]

**Witness**

SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
16	Riverwalk	12.01.2011	174	The walkway is suffering damage but currently stable. The structure would not be able to be secured if it floats clear and breaks away from its moorings. The CEO has directed that the structure be broken up to mitigate possible subsequent damage to assets and has initiated this action.	
17	Riverwalk	12.01.2011	182	CSA regarding the riverwalk being dismantled.	
18	Riverwalk	13.01.2011	196	Portions of the riverwalk have broken free and are floating down the river.	
19	Riverwalk	13.01.2011	201	Information received that the riverwalk at the end of Boundary Street, Brisbane was being used by sightseers. Rapid Response Group (RRG) were attending to further investigate.	CARS
19	Riverwalk	13.01.2011	204	Field staff are attempting to inspect the floating section of the Riverwalk from several vantage points. All reports to date cannot provide any confirmation that the sections of the walk have actually broken away and moved down stream.	


  
Colin David Jensen


  
Witness

20	Riverwalk	13.01.2011	209	<p>At approximately 0400hrs on 13.01.2011, downstream section of the riverwalk broke free and floated downstream.</p> <p>A 380m section washed away, with 400m remaining. The remaining section is still intact but the upstream gangway has been damaged and a pontoon against it. City Assets has advised that if river levels continue to fall, section may remain intact and in place.</p>	
24	Riverwalk	14.01.2011	240	<p>Inspection undertaken at 1030hrs. River level still high and debris covering platform. None of the sub-structure is visible. Upstream section still intact. Inspection also undertaken of the former downstream end at Merthyr Road where the fixed sections remains. A number of midstream platform pontoons are up-ended and resting on the fixed section and riverbank. These pontoons are secure however if river levels rise, may dislodge.</p>	

  
Colin David Jensen

  
Witness

33	Riverwalk	16.01.2011	304	<p>Inspection undertaken of BCC river infrastructure from Queensland University - Brett's Wharf/ 4/5 pontoons lodged against the fixed downstream end of the floating riverwalk. Water Police advised that they had not sighted any floating riverwalk pontoons in the section between Brett's Wharf and the river mouth. MSQ engaged a contractor to remove the floating riverwalk pontoons from Nudgee Beach yesterday.</p>	River Infrastructure
38	Riverwalk	18.01.2011	337	<p>Riverwalk - resident contacted Council to advise that part of the Riverwalk located at New Farm had broken away and was loose in the river. MSQ, DDC, QPS, and City Assets notified. City Assets attended site and identified that 1-2 pontoons were no longer in position. Further update provided to relevant agencies.</p>	
39	Riverwalk	18.01.2011	341	<p>MSQ advise they will not attempt to locate missing pontoons in the night as they felt they do not pose a significant risk. Follow up to occur.</p>	MSQ

Colin David Jensen

Witness

40	Riverwalk	18.01.2011	347	At 0812hrs, City Assets advised that 1 of the 2 sections at Merthyr Road had become dislodged. MSQ were advised and are responding.	
46	Riverwalk	20.01.2011	389	CSA on riverwalk and boardwalk (social media and web only).	
65	Riverwalk	24.01.2011	490	The floating riverwalk has been extensively damaged, some sections washed away. Facility will be closed for a significant period. Short term alternative pedestrian and cycle routes have been identified.	

### ***The Moggill Ferry***

- 2.14 The Moggill Ferry is owned and operated by a private company. Council has no regulatory control over its maritime operations.
- 2.15 Council's interest in the Moggill Ferry during the January 2011 Flood Event was to be assured it would not break from its moorings and become a River hazard downstream.
- 2.16 The safety of the Moggill Ferry was controlled by the owner and overseen by the DDC. The DDC provided regular updates at the daily LDMG Meetings (the notes for which appear as CDJ-15).
- 2.17 As a result of the briefings the LDMG and LDCC were satisfied that the safety of the Moggill Ferry was being adequately addressed.

### ***Drift Restaurant***

- 2.18 The Drift Restaurant is owned and operated by a private company.

