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BURROWS

QUEENSLAND FLOODS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Matters concerning the operation of the
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

Tuesday, 3 May 2011 at 10.00am

At Level 30, 400 George Street, Brisbane, Qld

Interview conducted by: Det Snr Sgt Mark Reid

Private interview of John Douglas Burrows

1 <JOHN DOUGLAS BURROWS, interviewed: [10.06am]

2
3 DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 10.06am on Tuesday,
4 3 May 2011. This is a recorded interview being conducted
5 at the offices of the Queensland Floods Commission between
6 Mark Reid of the Commission and John Douglas Burrows.

7
8 What I'd like to do initially, just for identification
9 purposes, is if everyone in the room can state their full
10 name and details and we will work our way from there. I
11 will start with myself. My name is Mark John Reid, I am a
12 Detective Senior Sergeant of Police, currently attached to
13 the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. My registered
14 number is 6091. John, could I have your full details,
15 thanks?

16
17 MR BURROWS: Yes. My name's John Douglas Burrows. I'm
18 currently a station officer employed at the Anzac Avenue
19 Fire Station, 201 Anzac Avenue, Toowoomba, and my number is
20 012740.

21
22 DET SNR SGT REID: Jenny, if I could just get you to
23 identify yourself as well, as you may have inquiries or
24 want us to slow down at some point.

25
26 MS JANSEN: My name is Jenny Jansen and I am here for
27 transcription purposes and I am employed by Merrill
28 Corporation.

29
30 DET SNR SGT REID: John, is there anyone else in the room
31 who hasn't identified themselves?

32
33 MR BURROWS: No, nobody else.

34
35 DET SNR SGT REID: Q. What I propose to do today is have
36 an informal discussion with regard to a number of issues
37 that you have highlighted through a submission or previous
38 interviews with the Queensland Fire and Rescue union with
39 regard to the running of the Queensland Fire and Rescue
40 Service or your personal dealings with the same.

41 A. Yes. That is the United Firefighters Union.

42
43 Q. Yes.

44 A. I just want to make sure - it's not in bed, so to
45 speak, with the QFRS.

46
47 Q. No, no, no.

1 A. No. It's the employee representative.
2
3 Q. Yes, that's correct. What we will go through today -
4 I have a number of issues that I want to discuss from a
5 prior interview that you conducted with Queensland Fire and
6 Rescue - oh, with the --
7 A. United Firefighters Union.
8
9 Q. -- United Firefighters Union.
10 A. UFU.
11
12 Q. Where you have brought to the surface a number of
13 issues that you are concerned about, and that interview
14 took place on 24 February 2011 at Toowoomba. So, during
15 the interview there will be a number of occasions where I
16 will ask you to go to, say, page 15 and then we will
17 briefly look at what you have said in that prior interview.
18 Rather than reinventing the wheel, we will look at what you
19 have already said and just clarify a few points. I have
20 read through the previous interview and I have read through
21 a number of comments from one of the lawyers who also has
22 an interest in what we are talking about, and she has also
23 highlighted to me a number of things that she wants us to
24 discuss today as well.
25 A. Okay.
26
27 Q. So if we can take our time, if we can get - just for
28 the recording - one of us talking at a time and not talk
29 over the top of each other. If at any stage either myself
30 or yourself talk about things perhaps that I don't
31 understand or you don't understand, we need to pull each
32 other up straight away and say, look, I don't understand
33 the question that you have asked, or I might say to you I
34 need you to explain to me in some detail what you have just
35 said. Okay?
36 A. Yes.
37
38 Q. So completely informal. I find that's probably the
39 best way for us to get through quite a large amount of
40 information. If you need a break at all, let me know. If
41 you need a cup of tea or coffee, we will have a break. As
42 you said, you had a late evening.
43 A. It's all right. If the need dictates, you have me all
44 day.
45
46 Q. Very good.
47 A. And tomorrow as well, if you wish.

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Q. Fantastic. All right. As you have outlined, your full name is John Douglas Burrows. What is your date of birth, John?

A. [REDACTED]

Q. You have indicated that you're the station officer, Anzac Avenue, Toowoomba and your registered number is 012740. How long have you worked for QFRS?

A. Since 1998 but prior to that I worked for the Country Fire Authority for 29 years and nine months, which gives me a total service of about 42 years.

Q. All in Queensland?

A. No. The 29 years and nine months were served in Victoria.

Q. How many years have you been the station officer up in the Toowoomba district?

A. Since I took up the position in 1998.

Q. For the rest of our discussions, do you refer to the areas as districts or do you have divisions for each station? So if we say the Toowoomba district, or are they broken up into smaller stations?

A. There's two stations within the Toowoomba area that are served by permanent staff. The rest are made up by auxiliary staff. The two permanent stations are Station 11, which is Kitchener Street Fire Station, located in Kitchener Street, Toowoomba, and Station 12 is located in Anzac Avenue, and Harristown is technically the suburb. Then we're supported by stations such as Oakey, Goombungee and Highfields, which are all auxiliary stations.

Q. The two, Kitchener and Anzac --

A. No. Kitchener and Anzac are all career, 24/7 stations.

Q. Yes, sorry, but Kitchener and Anzac --

A. Are in area 1.

Q. -- how many staff does that comprise?

A. In both of those two stations?

Q. Yes.

A. Approximately 48. On duty at any one time between the two stations are a total of 10, made up of three officers

1 and seven fire fighters.

2

3 Q. Is that on a rotational 24-hour shift?

4 A. That's on a 10/14 roster. That is correct, it's a
5 rotational shift.

6

7 Q. What level of swiftwater training have you received?

8 A. Interestingly enough, when I was employed in initial
9 employment within QFRS, I was brought in for a number of
10 special skill sets that weren't within Queensland.

11 Swiftwater Level 1 and Level 2 technician is what I
12 acquired when I was overseas, as sponsored by the Country
13 Fire Authority. I moved to Queensland and within a very
14 short space of time, Queensland didn't recognise my
15 international qualifications for the swiftwater rescue.
16 However, me being - unfortunately - generous to a fault, I
17 was asked by the then State special operations coordinator,
18 a Mr Gary Littlewood, would I write the swiftwater
19 awareness training package for the State of Queensland.

20

21 Q. What time period are we talking about here?

22 A. It would have been about 18 months into my employment,
23 so I --

24

25 Q. Sorry. What year would that be?

26 A. That would be around 1999 to 2000 I wrote that, in
27 conjunction with another training package. It was accepted
28 in its entirety for its subject content. It was
29 exclusively put together by myself and was rolled out
30 across the State as a swiftwater awareness package. Around
31 2000, they were very concerned that they actually might get
32 some rain in Queensland and with that would come floods.
33 So, somebody somewhere, at some point in time, believed
34 that I knew a little bit about swiftwater rescue. However,
35 the qualifications that I brought in from interstate, that
36 were both interstate recognised and internationally
37 recognised, were not recognised in Queensland.

38

39 Q. Is that policy still current?

40 A. Yes. I'm still only what's classed as a level 1
41 swiftwater operator, which means that I can go within 3
42 metres of an embankment or a swiftwater environment. I'm
43 meant to have a PFD, which is a personal floatation device,
44 on and be tethered. I can only, technically, work as part
45 of a team that's being coordinated by a swiftwater
46 technician level 2.

47

1 Q. Is your training package still current or has it been
2 modified?

3 A. It's been modified marginally but there's still a lot
4 of my photos that I took originally in there and a lot of
5 the subject content is still the same. As I said to a
6 firefighter a couple of days ago, swiftwater still doesn't
7 change. People still drown the same way as they did
8 15 years ago when I first started the swiftwater rescue and
9 it hasn't changed. The techniques are the same. Some of
10 the equipment may change but that's it. A river is a
11 river; a flood is a flood; a catastrophic event is exactly
12 that, a catastrophic event.
13

14 Q. You explained what a level 1 technician can do. Can
15 you explain to me if there are any further tiers? What
16 does a level 2 swiftwater technician do?

17 A. If I may, I'll just go back. Within Queensland Fire
18 and Rescue there's three levels of swiftwater. There's
19 swiftwater awareness, which is designed to stop the first
20 responder - being the firefighter - from drowning in the
21 event. In other words, it's to give them enough
22 information to stop them from jumping into a swiftwater
23 situation with what we call our structural turn-out
24 equipment. In a few of the bits and pieces, we suggest
25 that those people dress like that, dress to drown. It's
26 for structural firefighting, it's not for sloshing --
27

28 Q. By that you mean your large boots, your large pants,
29 your overcoat?

30 A. Your over-boots, your over-pants, your coat and your
31 structural firefighting helmet and gloves. It's a recipe
32 for disaster.
33

34 So you have an awareness level. Then you have a level
35 1 setup, where you basically do in-water throw-bag
36 recoveries. Then level 2 is where you work as part of the
37 rescue team. The main difference is that you are able to
38 do in-water effected rescues and you do a little bit more
39 on-rope. You're making up ferry angles and you're using
40 the power of the water to propel the rescuer out to the
41 patient and, if you have the right team on the other side,
42 they'll pick the patient up, put a PFD on the patient and
43 the power of the water will then propel them to the
44 reception party on the far bank. So instead of fighting
45 the water, we're letting the water do the work for us.
46 That's the main difference.
47

1 You have an awareness level, you have a what happens
2 if you fall in the water level, and then you have the
3 swiftwater rescue technician level 2 where they're actually
4 effectively operating within the water environment.

5
6 Q. What qualifications or what training needs to take
7 place to become a level 2?

8 A. Currently at this stage, as far as I'm aware - again,
9 in around 2000, they, being special operations, said for a
10 person to be considered to be a swiftwater level 2
11 technician, they had to actually be able to climb a rope.
12 So what they requested was that they be a vertical rescue
13 technician. So within Queensland they insist that people
14 climb up and down a rope and know how to do some basic
15 roping rigging.

16
17 Now, that doesn't suit all people and, as I said in my
18 statement, I have a couple of blokes on station who are
19 excellent surf swimmers but, purely because of this
20 limitation that they don't want to go and climb a rope or
21 hang their backside over nothingness, they don't want to be
22 a swiftwater technician. In effect, it puts us in a
23 logjam. We could have a lot of people who would be very
24 comfortable working in a swiftwater environment who are
25 being prohibited at this stage, purely because there is
26 this core belief that all things technical rescue have to
27 benchmark off the vertical roping component.

28
29 Now, within a lot of the roping components - oh sorry,
30 I'll step back one. Within swiftwater components, there
31 aren't many situations where you will have to do advanced
32 rigging - that's where you're moving in with a Tyrolean
33 traverse and having to do a mechanical advantage system to
34 effect the pick-off of the person. Most of the knots that
35 are taught for basic level 1 vertical rescue on station
36 will stand the person in perfectly good stead to do the
37 level 2 rescue technician's work for the bulk of it.
38 However, because there is at this stage level 2 technicians
39 supporting them, if there is a more advanced level of rope
40 rigging to be set up, they would be available to rig the
41 system up.

42
43 Q. I would have thought a lot of the work would be purely
44 horizontal.

45 A. Most of it is. I would suggest probably 99 percent of
46 it is horizontal. We, in Australia, haven't got - other
47 than up around Tully and further up towards Cairns, and

1 that, we haven't got the very sharp creek beds. Where we
2 are, predominantly out around Toowoomba, it's very easy for
3 a team to be set up each side within either throw-bag
4 distance or a shot-fired rope-thrower distance. That can
5 throw up to 400 metres - if and when they decide to
6 actually put them in. These things have been requested
7 some years ago and can be confirmed by both David Woods and
8 Tony Guse, who were, respectively, the technical rescue
9 coordinators within the south-west region. They had
10 requested that equipment be purchased.

11
12 Q. Do you know when they would have requested that
13 equipment?

14 A. Look, it would be five or six years ago now and it was
15 brought about because of a number of other technical
16 rescues that we were engaged in around Toowoomba; whether
17 it's roping down a cliff, or whatever. Unfortunately,
18 Toowoomba being on the top of a hill, we have a few little
19 areas around the place. Even at Crows Nest Falls we would
20 do probably, on average, one in-water rescue there every
21 12 months because people like to dive off a 30 metre cliff
22 into a pool, that's appropriately named the Devil's Pool,
23 and not know what's in there. The locals tell us there's
24 truck tyres and huge logs. They snap their spines and we
25 have to go and --

26
27 Q. Collect them.

28 A. -- collect them. If we don't, the police divers get
29 them where they're still stuck underneath the logs. But we
30 can't help that sort of --

31
32 Q. Behaviour.

33 A. -- behaviour, no. Yes?

34
35 Q. The interview that you had on 24 February, are you
36 happy to talk about everything that you mentioned in there?

37 A. Yes, absolutely.

38
39 Q. Because I can understand that sometimes talking within
40 your own group can be easier than when we start to talk
41 about it, when it can become a public document from here on
42 in.

43 A. Well, unfortunately, I think a lot of this needs to be
44 publicly aired, because we were operating on our
45 bootstraps, there was no strategic support from our senior
46 on-calls and it had become - in Toowoomba, anyway - a bit
47 of a standing joke that some senior on-calls you couldn't

1 get at all. I have a document that will support what I was
2 saying the other day. Toowoomba is about nine and a half
3 hours travel time - sorry, the south-west region is about
4 nine and a half hours road travel time across, yet to look
5 after that they have an eastern and a western senior
6 on-call, so we may, in fact, have a person in Charleville
7 who is making strategic decisions for Toowoomba, which is
8 nine and a half, 10 hours away.

9

10 Q. I would have thought --

11 A. So I'm quite happy to answer anything that you wish.

12

13 Q. Fantastic. I'll probably go through in some detail
14 about situational awareness in regard to those issues that
15 you have just described.

16 A. Yes.

17

18 Q. Before we go off and talk about the brass tacks
19 issues, can you just give me a rundown, starting from
20 firefighter up to commissioner, without going into too much
21 detail, just so that I can understand the structure of
22 QFRS?

23 A. Yes. Well, the structure at QFRS starts - are you
24 wanting within the urban or the rural, or both? Urban are
25 the people who work where the bulk of the structures are;
26 then you have your vegetation firefighters, who are
27 predominantly your --

28

29 Q. Rural.

30 A. -- rural.

31

32 Q. If we could just stick to the urban, initially, and
33 then if we need to talk about the rural fire brigade, we
34 will.

35 A. Yes.

36

37 Q. But if we can just stick to your main environment,
38 initially, that will be great.

39 A. Okay. My main environment is the township and
40 surrounds of Toowoomba. You have a daytime population of
41 about 210,000 and a nighttime of about 155,000; we have
42 major transport rumbling through the joint and growing
43 exponentially at about 21 percent per year, as far as the
44 transport risks are concerned.

45

46 Now, the structure is, as I say, that we have these
47 manned stations in Toowoomba, which is only two, manned on

1 a 10/14 basis. They're made up of a station officer and a
2 number of firefighters on each station. At Station 11,
3 which is Kitchener Street, you have two officers; one will
4 man the primary pumping appliance, which is 311 Alpha, and
5 the second officer and one firefighter will man what is
6 normally known as 311 Lima, which is a specialist rescue
7 appliance.

8
9 Now, those guys support anywhere in the region. So
10 depending on how lucky you feel at the time, you may have
11 the truck halfway to Cunnamulla when we actually have
12 something go down in Toowoomba. It just is a very thinly,
13 overstretched resource. Then we have --

14
15 Q. Would that be the appliance and the rescue vehicle or
16 just the rescue vehicle?

17 A. The rescue vehicle, with the one officer and one
18 firefighter on it, may be anywhere in the region and/or
19 interregional. We were - and it does get back to
20 operational tempo as well - that increasingly both our
21 Alpha appliance from Station 11 and the Lima appliance were
22 supporting down into what's called the western end of the
23 Lockyer Valley, right the way down to Gatton, for a number
24 of the swiftwater events before January 10.

25
26 Q. Where does western region finish, from an eastern
27 point of view?

28 A. South-west region ends halfway up the Toowoomba range.
29 So south-east region, which is administered out of the Gold
30 Coast - which is a fair drag away - starts from there and
31 goes down the Lockyer Valley, down to the Gold Coast; the
32 south-east region as it's known. Now, within the
33 structure, which I think you're wanting me to try to paint,
34 we then have an area director over the top of us. Now, if
35 he's not on duty, we have a senior on-call and that --

36
37 Q. Is the area director a fire --

38 A. He's a --

39
40 Q. Had been a fireman at some point?

41 A. Yes. Some of them, it may have been many years ago.
42 I don't know whether you want me to raise it now or not
43 but, unfortunately, the bulk of them are not even
44 swiftwater awareness trained and these people are the ones
45 who are making strategic decisions. My analogy to you as a
46 detective, it would be a bit like the Commissioner of
47 Police, never having fired a firearm in his life, being in

1 charge of the next big terrorist event and saying, righto,
2 we're going to use deadly force. He would not know the
3 nuances of that application and, unfortunately, and I've
4 got it with - what I've brought down is support
5 documentation to my statements. Our assistant
6 commissioner, our chief superintendent, superintendent, all
7 the way down our senior officer chain are not qualified at
8 any stage, phase or format in swiftwater.

9

10 Q. Is that due to the new - only having been implemented
11 in the last 10 years or 12 years?

12 A. Well, 10 years or 12 years I don't believe is a
13 reasonable excuse not to remain operationally aware. I'm
14 not saying that I required them to go and --

15

16 Q. Do the course?

17 A. -- do the course, but even their transcripts of their
18 core skills maintenance for senior officers, the bulk of
19 them haven't done the mandated training as directed by the
20 commissioner, which is Lee Johnson. So for me, as a
21 professional fire officer, I really am not fussed what rank
22 you sit at; if you are going to be a leader of men and
23 women, you have to know what you're talking about. So,
24 even if it means if it's a two-day course, you sit in on
25 the day one and do all the theory awareness training and
26 know that when I'm talking "river left" and "river right" -
27 when they hear that on the radio from an operational crew
28 that's turned out, they know what is being talked about.

29

30 Q. Do you think that would improve their situational
31 awareness and their decision making processes?

32 A. Absolutely. Absolutely. If you haven't even been
33 given the basic awareness on the specialist subject that
34 you're looking at, the only other information that they can
35 fall back on is their career experience over perhaps the
36 last 20, 25 years, which may or may not relate to
37 swiftwater rescue.

38

39 Q. Depending, I suppose, where they have been stationed
40 as well?

41 A. It's just pure luck - or unluck, as the case may be -
42 as to whether or not you're on the day everything goes
43 pear-shaped, or not. A lot of them are still relying on
44 what they did 20 years ago.

45

46 Q. If I can just take you back to the area, you talked
47 about your area director.

1 A. Yes.

2

3 Q. Where do we go from there, as far as structure?

4 A. We go from there up to the chief superintendent, which
5 is --

6

7 Q. So the area manager, is he a superintendent?

8 A. Yes. That is normally Steve McInerney but on the
9 lead-up to that day, the only person who seemed to be
10 around was an acting inspector by the name of Wally Rye.

11

12 Q. Where is he from?

13 A. He's from pretty much everywhere. He seems to be the
14 permanent relieving area director. He just flits around
15 from pillar to post. Again, by documentation, he's not
16 qualified in the area of swiftwater.

17

18 Q. Is he from the western district, the south-west --

19 A. He's from the eastern district but in the days and
20 evenings leading up to January 10 - his permanent residence
21 is normally at Stanthorpe, which is about 140 kilometres
22 away. So it may have been hosing down in Toowoomba and
23 area, and birds may have been singing and the stars
24 shining, as far as he was concerned. If you haven't got
25 one of these senior on-calls actually on the fire ground,
26 how on earth can they make a strategic decision based on
27 information that they're getting from our Fire
28 Communications centre, which is located in one very small
29 corner of an ambulance communications room. I kid you not,
30 it is an area that is 10 square metres for two operators.
31 This room that we're sitting in here would be approximately
32 two-thirds the size of Fire Communications.

33

34 Now, the operators, particularly when things are
35 really hammering along - there's only two of them there.
36 They can't afford to give a huge list of detail to the
37 senior on-call because there's triple-0s coming in, there's
38 radio messages to do, there's transcripts to log. They
39 have to say, "Well, this is what's been requested. Can you
40 contact the officer on the ground?" They just haven't got
41 the depth of people in the room, nor the space, nor even
42 the acoustic insulation. Ambulance might have ten people
43 in ambulance world and they're all talking and there is not
44 a divider to stop acoustic overspill.

45

46 Then you get down to the 10th and we had three other
47 people from the fire service who decided that they would

1 come and sit in that 10 square metre space and try to
2 prompt operators who were doing the best that they could,
3 who were probably more situationally aware than they were.
4 They were having debates between themselves as to what
5 should happen next, they were on mobile phones, they were
6 on radios. All of this - as you know if you've ever worked
7 in or stood in the communications centre, the whole noise
8 and the vibe of the place just steps up and up in tempo, to
9 the point where you've had to have operators say, "Look,
10 could you please shut up. I can't hear what's being said."
11 It's inappropriate. But, anyhow, I can get into that in
12 more detail later on.

13
14 Q. Where is the Firecom office situated?

15 A. It's in Herries Street, over the top of the
16 main ambulance.

17
18 Q. In Herries Street?

19 A. Herries Street, yes. So it's in Toowoomba.

20
21 Q. We'll come back to that.

22 A. Yes.

23
24 Q. We were at chief superintendent. So the chief
25 superintendent, does he look after the region or is he
26 still an area --

27 A. The chief superintendent, by location, is actually in
28 the area but, by intent, he is in charge of all of
29 south-west region. Then over the top of him you have the
30 assistant commissioner, which is Tom Dawson; then over the
31 top again at State level, you have a deputy commissioner.

32
33 Q. The assistant commissioner, is he your regional
34 resource?

35 A. He is south-west regional assistant commissioner, so
36 he is earmarked for south-west region.

37
38 Q. How many regions do you have across the State?

39 A. Oh, you're going to get me now.

40
41 Q. No, that's okay. I just thought you may have been
42 aware.

43 A. No.

44
45 Q. More than one, obviously?

46 A. More than one. Yes, more than one.

47

1 Q. The commissioner is --
2 A. Is Lee Johnson and he's located in Brisbane.
3
4 Q. Now that I can, sort of, understand the structure,
5 what we might do is go to your previous interview.
6 A. Yes.
7
8 Q. I'll give you the page number and then generally what
9 the block will relate to. So, for argument's sake - the
10 first one I was looking at - we're going to break it up
11 into preparedness; as you said, we'll discuss situational
12 awareness; we'll have a look at some command and control
13 issues, which you've raised. Along the way, if we can,
14 I'll try to steer you through some of the things that I
15 think the Floods Commission feel are important and I will
16 ask you some questions along those lines. Without trying
17 to go through and re-read each paragraph, if we can make
18 reference to, say - we'll start with page 15 and I think it
19 will relate to paragraph 62.
20 A. You mean to say I sat up 'til quarter to 2 and you've
21 skipped the first 15 pages? Hang on. I've got a fair bit
22 of stuff here.
23
24 Q. You'll find that we'll come back; we'll go back.
25 A. Okay.
26
27 Q. What we're trying to do - we'll just look at general
28 preparedness first. I have a copy here as well, if you
29 like --
30 A. No, it's all right.
31
32 Q. -- which is not split.
33 A. It's just that I have stuff that's linked back to
34 documents that will support what I've been trying to say.
35
36 Q. No problems.
37 A. If that's all right.
38
39 Q. Yes. No, no problems at all.
40 A. Because Laura did say bring down everything.
41
42 Q. Yes. Fantastic.
43 A. I think about three trees fell in the forest last
44 night. 15, yes, I've got.
45
46 Q. Page 15. We'll start with 62, which is this fellow
47 here.

1 A. Yes.

2

3 Q. The paragraph that I wanted, initially, to talk about
4 with regards to resourcing states:

5

6 We have, over a protracted number of years,
7 tried to increase the resources, that's the
8 human resources, available to get out of
9 the door to do a job.

10

11 You said that in 1976 there were 12 firefighters on shift.
12 In 2011 you've got 10 firefighters on shift. You've talked
13 about an increase from 56,000 people to 156,000 at
14 nighttime and 210,000 during the day, in regard to the
15 structures that we've talked about and the increase in the
16 transport department, and whatnot.

17

18

19 Q. But you've also gone on to indicate that 1.5
20 administrative staff have now increased to 80
21 administrative staff within that same region. What I want
22 you to do, if you could, is quickly give me a precis of how
23 you've arrived at that. What was the main thrust of what
24 you were saying there? Obviously, that admin staff are
25 increasing but operational staff are not increasing?

26

27 A. And the size of the population of Toowoomba and the
28 number and type of jobs that Queensland Fire and Rescue are
29 responding to are increasing. Back in 1975/'76 - all the
30 documents were derived from historical records from the
31 fire service and the union's own research, and those sorts
32 of things, and out of the Bureau of Statistics.

32

33

34 It just seems strange that Toowoomba's response
35 capacity has not increased, as you said quite correctly,
36 it's decreased in capacity. It's getting taller, broader
37 and we're going to far more complex and different types of
38 incidents, and the fire service has just not responded to
39 it. Now, do you want these two documents tabled to
40 yourself or do you want me to leave them within this, where
41 it's linked back to --

41

42 Q. As we go through them, we might label them. So we'll
43 write number 1, number 2, so that we will know exactly --

44

45

46

47

A. I've actually done it myself, fairly crudely.

Q. Okay.

A. Document 13 relates to --

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Q. Give me one second and I'll go and get some flags.
A. All right. I've tried to be helpful

Q. Very good. Fantastic.
A. It was more for myself than yourself.

(Det Snr Sgt Reid left the room and subsequently returned.)

Q. I suppose the first question I want to ask, though, is what - we'll flag those so then we'll know in what order we've talked about them. Let's call the first document you're going to refer to document 1.
A. Okay.

Q. So if we could flag it "D1". So, what do you think has caused the - or has inhibited the growth? Is it staffing, for argument's sake? What's the major cause that's stopped growth?
A. I think, unfortunately, management just didn't look at the response capacities that are required. In Toowoomba now, Queensland Police can certainly go to more than one incident at once and Queensland Ambulance can go to more than one incident at once, yet Queensland Fire, if we have one structural fire - and that's a house fire or a small building fire - all of our resources in area 1, which is Station 11 and Station 12, by their own standing orders for safe work on the fire ground and those sorts of things, are fully committed.

We have no capacity to do more than one job at once, unless the guys on the fire ground actively go, "Nuh, it's right, we think we'll be right.", and struggle through with what we've got on the first job and we'll send another truck off to the next job. Which is all right until somebody gets hurt. Then management will jump up and down and say you shouldn't have started that fire fight or that incident until you had sufficient and adequate resources on scene - which I do not disagree with, that line.

Q. Yes, yes.
A. However, they know that a firefighter, if somebody is trapped in a car or being swept down a creek, will invariably say, "Guys, do you think you've got the structure fire under control", or, "that incident under control with what you've got?" "Yep." "Okay. You're good for us to go.", and we'll go to the next one, which

1 invariably means that when we get - we're spreading the
2 resources ultra thin, to the point where it is dangerous.

3

4 Q. Is that implied by management, that practice?

5 A. Yes, it is and why I say it is implied is because when
6 it happens, where people quite blatantly breach their own
7 zero harm policy - and Mr Dawson has said on one occasion
8 that we're not to commence an interior attack unless we
9 have three appliances on scene. Why I suggest that
10 management do condone that practice is that they don't say
11 to the guys after the event, "Why did you split the
12 response up and go to two separate jobs" or "three jobs".
13 So they allow the practice to occur. Why? I suppose it
14 suits their needs.

15

16 Now, if somebody is injured, they will just fall back
17 on their sword and say, well, under the zero harm policy
18 you shouldn't have, naughty boys. So we're stuck between a
19 rock and a hard place. Firefighters live in the community
20 which they serve, by and large, and the last thing they
21 want to have occur is to have the community say why didn't
22 you go to my moment of crisis, why were you busy at a
23 structure fire, or something else, why didn't you come
24 over.

25

26 Q. Who makes the critical decision to split the
27 appliances?

28 A. It's invariably the operational crews on the ground.

29

30 Q. What rank would that person be?

31 A. Station officer.

32

33 Q. Okay. If I'm the second fire of the night, which
34 starts 25 minutes after the first fire, what would happen
35 to me in Toowoomba if you, as the station officer, decide
36 not to split the crews for safety reasons? What happens to
37 my home or my business property?

38 A. Well if that fire started, as you said, 25 minutes
39 after, statistically --

40

41 Q. Well, make it 10 minutes.

42 A. No, no. 10, 25, it doesn't matter. Sorry. We've
43 only got two stations; they're committed at that first
44 incident, doesn't matter what it is, and the incident
45 controller has said, no, the resources have to stay there
46 for safety. It means then that 10 or 25 minutes in -
47 whichever you want to go with - our fire communications

1 centre is then obliged to page our Toowoomba auxiliaries or
2 the Highfields auxiliaries or even the Gatton auxiliaries.
3 Now, statistically, our Toowoomba auxiliaries will take
4 24 minutes after being paged to get onto the fire ground.

5
6 This morning is an example. We were working a RTC -
7 road traffic crash - out on the Gore Highway; I called
8 auxiliaries in; we had two respond, in total, over a period
9 of an hour and a half. Four is the minimum required to
10 respond --

11
12 Q. To turn out?
13 A. -- into an urban area. So in answer to that, the fire
14 call goes down; 24 minutes later, at best, you may have
15 Highfields or the Toowoomba auxiliary crew rock up. Now,
16 you said it was a fire. If it's actually somebody trapped,
17 flashover occurs about seven and a half minutes in, where
18 the compartment the person is in is completely consumed.
19 But two and a half minutes into the fire starting, if the
20 person is not out of the structure, they will succumb to
21 smoke inhalation. So 24 minutes in, when they get there,
22 the people are either out or deceased.

23
24 Q. What would be your recommendation then?
25 A. The recommendation is that, quite plainly, we need
26 another permanently manned station in Toowoomba,
27 particularly coming on the back of the developments out
28 towards Charlton where they're putting in a huge,
29 multimillion dollar transit interchange. It's going to
30 have the rail come up from Victoria and then there's going
31 to be semi trailers, and Christ knows what, there and rail
32 going down to Brisbane. It's the inland rail corridor head
33 that will serve Queensland.

34
35 Q. Have you seen any documentation, as far as strategic
36 plans or any of the QFRS planning documents for your
37 particular region and area?
38 A. No, we haven't and probably part of that is that
39 Queensland Fire and Rescue have breached their own business
40 rules. We're meant to have, as station officers and
41 captains, a meeting with our superintendent or managers
42 further up at least five times a year. They haven't
43 happened for three and a half years.

44
45 Q. What's the thinking behind that?
46 A. I think it's to save money, to be brutally honest.
47 There was one run three and a half years ago by a manager

1 and, to be honest, it was a disaster. It was a talkfest.
2 We weren't allowed to couch our concerns as operational
3 fire officers and station officers, and the Assistant
4 Commissioner said, "No, it's a waste of money", and he
5 elected not to do any more of these mandatory, under their
6 own business rules, station officer meetings, which is the
7 only time as a work group that the four shift officers can
8 get together and talk about issues.

9

10 Q. That's what I was going to say. How do you get the
11 opportunity then to, say, air grievances and I suppose, for
12 want of a better term, rapport build amongst the officers,
13 so that you can discuss issues from a particular shift or a
14 particular type of activity, be it road traffic crashes or
15 be it swiftwater rescue? When do those discussions take
16 place between middle management, as yourself, station
17 officers and whatnot?

18 A. They only happen on changeover of shift. So it's
19 entirely dependent upon the enthusiasm of the off-going
20 shift officer to actually hang around and have a talk -
21 unlike, say, the nursing profession where they have to come
22 in half an hour early to do a handover. Quite literally,
23 if somebody doesn't want to talk, they can blow in at five
24 seconds to start of shift. It's like the old cartoon
25 series with the sheepdog sitting there: "Hi, Ralph",
26 click, and off he'd go; nothing to say and out the door
27 they go, when in fact there's a whole heap to be said.

28

29 Q. What I was more interested in, though, are the longer
30 term issues. When do you, as a station officer, talk to
31 other station officers about your longer term issues; your
32 longer term concerns with regard to appliances, equipment
33 and that sort of thing? Rather than just a shift to shift
34 basis, I'm talking more your longer term issues?

35 A. Unfortunately, the only medium that has been left to a
36 lot of the station officers is to use the union executive
37 in the Toowoomba branch to take up those issues with
38 management, which isn't really their job in the first
39 place, but it was the only consistent conduit to management
40 and even then, if management didn't want to meet, it didn't
41 happen.

42

43 Q. Do you think that your area - if we just look at
44 Toowoomba, rather than moving down into Grantham - your
45 sphere of control, do you think that you guys were prepared
46 for the incident that took place in Toowoomba on 10 January
47 - as far as resourcing, I mean, not as far as a skill set,

1 so to speak.

2 A. No, and why I say "No" quite blatantly - the guys on
3 the ground did a brilliant job. However, from
4 recollection, I think there were only 15 of us who actually
5 worked that day. Two other guys that I know of, plus
6 myself, in effect, turned up at the station.

7
8 Q. And that's out of a possible 40 --

9 A. 48. So, for I don't know what reason, there was not
10 the call go out, "All staff report to station."

11
12 Q. Recalled to duty.

13 A. So we did not have 48 human assets on that job.

14
15 Q. Who would be responsible for a callout of that nature,
16 a return to duty request?

17 A. At that stage it was acting - Wally Rye. He was from
18 - and I'm only going by recollection. It's actually in the
19 documents further down. He was requested earlier in the
20 morning to stand more swiftwater qualified people up on
21 stations and that was denied. Interestingly enough, Oakey
22 army --

23
24 Q. When?

25 A. About 7.30.

26
27 Q. Am?

28 A. Am.

29
30 Q. On the morning of the 10th?

31 A. On the 10th. Interestingly enough, the assistant
32 commissioner stood up - in other words, manned - three
33 auxiliary stations. None of them are even awareness
34 trained in swiftwater operations.

35
36 Q. What was the purpose of having the auxiliaries on
37 standby?

38 A. Don't know because, as far - unless it was just to
39 slop around in the flood. But they were not swiftwater
40 qualified, so they - even though some of them came down and
41 did a little bit, because unfortunately it was all hands to
42 the wheel, so to speak. But going on from that, the
43 assistant commissioner elected to man up his regional
44 operations control centre and he put additional people in
45 the fire communications centre.

46
47 Q. This is all in Toowoomba?

1 A. In Toowoomba. But he did not, or failed to actually
2 bring back additional staff to duty until after 1700 that
3 night, and that was only on the insistence of the local
4 branch UFU secretary, who said, "Tom, if you don't have
5 another crew manned up on each of the stations tonight, the
6 media are going to know about it in the morning." In other
7 words, having to pressgang him into doing it.

8
9 Q. "Tom" being?

10 A. "Tom" being the assistant commissioner.

11

12 Q. The assistant commissioner for the region?

13 A. For the region.

14

15 Q. What's his surname?

16 A. Tom Dawson. I had a fairly robust conversation with
17 him as well that evening. The town had been slammed by
18 that stage.

19

20 Q. Were you being supported by the superintendent, by the
21 manager, at that point?

22 A. No, because the acting area director had vanished
23 midstream, so to speak. With the singular most disastrous
24 event to hit Toowoomba, the person who was in charge of the
25 operations on the ground vanished.

26

27 Q. That's the acting --

28 A. That's Wally Rye. Any other service, any other time,
29 he would be up on a dereliction of duty charge.

30

31 Q. Had he, at any point, or your chief superintendent -
32 had anyone indicated their intent to you at any point on
33 what their thinking was, say, at 7.30 for not standing up
34 any further staff or for --

35 A. They just said, "No, your request for additional staff
36 is denied." There was no intent. Yet we knew from other
37 people around the place that the Oakey air base, which is
38 the army base, their Weather Bureau person had said to the
39 CO out there "We need to evacuate the base" in the morning.
40 So there was situational awareness out there.

41

42 The crews on the ground knew that something was
43 happening. The ground was completely saturated. If you
44 spat onto the lawn, your saliva would run off. There was
45 absolutely no capacity for water absorption in the soil at
46 all. We had a number of events where we actually had to
47 drag people out of - even the intersection of Kitchener and

1 James Streets, where, unfortunately, there were the two
2 people who died, and that would be on City Safe TV footage
3 as well.

4
5 Q. It is.

6 A. Prior to January 10, it was just cycling up. It was -
7 my best description is it was a timeline to disaster and
8 yet nobody noticed the trigger points. The senior
9 officers, unfortunately --

10
11 Q. Well, who were the --

12 A. The bulk of them had gone on holidays. They'd gone on
13 three weeks Christmas leave.

14
15 Q. Who were the seniors working on the 10th? So when you
16 say --

17 A. Wally Rye.

18
19 Q. No, no, sorry. He was the superintendent?