**Colin David Jensen**

**Witness**

- 2.19 Council was aware of the risk that the Restaurant may come loose from its moorings during the course of the January 2011 Flood Event. However, the Restaurant was considered to be no greater risk than any other pontoon. As the River was closed to navigation, the Restaurant did not pose any greater threat to life than any other debris in the River. Further, the Restaurant did not pose any significant risk to public infrastructure.
- 2.20 Council was aware that on 12 January 2011 part of the Restaurant hit the Goodwill Bridge but did not cause any issues.
- 2.21 Following the January 2011 Flood Event, Council assisted the private owner of the Restaurant by:
- (a) coordinating volunteers to remove waste and debris from the premises;
  - (b) removing waste and debris that had been left on the Bicentennial bikeway at Coronation Drive; and
  - (c) arranging for Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) to assist with the pumping out of the pontoon upon which the remaining part sat to prevent it from sinking.
- 2.22 This assistance was provided to the owners at no cost to ensure the timely reopening of the Bicentennial bikeway.
- 2.23 A summary of the actions taken in relation to Drift Restaurant are set out in Table 6 below and in the bundle of emails forming Attachment CDJ-20 to this statement.
- 2.24 **LDCC Situation Report Summary**

**Table 6**

SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
16	Drift	12.01.2011	174	The drift restaurant has hit a bridge without any issue.	
49	Drift	20.01.2011	413	Reports received that the Drift Restaurant is placing large quantities of flood damaged perishables on the Bicentennial Bikeway.	

  
**Colin David Jensen**

  
**Witness**

53	Drift	21.01.2011	429	Council is in negotiating with the owner of Drift to ensure that the bikeway is clear of items not for collection prior to the waste collection scheduled for that upcoming Sunday.	
56	Drift	22.01.2011	439	Bikeway is clear of mud between Cribb and Land Streets. This includes the underpass near Cribb and Land Street. The majority of the bikeway has been swept and hosed and an onsite meeting is scheduled to occur at 1430 to scope the remaining areas to be washed tonight.	
57	Drift	22.01.2011	450	By Saturday night, the bikeway between Toowong and the Drift Restaurant will be cleaned and ready to be opened for public access. Council officers will perform daily patrols to ensure that the bikeway at this location remains clear.	
60	Drift	23.01.2011	462	Clearing of bikeway to be completed by COB Sunday 23 January 2011.	
72	Drift	27.01.2011	575	Centennial Bikeway reopened at 1400hrs following closure to pump out the drift restaurant.	

### ***CityCat Terminals***

2.25 The Ferry and CityCat services were suspended, until further notice, on Monday 10 January 2011. On Tuesday, 11 January 2011, Council removed the Ferries and CityCats from the River and moored them at safe harbour.



**Colin David Jensen**



**Witness**

- 2.26 The CityCat Terminals were not considered a significant safety risk and posed no greater threat than any other floating debris in the River. Given the magnitude of the flood, there was nothing feasible that could be done to improve the security of the moorings or to remove them from the River.

#### ***Dockside Marina***

- 2.27 I am not aware and have not been informed of any issues associated with Dockside Marina that caused or may have caused a hazard in the River.

#### ***The Island***

- 2.28 The Island barge is owned and operated by a private company. Council has no regulatory control over its maritime operations.
- 2.29 The Island is a large vessel that, if uncontrollably floated downstream in the January 2011 Flood Event, would be capable of causing significant damage. Accordingly, Council's interest in the Island during the January 2011 Flood Event was to be assured it would not break from its moorings and become a River hazard downstream.
- 2.30 The safety of the Island was controlled by the DDC. The DDC provided regular updates at the daily LDMG Meetings (the notes for which appear as CDJ-15) or more frequently if required.
- 2.31 As a result of the briefings and general communication from the DDC, the LDMG and the LDCC were satisfied that the threat posed by the Island was being adequately addressed.

#### ***Pontoons***

- 2.32 Council was aware that during the January 2011 Flood Event there were many privately owned Pontoons that had broken free from their moorings and floated downstream.
- 2.33 As the River was closed to navigation, the Pontoons did not pose any greater threat to life than any other debris in the River. Further, the Pontoons did not pose any significant risk to public infrastructure.
- 2.34 Although owners of Pontoons are entitled to replace them in the same manner as those Pontoons were originally secured, Council considered it important to advise residents of a method to properly secure their Pontoons in case of future River flood events.

  
**Colin David Jensen**

  
**Witness**

- 2.35 On 18 February 2011, Council issued a "Flood Fact Sheet - restoring or replacing private pontoons following January 2011 flood event" (**Fact Sheet**). Attachment "CDJ-22" is a copy of the Fact Sheet.
- 2.36 Council wrote to over 300 registered pontoon owners providing them with a copy of the Fact Sheet and informing them of DERM's exemption to replace like for like. The Fact Sheet was also provided to major manufacturers of pontoons and through various other means including, media and community services announcement, the Council website and community newsletters.
- 2.37 Council continues to distribute the Fact Sheet via its website and makes it generally available to anyone, for example, making a development application. It is intended to further disseminate the Fact Sheet wherever appropriate, such as at Boat Shows.
- 2.38 A summary of the information relevant to Pontoons is set out in Table 7 below and in the bundle of emails forming Attachment CDJ-20 to this statement.
- 2.39 **LDCC Situation Reports Summary**

**Table 7**

SITREP number	HAZARD	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
21	Pontoons	11.01.2011	94	Two pontoons were reported loose in the river.	
21	Pontoons	13/01/2011	217	City Cats and Ferries - all fleet safe with some minor fibreglass damage due to private pontoons and boats hitting. One sustained more serious damage however is repairable.	
21	Pontoons	13.01.2011	218	Fuelling pontoon - intact. The building has 1ft of water through it. The underground tank is submerged, however it is sealed.	

41

**Colin David Jensen**

**Witness**

				Engineers will check once water subsided whether contamination has occurred.	
29	Pontoons	15.01.2011	263	North RIMT update - heavy lift and long reach equipment will be sought from QMCA next week to lift pontoons that have washed onto the foreshore. (also referenced in SITREP 28 and 32).	North RIMT
45	Pontoons	19.01.2011	385	Dutton Park - retrieve sunken pontoon and gangway, UQ - MSQ mooring Buoy under pontoon, West End - remove semi-sunken walkway, Regatta - everything presumed lost but check to see if pontoon is sunk at site, Davies Park - retrieve UQ gangway, North Quay - remove all debris and salvage existing gangway for future repairs, South Bank 2 - remove gangway caught on pile, QUT - remove semi-sunken walkway, Holman Street - water has receded, suspect pontoon is still attached to piles, salvage pontoon if in place, Sydney Street - salvage sunken pontoon.	
45	Pontoons	19.01.2011	385	A 'Notice to Mariners' was issued by MSQ prohibiting commercial and ferry vessels from using the river. MSQ taking the lead on the clean up of the bed of the river.	
56	Pontoons	22.01.2011	440	LDCC - looking into orphan pontoon management and	

42

Colin David Jensen

Witness

				collection policy.	
57	Pontoons	22.01.2011	446	Aerial assessment - damage has occurred on either side of the Brisbane River from Bulimba to Moggill with damage ranging from minor to significant to pontoons and trees along the river banks.	
64	Pontoons	24.01.2011	481	ADF update - Graceville Sea Scout Hall and pontoon recon complete. NFA by ADF.	ADF
68	Pontoons	25.01.2011	500	North RIMT - awaiting advice regarding what to do with private property eg. Pontoons and water tanks.	
69	Pontoons	26.01.2011	506	MSQ - managing water contractors for removal of hazards, have implemented an action plan to assess damaged pontoons and vessels, is continuing to assess damage to navigational infrastructure within the region that may affect shipping.	MSQ

***Boats and other Vessels located in the Brisbane River***

2.40 As set out in paragraph 2.3 above the MSQ is responsible for the traffic on the River and, in particular, the Boats and other Vessels on the River.

2.41 In addition, as referred to in paragraph 2.25, Council removed its Ferries and CityCats to safe harbour on 12 January 2011.