20 A. Mmm.

21
22 Q. Oh, so when you talk about the "senior", when you ring
23 for approval for further appliances or anything, you're
24 talking about your superintendent as the senior?

25 A. No, sorry. He's our acting inspector, that's Wally
26 Rye, so he is our acting area 1 supervisor, for want of a
27 better description

28
29 Q. So who do you get your approvals from? As a station
30 officer, who do you call?

31 A. We get our approvals from him.

32
33 Q. Sorry. I misunderstood what you had meant in regard
34 to the senior and the superintendent, so now I'm clear on
35 that.

36 A. There's two ranks. They can be either an inspector,
37 if they're a lower rank, or a superintendent, if they're of
38 a higher rank. Then you have your chief superintendent,
39 then your assistant commissioner. But on that particular
40 day there didn't seem to be any dissemination of who was
41 who in the zoo; it was quite literally left to the
42 operational crews, and a number of weeks prior to that.
43 Because the senior officers would not make a decision on
44 how we were going to respond to these swiftwater incidents,
45 the agreeance across all of the shifts - everyone would
46 just ring up and say, "Oh well, yeah, that sounds like a
47 good idea that C shift are doing, we'll do that too.",

1 without any approval from senior managers. What was
2 occurring was if we had a swiftwater incident down the
3 range into south-west region, it would normally - the
4 rescue appliance would only have two people. Now, two
5 people are not a swiftwater rescue crew by any stretch of
6 the imagination.

7
8 Q. From what I understand, you need two 2s and a 1 - is
9 that correct - to constitute under your directives? Would
10 that --

11 A. No, no. You've got one truck, with two people in it;
12 that's the rescue truck. You need a minimum of six people
13 to form an effective swiftwater rescue team because - and
14 do you want me to explain how it works?

15
16 Q. Yes, definitely.

17 A. Okay. So you've got - when you get to the incident -
18 don't worry about where the resources come from, other than
19 the fact that they have to be trained. It's no good,
20 basically, taking an auxiliary who isn't trained. You may
21 as well take Joe Blow off the street.

22
23 You have an incident controller, then you have an
24 upstream spotter, you have two downstream spotters as a
25 minimum, and then you'll have two or three in-water people
26 who are assisting - and that's just on one side. You may
27 need to split them up so they come round from each side so
28 that, as I was saying before, where you're using the
29 hydraulic effect of the water and you're setting up a ferry
30 angle, which is a rope at a diagonal across the water
31 source or the feature, they communicate to each other. A
32 minimum of six.

33
34 Invariably, we were responding with two but we made a
35 strategic decision, in the lack of any direction on the
36 issue from senior management, on the two station floors
37 that if the rescue appliance with a crew of two in went out
38 the door, the nearest - either Station 12, which is Anzac
39 Avenue, or Station 11, which is Kitchener Street, if they
40 were the nearest to where that rescue was responding to,
41 they would back it up as well. So it was only the guys on
42 the station floor who came up with, well, this is the only
43 way we're going to keep our own members safe is if we send
44 another truck with trained people in it to back them up for
45 all things safety.

46
47 Q. What level were those decisions being made at? You

1 talked about the on floor. What --
2 A. At the station.
3
4 Q. Yes, but what rank is --
5 A. Up to station officer. We just seemed to - the only
6 way I could describe the feeling, it was like a computer
7 locking up when you were talking to some of these senior
8 on-calls. The light was blinking and you were getting no
9 output.
10
11 Q. I notice that at page 3, paragraph 16 you're referring
12 to your meetings that you're required to conduct between
13 your station officers, meeting five times a year.
14 A. Yes.
15
16 Q. How were you and other station officers making
17 strategic decisions about what you were going to do in the
18 coming week or the coming month? Like, how were you making
19 your decisions?
20 A. We were just ringing up between the stations and
21 saying, you know - I work with two other officers down at
22 Station 11 and you'd ring up and go, "Yep, looks as though
23 it's going to be a bugger of a day. How do we want to do
24 this?", because we had no direction.
25
26 Q. So just simply negotiation on the day?
27 A. That's it.
28
29 Q. No structure at all as to how --
30 A. No guidance from above. None at all.
31
32 Q. I suppose you would have two things that you'd be
33 concerned about in the wet; one would be road traffic
34 crashes and the second would be your swiftwater response.
35 So was that left up to you and the other two officers, as
36 you've mentioned, to simply discuss how you're going to
37 address them at the start of each shift?
38 A. That's correct. It was just complete seat of the
39 pants.
40
41 Q. In that same paragraph, and we're talking about
42 page --
43 A. Did you want this one?
44
45 Q. Page 3, paragraph 16.
46 A. Do you want that to be document 3?
47

1 Q. Yes. If you could explain to me what that document
2 is?

3 A. The document that I am pointing at - which I have
4 labelled as "Doc 1" but I'll label as document 3 for
5 yourself - is where I've sent an email to my assistant
6 commissioner, believing that we're breaching our business
7 rules and I sent it to him on 31 December 2009, where I
8 raised - and I'd had a number of officers saying, "Look,
9 when are we going to have a station officers meeting?"
10 They tried to say, "Well look, let's make it an industrial
11 issue.", because we just wanted to be able to talk about
12 important things that affect senior - middle level
13 managers.

14
15 Q. Yes, okay. Definitely.

16 A. So will document 3 work for you?

17
18 Q. Where's document 2?

19 A. Sorry. Document 2 is the one behind that one. I'd
20 better put that one there.

21
22 Q. Okay, yes. If we can throw document 2 on the other
23 one as well, that would be great.

24 A. Okay.

25
26 Q. Just for the record, document 1, can you just briefly
27 outline to me what document 1 relates to?

28 A. Document 1 relates to what you were talking about
29 before, as to the population level, the claim --

30
31 Q. The demographics that you were --

32 A. The demographic; the claim made by, at that stage, the
33 United Firefighters Union that in 1956 we had - sorry, 1976
34 I should say. We had about 55,000 and we had 1.5
35 administrative staff supporting a total of 12 firefighters
36 and officers per shift. Now, in 2011, we have 10
37 firefighters per shift for a population that's tripled -
38 well, pretty much that size.

39
40 Q. Document 2, what does that relate to, John?

41 A. Document 2 is relating to yet another - it was a
42 request, actually, for a - a brief to the then
43 Attorney-General, which was Kerry Shine, where the union
44 had made submissions to him and said, look, it's just
45 craziness that we can only handle one small job at once,
46 and the town has grown that much that --

47

1 Q. All right. If you could label that --
2 A. As document 2?
3
4 Q. -- as document 2, and then we'll go on to label
5 document 3.
6 A. Which I've just done.
7
8 Q. Which you've just done. Anyway, we were at document 3
9 and we were referring to you - you've notified your
10 assistant commissioner --
11 A. Yes.
12
13 Q. -- that you think that there appears to be a clear
14 breach of - did you say "policy" or did you --
15 A. Business rules
16
17 Q. Business rules, in regard to your station officers
18 meetings; is that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20
21 Q. What response did you receive?
22 A. Nothing. I spoke to Mr Dawson face-to-face. I said,
23 "Did you get my email?" He said, "Yeah." He said,
24 "They're a waste of time. Not going to happen."
25
26 Q. And you think that may be because of, what, financial
27 reasons or productivity reasons?
28 A. I don't know but I would've thought - call me crazy,
29 but when the commissioner of an agency, within the business
30 rules - and he signs off as the signatory of the business
31 rule that he endorses it. If he says that there is to be a
32 minimum of five meetings per year, I would think that he
33 would like to expect that there is actually being five
34 meetings per year, so that you have a clear communication
35 line between senior managers and middle level managers. If
36 you haven't got the meetings, you haven't got
37 communications occurring. You will have seen in there -
38 years and years ago, I was taught by another agency the
39 principles of operations, and one of the principles was
40 that administration was not to hamper operations.
41
42 Q. I remember reading that in here previously.
43 A. Okay, and it is still relevant. It's been ripped
44 straight out of the Australian army doctrine years ago, but
45 you had these principles of operations that administration
46 was not to hinder operations. We still have today - if I
47 elect to make a second alarm response, which means I want

1 more trucks, instead of me being taken on face value,
2 42 years into the job, that if John Burrows is looking at
3 something and says, "Oh dear, we need more resources",
4 currently that is only approved after the fire
5 communications operator tracks down, then is able to
6 contact, the senior on-call to go, "Look, there's just been
7 a request for a second alarm. Will you endorse it or not?"
8

9 Q. And what would the --

10 A. And they might be hundreds of kilometres away.
11

12 Q. Okay. What could the turnaround be, timewise, in that
13 urgent - I should imagine it would be an urgent request?

14 A. Well, we've responded with lights and sirens, so
15 somebody somewhere has categorised it as an emergency
16 incident. Then, based on either what we know of the injury
17 or the potential for injury, we can elect to upgrade or to
18 downgrade it - as can Firecom, they can upgrade it. But
19 they can only upgrade it or downgrade it, the same as us,
20 if they ring the senior on-call. Unfortunately, with the
21 senior on-calls, some we've never been able to contact, so
22 zero response, even though they're being paid an on-call
23 allowance to be available via their mobile phone, via a
24 pager, via a radio, via a landline.
25

26 Q. Are there certain officers who are more prone to --

27 A. Yes.
28

29 Q. -- contact failure than others?

30 A. Absolutely.
31

32 Q. Are there certain officers who are more reliable than
33 others?

34 A. Yes, and unfortunately it has to be said because the
35 guys on the floor are saying, "John, it has to be said."
36

37 Q. Are they aware --

38 A. The acting area director on the day was renowned for
39 doing a 'Where's Wally'. His name's Wally and he'd just
40 bugger off.
41

42 Q. As in the cartoon - the --

43 A. Where's Wally.
44

45 Q. Yes.

46 A. Even on the day, even in the debrief afterwards, two
47 weeks after, Mr Dawson said, "Yeah, well, we really don't

1 want to talk about that." This guy just buggered off.
2 It's the only way I can describe it.

3

4 Q. Just quickly - and we've touched on it previously -
5 you've got seniors who are quite possibly or could quite
6 conceivably be nine and a half hours away from your
7 incident.

8 A. Making a decision.

9

10 Q. Making a decision.

11 A. Without sighting the incident at all.

12

13 Q. How do you think that affects your operational
14 appreciation or your situational awareness in regard to
15 that?

16 A. On a number of occasions - the only way I can describe
17 it is extreme frustration. We are the people on the
18 ground. The number of times where we've still been cutting
19 people out of cars who have been entrapped and we are
20 getting calls from Firecom, "Could you please contact the
21 senior on-call?" You contact him and he says, "Oh, I want
22 the appliances back in the Toowoomba area as soon as you
23 can." "Yes, sir, but we are still working the job. We are
24 still cutting the people out of the vehicle."

25

26 Because they don't elect to come on, they're actually
27 breaching their own incident control structure where
28 they're meant to say that the person who is in charge,
29 that's me as the first responding officer, as the incident
30 controller - if he wants to modify it, he actually has to
31 get up out of his bed, get in the car and tootle along to
32 actually see what's doing before he says, "I didn't like
33 that" or "Let's change it."

34

35 Q. Well, that's not going to be possible from nine and a
36 half hours away, is it?

37 A. Well, perhaps they need to be considering to put
38 somebody in the areas where you've got a higher density
39 population. You've got, as I said before, major population
40 base, so why haven't we got a senior on-call who is
41 exclusive for the Toowoomba and surrounds, who is going to
42 service the western end of south-east, down to, say, Gatton
43 and out towards Dalby way.

44

45 Q. Would that be a recommendation that your - obviously
46 you've discussed it with other station officers and other
47 staff. Is that something that you would think would be a

1 reasonable recommendation?

2 A. Well, they can do either one of two things: they can
3 either go and reside at the stations or within close
4 proximity to the situations, or comply to their own
5 operations doctrine, policies and procedures and trust the
6 incident controllers word back.

7
8 Q. I see you pointing over there towards a document.
9 Should we now introduce that as well? Is that - do you
10 have - you're making reference to --

11 A. It's - it will be hidden, unfortunately, wherever we
12 were talking about it. It's there.

13
14 Q. What we might do is during a break we'll locate it --

15 A. Find it.

16
17 Q. -- and once we've located it, depending on where we
18 are --

19 A. We'll mark that document whatever it is.

20

21 Q. Yes. Okay?

22 A. Yeah.

23

24 Q. So we'll make sure we come back to that. We've looked
25 at situational - you know, operational appreciation, and
26 whatnot, and we'll move on from there.

27

28 Previous requests for additional resources. If we go
29 to page 4, reference 16, you've talked here about, "I've
30 got quite a few documents that detail the number of times"
31 that a number of concerns have been put forward in the past
32 in regard to sufficient resources to safely handle more
33 than one structural fire. Have we already dealt with those
34 documents? Are they part of the ones that you and I have
35 spoken about previously, documents 2 and 3?

36 A. Yes, where - the submissions.

37

38 Q. I just wanted to make sure, for thoroughness, that we
39 do cover that.

40 A. Yes.

41

42 Q. So those documents have been forwarded, as you said,
43 to the assistant commissioner and they've --

44 A. And to the Attorney-General, Kerry Shine.

45

46 Q. But the ones that went to the Attorney-General, were
47 they through the firefighters union or were they directly

1 sent by you?

2 A. They were sent by the firefighters union.

3

4 Q. You talked about a structure fire where your
5 appliances are going to obviously show up. When you talk
6 about a road traffic crash or a swiftwater event, are they
7 equivalent to a house fire in regard to the turn-out, you
8 know, for manning for that turn-out?

9 A. Similar, and why I - and I'll --

10

11 Q. I mean, would you only be able to attend - even if it
12 was one road traffic crash or one swiftwater rescue, can
13 you only attend one incident at a time?

14 A. Yes. We can't be everywhere at once.

15

16 Q. No.

17 A. I know that's sounding silly. What I'll do, if you
18 like, is I'll tender that fire communications centre
19 directive that relates to --

20

21 Q. Okay. What are we up to, 4 or 5?

22 A. 4.

23

24 Q. I think we're up to 4, yes. And what document is
25 this?

26 A. It's FCCD-Q3-113, which is the State communications
27 standard, and if you actually rummage through up the back
28 here, it actually details that for a swiftwater rescue, QPS
29 will be notified and QAS will be notified. Now, neither of
30 those are qualified or competent to enter the water.

31

32 Q. No.

33 A. Notify the senior on-call, but it says one pumper on
34 turn-out and one special rescue truck.

35

36 Q. Which you were talking about --

37 A. Yes.

38

39 Q. -- your Alpha and your Lima?

40 A. Which, by default, is exactly what we ended up doing,
41 so that what was happening in the area was the special was
42 being sent but with no backup and we've said, no, it's
43 broaching all things safety; two people are not a rescue
44 team in that environment. It's just a recipe for disaster.
45 I can talk about losing Peter McCarron later on and that
46 was the longest minute and a half I ever had. But that is
47 the State directive on swiftwater response. So that's

1 document 4.

2

3 Q. Okay. Let's label that document 4.

4 A. Unfortunately, in the lead-up to all of this, there
5 were an increasing amount of responses by the specialist
6 rescue where there wasn't trained support personnel
7 following them up. We had an incident out at Dalby before
8 that and it was only fortunate that one of our technicians,
9 who was working day work, heard it. Yes, he went against a
10 directive and self-responded, but he ended up being the
11 only person out there who was qualified to do the job, with
12 a person trapped midstream at Dalby. It all went a bit
13 pear-shaped. The flood boat that they tootled out with
14 first off got high-sided and was swamped, so they ended up
15 spending about two hours sitting on the bow of the boat,
16 waiting for another SES float boat to come out from
17 Chinchilla, I think.

18

19 Q. We'll go through and discuss that quickly.

20 A. Yep.

21

22 Q. We were going back through preparedness. What were
23 the nature of the resources that you think you were
24 lacking? We were talking about when you've sent
25 documentation away, talking about, you know - I think we
26 touched on it earlier but what, primarily, do you think
27 you're lacking within your area?

28 A. Well, I'll start at the top and work down, if that's
29 all right?

30

31 Q. Yes.

32 A. I believe we were lacking in senior officer
33 understanding of the type of incidents that were being
34 responded to. That can quite clearly be confirmed by their
35 own learning manuscripts, as to whether they're competent
36 or not in those areas. So the human resources at the top
37 were lacking in the skills and an understanding as to what
38 they were meant to be doing. Then you get down to the
39 station levels. I believe we didn't have enough resources,
40 as in the physical resources in the station. We didn't
41 have enough in-water equipment; we didn't have --

42

43 Q. By "in-water", what do you mean?

44 A. PFDs, throw bags. It was only about three days prior
45 that the acting inspector brought up a boat, an inflatable
46 boat that was just oar powered. But we haven't even got
47 enough gear that if it is wet, we can cycle that lot out,

1 dry it and replace it with spare equipment. There is not
2 the spare equipment. There's been no uptake of
3 recommendations that have been made over a long period of
4 time to buy more equipment, so that we have --

5

6 Q. Do you have access to those documents?

7 A. Again, you'd have to talk to either station officer
8 Tony Guse or station officer David Woods. I know that for
9 a long time they were very, very frustrated at the requests
10 for equipment that were being denied. The operators on the
11 ground --

12

13 Q. Sorry, Tony Guse and what was the second chap's name?

14 A. David Woods. They were both, for a period of time
15 each, the south-west region technical rescue coordinators,
16 so it was their job to try and keep us up to a good
17 operational capacity. But then you get down to the floor
18 itself. As I say --

19

20 Q. By "the floor" what do you --

21 A. Well, the station. Sorry, not the station physically.
22 We call it the workshop floor. There are a lot of people,
23 as I said before, who would've been quite happy to have
24 been trained to a higher level of swiftwater who were being
25 prohibited because of this - you had - I think it got down
26 to financial because if you're a qualified rescue
27 technician, you're paid a 2.5 percent allowance on your
28 fortnightly wage. For somebody like myself, that is about
29 \$59 a fortnight. And the expectation is you have to keep
30 your skills up, and those sorts of things, in those
31 particular areas. But I think there was actually a
32 financial or budgetary cap State-wide as well as
33 regionally-wide. As I say within my notations there, it
34 would be akin to having only one person on a fire appliance
35 being competent to wear breathing apparatus and the other
36 three having to sit outside and watch the one person work.
37 Why not allow --

38

39 Q. Due mainly to, what, budgetary constraints?

40 A. That's right. There was a cap on how many - it was
41 invitation only as to who got to do it and then it was only
42 - there were set numbers. Initially it started at eight,
43 then it grew to 10 and I think it may be to 12 now. But if
44 48 of the firefighters all want to do swiftwater, why not
45 train 48 so that you've got 48 who are capable of doing
46 in-water swift, instead of having a whole heap of
47 bystanders - including myself, the way things have

1 transpired. Technically, I shouldn't have entered the
2 water at all.