***(e) Any recommendations to mitigate or manage the risks posed by potential river hazards in the Brisbane River during future flood events.***

43

**Colin David Jensen**

**Witness**

- 2.42 I refer to my comments at paragraph M of this Statement.
- 2.43 One emerging issue that could be the subject of consideration by the Commission relates to Submerged Objects in the River.
- 2.44 Council has received information from high-resolution multi-beam surveys indicating that there are a high number submerged objects in the river, predominately trees. Although it is not Council's responsibility to remove objects from the bottom of the River (which is State land) Council does have an interest in ensuring that these objects do not mobilise, which they are likely to do over time.
- 2.45 Council would support a recommendation by the Commission for the removal of these objects, to be undertaken by the State. Council is willing to provide any reasonable assistance to the State if requested.
3. **Brisbane Markets precinct at Rocklea (Rocklea Markets)**
- 3.1 Attachment "CDJ-23" is an extract from the LDCC Log in relation to question 3 of the Notice.
- 3.2 Attachment "CDJ-24" is a bundle of material in relation to question 3 of the Notice.
- 3.3 The Rocklea Markets are a privately owned business encompassing both fresh produce market and large cold stores for the storage of frozen products (including meat and seafood).
- 3.4 Ordinarily, as it is a private business, Council would not enter the markets or assist with the clean up of the markets following the January 2011 Flood Event.
- 3.5 Council did, however, have an interest in ensuring that the Rocklea Markets were cleaned up and operational as soon as possible as the markets are an essential service for Brisbane and Queensland:
- (a) for the distribution of food; and
  - (b) economic recovery.

(a) *Details of the information received by the LDMG/LDC regarding the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the Rocklea Markets, including details of the source/s of that information and when it was received.*



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**(b) Details of the action/s taken by the LDMG/LDC in response to the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the Rocklea Markets, including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.**

- 3.6 On Thursday 13 January 2011 the LDCC received information from the Queensland Police Service that the Rocklea Markets Manager had requested that Sherwood Road be re-opened as soon as possible to allow undamaged produce to be distributed.
- 3.7 On Friday 14 January 2011, the LDCC coordinated City Waste Services (CWS) (part of Council), volunteers and the ADF to commence the clean up of Rocklea Markets with a view to making the markets ready to begin limited operations from Monday 17 January 2011.
- 3.8 CWS, in turn, engaged a range of contractors to assist, primarily Veolia Environmental Services and J.J. Richards & Sons Pty Ltd.
- 3.9 These contractors provided services including:
- (a) removal and clean up of flood affected food waste at the markets and associated cold storage areas;
  - (b) general clean up of flood damage around the markets and surrounding areas; and
  - (c) operation of the Archerfield Road transfer station (Richlands site).
- 3.10 These activities were completed in cooperation with Council's Brisbane City Works and Local Asset Services branches. These branches assisted with the labour and plant and equipment to complete the tasks.
- 3.11 The clean-up operations continued for 24 hours a day, from the time of the request on Friday 14 January 2011 until Monday 17 January 2011, when limited market operations restarted by the reopening of the fresh produce distribution centre. Waste removal activities continued to occur as required.
- 3.12 The operations in relation to the cold stores were conducted under sometimes extreme conditions. Due to the nature of the products removed (i.e. decomposing food), breathing apparatus was required in certain situations. This equipment was sourced from the QFRS, which provided training for the use of this apparatus to contractor personnel.

  
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- 3.13 A total of 4,353 tonnes total of food waste was removed from the markets and surrounding cold stores.
- 3.14 All food waste was specifically directed for disposal at the Veolia Ti-Tree Bioenergy Facility (Landfill) at Willowbank due to the nature of the waste. This facility was operating 24 hours per day to receive waste from Rocklea Markets.
- 3.15 CWS has incurred approximately \$1M in costs directly related to the clean-up operations at the Rocklea Markets and the associated disposal.
- 3.16 Council, as a health regulator, deployed environmental health officers to advise, inspect and certify that the food operations were safe to recommence.
- 3.17 Table 8 below is a summary of the LDCC Situation Reports which relate to this topic.
- 3.18 **LDCC Situation Reports Summary**

**Table 8**

<b>SITREP number</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>DISC PAGE</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b>	<b>SOURCE</b>
24	15.01.2011	251	Sherwood Road leading to the Rocklea Markets has been cleared to permit access to the markets to commence trading tomorrow afternoon. EHOs will be deployed to the markets to conduct health inspections to ensure the markets are safe to operate.	
27	15.01.2011	255	Access to the Rocklea Markets is now available from Sherwood Road via Ipswich Road.	
		256	Access to the Rocklea Markets is now available from Sherwood Road via Ipswich Road.	



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29	15.01.2011	262	ADF update - Rocklea Markets Deployment. Allocated as a priority for tomorrow morning (16.01.2011) approx. 100 personnel plus equipment. ADF managing	ADF
32	16.01.2011	286	Royal Queensland Regiment coordinating civilian volunteers in the cleanup and sanitisation of Rocklea Markets.	ADF
		287	ADF clean up of sector H focusing on Rocklea Markets.	ADF
33	16.01.2011	295	1800hrs fresh fruit and vegetables commenced arriving at markets. Markets open as a distribution centre only and will operate 24hrs.	
34	17.01.2011		Re-opening of Rocklea markets. Urgent request of reinstatement of traffic signals in the area received. Energex advised previously that generator was to be deployed to power lights. Inspection by Energex crew however found the site flood damaged, preventing Energex from safely energising the lights with the large generator being deployed to the markets. Council to deploy a generator asap.	
35	17.01.2011	311	Re-opening of Rocklea markets. An inspection of the traffic signal box on the corner of Martin Taylor Dr and Sherwood Rd has identified that it has significant damage. The traffic signals at this intersection are expected to be operational by 12noon today. Traffic control	

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			arrangements will be in place until the traffic lights are operational.	
36	17.01.2011	324	Road closures - Rocklea - Sherwood Road at Taylor Street (outside the Rocklea Markets).	
37	17.01.2011	329	EH update - Support has been provided to Rocklea Markets via the LDCC with regard to the provision of chlorine.	Compliance and Regulatory Services
LDCC SITREP	19.01.2011		Hazardous Waste update - Rocklea area has been assigned a priority area, and contractors are clearing as fast as possible.	City Waste Services
BCW SITREP	19.01.2011		Rocklea Markets intersections have further lanterns requiring replacement. Sovereign is scheduled to finish western intersection tomorrow. Rain has prevented BCW work for the main entrance.	
48	20.01.2011	401	Rocklea Markets intersections both have further lanterns requiring replacement.	
49	20.01.2011	415	Brisbane markets now has all bulk waste removed. Another 130 loads removed since yesterday, bringing total removed to approx. 3750tonnes / 270 loads. Rocklea Cold Stores was completed yesterday (approx 850 tonnes).	City Waste Services
BCW SITREP	20.01.2011		Sherwood Road at Rocklea Markets Western entrance was finalised by	TNP - Traffic Signals


  
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			Sovereign Electrical today and is now operational.	
CARS SITREP	23.01.2011		EHOs have inspected the Rocklea Markets over the last few days and have provided advice to approximately 50 premises owners.	Compliance and Regulatory Services
RIMTSouth SITREP	29.01.2011	3	7 food premises (including 4 for Rocklea Retail Markets) were inspected and approved for re-opening.	

**(c) Any recommendations to mitigate, and respond to, the potential impact of future flood events on the Rocklea Markets.**

3.19 I refer to my comments at paragraph M of this Statement.

**4. Evacuation centres**

4.1 Attachment "CDJ-25" is an extract from the LDCC Log in relation to question 4 of the Notice.

4.2 Attachment "CDJ-26" is a bundle of material in relation to question 4 of the Notice.

4.3 Council considers an evacuation centre to be a place where residents can temporarily shelter whilst their own home is uninhabitable. The evacuation centre would register evacuees and provide them with food, shelter, limited health support, policing support and may transition to be a recovery centre after the initial event. This is distinct from a place that may provide immediate shelter from the event, in the immediate vicinity of the affected residences, or is a support centre which is an adjunct to temporary shelter.