3

4 Q. So you're looking at, I suppose, training and then the
5 upkeep of that training?

6 A. Sure.

7

8 Q. And your financial concerns from an area and regional
9 --

10 A. But interestingly enough, I think the Commissioner,
11 Lee Johnson, must have had what he calls his wee small
12 hours of the morning light bulb moments, when he came down
13 and addressed a gathering, it would have been of about 60
14 urban search and rescue technicians at Cannon Hill when we
15 were being deployed to the Brisbane floods. He said,
16 "Well, gentlemen, in the last two months you've saved more
17 people from floodwater than the agency has dragged out of
18 house fires in the previous ten years." It was saying
19 volumes that he probably was having a little bit of a panic
20 attack that, oh dear, we perhaps should have trained a lot,
21 lot more because, for bang for buck, more people have been
22 dragged out in the last two months in the floods out of
23 swiftwater incidents than there had been out of structure
24 fires - which is supposedly our core business - in the last
25 ten years. That was said in front of about 60 people at
26 Cannon Hill.

27

28 Q. Well, it appears to me that your core business is
29 exponentially changing --

30 A. Yes.

31

32 Q. -- from turn-out for house fire to turn-out to road
33 traffic crashes, to turn-out now to, I suppose, an ongoing
34 swiftwater rescue response. Would that be a fair
35 assessment?

36 A. Well, when I started 42 years ago, I started as a
37 vegetation firefighter with occasional structure fires,
38 then the next flavour was LPG gas, then we had chlorine,
39 then we hazardous materials responses, then it just grew
40 like Topsy. We had confined space, then we had trench
41 rescue, then we had swiftwater, then we had urban search
42 and rescue. You're right, it's just gone like Topsy,
43 possibly without people asking how many human resources do
44 we need to train for a fairly massive event.

45

46 Within the swiftwater environment now, I've come up
47 with categorising it at three levels of swiftwater. You've

1 got the swiftwater that is within the confines of the creek
2 or channel feature. Then you've got the swiftwater that's
3 overflowed and could be broad acreage. In Toowoomba, some
4 of the walk-ins were over a kilometre to get to the
5 patients. Then you've got the catastrophic swiftwater,
6 that if you had technicians in the mainstream, like in
7 Toowoomba, they would have died. The only way you could
8 have effected a life rescue of somebody trapped midstream
9 in that would be if the person was trapped against a pole
10 or on a car and you had helicopter access.

11
12 But helicopter access for swiftwater is always
13 considered to be the absolute last resort because
14 helicopters, with a bag fan over the top, if they're
15 hovering below about 500 feet and they have a carburetor
16 problem and it goes cough, they tend to handle like a house
17 brick and they crash and kill the crew on board and the
18 person they're trying to save. In the urban environment of
19 Toowoomba, there is no way that they could have tracked
20 down the creek at the speed it was doing to effect a
21 pick-off without getting snared in something. They would
22 have lost their crew member and probably lost the aircraft
23 if the observer wasn't quick enough to fire the winch sever
24 bolt.

25
26 Why I believe that if anyone was actually in that
27 water themselves, why they'd die, is I unfortunately had
28 the delight of finding the lady around behind the flour
29 mill in Toowoomba.

30
31 Q. Donna Rice.

32 A. She started at --

33
34 Q. Kitchener and James.

35 A. -- Kitchener and James fully clothed. When I found
36 her, and she'd only gone a fairly short distance, she
37 didn't have a stitch on her - not a stitch. So it was the
38 washing machine from hell that poor woman had been through.

39
40 Q. Yes. You mentioned that everything is growing, and
41 you have indicated that; the levels of your turn-outs are
42 changing and growing. What documentation can we point to
43 that looks at strategic growth of staff and resources in
44 keeping with the population? Have you seen or read
45 anything at all from --

46 A. No. From management - all that I know is that over
47 the years, out towards the western side of the Toowoomba

1 airport they've bought and sold two station sites. I
2 haven't got it with me and I do apologise, but there is
3 documentation from the mid-80s from the then Toowoomba fire
4 brigade's board that makes recommendations for a third and
5 fourth station, as a matter of urgency, to be built in
6 Toowoomba. They were never acted on. That was with a
7 population then that would've been lucky to be nudging
8 90,000. So somebody, be it the commission or the board
9 then, had obviously identified that they just didn't have
10 the operational capacity to be able to respond to more than
11 one job at once.

12
13 Q. You talked earlier about a lack of guidance or a lack
14 of direction being provided by senior management in regard
15 to turn-out for swiftwater rescue. What sort of guidance
16 were you seeking?

17 A. We were just seeking endorsement of the resources that
18 we were requesting, and by that - again, it's within the
19 documentation; it's all somewhere there.

20
21 One night, I think it was around the 6th, I was
22 working a job out on the Oakey Pittsworth Road. We had
23 four personnel trapped in four different vehicles on this
24 very broad, flooded causeway. It was absolutely hosing
25 down again. We'd just effected the rescue there.
26 Mid-rescue, I'm getting, as the incident controller, pinged
27 by the senior on-call saying he wants all personnel and all
28 appliances to return ASAP and I've had to say, "We are
29 still working the rescue. They will return when we've got
30 the people out of the water and when we have accounted for
31 all persons."

32
33 Again, he's sitting 140 kilometres away and it
34 probably wasn't raining. I don't know what they think
35 sometimes; whether we like standing out in rain that is
36 just sheeting down, as we say, for shits and giggles. We
37 don't do that. We're out trying to look after that.

38
39 Q. What date was that? Do you recall?

40 A. I've got it in here as well (indicating).

41
42 Q. Prior to the 10th?

43 A. Yes, prior to the 10th. What really disappoints me
44 there is that Station 11 - I was at Station 12 that night.
45 Station 11 had to respond to another - there was actually
46 two separate incidents, but one was down towards the
47 southside of Pittsworth with a person sitting up on the

1 roof of their car, midstream in a creek crossing, and
2 Station 11 had to respond to that. The fire communications
3 tempo was to the point where pretty much every second time
4 we'd call them, they'd say, "All units wait out on
5 triple-0s. All units wait out on triple-0s." They were
6 just being flogged. So you had to say, with just two
7 people in there and nobody else assisting them, the quality
8 of data entry in may have been suspect. They did a
9 brilliant job. To their credit, the girls and boys did a
10 great job there.

11
12 But we then went down - or I went down to Station 11
13 to stand by, because I'd got our auxiliaries to stand by at
14 Station 12. As soon as I've walked in the door I said to
15 the guys, "This is fucking bullshit." I've gone in and
16 they've filed in after me, obviously seeing that I'm seeing
17 red, and I've rung the senior on-call, which was acting
18 inspector Wally Rye, and I've quite civilly said, "Wally,
19 Firecom is being flogged. We've just dragged" - and it's
20 in all of my statements. "We've dragged four out of the
21 water, we've got another two separate swiftwater rescues
22 queued up; mate, we need to go to level 2 incident
23 management system." Which, again, is all embedded in all
24 this stuff here. It's over there (indicating). "And we
25 need to set up an incident control centre because Firecom
26 is being punished so badly." And I was just gobsmacked --
27

28 Q. Do you recall the date? This is the one we're still
29 referring to, the one at Oakey Road?

30 A. Yes, I've got the date, yes. He said, "But it's
31 dark.", and I said, "Turn the fucking light switch on."
32 Now, there was no disrespect meant to the senior officer
33 but I knew exactly where he was; he was sitting on the side
34 of his bed, "Oh but", and I knew that it was code for 'But
35 the senior officers have all buggered off for their
36 Christmas break for three weeks' and that he didn't have
37 the physical resources or the time to be able to drive 140
38 clicks in from wherever, to boot up the ICC. It was
39 farcical.
40

41 Q. When the ICC gets up and running, what further
42 resources will they provide for you?

43 A. What a properly functional incident control centre, an
44 ICC, will do is it gives Firecom the ability to do nothing
45 other than take the emergency call, dispatch the crew and
46 then say "Appliance X, your operating channel is Y", so
47 that they then talk to the incident control centre on

1 channel Y, back and forth, and the incident control centre
2 runs that incident, so that Firecom can then focus on,
3 right, what resources have I got, what do I need to
4 dispatch to the next job that comes in.

5
6 But as it was, Firecom was having to make strategic
7 decisions for the lack of anyone to actually give them any
8 guidance. They didn't have the time for someone to say
9 what has John actually got out there. They didn't have the
10 time for the waffle.

11
12 Q. So the ICC manages, for want of a better term, your
13 incident and then Firecom will look after, say, the
14 management of your call-out for your auxiliaries --
15 A. No.

16
17 Q. -- or further turn-outs?
18 A. Yeah. What they'll do is they'll take the call from
19 the incident, the triple-0 hits. ESCAD, which is the
20 Emergency Services Computer Aided Dispatch system - so
21 they'll take the call, look it up under ESCAD and it will
22 come up with that recommendation under the FCCD directive
23 of one pump and one special - if we've got it at that stage
24 - dispatch it and then as they hear them going out the
25 door, they'll say, "You are to communicate directly with
26 Highfields ICC on channel" such-and-such, UHF or VHF.

27
28 Q. Say they've set the ICC up, for argument's sake, on
29 that particular evening. Firecom then won't look to try
30 and retask you again because you're already being managed,
31 for want of a better term, by the ICC? Would that be a
32 fair assumption?

33 A. That's correct, so it makes it --

34
35 Q. So he'd then go to the next station officer from
36 Highfields or from, say - you're 11?

37 A. Yes - oh, Station 12.

38
39 Q. So he'll go to Station 11, for argument's sake, if
40 they haven't turned out to assist you? Is that how it
41 would work?

42 A. No. What they do is they look at each incident in
43 isolation, so that they know that - let's say I'm on a job
44 with 311 Lima. They know that those two assets are still
45 on the job until I book a code 4. Code 4 means that I am
46 available for retasking again. So I'm communicating back
47 and forth to the ICC about all the nuances of the job that

1 I'm working, so that Firecom hasn't got all of this
2 incessant chatter, phones and that sort of thing, going on.
3 For the incident to go code 4, it means that the resources
4 that I'm in charge of, the pump - as each pump or an
5 appliance goes code 4, they are then available for
6 retasking. So all that Firecom has to do is look at this,
7 it's green, and say, mmm, Pittsworth is the next nearest or
8 Oakey is the next nearest, or whatever, and the computer
9 does it for them; they respond them to that job. That's
10 all that they needed to do.

11

12 Q. I've got two quick questions, so if we can stop there,
13 we'll go back quickly and cover these two. During that
14 period leading up to the 10th when there was the discussion
15 in regard to upgrading capabilities, and whatnot, for
16 swiftwater rescue, you've mentioned at page 4, area 20 that
17 there had been some conversation in regard to water boat
18 capacity or water boat - you know, a platform for response
19 there. What ended up happening with that?

20 A. Well, as I said to you, about three days before,
21 Acting Inspector Rye borrowed a second-hand archangel, as
22 they're called, from Cannon Hill I'm led to believe -
23 somewhere down in Brisbane - and it was brought up and
24 strapped onto the back of an F350 fire appliance that we're
25 using as a second swiftwater vehicle, for want of a better
26 description.

27

28 Q. Was it powered?

29

30

31 Q. Had there been discussion prior to, say, the incidents
32 of late December, early January in regard to water
33 platforms for your area?

34

35

36 Q. Is there any correspondence or any documentation that
37 would support the applications for that equipment or for
38 consideration for that equipment?

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

management system, which is our new computer system that is

1 very hard to use. So we're sitting --

2

3 Q. When was this? Prior to --

4 A. Yes.

5

6 Q. What was the purpose of him coming in to teach you the
7 --

8 A. To teach - he was one of the OMs instructors on how to
9 work this computer system, that is not very good.

10

11 Q. Why would you need to be able to work the OM system?

12 A. As a station manager, I have to be able to do the
13 inputs into that OM system for fire reports. It's
14 basically a time and motion tool, even though management
15 said it will never be used as a time and motion tool. In
16 some other regions they're wanting every minute of the day
17 accounted for. It's an electronic diary, for want of a
18 better description, but we also use it for building
19 inspections, asset management tracking and fire reports.

20

21 Q. Does it track critical decisions?

22 A. No. It's pretty dumb in that way. But as I say, with
23 that section you're referring to, it was very, very
24 disappointing to be sitting next to Graham and watch him
25 become increasingly more and more restless. I said, "Look,
26 Graham, this is what will happen. The Lima has gone out
27 from Station 11 and both of them are not swiftwater level 2
28 trained." I don't know why, but it's just the way it was.
29 Then I heard Cameron Ashmore - and I believe he did the
30 right thing, even though some people have actually
31 counselled him for self-responding. He ended up being the
32 only level 2 technician --

33

34 Q. Self-responding from where?

35 A. He responded from the rear of 201 Anzac Avenue. He
36 was in a day work position. When I say self-responded --

37

38 Q. On what date are we talking, sorry?

39 A. Again, it's contained within some documents in there.
40 I've got the dates but I haven't got it --

41

42 Q. Can we check both of those dates when we get the
43 opportunity?

44 A. Yes, when I get a chance to rummage through. Anyhow,
45 he's sitting there for a period of about an hour and a
46 half. It sort of went down, I suppose, about - my guess is
47 around the 10.30 mark. The incident controller out there

1 was Ian Tuppick and he was doing a brilliant job, painting
2 the picture very well. He initially said, "Look, we have
3 this person who is stuck midstream at Dalby, sitting on a
4 tree." Then next minute you hear him come back and say,
5 "We've been in conversation with the Queensland Police
6 Service, they have spoken to the SES, they have no
7 qualified operator of their flood boat, however a
8 Queensland Police vehicle is going down to get the flood
9 boat."

10

11 So I'm saying to Graham, "This is not going to end
12 well." My belief is that somebody is going to go, yep, I
13 know boats - bit like the ad on TV - and will take this
14 thing out into a flood environment, which none of them are
15 trained in, on a platform. Next minute he says, "Yeah,
16 we've got three people on the SES flood boat." I didn't
17 know who was driving it. I don't believe it was our
18 swiftwater technician. But then within about two minutes
19 he said, "The boat's capsized, filled full of water." The
20 three people are sitting on same tree. On the bow of the
21 boat is the person they were trying to rescue. So they
22 then had to wait about two hours for the Chinchilla SES
23 boat to come out and pick up the four of them in the end.

24

25 Q. So who was on the boat?

26 A. A couple of auxiliary firefighters from Dalby who were
27 not swiftwater trained at all, plus our technician.

28

29 Q. So only the three?

30 A. The three of them.

31

32 Q. Whose decision was it for those three to go out in it?

33 A. I don't know but on camera, in a piece to WIN News
34 later in the evening, the swiftwater technician, Cameron
35 Ashmore said, "If the boat had actually turned the other
36 way, it probably would've killed us."

37

38 Q. So was he the chap who self-responded?

39 A. Self-responded.

40

41 Q. How would he go about self-responding? Like, how
42 would he have heard about it?

43 A. The guys have got either their radio or a scanner
44 going in their workplace. So he's working, he was on duty,
45 but --

46

47 Q. In, you said, 201?

1 A. At the rear of 201 Anzac Avenue, which is behind the
2 fire station. At the rear of the fire station we have
3 breathing apparatus, service section --
4
5 Q. That's your Station 12, is it?
6 A. Yes. We have a regional training section and we have
7 an operational support section. He was working in the
8 operational support section as the i-Zone officer, who are
9 in charge of urban rural interface fires. It had been
10 bucketing down with rain, so there obviously wasn't too
11 many urban rural interface fires. So the only thing that
12 he probably didn't do is actually let his boss know that he
13 was going, he just jumped in his vehicle and went.
14
15 Q. So who would that be, the station officer?
16 A. No, he was the station officer.
17
18 Q. Oh, okay. So who --
19 A. But he didn't tell his --
20
21 Q. Who would he tell - not by name, but what rank?
22 Who would he tell?
23 A. His acting inspector. So he didn't tell him, he told
24 Firecom that he was going. But I would back his decision
25 to the hilt because Graham Cooke made a couple of calls to
26 the assistant commissioner and said, "Look, you know I
27 really should be getting out to Dalby. It's starting to
28 flood, I've got a person stuck up a tree.", and he was
29 told, "No, you'll keep doing the training."
30
31 Q. So Graham Cooke is the fellow who was --
32 A. Who was doing the instruction.
33
34 Q. What's his rank?
35 A. He's a superintendent.
36
37 Q. So he's primarily there, supposedly, to help you with
38 your operational management system?
39 A. Only on that particular day, but he is in charge of
40 area 3, which encompasses Dalby, and Dalby is where his
41 office is normally stationed.
42
43 Q. Was he there specifically to train you on the day?
44 A. Yes. He came in from Dalby to train me, and we're
45 listening to it and I said, "Graham, this is how it's going
46 to go down.", and he's going, "No, no.", and the next
47 minute everything that I said, that I reckoned was going to

1 happen, happened. Then by probably around midday he has
2 just said, "Tom, look, I need to go. We've now got our own
3 rescue crews stuck in the tree."
4
5 Q. Is this the end of December or early January?
6 A. It would be early January.
7
8 Q. And we'll chase the dates --
9 A. We'll chase those dates.
10
11 Q. -- in our break.
12 A. Yep.
13
14 Q. If you can have a quick peek through.
15 A. Yep.
16
17 Q. So did he go back to Dalby?
18 A. Yes.
19
20 Q. He did?
21 A. Yes.
22
23 Q. After initially being told --
24 A. "No, you stay" and keep training me.
25
26 Q. -- to stay and finish the training.
27 A. Yes.
28
29 Q. Is it that important?
30 A. Well, again, what did I say with the statement before
31 with the principles of operation? Administration does not
32 get in the way of operations. That was a clear example of
33 administration - the training of me - having the priority
34 over a life rescue.
35
36 Q. How did the two auxiliaries get out or how were they
37 called out to assist?
38 A. Well, the whole Dalby auxiliary station were turned
39 out to it.
40
41 Q. Do they have a permanent --
42 A. No. I suppose, for want of a better description,
43 they're retained. In other words, they get paid when they
44 turn out or respond. They're not volunteers, they are
45 urban firefighters but at this stage they haven't had any
46 swiftwater training at all.
47