**(a) Details of any policies or procedures for managing contacts with unofficial evacuation centres.**

4.4 The details of planning and operation of official evacuation centres co-ordinated by Council are set out:

(a) at paragraphs 13.1 to 13.5 of my First Statement; and

  
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- (b) at paragraph 6.2(e) of Council's Initial Submission (including the Evacuation and Emergency Human Services Plan as Attachment 23 to that Submission).

4.5 It is necessary to preface a response to this topic by noting the following.

4.6 Firstly, the experience of the flood warnings that were issued during the January 2011 Flood Event were that, as intended, they were conservative, in that all flood areas had a flood warning issued. It follows, that in terms of managing the task of rapidly housing displaced persons, it is important that persons who are not at risk of flooding remain in their homes.

4.7 The opposite of this is that once an area has a flood warning issued in respect of it, the residents should make plans to effect an orderly evacuation if and when required. In the event it becomes apparent that the flood will occur in that particular area, the residents should then leave as quickly as possible, rather than wait for a compulsive direction to do so.

4.8 Secondly, by their nature, evacuation centres are extremely basic and provide essential, rather than comfortable, shelter. Essentially this is because, not only of the fact that they must be commissioned virtually instantaneously, but it is also necessary to have numerous alternatives to cater for the particular event in question. That is, appropriate locations for evacuation centres for a flood may be different to those for, say, a storm surge, bushfire in the outer suburbs or terrorist event. Council maintains an extensive register of possible official evacuation centres.

4.9 The primary source of shelter for displaced persons in a flood, ought be, friends and family where the surroundings are a great deal more comfortable and familiar. In addition, those surrounds are far more likely to provide optimal support for such people.

4.10 Finally, if this is not possible, then residents should relocate to an official evacuation centre supported by Council and the Red Cross.

4.11 Consequently, Council does not support the setting up of unsupported ad hoc evacuation centres.

4.12 The risk associated with unofficial evacuations centres is that:

(a) the location of the centre may be inappropriate;

(b) there is a lack of detailed professional planning and co-ordination;

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(c) the centres may be under-resourced.

4.13 During the January 2011 Flood Event, a number of unofficial evacuation centres commenced operations in various parts of Brisbane (a list of those centres appears below).

4.14 Council received a number of requests for assistance from those centres which were actioned, as appropriate, by Council through the LDCC.

**(b) Details of any requests for assistance received from, or in respect of, any unofficial evacuation centres in the Brisbane Local Government Area during the 2010/2011 flood events and the response/s thereto.**

4.15 Set out below is a list of the unofficial evacuation centres and support centres that Council was aware operated and a summary of the requests and response by Council.

4.16 **Good News Lutheran Church, Middle Park**

(a) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - the LDCC received a request for a generator which was delivered by Coates Hire that evening.

(b) Saturday 15 January 2011 - the centre was closed.

(c) Tuesday 18 January 2011 - a request was received for rubbish bins to be emptied. The LDCC arranged for contractors to action by next day and additional bins were delivered.

4.17 **St Catherine's Anglican Church**

(a) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - Opened as an unofficial evacuation centre.

(b) Friday 14 January 2011 - converted from an unofficial evacuation centre to a community clean up centre.

4.18 **Corinda State School**

(a) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - LDCC informed that 20-30 residents taking refuge at site.

(b) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - LDCC received a request for food, water, beds, generator.

  
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- (c) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - Council assessed the centre as not suitable for an evacuation centre.

**4.19 Kenmore Library**

- (a) Friday 14 January 2011 - the LDCC advised that the library and local Councillor's Office was being used as a support centre.
- (b) Friday 14 January 2011 - this centre supported about 800 people per day who accessed the internet and facilities to recharge mobile phones.

**4.20 Metro Church, Seventeen Mile Rocks**

- (a) Wednesday 12 January 2011- LDCC received request for generator, toilet paper, food, lights.

**4.21 Moggill Uniting Church**

- (a) Thursday 13 January 2011 - LDCC received a request from Dr Bruce Flegg MP for food/supplies drop.
- (b) Thursday 13 January 2011- LDCC coordinated the ADF and supplies were delivered with five more vehicles to arrive later.
- (c) Friday 14 January 2011 - Council trucks delivered additional food to Bellbowrie.
- (d) Saturday 15 January 2011 - Access to these areas was no longer restricted.

**4.22 Mt Crosby State School**

- (a) Wednesday 12 January 2011 - The LDCC was advised that an evacuation centre had been set up by isolated locals on Mt Crosby Road, Mt Crosby. The area was cut off by road access and they were seeking assistance with food drops.
- (b) Friday 14 January 2011 - The LDCC received a request from local resident for supplies to the centre.
- (c) Friday 14 January 2011 - the LDCC arranged for food and supplies to be delivered by Black Hawk helicopter.

  
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4.23 **Kedron Wavell Services Club**

- (a) Thursday 13 January 2011 - the LDCC was advised that the Club was being used as a temporary facility until the official RNA evacuation centre was set up.
- (b) Thursday 13 January 2011 - the LDCC received a request for beds, pillows & linen to be delivered from the RNA centre.
- (c) Friday 14 January 2011 - the centre became a transitional facility for the RNA centre and used as daytime information centre only.

(c) *Details of any issues arising out of the establishment of unofficial evacuation centres in the Brisbane Local Government Area during the 2010/2011 flood events, including any secondary evacuations that became necessary.*

4.24 As set out above, Council does not have policies and procedures in place for unofficial evacuations centres as it encourages the use of official centres where required. However, Council has identified a number of issues arising out of the establishment of unofficial evacuation centres during the January 2011 Flood Event, which are summarised below:

- (a) the establishment and advertising of unofficial centres has the potential to cause large numbers of evacuees to arrive at a centre before suitable capacity and capability is established and in some cases where it never can be;
- (b) agencies cannot guarantee resources or supplies at unofficial centres;
- (c) unofficial centres may encounter safety issues due to their location and lack of staffing. For example the Corinda State School encountered access problems when the car park flooded. Evacuees then refused to leave as requested by SES;
- (d) due to their location, unofficial centres may encounter waste collection delays. For example this was experienced at the Good News Lutheran Church at Middle Park;
- (e) unofficial centres may not have back-up power;
- (f) unofficial centres may not have been properly assessed for:
  - (i) safe and accessible location;

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- (ii) adequate facilities;
- (iii) reliable communications.

4.25 As an example, it was necessary to evacuate people from Yeronga State School to the official evacuation centre at QEII Stadium as the original site was unsuitable as an evacuation centre.

4.26 Table 9 is a summary of LDCC Situation Reports relevant to this question.

**Table 9**

SITREP number	DATE	PAGE	COMMENTS	SOURCE
13		99	Evacuation of campers at Moreton Island to Tangalooma Resort.	
16		135	Evacuation centre update including numbers on the two registered evacuation centres and also unauthorised centres, including Yeronga State School, Good News Lutheran Church, St Catherine's Anglican Church, and Moggill Uniting Church.	
16		175	Evacuation centres activated in Jamboree Ward.	
16		176	Evacuation centre update including numbers on the two registered evacuation centres and also unauthorised centres, including Yeronga State School, Good News Lutheran Church, St Catherine's Anglican Church, Moggill Uniting Church and the Salvation Army Church.	
		180	Update from CARS East - attempting to visit smaller evacuation centres in the area to determine if any assistance is required.	
17	12.01.2011	184	RFA for food to Mt Crosby for potential air transport of food and supplies. Yeronga State School has lost power. 20 Evacuees are to be moved to QEII.	
17		188	QFRS are requesting QPS assistance with evacuations in Oxley.	
18	13.01.2011	196	RFA for food to Mt Crosby for potential air transport of food and supplies has been escalated to the DDC.	
18		198	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and	