1 Q. Captain Tuppi ck.
2 A. Ian, yes.
3
4 Q. Qualified - okay. So there were no SES available
5 to --
6 A. Operate their flood boat.
7
8 Q. -- operate the flood boat. The police went and got
9 it?
10 A. Yep.
11
12 Q. And then it was used by your staff, and he was the
13 only swiftwater rescue technician?
14 A. Who was qualified, on site, so that's why I say - I
15 know there is no such thing as the wisdom of hindsight, but
16 I believe he used foresight and identified that there was
17 not the qualifications on the rescue appliance that was
18 going because one of the shifts for a number of months had
19 no level 2 technicians on it at all, so you had a one in
20 four chance of having nobody correctly trained on that
21 rescue appliance. So he actually did the right thing and
22 provided some degree of qualified guidance on the scene.
23
24 Q. I think you've gone on to discuss there that the SES
25 platforms are for still water --
26 A. They're for broad area flood work.
27
28 Q. Deep V, shifting --
29 A. We had discussed, just on-shift with Stewie Lange and
30 that sort of carry-on, why for those big, broad acre jobs
31 didn't we something like an inshore rescue boat; in other
32 words, very similar to the surf lifesaving society.
33
34 Q. IRBs, yes.
35 A. IRBs, that are very manoeuvrable, they've got a shroud
36 on them to stop them getting gummed up with weed and also
37 from slicing and dicing people.
38
39 Q. And running over your staff.
40 A. Unfortunately, there's a lot of the SES boats that
41 haven't got covers on their props. But they're far more
42 manoeuvrable and you can skid them around in a running
43 water environment, but they would also have been brilliant
44 for these large, broad acre jobs. I know in talking to - I
45 can't think of the name of the crew that lost the young
46 child; that made contact with four and lost one.
47

1 Q. Ashby and Bland.
2 A. Yep. They walked in for over a kilometre. Now,
3 you're going to be stuffed, walking through mud and deep
4 water and being pushed up against barbed wire fences. It
5 would have been really, really nice to have had a
6 semi-rigid V-hull underneath and inflatable on the outside.
7 Why I say semi-rigid is it would give you the ability, to a
8 degree, to be able to skate over barbed wire fences that
9 you can't quite see.
10
11 Q. Yes. Well, Ian Bland, one of the officers, indicated
12 there's not a throw bag in the world --
13 A. No.
14
15 Q. -- that could have got them out there.
16 A. Yes, and I know we're talking about another incident,
17 but I had the conversation with him and he had it with a
18 number of people. At that stage, we didn't have PFDs for
19 children. We have no paediatric PFDs. I know in that
20 particular case he tried to wrap an adult PFD around the
21 child and, as he said - I think he described it that the
22 child took off as though they had a jet behind them when he
23 hit the main current - gone.
24
25 Q. They were up so high in the water.
26 A. Well, possibly that too, but he just said there's no
27 way you would've caught them. But that's sort of, I
28 suppose, getting back to equipment as well. There just
29 seems to have been - see, the swiftwater training within
30 Queensland has been conducted at Tully, which is a natural
31 rock-strewn creek. None of the training is done on
32 anything resembling a flood where it has broken the banks.
33 I did suggest years ago that it cost them an absolute bomb
34 to go to Tully, to fly everyone in the State up to Tully;
35 why didn't they go down to the Olympic kayak course in
36 Sydney, where you can - based on the amount of volume with
37 the pumps --
38
39 Q. Regulate it.
40 A. -- regulate the water to replicate different sorts of
41 categories of swiftwater rescue, so that they could
42 actually walk through the creek first or the kayak course -
43 I think it's in Penrith - and say, righto, here's all the
44 features; what sort of hydraulic effect will that have when
45 the water flows down. It didn't seem to generate any sort
46 of enthusiasm.
47

1 Q. It would help with recognition, I suppose, as well.
2 Different features would give you different outcomes.
3 A. It goes back to what I was originally taught. I was
4 taught over in the white Feather River in northern
5 California and the instructors there could ring up the
6 hydro dam operator and say I want a category 1, category 2,
7 category 3, category 4. Well, we could walk through the
8 natural river features first and say, well, this might
9 perform an eddy. Then the water would come through; no,
10 it's not an eddy, it's a V. So you were learning.

11
12 The other side of it, too, is my concern is that
13 sooner or later they'll probably lose somebody in Tully
14 because it's an uncontrolled river.

15
16 Q. Yes. That makes sense. That makes sense. Do you
17 need a break?

18 A. I do.

19
20 DET SNR SGT REID: All right. The time now is 11.51am. We
21 might take a five minute break.

22
23 SHORT ADJOURNMENT

24
25 DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is about 12.01pm and we
26 will resume the interview.

27
28 Q. There were two incidents that we were going to look at
29 for the dates. Firstly, if we could look at the Dalby
30 incident and the other one being the Oakey incident, where
31 the four people were stranded. I just need those two
32 dates, if we could, so we might as well --

33 A. I'm going to have to rummage through, unfortunately.

34
35 Q. That's okay. We have plenty of time.

36 A. Remember I - sorry. If I may?

37
38 Q. Yes.

39 A. You can have that (hands document). Remember I was
40 talking about requesting from level 1 to level 2 incident
41 to the ICC?

42
43 Q. Yes.

44 A. You can have that.

45
46 Q. I might mark the page there for my reference.

47 A. And the same is referenced in this training document

1 here. That is what's known as our FIG, which is a field
2 incident guide, so that it's available for everyone to
3 refer to. But there it is there (indicating), just
4 basically tells you what it does and that sort of guff.

5
6 Q. Just talking about the ICC generally?

7 A. Yes, but what it does - if you have a look there, it
8 transitions from level 1, which is our normal, first out
9 the door response, unless there's been a predetermined
10 level response to it. But a level 1 incident is that, and
11 then we go to a level 2 within the incident management
12 structure.

13
14 Q. Excellent.

15 A. I'll see if I can find this other stuff.

16
17 Q. That's good. Probably for me, that's how I understand
18 the ICC to work, so that's probably very helpful. Probably
19 not so much when it goes around the corner to some of the
20 Floods Inquiry staff.

21 A. I'm quite happy to give you the entire folder, the way
22 I've got it crudely marked, if that's going to help you.

23
24 Q. That would be fantastic, as long as we can flag it.

25 A. Yes. Because what I've pulled out for you is the ICC
26 activation protocols; in other words, was I working, I
27 suppose, within the incident directive or outside, and what
28 needed to have occurred. It also talks about who is in
29 control and when that control is transferred. So, you
30 know, I would have to suggest that within their own
31 document, people who are making strategic decisions offsite
32 really aren't entitled to do that by their own document.

33
34 Q. Can we label that - what are we up to, number 5?

35 A. Yes.

36
37 Q. So document 5 for us - I think you have it labelled
38 "Doc 7", but document 5, for my purposes, relate to your
39 senior officer.

40 A. And also incident activation - incident control centre
41 activations. But it also refers, down in part 4 of the
42 directive, to transfer of command and control from the ICP
43 to the ICC and who will do that. But it also, further
44 back --

45
46 Q. Sorry. The "ICP" being?

47 A. Incident control point. So what happens is --

1
2 Q. Which would initially be you?
3 A. Which is the first attending appliance. So that if we
4 - do you want an example?
5
6 Q. Would they generally be a station officer, the ICP?
7 A. It is whoever is the most senior person on the
8 appliance. Let's say we have an incident at 400 George
9 Street and I'm the first appliance that pulls up. I say,
10 "Firecom, this is 312 Alpha; 312 Alpha is ICP; IC",
11 incident controller, "SO Burrows; incident known as George
12 Street control." So then everyone knows "George Street
13 control" is at - you don't have to say, "From 312 Alpha, at
14 400 George Street", da, da, da. It's a way of putting a
15 little bit of abbreviation --
16
17 Q. And continuity, for into future transmissions?
18 A. Yes. You own that incident, so to speak, so that even
19 if my boss comes up and says, "Look, John, I now want you
20 to be operations", and he assumes the role of the incident
21 controller, it is still known for the entire duration as
22 "George Street control".
23
24 Q. Got you. Okay.
25 A. I'm just trying to find --
26
27 Q. So the two were Oakey Pittsworth Road and the Dalby
28 SES boat flip over.
29 A. You know, I may not have that one. I might have to
30 send it to you.
31
32 Q. Actually, let's agree to --
33 A. To find it.
34
35 Q. -- find that. You might have a chance to look for it
36 later on. So we've got the two incidents. We're just
37 looking for the date, as I said, for the Oakey Pittsworth
38 Road and that was, I think you mentioned, four separate
39 lots of people rescued.
40 A. I have that one. I printed it last night. It's just
41 a matter of finding it, please.
42
43 Q. The second one being the Dalby --
44 A. The Dalby and the Oakey Pittsworth.
45
46 Q. Now, Station 11 is Kitchener Street?
47 A. Yes.

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Q. Who was tasked initially with turning out to that particular job, the Oakey Pittsworth Road job?

A. You had Station 13, which is Oakey.

Q. Auxiliary?

A. Auxiliary, because they were coming in from the north-western side of the incident. Station 12, which is myself, was tasked to come in, along with 311 Lima, out from Toowoomba along the Oakey Pittsworth Road. Then, because I was concerned that we mightn't get to the right side, I responded that station - sorry, Pittsworth. I can't remember its call sign, its numeric number, but it was Pittsworth that came in on the southside. As it turned out, we also had a swiftwater technician who was on holidays. Stewart Lange contacted the senior on-call, who authorised him to be recalled to duty, because we all take our gear home anyway and he lives in Pittsworth, so he responded to the incident from the southside. So we pretty much had it surrounded.

Q. With that particular incident you tried, through Firecom, to push to have an ICC put in place in regard to that particular incident?

A. Well, not just that particular incident but because of the operational tempo. We had another two separate locations in-water rescue incidents lined up as well.

Q. Where were they?

A. One was to the south of Pittsworth as we were starting to go back, and the other one, I can't recall where it was but it was within our, sort of, immediate response areas. But there was nothing left in town and we'd been then given a directive by the acting inspector that when we'd finished, we were to return.

Q. Can the ICC be stood up and stood down quickly?

A. There it is (indicating). Talking to the people at Highfields, they reckon 20 minutes to get the ICC set up. They've got staff trained up there, auxiliaries, to fulfil the functional roles and that's the four functional roles, of incident controller, operations, planning and logistics officers and any support that's needed. So, in essence, to get all of that happening, all they need to do is bring in a pump crew because we've all been trained in incident management systems.

1 Q. Where would they have set the ICC up?
2 A. At Highfields Fire Station. It has laptops sitting up
3 there; all they have to do is plug them in, turn them on,
4 boot them up and then say to Firecom, "Highfields ICC is on
5 air." I have found that document.
6
7 Q. And they did choose not to do that, I understand?
8 A. They weren't directed to do it.
9
10 Q. No, no. The --
11 A. Yes, the management said, "But it's dark." It's that
12 one there (indicating).
13
14 Q. Let's label that document 6.
15 A. That would be about 6, "D6".
16
17 Q. That relates to the Oakey Pittsworth incident?
18 A. The incident number is QF3-10-111965. So you want D6.
19
20 Q. Okay. I think we've covered in some detail there --
21 A. I'll leave that in the folder.
22
23 Q. Oh, definitely. Leave them in the order that you had
24 them but I'll label them just for us.
25 A. Yes.
26
27 Q. That relates to the Oakey - what was the date, sorry?
28 A. The date of that was 26/12.
29
30 Q. Because I do know that there were a number of, I
31 suppose --
32 A. We had jobs before that.
33
34 Q. -- flooding events in that December around Christmas.
35 A. We had it before that as well. There were events.
36
37 Q. Okay. Just the continual rain.
38 A. As I say somewhere in my statement, I think, when I've
39 detailed what I did on the day. You know, I had two kids
40 and we went for a drive to get a DVD. I was going to call
41 them videos - that's showing my age now. The three of us,
42 and they're both teenagers, didn't have a mobile phone
43 between us. We elected to go down to what we call the
44 goober trap, which is where all the dummies drive into the
45 water and get flooded, and we watch them get stuck - and
46 here's the airport bus, stuck. That's how my day started.
47

1 Q. Yes, and then you knew - you've indicated that you
2 decided something. You went back to work and --
3 A. Well, the only responsible thing to do, because it was
4 hosing down so much and nobody was stopping because you had
5 very deep water on all of the roads around Toowoomba, was
6 to make my way up around Curzon Street and down Herries
7 Street to the fire station and report it. I believe you're
8 duty bound to report an incident --
9
10 Q. Yes, definitely.
11 A. -- when you had eight or nine people trapped in an
12 airport bus. I don't know. Do you drive away? I don't
13 think so. I don't, anyway.
14
15 Q. No. I agree. It has here, on that same tour - so I
16 suppose we're going back and we're still referring to -
17 which is quite long - page 4, area 20 right through to page
18 7, area 34. You make reference to a motorcyclist in a
19 causeway at the Toowoomba Cecil Plains Road.
20 A. Yes. I need to find that one for you too.
21
22 Q. No, that's okay.
23 A. No, I've got it here but I'll just have to find it.
24 I'll look as I talk. On that particular evening we
25 responded, it would have been about 45 minutes before last
26 light, to a report of a motorcyclist on the Toowoomba Cecil
27 Plains Road on Milmerran Creek in a swiftwater event.
28 Obviously "fire bird", which was its call sign - I can't
29 recall but it might be in the document in here. Fire bird
30 is a rotary - in other words, a helicopter - asset and if
31 it's called fire bird, it's leased, or something, by QFRS,
32 "fire" being its designator. But with the "fire bird" call
33 sign, it means it is only recognisance. I'm suggesting or
34 suspecting it may have been used for flood recognisance,
35 because we have in our area a number of firefighters and
36 station officers who are trained air observers and they may
37 have been used for impact assessment for the floods around
38 that period. So flooding was occurring around that time.
39
40 Q. Do you recall the date for this Cecil Plains incident?
41 A. Oh, I'll find it.
42
43 Q. Just to give it context.
44 A. I can't recall the date. I'll find it. It's on the
45 fire report. Sorry. That's that other document I was
46 referring to, that proves that they actually do east-west
47 senior on-calls.

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Q. Okay. Where are we up to? I think we were up to 6.

A. I'm sorry to be jumping all over the place.

Q. No, that's okay.

A. I've put my "Doc 3" that supports page 3 that I've highlighted down next to document 3. So do you want to call it document 7?

Q. We'll call it document 7 and it will give us some rise as to how we've gotten to there during our interview.

A. I apologise for the random harvest of information.

Q. So that relates to your on-call --

A. The way they do it. That is their call roster from July 2010 to December 2011. That's to give you an idea as to how they do it.

Q. And that's your "Doc 3"?

A. That my "Doc 3".

Q. Had you spoken to Firecom or did you speak directly to fire bird?

A. I'm fairly sure that the pilot or whoever was on board was showing a little bit of initiative because I would've been probably no more than two minutes into my response, I was next to the Toowoomba race track, the turf club, and they've identified themselves to Firecom. They've said, "This is fire bird" X, Y, or Z, "we are still running, we have 45 minutes of endurance and are available for tasking." I've heard that and I've said, "Firecom, I require fire bird to respond to this incident.", and it never did.

The story that I got back is that the request had to go from Firecom to Regional Operations Coordination Centre, then to the State Operations Coordination Centre, then to the air desk for tasking. Yet, in their own documents - if I can find it. It'll be in here somewhere. Yes, it must be there. Air operations - aircraft operations - sorry. I refer to incident directive 1.3, titled Air Operations, Activation, under 3.1 part A:

All requests for aircraft support are to be made through the relevant Firecom dispatching resources to the fire or the relevant regional fire communications

1 centre established. Requests for aircraft
2 support may be made by the incident
3 controller.

4
5 I was the incident controller.

6
7 Q. You've indicated it may be made by you, a request, but
8 it doesn't then go on to say who can give approval for that
9 to occur.

10 A. No. It says:

11
12 Aircraft operations extending beyond two
13 hours must then be authorised by the
14 assistant commissioner.

15
16 In one of my previous roles I worked as the i-Zone training
17 officer and --

18
19 Q. Sorry. i-Zone?

20 A. Urban rural interface officer. You know, scrub next
21 to houses, burn down, death and destruction.

22
23 Q. Yes.

24 A. We would always reinforce and State air operations had
25 always reinforced that the aerial assets were to be
26 considered nothing other than another QFRS appliance that
27 could be utilised. Okay? So in this particular incident I
28 had an appliance, a fire bird, sitting, still running at
29 Toowoomba airport with three-quarters of an hour endurance.

30
31 Q. Available for tasking directly by you?

32 A. And I requested it to be responded to the job and it
33 was not sent. So some --

34
35 Q. Sorry. Can we go back to your "Doc 9"?

36 A. My "Doc 9".

37
38 Q. Which now becomes our document 8.

39 A. We're calling it document 8. Now, that's on
40 activation.

41
42 Q. Yes, and that relates to air resources, air
43 operations.

44 A. That was also in line with incident directive 1.14,
45 which is titled Regional Support For Aircraft. The part
46 that I highlighted is 4.2 and it just stipulates local
47 airport use and the conditions and terms of using it, and

1 that sort of carry-on. So it was sitting at our local
2 airport, it had just landed from something and it had
3 45 minutes of endurance. It would have been spot on. It
4 probably would have been over the job in six minutes.

5
6 Q. Why wasn't it utilised?

7 A. No idea.

8
9 Q. When does the ROCC become involved?

10 A. Well, the --

11
12 Q. You've got Firecom --

13 A. The ROCC shouldn't. The ROCC is technically an
14 information collection centre for all of the ICCs that are
15 running. So the ROCC shouldn't be set up unless it has
16 ICCs to support. So if I'm working in the field and I put
17 a request into the ICC that I want another two strike
18 teams, that request goes on a logistics request form over
19 to the ROCC and they go, righto, that ICC said they want
20 two more strike teams, and they make it happen that way.

21
22 Q. Was there an ICC running with you on that particular
23 day?

24 A. Not that I'm aware of, although I don't know. Further
25 in they describe it as being in almost like a ghost mode,
26 which I've never seen. Again, I have documents that
27 clearly articulate what modes it should have been and
28 they've come up with something that is not within their own
29 documentation. They had one person who might have been
30 sitting there, instead of it being fully functional and
31 supporting all of the ICCs around the region that, at that
32 stage, were working in flood mitigation works from
33 Charleville all the way in, Condamine, Dalby, etc, even
34 into Warwick - the station out there got flooded out three
35 times. You had, on a lot of occasions, nobody working
36 there of a nighttime, which I thought was taboo, and one or
37 two people during the daytime.