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			unauthorised centres.	
20		212	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
21		219	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
19		205	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
20		211	RFA - Moggill Uniting Church for supplies.	
		212	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
21	13.01.2011	218	RFA - food to be delivered to Bellbowrie. ADF are delivering food. Request being finalised.	
21		219	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
22		224	Mt Crosby food drop will take place tomorrow morning by ADF.	
22	14.01.2011	225	APS advise that 1 ADF MOG vehicle arrived at Moggill Uniting Church. 8 ADF personnel will remain at Bellbowrie Shopping Village to undertake security. 5 x ADF MOGS will deliver the rest of the food tonight.	ADF
22		226	Limited food supplies at various locations including Moggill Uniting Church and Mt Crosby State School and numbers of evacuees.	
		231	at 0300hrs, LDCC advised that 30 soldiers would deliver 5 truck loads of supplies to Moggill Evacuation Centre. Limited food supplies available at Moggill and Mt Crosby. Update on evacuation centres (232).	
24		240	Mt Crosby was supplied via air drop with provisions today at approximately 1330.	
24		241	Evacuation centre update including both authorised and unauthorised centres.	
25	14.01.2011	247	food drops completed to Moggill Uniting Church and Mt Crosby State School. Second food drop to Mt Crosby by road. DDCC advise that aerial survey to be undertaken to identify	

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			any isolated communities in Bellbowrie and Moggill areas.	
28	15.01.2011	272	Food drops have been discontinued to Mt Crosby as 12 tonnes already delivered, roads are open and there are no known isolated properties.	
			Air Transport RFA for food drop to Mt Crosby State School for up to 2000 isolated residents for food and medical supplies.	
23	14.01.2011	600	Evacuation Centre update - Moggill Uniting Church	

**(d) Any recommendations regarding the establishment of potential evacuation centres during future flood events.**

4.27 I refer to my comments at paragraph M of this Statement.

**5. Sewage treatment**

5.1 Attachment "CDJ-27" is an extract from the LDCC Log in relation to question 5 of the Notice.

5.2 Attachment "CDJ-28" is a bundle of material in relation to question 5 of the Notice.

**(a) Details of any sewerage treatment failures as referred to in the Brisbane City Council's Initial Submission at paragraph 6.2(b)(vi) A.4), including the timing thereof and any relevant actions taken by the LDMG/LDC in relation thereto.**

5.3 Council's Initial Submission does not, at paragraph 6.2(b)(vi)A.4), refer to any "failure" of sewage treatment facilities.

5.4 This reference is to a Community Service Announcement which was designed to warn residents that untreated sewage may enter flood waters. Although Council has no responsibility in relation to the treatment of sewage at Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP), Council is aware of the risk that:

(a) inflow of rainfall and storm water into the WWTPs can cause those facilities to become overwhelmed; and

(b) flood waters may directly affect those facilities as they are generally located in low lying areas next to the River or creeks.

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5.5 For that reason, Council sought to warn residents prior to and during the January 2011 Flood Event of the potential dangers associated with untreated or under-treated sewage that may escape into waterways.

*(b) Details of any Queensland Urban Utilities' infrastructure failures, referred to in Colin Jensen's statement dated 25 March 2011 at paragraph 8.3(c), including the timing thereof and any relevant action taken by the LDMG/LDC in relation thereto.*

5.6 Paragraph 8.3(c) of my First Statement provides as follows:

*" (c) During the immediate recovery, Council removed debris from around infrastructure owned by Queensland Urban Utilities to allow them access to fix their equipment on an urgent basis"*

5.7 That paragraph is not a reference to any "Queensland Urban Utilities infrastructure failures" as suggested by this question.

5.8 Paragraph 8.3(c) is a reference to a request from Queensland Urban Utilities (QUU) (received through the LDMG) to remove some debris from the footpath outside the entrance to QUU infrastructure to allow QUU access.

5.9 I recall that the QUU representative at the LDMG meeting who made the request was invited to provide a list of the locations of their infrastructure which was blocked by debris in order that the request could be immediately actioned by the LDCC.

5.10 I do not recall if such a list was received, however Council did remove debris either specifically for QUU or as part of the general clean-up coordinated by the LDCC.

I make this statement conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act 1867 (Qld).

Dated 19 April 2011



Colin David Jensen



Witness

Signed and declared by Colin David Jensen at

in the State of Queensland

this 19<sup>th</sup> day of APRIL 2011

Before me:



Signature of person before whom the declaration is  
made



Signature of declarant

SCOTT WILLIAM SHARRY, SOLICITOR

Full name and qualification of person before whom the  
declaration is made