38
39 I'll see if I can find it. That might be the one
40 there. It is. Okay. That particular job that night where
41 I went out onto the Toowoomba Cecil Plains Road, that was
42 QFRS incident number QF3-11-002953 and the date was 10/1,
43 so it was going into the pm. So Toowoomba is being smashed
44 and I've put a request in for a helicopter that was on the
45 bitumen at Toowoomba airport, still running, saying he had
46 45 minutes endurance. It says here at 1746:

47

1 Word back: 312 Alpha copied. Fire bird
2 available for tasking if available for
3 incident. Would be happy if available.
4 Dark in three-quarters of an hour.
5

6 Because if they're not instrument rated, they have to be on
7 ground ten minutes before last light. So they had plenty
8 of time. Now that request was denied. So that's my
9 "Doc 8" which would be your document 10.

10
11 Q. No, we're up to document 9.

12 A. Oh, document 9, sorry. That's my "Doc 8", your
13 document 9.
14

15 Q. Correct. Was that a life-threatening situation?

16 A. Yes. Well, we were told that a person had been swept
17 off their motorbike. In talking to the gentleman later, he
18 decided that it sounded like a lot of fun to ride into
19 floodwater that was 1.7 metres in depth on his motorbike
20 for no other reason than to ride into it because it looked
21 like fun, and he was a middle-aged gentleman on a trail
22 bike. I think on the back end of that somewhere - "Owner
23 of the Honda motorbike had attempted to cross a flooded
24 causeway that was 1.5 metres deep and stalled."
25

26 A truck driver then drove in and effected a rescue.
27 So he disconnected his trailer, drove his prime mover in -
28 at his own peril - and effected the rescue. I've stated on
29 a note there, "Recommend that rider be fully charged for
30 all QFRS resources that responded.", and there was four
31 resources. We were getting to that stage where our
32 tolerance for stupidity was getting very, very short.
33

34 Q. A hundred percent. All right. We're still on
35 preparedness. Acting on weather information and previous
36 swiftwater rescues, passing weather info onto operational
37 crews, crewing up stations adequately. Okay?

38 A. From a Weather Bureau's perspective to an end user's
39 perspective, we didn't get that automatically, we went onto
40 the BoM sites and watched the weather radar and things. At
41 the station level, the boys did a good job - boys and girls
42 - but as far as the senior officers disseminating any
43 information to us? No.
44

45 Up until the 10th, we were on our own. With 311 Lima,
46 it has an on-ground response time of up to four hours on
47 any of those western roads. Right? We could not get any

1 road closures from what should have been Planning within an
2 ICC or an ROCC environment prior to the incident going
3 down. We were having to ring or get onto the CB to talk to
4 truckies to find out which road was closed, open, etc, for
5 us to be able to respond out to those incidents. We did
6 not have any preplanning on routes that were open versus
7 routes that were closed, to get to reports of car
8 accidents, Hazmats - hazardous materials.

9

10 Q. Were you aware of anyone who you had contact with who
11 was actually participating, say, in your local disaster
12 management group meetings?

13 A. No. But if they were, they weren't bringing any
14 information back to us. We're only the response crew.

15

16 Q. Because usually Queensland Fire and Rescue will have a
17 member on a local disaster management group; QAS will
18 usually have one. Were you aware or had you spoken with
19 anyone who had been privy to any information from the local

20

21 A. I had heard, and it's only anecdotal, that the person
22 who was sent was removed from the local disaster management
23 group meeting because he was fairly useless and had to be
24 replaced by a junior officer to do the task.

25

26 Q. From a station officer's point of view, had you
27 received any warnings about whether - in that lead-up
28 between, say, New Year through to the main event, which
29 took place I think on the 10th, had you been getting
30 updated as to what your operation or your preparedness
31 should be or how many staff you should have on deck?

32 A. No, but interestingly enough - and, again, I have a
33 document here somewhere, it's a thing with a big elastic
34 band around it - in talking, prior to the main event, to
35 Neil Goodman and Tom Dawson down the ROCC at the start of
36 one morning --

37

38 Q. Neil Goodman, what is his --

39 A. He's a station officer who at that stage was still
40 acting in the business support unit down the back at 201
41 Anzac Avenue. Mr Dawson said that --

42

43 Q. He's your AC, is he?

44 A. He's my assistant commissioner. He said, "You know,
45 we probably should be starting to treat these swiftwater
46 events like we do the wildfire events.", where there's
47 actually four levels of, let's call it operational tempo.

1 Level 1 is business as usual; level 2, we start to wind
2 down on some of the stuff that's occurring around the place
3 - I'll just take that elastic band off, at risk of it going
4 somewhere - and then you get to level 4, which means that -
5 well, I'll go through them, if you like, because I've just
6 found the page. Will that help?

7

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. So characteristics of a level 1. It means that,
10 basically, alert level 1 is normal conditions - and this is
11 for a wildfire but this is where he said, "Look, we
12 probably need to be applying this to other incidents such
13 as the swiftwater." The fire activity is normal for that
14 time of the year and the conditions are such that there is
15 no adverse threat of fire. Rural urban fire brigade
16 management team consult regularly to establish future
17 forecast.

18

19 A level 2 alert is - the above table is a guidance,
20 and the appropriate wildfire alert level should be
21 determined based on the fire index, a combination of the
22 variables and discussion between the urban rural fire
23 management team, with consideration given to the number of
24 active fires in the region. In the view of a swiftwater
25 event, you're starting to talk about, well, the number of
26 swiftwater jobs we're doing.

27

28 Q. Yes.

29 A. So you should be saying, well, it's not raining, so
30 it's level 1. It's started to rain, yes, we've started to
31 drag a few people out, so we might want to go to a level 2.
32 Then you go to a level 3 alert level. The above table
33 again is a guide to the appropriate wildfire alert level.
34 It should be determined based on the fire index and a
35 combination of variables and discussion between the rural
36 urban fire management team and consideration given to the
37 complexity and number of fires burning within the region.

38

39 Now, one of the very common resource tools that fire
40 managers use to determine these alert levels is they get
41 onto the Bureau of Meteorology. They will give them, if
42 they wish, a spot weather forecast. So they could say this
43 is where we are in Toowoomba, what's the fires going to be
44 like on this particular day. They can go, mmm, looks as
45 though it's going to kick off a bit. Now, the exact same
46 Bureau of Meteorology technology is utilised for
47 swiftwater.

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Then you go to level 4. Basically, yes, this is the highest alert level, consideration of firefighter safety and communications and communities. What it does - if I can find it again - is it tells you at different levels what is occurring on the station. At wildfire alert level 4, as Mr Dawson had in the past, he stood up all of his stations for what he thought was going to be a very bad fire day. Yet we have this trend upwards of operational tempo to swiftwater rescues and nothing occurred other than on the 10th, when probably catchup was occurring.

But at level 4 we don't do any inspections. We sit at the station and the very first thing we do is we check all of what we believe is going to be the operation specific equipment. So if it's been bucketing down with rain, we're not going to be checking the knapsacks for grass firefighting, we're going to be checking all of our swiftwater rescue equipment. The regional swiftwater rescue coordinator would be talking to the assistant commissioner and saying, "Tom, based on all the information we've received, I think" and "I make recommendations that we need", as they did on the day, to crank up the levels of manning on the different stations. And it didn't within Toowoomba.

Q. You indicated to me earlier that that hadn't taken place at all.

A. No, no. And the firefighters on the station, Station 11, had in fact - I think it was Mark Haddow, from memory, who requested of the senior on-call that we needed more people on the station at 7.30 in the morning.

Q. What is his rank?

A. He was acting station office at that time, but he is also a swift water technician.

Q. He was at 11?

A. He was at Station 11 on that day. But they had requested additional resources be brought to bear. As I say, at a level 4 alert level, everything else stops, we're waiting for the hit, waiting to be slammed with something. All the incident prediction that should be coming out of the Planning section the night before, saying, righto, if something happens, these are the reserves we have of trained people, and that sort of thing, it just didn't happen on the 10th. So, that's why I'm sort of suggesting

1 that wildfire alert document. Mr Dawson said, you know,
2 that's probably the same style of methodology that we need
3 to be looking at for swiftwater.
4
5 Q. That you should have been looking at?
6 A. That's right.
7
8 Q. Let's make that --
9 A. It's my "Doc 11".
10
11 Q. And it's our document 10. To me, that makes good
12 sense. I suppose from a police service point of view, we
13 try to limit it to particular events. We just simply look
14 at it as an incident and then, you know, your situational
15 awareness then for --
16 A. But I would imagine within the police that if somebody
17 says we're going to have CHOGM tomorrow, your operational
18 tempo and the way you'd move would probably change. You
19 may not have as many RBTs around the countryside.
20
21 Q. Correct.
22 A. And you're more focusing on security of the Heads of
23 State.
24
25 Q. Yes.
26 A. So yours is also preplanned. You'd have a template
27 that looks a bit like that (indicating) on how to do it,
28 and somebody meets and makes a decision on where are we
29 going to get the logistics to make that particular document
30 work. It's no different. That's for increasing awareness
31 and operational responses to wildfires and Mr Dawson said -
32 guess what.
33
34 Q. What do you think on the 10th, for argument's sake -
35 you talked about Mark Haddow saying at 7.30, look, we're in
36 a bad position at the moment due to ongoing weather, and
37 whatnot.
38 A. Yes.
39
40 Q. With your 48 staff, where should you have been, do you
41 think, on that morning of the 10th?
42 A. Full recall of staff, all shifts.
43
44 Q. In preparation?
45 A. All shifts. Absolutely.
46
47 Q. Would it be any different if it was - if you had

1 40 degree days, the wind's blowing at 30 knots from the
2 west, what would be the situation for, say --
3 A. All stations would be stood up, that's auxiliaries as
4 well as manned stations, and the ROCC would be activated.
5 If it was an extreme catastrophic day, as they're talking
6 nowadays, you'd have the ICC set up in readiness and you
7 would have air observers up, in anticipation of flying to
8 the first puff of smoke. The same could occur with
9 swiftwater.

10
11 Q. Should that have been the equivalent response on the
12 10th?

13 A. Yes but, for whatever reason, they failed to act.
14 They had the information; they manned up the non-critical
15 areas, the administrative areas - apart from Firecom, but
16 then they overloaded Firecom, as I said before. Instead of
17 having the supervisor and two operators there, they put
18 another three spectators into that environment and it ended
19 up being a shouting match. Instead of them taking the due
20 diligence to set up their already prestructured ICC at
21 Highfields, they elected to take the easy way out and sit
22 at the fire communications centre.

23
24 Q. When did they stand the ICC up, what date?

25 A. On the 10th at about 11.30 - oh sorry, no. They
26 didn't stand the ICC up on the 10th. It didn't go up.
27 Everything was being done out of either the ROCC at the
28 back of Anzac Avenue Fire Station or from Firecom. There
29 was no sectorisation of the jobs.

30
31 Q. Did Mark Haddow intimate that it would be a good idea
32 for an ICC to be set up at 7.30, or should a manager have
33 taken that to the next --

34 A. Look, any manager worth his salt should have.

35
36 Q. Who was the manager on the day?

37 A. Wally Rye.

38
39 Q. You mentioned earlier in our previous discussion --

40 A. But Tom Dawson also approved putting a couple of
41 people and rural training officers into the regional
42 operations coordination centre. Now, you must make the
43 distinction there that the rural training officers field of
44 expertise is vegetation fires only. They never have been
45 and never will be trained in swiftwater awareness. It's
46 not their skill set. Now, how the hell can you be thinking
47 strategically with somebody who does not know the first

1 thing about a swiftwater environment? In fact, on that
2 particular day, those three people who were initially
3 working in the ROCC were then sent out into the water to do
4 something, which is completely against - and again I've got
5 the reference documents - the agency's zero harm policy.
6 Why would you send somebody out into a known disaster with
7 zero skill sets? Because if something had happened to
8 them, the assistant commissioner would be in a world of
9 hurt at many levels.

10
11 Q. I'm still not understanding why the ROCC was
12 overseeing everything when I thought that the ICC would
13 have been set up initially to prepare --

14 A. Well, the only thing I could put it down to is
15 laziness and convenience, because the ROCC is in Toowoomba
16 Central and people could walk back and forth from regional
17 training, from the business support unit, or the assistant
18 commissioner could drive there, and it's only 4 k's to
19 drive whereas Highfields is about 21 k's - it's not
20 convenient.

21
22 But that's the system that they set up so,
23 unfortunately, the ROCC, for the bulk of the incidents, was
24 working as Toowoomba's ICC, which it was not designed to
25 do, because you're either working at a strategic level and
26 supporting, as I said before, with requests coming in from
27 ICCs and dealing with those and putting them up to State
28 and vice-versa, because the ROCC gets the intel, sends it
29 to the State operations coordinations centre, which then
30 briefs our commissioner, then the D-G - the
31 Director-General - who then briefs the Premier in Cabinet.

32
33 Now, if the ROCC is getting bogged down in - and they
34 were. They were responding appliances off - there's a
35 redundancy set of radios in the back of the ROCC and they
36 were responding appliances out of the back of the ROCC on
37 the radios. So you had Firecom wondering who the hell is
38 going where, they're trying to do their direction of
39 appliances and you've got these guys sitting there - who
40 are rural guys, who don't know what they're doing - saying,
41 oh no, we'll send them here, there or wherever.

42
43 They didn't understand the first concepts of
44 swiftwater jobs. They didn't understand that if the P00,
45 as we call it, which is the point of origin - and is
46 probably appropriate for the people who are reported
47 because they're in the poo. One appliance will go to that

1 location where they were last seen, but there should be
2 people in appliances put downstream as intercept teams.

3
4 As I say in my statement, the water had to be, on my
5 guesstimate - probably some expert has done it with video
6 footage but, on my guesstimate, it was doing 55 kilometres
7 an hour. Why I can state that is that in Chalk Drive years
8 before that, myself and another bloke by the name of Dave
9 Woods - I said, "Come on. It's rained a little bit, so
10 let's go and see how fast this water is flowing.", and in
11 Chalk Drive we paced the foam liner out of a pushbike
12 helmet doing 43 kilometres down that constructed culvert.

13
14 Now anything that's constructed, that's man-made, will
15 be far, far faster than a natural river bed. A natural
16 river bed will inherently only produce a speed of up to
17 about 17 kilometres an hour --

18
19 Q. Are you talking about East Creek now?

20 A. No. East Creek is man-made but the creek itself, once
21 it gets back into a natural creek environment, will only do
22 about 17 kilometres an hour. But if you have a concrete
23 lined, man-made culvert or an open drain, it can do up to
24 70 kilometres an hour.

25
26 Q. I'll quickly touch on some other subjects before we
27 move on. You said that at a Brisbane taskforce the
28 commissioner got up and spoke about, in that two months
29 period, the swiftwater rescue having saved more people than
30 from house fires in the previous --

31 A. In the preceding ten years.

32
33 Q. -- ten years. What was that taskforce in regard to?

34 A. I was part of the urban search and rescue team and we
35 were tasked with doing rapid building assessments, which
36 was looking at the damage levels of any of the flood
37 impacted buildings, and that information was going back via
38 an electronic device called the Trimble, which GPS'd our
39 location, we took a happy snap, and those sorts of things.
40 It was a way of being able to get information back very,
41 very quickly to government level so they could prioritise
42 where the effort to recover would be going.

43
44 Q. What was the date for that taskforce?

45 A. It would be two or three days after the 10th.

46
47 Q. So we're thinking around 12 and 13 January?

1 A. Yes, around that. I could get precise but - do you
2 want that?

3

4 Q. Yes, if you could. That can go on our list of things
5 that we can chase up. From page 1, paragraph 6, you talk
6 about crews on the ground, and we talked about this earlier
7 --

8 A. Yep.

9

10 Q. -- so we probably don't need to go into too much
11 detail. But the crews on the ground were far more
12 situationally aware in regard to what was happening in the
13 lead-up to the events. So there was no communication of
14 impending event from the senior management --

15 A. That's right.

16

17 Q. -- you've indicated?

18 A. Yes.

19

20 Q. How were they going about getting that situational
21 awareness, your crews?

22 A. It was based on firsthand operational experience. As
23 I said, we were going - I believe we started early November
24 with the rain cycles and minor flooding, minor flooding,
25 then moderate and then it built up to major. We were just
26 going to more and more of these flash flood events. So we
27 were the people on the pointy end, even though the managers
28 can read the fire reports and the incident reports for the
29 previous week, 24 hours - whatever period they want - and
30 they should be going, "Oh look, we're starting to get a
31 trend up on swiftwater response cycles. We should be", as
32 I said before, "perhaps looking at a way of manning or
33 crewing up for it.", and they didn't.

34

35 The guys on the floor knew it was coming. We'd been
36 to multiple events where we had water through houses that
37 had never had water in them; we had cars stuck on
38 intersections that had never had water over that
39 intersection before, let alone having people sitting up on
40 the roof.

41

42 A number of people who have lived in the town for
43 years said that they had never known water to go over the
44 James and Kitchener Streets intersection. That's probably,
45 in part, because 25 years ago when they might have started
46 in the job, the catchment area that led into the township
47 of Toowoomba was predominantly farmland, so it had some

1 degree of retention capacity. Now it's predominantly house
2 roofs --

3

4 Q. Road curbs.

5 A. -- roads, driveways, so any flash event with a high
6 volume of water, instead of it being slowed up, as I said
7 before, through natural features, it flashes very, very
8 quickly at high speed and no amount of retention basins
9 that they've got in Toowoomba will stop another occurrence
10 of that flash event. It was interesting reading in the
11 Toowoomba Chronicle, it would have been a month afterwards
12 - everyone's said, "It's a 1 in a 500 year event". No it's
13 not, by the historians. It probably happens, on average,
14 every 25 to 30 years. This bloke detailed in a two-page
15 spread, bullock drays being washed down Ruthven Street.
16 Now, a bullock dray doesn't float like the modern car.

17

18 So these events have been occurring but what's
19 occurred, I believe, is that since then we've compounded it
20 by allowing the natural - and it's only about a 3 kilometre
21 catchment area that leads into the township proper and it's
22 been built over.

23

24 Q. So you're saying, for your situational awareness for
25 your staff, it's a combination of, say, their experience
26 and their observations? Would that be that be a fair
27 assessment?

28 A. Yes, coupled with the increasing number of incidents
29 that we were going to.

30

31 Q. Were those --

32 A. Both within Toowoomba and down in the Lockyer Valley.
33 We were going to more and more of those.

34

35 Q. Was this situational awareness being passed on to
36 senior management? Were they aware of it?

37 A. Well, they would know every time we've said, "Look,
38 we're going down the Lockyer. We need a recall crew.", and
39 invariably were told, "No, wait and see." In other words,
40 to back up, to fill in Toowoomba because, as I said before,
41 we're chronically under-stationed and under-staffed for the
42 size of the town. So we would request more people to be
43 brought in just in case we had another incident and,
44 invariably, there would be another incident.

45

46 But yes, these guys were going down more and more and
47 it just wasn't being picked up. The senior management, if

1 they are exercising the due diligence that is required,
2 they're meant to be looking at the fire reports that are
3 coming in on their computer, so that when they --
4

5 Q. That was my next question. How do they become aware
6 or how do you report to, say, the next lot of managers up,
7 so the superintendent?

8 A. It works on a number of levels. If the superintendent
9 is on duty or the senior on-call, he's going to be hit with
10 a pager message or a mobile phone call or he's listening to
11 the radio messages. He should, if he's any sort of a
12 manager, have that sort of stuff just whirring away in the
13 background. Oh, hang on, I've got four trucks going to
14 somebody stuck in water; I might need to go down and have a
15 look at that. But invariably they wouldn't. There were
16 very, very few occasions when our senior on-calls would
17 actually go and have a look for themselves. They're very
18 quick to say, "Get back. I'm giving you a direction you
19 will get back into town as soon as you can.", but they
20 weren't there to make that call.
21

22 So, in absence of themselves, they should have been
23 trusting the officers who were responding, and the officers
24 who were responding were saying on numerous occasions, "Hey
25 boss, we need to be doing more." "We need to be getting
26 another truck in." "We need to be doing" this or that, and
27 it just wasn't happening. As I said, there were a number
28 of officers who were locked into this 'I'm on holidays for
29 three weeks'.
30

31 Q. So for each incident you attend, you complete an
32 incident report?

33 A. Yes.
34

35 Q. Are they all then forwarded - are they funnelled
36 through your --

37 A. Area director, who has to also read it and sign it off
38 as well electronically. But, as I say, if it's a
39 significant event as well, the assistant commissioner gets
40 a page of any event, so he is usually - or should be, via
41 his pager - situationally aware of what's been going on
42 because his pager is being hit all the time.
43

44 Q. Both of those managers are seeing not just your
45 incident from Station 11, but --

46 A. Station 12, yes.
47

1 Q. Oh, sorry. From station 11 --
2 A. Yes. It doesn't matter.
3
4 Q. But all of the areas as well?
5 A. Yes.
6
7 Q. So it seems odd that they're not making the decisions
8 then to, you know, upscale the staff.
9 A. Well Charleville, I think, and Dalby had in the area
10 of hundreds of water incidents - only a couple of
11 swiftwaters, but hundreds of incidents. Now, surely Blind
12 Freddy would've felt his pager vibrating and say, hmm,
13 something is happening. You didn't have to see it; you
14 could have read it on the pager and said, yep, things are
15 starting to cycle up; we better get more resources in.
16
17 Q. On to resources, how many level 2 swiftwater rescue
18 members are there in Queensland? Are you aware?
19 A. I'm not aware.
20
21 Q. How many within your area?
22 A. Eight of the level 2s.
23
24 Q. Level 2s?
25 A. Yes, and about 45 level 1s.
26
27 Q. Do you have a recommendation on how the structure
28 should look for your area in regard to swiftwater rescue
29 response?
30 A. I believe the people who are appropriately trained in
31 those areas are the only people who should be able to make
32 the call on the level of resources. If Stewart Lange, who
33 has the grand title of regional technical rescue
34 coordinator, is to fulfil his role correctly, people need
35 to trust his skill sets. In lieu of senior management not
36 being trained, if he says, "Look, I think we need three
37 teams at Dalby", that's it, because he is basing it on his
38 expertise. If other people aren't trained, how can they
39 say yes or no to a request from a person who is trained?
40
41 Q. How many should you have within your area, not just on
42 any given shift? We keep talking about 48. How many of
43 those 48 - keeping in mind that we can't have everything
44 that we need all the time; finance just doesn't allow it.
45 Realistically, how many do you think you need within your
46 area to be able to function at a reasonable level, and I'm
47 talking level 2s.

1 A. A lot of it gets back to skills maintenance. You've
2 got some auxiliary stations out there that are lucky to be
3 able to get two or three people in there all the time to
4 train or to even respond. So it's a case, potentially,
5 that a little information, in this case, can be deadly
6 because they may have nobody to back them up. As I said
7 before, it's my belief that you need a crew of six to make
8 a swiftwater in-water rescue team.

9
10 You could fix it up one of two ways. You've got the
11 Toowoomba airport. You could build a third station
12 adjacent to the Toowoomba airport, which just happens to
13 now have a dedicated rescue chopper sitting there. So it
14 doesn't take much of a stretch to say, well, if we built a
15 fire station with the technical rescue people sitting next
16 to the helicopter pad, they could, amongst other things,
17 respond with the aircrew to all points west, at - what does
18 a chopper do - about 180 knots. It is far, far quicker
19 than ground units will get in and they can be dropped
20 in situ.

21
22 Swiftwater equipment doesn't take up much weight. The
23 largest weight is the crew. But then you might want - it
24 takes four minutes to drown, so I'm not sure whether if you
25 were to strategically put swiftwater rescue teams full-time
26 - although they're not, they're only auxiliaries - at your
27 major stations, whether that's going to help. Again, how
28 do you keep their skills maintenance up?

29
30 Q. Yes, but that's not something that's happening at the
31 moment, is it?

32 A. No. They're not being trained because, from a State
33 perspective, they were concerned that if we can't keep
34 their skills up, they become a potential liability. If
35 they haven't worked in - like, in some of the areas it
36 hadn't rained for ten years. Then if suddenly it rains and
37 they haven't done any training around water for ten years,
38 they could drown.

39
40 So there's the cause and effect; every action has an
41 equal and opposite reaction. You train them; ten years
42 down the track, they'll think that they're still current in
43 competencies. It's a bit like the police. If you carry a
44 sidearm, you have to go to the range and bang a few rounds
45 down range to prove that you still have proficiency. It is
46 no different in this life-saving exercise. Is that the
47 best analogy I can give you?

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Q. Indeed, indeed. We've already gone through and talked about the ROCC and the zero harm policy.

A. I've got that here. Do you want the zero harm policy?

Q. Yes, if you wanted to cover it, but we have touched on that.

A. It's all buried in here somewhere.

Q. Do you think we need to discuss that any further?

A. The zero harm?

Q. Mmm.

A. Well, I suppose --

Q. Other than suffice to say that you said it looked as though there had been breaches of directives, and whatnot, in regard to that policy?

A. Well, on the particular day - there's that ROCC document. On that particular day because of just the extreme tempo of life rescues that were there, there was not one of the guys who responded who said, "No. The zero harm policy", and, "I'm only a level 1 swiftwater technician which means that I can't go into the water." Because it was broad bank style of water and then you had the main channel, there was a lot of people who went into situations that technically they were not trained to go into.

However, they knew the hazards and as the commissioner keeps saying, you carry out on the ground a dynamic risk assessment. Are we going to get away with this or not. We've got six people sitting in the middle of James and Kitchener Streets. Do we just say sorry, we can't go in, or do we support the rescue technician level 2 and go in a little bit downstream where we might be up to the knees or even our waist and where we can at least throw some sort of throw bag out if somebody is swept away, intercept them and let the water pendulum them back into the bank that we're standing on.

There were a lot of people who did a lot of things that, if it was just one swiftwater rescue and only one person or two people trapped, you wouldn't have had that number of people go in. But because there was only about 15 who actually went initially from the two stations, it was all hands to the pumps. By our own estimate in the

1 incident debrief that happened two weeks later - which was
2 in contravention of their own directives that say it should
3 happen within 48 hours - the guesstimate is that we saved
4 90 and lost two. That's only a guesstimate because we just
5 didn't have a chance to go, "Gudday. I've just dragged you
6 out of the water. Can I have your name and address?", as
7 we're meant to do. We just didn't have a chance.

8
9 Q. Where does that leave your staff, though, from a
10 liability point of view when they're breaching directives
11 that perhaps management may imply can be breached if the
12 situation arises?

13 A. Well, you really probably wouldn't want to know the
14 general feeling - well you do, you want to know the feeling
15 on the floor.

16
17 Q. Yes.

18 A. There was quite a few people who said, "Look, if
19 management is going to hang us out to dry for doing the
20 right thing in the community that we live in on the day,
21 they can get fucked." I can't put it any more succinctly
22 than that.

23
24 Q. No, no.

25 A. Because the emotion was there. Are you going to stand
26 there and just watch people sweep away, knowing that you
27 may be able to do something? It's interesting that - I'd
28 sent an email to Tom Dawson, it would've been two and a
29 half years before that, from the Black Saturday Inquiry.
30 Did you happen to see the reference?

31
32 Q. No.

33 A. It's come back to roost something fierce. I'll find
34 it. It all gets back to administration and operations, and
35 that sort of carry-on. I'll see if I can find. It will be
36 around the wildfire stuff, I think.

37
38 Q. Whilst you're looking and I don't mean to distract you
39 --

40 A. No, it's all right.

41
42 Q. -- whilst you're doing that, you mentioned before that
43 when they manned up, so to speak, the ROCC to try and meet
44 the incoming information for Firecom or to assist Firecom,
45 you've indicated that they haven't then manned up the
46 operational personnel to correspond with that?

47 A. They put the incorrect skill set into that regional

1 operations coordination centre.
2
3 Q. I know, but I mean externally as well.
4 A. No, no, they didn't man up anyone.
5
6 Q. I mean outside, from an operational standpoint.
7 A. No. For the people who were actually going to do and
8 effect the rescues, they weren't manned up.
9
10 Q. Would you like a break? While you're looking for
11 that, we'll come back and restart --
12 A. I've just found another.
13
14 Q. Sorry, you've found it?
15 A. No, I've found another document. I'll just whack on
16 one of these tags. It gets right back to not enough
17 manning.
18
19 Q. So what are we going to flag? We'll go on and flag
20 that as document 11, if we could.
21 A. Okay.
22
23 Q. What is it?
24 A. It's titled "Dumb Luck", to our assistant
25 commissioner, and it's with regards to the ongoing
26 difficulties where we go to one incident and crews get
27 injured and the assistant commissioner says, oh well, you
28 need to wait until you get three on, and that sort of
29 carry-on, on the fire ground. So it's from our branch
30 secretary and it was then sent to me.
31
32 Q. Can we mark that document 11?
33 A. Yes.
34
35 Q. What have you numbered it as yours, or haven't you
36 numbered it?
37 A. "Doc 2".
38
39 Q. When we come back, we'll start straight onto the
40 debrief.
41 A. Yep. I'll see if I can find that other one.
42
43 DET SNR SGT REID: You and I will look for that, but we'll
44 break now and then we'll chase up the other documents. The
45 time now is 1.02pm and if we could be up and ready to go by
46 half past.
47

1 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

2

3 DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 1.31pm. We will resume
4 the interview.

5

6 Q. We have been speaking briefly in regard to
7 documentation prior to the interview commencing and you
8 have gone through and marked a number of documents that you
9 think are relevant that we also need to include as part of
10 your interview today. Rather than wait to go through each
11 one, as we discussed, we might go through - I think we're
12 at document 12 onwards - and read them into the record and
13 label them as we go.

14 A. Yes. What I have attempted to do prior to coming down
15 here is I got all of my transcript and then put in all of
16 the, what I thought was supporting documentation in emails
17 or standing orders or incident management directives, etc,
18 and I have scribbled on the top. In this case, where we're
19 starting off is "Doc 2", but we must have it in there
20 already as document 11.

21

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. So that one's done.

24

25 Q. Yes. I think that is the last one we did. I think
26 we're up to document 12.

27 A. All right. Document 12 is my "Doc 4" and what I've
28 done is in the margin is the notes that I've got, that I
29 will give you to you. I'm quite happy for you to take them
30 because I can replicate the whole lot again with five or
31 six hours work. It's relating to an escalation of an
32 incident, level 1, level 2, level 3 and the incident
33 management system. Do you want me to go through some of
34 the bits that are relevant?

35

36 Q. Yes.

37 A. As I say, it's looking at level 1, which is where I'm
38 on a truck and I'm the first attending ranking officer. It
39 says that the level 1 incident officer in charge takes
40 control and informs the relevant fire communications centre
41 of the nominated incident control point and provides the
42 appropriate situation reports. It was a bit like that
43 analogy that I gave you of 400 George Street, and that sort
44 of carry-on.

45

46 Then, where a higher ranked officer arrives and
47 assesses the incident to be within the scope of the

1 existing level of control, the higher ranked officer need
2 only advise incident control of their arrival and that they
3 will not be taking control. So they can or can't take
4 control if they elect to. When this occurs, the higher
5 ranked officer may, at their discretion, be delegated
6 another role, leave the scene or remain to observe.

7
8 Now, I can't find the other document but it quite
9 clearly articulates that the senior officer, if he elects
10 not to come onto the scene or take over on the scene, it
11 says that it clearly does not abrogate his responsibility
12 as the senior officer. So if he doesn't elect to go to the
13 scene and it goes to hell in a handbasket, it still sits
14 with him, even though he may be nine and a half hours or
15 140 clicks away, or whatever. If the assessment determines
16 the existing level of control is not adequate for the
17 incident, the higher ranked officer, after appropriate
18 briefing - which is in what we call a SMEACS format. It's
19 an acronym for situation, mission, execution,
20 administration, communications and safety format.

21
22 The current incident controller shall
23 immediately assume the role of incident
24 controller.

25
26 So, if my boss comes on and he thinks that I'm making a
27 mess of it, he can say, "John, give me a SMEACS briefing,
28 tell me what your incident action plan is", you may hear it
29 referred to as IAP, and then he can take over if he elects
30 to and say, "John, you're operations." Normally they put
31 you in charge as the operations officer because you've been
32 there from when you've arrived to when they've got there.

33
34 Further down the track in part 3.2F:

35
36 The incident controller will request the
37 establishment of an ICC and will maintain
38 control until advised of the establishment
39 of the ICC.

40
41 So the buck stops with me at a level 1 incident. If I want
42 it to go to a level 2 incident, I request it, and it's
43 hopefully then up to the person who's supporting me who
44 comes on scene and says, "Yep, I support that", or if he's
45 got enough faith in me from a remote distance, says "Yep, I
46 totally support that."

47

1 Then it goes through a whole heap of documentation where
2 it's kicking up to a level 2 incident.

3

4 An incident shall be reclassified to a
5 level 2 incident by a senior urban officer
6 or senior rural operations officer.

7

8 So they're able to verify that. And the same deal with the
9 level 3. The incident control centre - this is relating to
10 - and it's got flow charts on how it works.

11

12 Q. Yes, I've got that one there.

13 A. So this gives you a little bit more detail. Have you
14 got a reference number on that one? You can keep that. Do
15 we want to give that a tab, the FIG that you've got?

16

17 Q. Oh sorry. This?

18

19 A. Yes.

20

21 Q. Yes, definitely.

22 A. That's yours to keep, so do we want to give it a tag
23 as well?

24

25 Q. If we're reading directly from that. The one you are
26 on is document 12, I think, because I don't think we have
27 labelled the front of that.

28

29 A. No, we haven't yet, no. It details that:

30

31 The incident control centre must be fully
32 operational before transfer from a level 2
33 incident control point occurs. If a level
34 2 control centre is functioning, the only
35 change is in staffing. The incident
36 control centre may be predetermined in
37 regional response plans or may be
38 identified for suitability in relation to
39 the incident location.

40

41 So it again gets back to preplanning. So you'd like to
42 make that one?

43

44 Q. Leave your green tags on there because it's
45 highlighting the paging.

46

47 A. Yes. So you want to make that?

48

49 Q. Document 13. Document 12 your field incident guide
50 with reference to IMS 2.3, page 11, which relates to

1 incident management system.

2 A. Doc 12 or 13?

3

4 Q. Yours is going to be 13.

5 A. So that's that one. Remember I said before that we
6 had a number of people who were either being placed into
7 the regional operations coordinations centre who were not
8 qualified --

9

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. -- or were then being sent out into this extreme
12 weather event, not being qualified. I've got them as my
13 "Doc 5", I've still left them as "Doc 5", and there's two
14 of them.

15

16 Q. Let's make that those documents 14A and 14B.

17 A. Okay. That was for Wayne Waltisbuhl, and the second
18 bloke is Paul Storrs. So that's documents 14A and 14B; is
19 that correct?

20

21 Q. Yes, please.

22 A. The next one that I was talking about relates to an
23 email that I sent to my assistant commissioner on 24/7/2009
24 and it's titled "Just a couple of observations out of the
25 Victoria Black Saturday fires."

26

27 Tom, just a couple of observations out of
28 the Victorian Black Saturday fires and a
29 couple of sobering comments that I've
30 found.

31

32 This was from the Royal Commission. Paragraph 1:

33

34 Conformity to rules was the enemy of
35 judgment, commonsense and moral
36 responsibility.

37

38 The next one I put in there was:

39

40 There was a failure by media to distinguish
41 between the firefighter on the frontline,
42 who were rightly lauded, and the competence
43 of those who were controlling the fight.

44

45 I've said in the closing paragraph there, and there's only
46 three of them:

47

1 However, in conversation with some QFRS
2 managers, there is a belief that this would
3 not happen in Queensland. What's your
4 thoughts and have we prepared ourselves to
5 ensure this doesn't happen?
6

7 Q. What was the response?

8 A. Tom seemed to think that, no, that sort of stuff
9 wouldn't happen in Queensland. Unfortunately, I do have
10 the happy knack of being the prophet of doom. This is
11 straight out of the Victorian Royal Commission into another
12 massive scale incident.
13

14 Q. Regardless, as we discussed, of what the incident is?

15 A. Irrespective. So I was just trying to - the only
16 intent with that was to inform and say, "Look boss, could
17 something like this happen potentially in Queensland?", and
18 the answer was, "No."
19

20 Q. Okay. Let's mark that up. Your "Doc 12" will be my
21 document 15, and that relates to your email to --

22 A. To Tom Dawson, the assistant commissioner.
23

24 Q. -- Tom Dawson the AC.

25 A. The next one is learning histories of my senior
26 officers in my immediate area, and there's seven of them,
27 where they are not qualified even at swiftwater awareness
28 level. So all that I wanted to introduce that for is
29 because how can these people be making strategic decisions
30 on something that they have not been trained in.
31

32 Q. I'm in agreeance with you one hundred percent. Are
33 you prepared for the fallout that may result --

34 A. I believe it's --
35

36 Q. -- from a senior - and it's probably not something I
37 want to go into in too much detail.

38 A. No. It's --
39

40 Q. Are you happy to provide those documents and --

41 A. Yes.
42

43 Q. Okay. We'll leave it at that.

44 A. Because if you wished, as a Commission, I would
45 believe you could subpoena the records anyway.
46

47 Q. Definitely, definitely.

1 A. So all that I'm doing is supplying them to you.
2 There's seven, so do we want to go 16 --

3

4 Q. Let's put those seven documents as documents 16A, 16B,
5 etc.

6 A. There's seven of them.

7

8 Q. If you could just read the seven names --

9 A. Okay. We have --

10

11 Q. -- and their positions?

12 A. Tom Dawson, assistant commissioner south-west region;
13 Edward Lacko, business management unit south-west region.

14

15 Q. What's his rank?

16 A. Inspector. Lawrence Bell, who is the manager for
17 strategic development south-west region; Paul Evans,
18 inspector and manager, community safety unit; Steve
19 McInerney, inspector area 1; Walter Rye at that stage was
20 acting inspector area 1; Bruce Smith is the superintendent
21 south-west regional training; Lindsay Hackett is the chief
22 superintendent.

23

24 Q. For your area?

25 A. For our area, yes.

26

27 Q. Let's bundle those together as document 16A right
28 through to document 16G, and then we can put a clip on
29 those.

30 A. Okay. There's the zero harm documents, if you want
31 them, and also the ROCC activation protocols.

32

33 Q. Yes. I think we've covered, I suppose - unless
34 there's something in particular you want from the ROCC, we
35 can introduce both of those documents and then --

36 A. Yes. But it goes back to you getting into the
37 debriefing or briefing phase later on. I've put a little
38 tag here where Mr Dawson said the ROCC had been running
39 then, loosely, from 27/12 working on a low profile.

40

41 Now within their own documents, the activation levels
42 of the ROCC - I cite incident directive 7.2 relating to
43 ROCC activation protocols. It says that you have four
44 activation levels; one is watching brief, the next one is
45 alert, the next one is standby, and then the next and last
46 is activation. There is no such thing as the term "low
47 profile". That gives you, unfortunately, a bit of an idea

1 that I don't believe that they were taking the whole
2 build-up seriously.
3
4 Q. Let's label your "Doc 16" my document 17.
5 A. That's the zero harm policy?
6
7 Q. Yes, please. Document 17 will be the zero harm
8 policy. Your "Doc 17" will be my document 18 and that
9 relates, as you've pointed out, the incident directive for
10 ROCC activation protocols, which also comprises, as you've
11 pointed out, the response the commissioner has made at page
12 22 - is it 98 up here?
13 A. Of section 98, that's correct.
14
15 Q. You've highlighted that as well.
16 A. Yes, and I've called it my document reference
17 "Doc 17".
18
19 Q. Okay. Excellent.
20 A. Just for your viewing pleasure as well, because we're
21 getting into incident debriefing, I've attached Guide 7,
22 which is operational debriefing.
23
24 Q. Excellent. Is that labelled separately?
25 A. Not yet.
26
27 Q. Let's make that document 19. That pretty well covers
28 us, I think. That was our last one.
29 A. I think so.
30
31 Q. Let's get straight onto the debrief. Page 22, section
32 98:
33 I'll give you a quick brief of what I
34 picked up from the debrief that was
35 conducted on the 12th of February. It was
36 chaired by Steve McInerney. You had
37 Dawson, Hackett and Smith there.
38
39 Dawson is the AC?
40 A. Yes.
41
42 Q. Hackett is?
43 A. Chief superintendent.
44
45 Q. And Smith is?
46 A. Superintendent south-west regional training.
47

1 Q. And Steve McInerney?
2 A. Yes.
3
4 Q. Who is he?
5 A. Steve McInerney is a superintendent but he's - he was
6 area director, but on holidays.
7
8 Q. He wasn't present then for the main incident?
9 A. No. So I think, as per their ops guide, he may have
10 been brought in as the educated third party facilitator.
11
12 Q. His position was being filled by Wally; is that
13 correct?
14 A. That's correct, by Wally Rye - who, as I say there,
15 was very conspicuous by his absence.
16
17 Q. Did he attend that --
18 A. No.
19
20 Q. He didn't attend the debrief either?
21 A. No. I don't know why but, as I said, there were a
22 number of debriefs conducted, which is contrary to their
23 own document, where we should be getting everyone
24 together --
25
26 Q. In one. Who was present at this? You said this took
27 place two weeks after the 10th?
28 A. Yes.
29
30 Q. Do you know the date?
31 A. It was conducted on 12 February.
32
33 Q. Oh, sorry. Conducted on 12 February, yes, sorry.
34 A. So it happened on the 10th - it's almost a month.
35
36 Q. Yes, nearly a month after the event.
37 A. Yes. My understanding of debriefs was that you're
38 meant to try and do them within 48 hours and keep people
39 relatively quarantined from each other so that when you
40 actually - (a) it gives you a chance to get witness
41 statements without them being corrupted by, "Oh, I didn't
42 realise that", etc.
43
44 Q. Yes.
45 A. You, being a serving police officer, would know how
46 easy memories are able to be swayed and corrupted. And it
47 went almost a month afterwards.

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Q. If they saw fit to have this "low profile" ROCC operating from 27/12, what period did the debrief explore?
A. They only wanted to talk about the 10th. They would not allow discussion of all things leading up to the major event.

Q. Do you think that they should have been discussing from the start of the incident - which, by the looks of it --

A. November. Most definitely.

Q. Just to look at the overall response.

A. Yes. The idea of an operational debrief, if it's run correctly, is that it's to go, basically, what did we do well and how could we improve for next time. It's not meant to be a witch hunt, pointing the finger, the bone, or whatever you like; it's meant to be so that we can learn from what we did and how we could do it better - quite simply - and then to get it down on paper.

However, it was interesting that when it was being conducted, they had one of the admin staff who was a JP and people were told, "You will do your stat decs now", and most of the guys said "No", we're not, because it - they all just felt as though they were being, you know - (a) it was a guided discussion not a debrief and, instead, being strong-armed into signing something that they felt further down the track was going to be held up in court. Unfortunately, it would have been about two weeks ago one of our guys who was going to appear in Toowoomba had been taken away and talked to by QFRS solicitors and given a piece of paper that highlighted that you also have to be very aware of the code of conduct, which --

Q. Do you know who that officer was?

A. Yes. David Crighton, and he actually had the decency to bring it to my attention and, unfortunately, it's an attempt to gag the people from open --

Q. What rank is he?

A. A senior firefighter, but he's also a level 2 rescue technician, etc.

Q. Where is he attached?

A. He's at Anzac Avenue Fire Station.

1 Q. So at --
2 A. Yes, he works on my shift.
3
4 Q. -- at your station.
5 A. Yes.
6
7 Q. Is that appropriate, do you think, of Queensland Fire
8 and Rescue to --
9 A. No, it's not appropriate and I know that through the
10 efforts of John Oliver, the UFU State Secretary --
11
12 Q. Sorry, UFU?
13 A. United Firefighters Union. He contacted a number of
14 people in political circles and the QFRS came out with a
15 thing basically saying, "We're sorry that we put out that
16 thing to" - that was really an attempt at a gag order,
17 because they want to control what's being said.
18
19 Q. Do you think that the debrief highlighted any issues
20 that needed to be addressed or was it --
21 A. It was a guided discussion and a guided discussion,
22 depending on who is doing the guiding, will only go one way
23 and that's the way that the person is leading it. We
24 wanted to talk about preceding incidents working up to it;
25 that was knocked on the head.
26
27 Q. Did you get the opportunity to bring up your --
28 A. Concerns?
29
30 Q. -- concerns?
31 A. Yes.
32
33 Q. Or any issues?
34 A. Yes, but --
35
36 Q. How was that received?
37 A. Shut down.
38
39 Q. Who by?
40 A. The people that - Steve McInerney, who was running the
41 debrief, and/or other people around the place who were from
42 the senior management group. We weren't allowed to have a
43 robust discussion. All that it ended up being is, "Right
44 John, now you talk about what you did on the 10th."
45 Nothing before, nothing after, just the 10th. I wasn't
46 even allowed to talk about what I did on the night where I
47 had the issue with the helicopter sitting at the Toowoomba

1 airport, etc.

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Then we were told, well, how can we be talking - we had some of our fire communications staff there for 12 February, but we did not have Firecom transcripts or voice recordings. We were told by Mr Dawson that the whole lot had been quarantined, that we were not to have access to it. In fact, for a long, protracted period of time there were at least 80 fire or incident reports that we couldn't access. Even now - what are we - into the fifth month, there are still reports pending on 10 January that haven't been completed yet because this operational management system is so pathetic that the guys can't get the data in. It has issues with its electronic brain and we haven't completed them yet.

So even with the number of fire reports that we went to, it depends on how Firecom enter it in. It could be smoke, water removal, which is still water; it could be swiftwater, it could be life rescue. So there's a whole heap of categories and it was fairly hard to actually capture with any degree of certainty how many incidents we responded to.

Q. Can they all be retrieved from the operational management system?

A. Well, as I said, some of them haven't even been completed yet, but we have not been as a union, for instance - and I would think, in the interests of being able to present an open and robust case, it would be really nice to be able to actually have a voice transcript from Firecom as to what occurred on the day.

Q. Does your CAD system actively capture all the taskings of all the fire units on any given day?

A. It attempts to but again, see, 94 percent of the time - which is the bulk of our work - two operators are, sort of, sufficient in Firecom. But when you get that 4 percent which is a level 3 incident, which this job certainly would be, it wasn't up to speed. They failed to set up ICCs around the place to support the Firecom. They were, in fact, later on the 10th in the evening, sending trucks back to addresses to check whether it actually had been closed off or not; in other words, well, is there somebody in the card.

Q. Because the CAD wasn't reflecting the completion or,

1 as you said, code 4?
2 A. Nobody knew. Nobody knew. As I say, the
3 disappointing part about it is that for us to be able to do
4 anything - even with the debrief, we should have been able
5 to sit down for that two hour window and just listen -
6 listen to the operational intensity.

7
8 See, a lot of the radio traffic would also have been
9 missed - not intentionally - by Firecom. The trucks
10 themselves have three separate radios on board. You have
11 channel 61, which is UHF frequency, which is our talk
12 straight back to fire communications. Then we have a
13 yellow radio, which is a VHF channel 69 repeater that
14 bounces off Picnic Point, and we use it as a truck-to-truck
15 chatter. Then we have fire ground channel 1, which is UHF
16 channel 1.

17
18 As soon as we go off channel 61 to channel 69 or
19 channel 1, there is no automatic tape logging of the voice
20 incidents; there's nothing there. On that day you couldn't
21 have used a notebook or anything like that to record
22 everything down because the inside of the trucks couldn't
23 have got any wetter if you'd hosed them out. We were
24 climbing in and out of the trucks in wet suits, in life
25 jackets, throwing ropes back in, and that sort of carry-on,
26 and it was just awash with water. So we lost a lot of
27 data.

28
29 I have been on to Mr Dawson for some period of time,
30 saying, "We need" - and I told him before we even had that
31 incident, "If we have a major incident, my concern is that
32 as soon as we go on to another radio channel, we've lost
33 the automatic voice capture that we have in Firecom." So
34 there was certainly heaps and heaps of discussion but it
35 wasn't going through Firecom. Firecom, in the end, we
36 basically let them off the hook and just said, "Righto,
37 we're code 4, available for tasking." We'd go off and chat
38 to each other on the truck radios and then, "Yeah, code 4
39 again, available for retasking again."

40
41 Q. Was it lack of resources within Firecom or negligence
42 on their part in regard to the failure to be able to record
43 or adequately put details back into your CAD system?

44 A. Both because, as I said before, I've had the
45 discussion with the AC on many occasions and with my area
46 director about my concerns that when we go off the Firecom
47 recorded radio frequency, we lose automatic logging. So,

1 yes, we didn't have the physical resources at Firecom to
2 log it as soon as we go to alternate channels; however, if
3 the ICC had been booted up, they would have been able to at
4 least manually log all those sorts of things, but because
5 there was no ICC set up, it didn't happen. But then you
6 look at it from the management side of things, and we've
7 discussed it previously on a couple of occasions, and you
8 would have to suggest negligence.

9

10 Q. By Firecom or by the administrative body overlooking
11 or over viewing Firecom?

12 A. By the senior managers, because Firecom themselves
13 can't go, oh, we're going to buy a nice DVD voice recorder
14 and put it on to channel 69 or channel 1. It has to be
15 approved by the senior management group. So unless they
16 go, mmm, that's a good idea and put it in, it doesn't sit
17 at Firecom. Firecom can't go down to the local Dick Smith
18 and say I'm going to buy an automatic data logger.

19

20 Q. Do you have correspondence to support applications to
21 buy any equipment?

22 A. That'd be another one I'll have to look at.

23

24 Q. Okay. You'll make a note of that?

25 A. I know I certainly had verbal with him.

26

27 Q. Even if you can have an idea of when that verbal took
28 place.

29 A. Yes.

30

31 Q. Now I understand that you guys responded to Grantham
32 on the 9th?

33 A. I didn't personally but one of our crews did.

34

35 Q. One of your crews did?

36 A. Yes.

37

38 Q. What would necessitate them having to go down and
39 respond?

40 A. Just, again, it came in as a life rescue swiftwater,
41 and Grantham and Helidon, they're all in the far-western
42 periphery of south-east region and they're almost like the
43 forgotten country cousins to the west.

44

45 Q. Right on the border, yes.

46 A. So the thing is that Toowoomba Station, Station 11, is
47 within two kilometres of that eastern boundary. Our

1 boundary is within two kilometres of the western edge of
2 south-east region. So our fire service boundaries don't
3 align with QAS boundaries or QPS boundaries when, in fact,
4 we could very, very easily and very comfortably provide -
5 and we had been doing so for a long period of time -
6 operational support right the way down to Gatton and
7 beyond, down to Plainlands, for major prangs - sorry, RTCs
8 - hazardous material incidents, fires, that sort of thing,
9 because we're so close.

10

11 Q. Who regulates the tasking of your staff for that, to
12 go outside of your area?

13 A. Well, it comes in via this emergency --

14

15 Q. Into Firecom?

16 A. It comes into Firecom but it comes in via south-east,
17 so if south-east says, right, the next - we'll talk about
18 rescues for a second. The next nearest rescue appliance
19 may, in fact, be Ipswich - which it is, a technical rescue
20 appliance. Now, if it's off the run or off doing another
21 incident somewhere, south-east ESCAD, which is the
22 Emergency Services Computer Aided Dispatch system, says,
23 right, the next nearest is Toowoomba, so it quite
24 literally rips it down the range.

25

26 However, we have had some senior officers - and
27 Mr McInerney is pretty good at it - saying, "No. Turn it
28 around. I'm not letting my appliances go down to
29 south-east.", which I find bizarre. We are the Queensland
30 Fire and Rescue Service, not the Toowoomba fire service or
31 the south-west regional fire service. My belief is that if
32 somebody says, look, you're the next nearest truck, you're
33 going to Tully, that's just the way the computer is telling
34 me to go. Why do we have these human beings who want to
35 inject and say, look, I know better than a computer. If
36 somebody is stuck in a car or being swept down in
37 swiftwater, why on earth are we getting people saying, no,
38 I'm not going to let the truck go down the hill - and it
39 has happened on numerous occasions.

40

41 Q. You've mentioned further on in that paragraph:

42

43 But as was pointed out earlier, as soon as
44 we go down to Grantham we've lost any sort
45 of operational capacity there.

46

47 I assume by "there" you're referring to Toowoomba; you've

1 lost your operational capacity for Toowoomba because you're
2 responding to Grantham?

3 A. Yes, because unfortunately there's a very dominant
4 thing within senior management where they go, well, let's
5 just wait and see what they've got. Now, even to go down
6 to the bottom of the range at Withcott and turn around and
7 come back again is half an hour. So you can potentially
8 have one crew left in Toowoomba, which is Station 12,
9 looking after the next big thing in Toowoomba, purely
10 because a senior on-call or on-duty has failed to go,
11 right, better get the auxiliaries in - which we know, as I
12 said before, takes 24 minutes to get on to the fire scene,
13 if there is something there.

14
15 So we have no support for the first responding
16 appliance. If they're working a breathing apparatus safety
17 team, which is known as a BAST team, etc, they're going
18 against the commissioner's best intentions to say, look, we
19 need at least a BA safety team on the ground if it's a
20 structure fire, and the assistant commissioner has said,
21 well, we need three trucks at the fire scene if you're
22 going internally into a structure fire. So it means then
23 that we've got the tyranny of time. You can't afford, as
24 an emergency service organisation, to be saying, well,
25 let's just see what they've got.

26
27 Q. So is that financially motivated?

28 A. That's the only thing I could put it down to because
29 if it wasn't financially motivated, they wouldn't care.
30 The third pump that comes in anyway are auxiliaries, so
31 they're as cheap as chips. They're, I think, about \$20 an
32 hour each and they only have to pay them a minimum of an
33 hour's recall.

34
35 Q. They're drawn from Warwick?

36 A. No, no. These are people who are going about their
37 day-to-day business in Toowoomba and they're auxiliary
38 members. So they come into Anzac Avenue Fire Station and,
39 if work will let them go, they're available to go.

40
41 Q. What are their home stations, your auxiliaries within
42 Toowoomba?

43 A. Anzac Avenue.

44
45 Q. They actually belong to --

46 A. Anzac Avenue but they are called Toowoomba
47 auxiliaries. I don't know why because they have always

1 been attached to --

2

3 Q. Okay. So Highfields, of course, are a part-time --

4 A. At Highfields, yes.

5

6 Q. And that's an auxiliary station. Oakey's the same, is
7 it?

8 A. Oakey's the same. Pittsworth, Goombungee --

9

10 Q. Got you. I didn't understand. So you guys have
11 access to auxiliaries within your own area?

12 A. Yes. However, because - particularly where we had the
13 global financial crisis kick in, there were more and more
14 employers being less and less predisposed to letting their
15 employees just quite literally bugger off to a fire. Even
16 the fire service themselves, some of their own employees
17 they won't let them go to a fire. They expect Joe Bloggs
18 public, business owner, to let their people go, but when
19 push comes to shove, oh no, no, we need you to fix this
20 computer.

21

22 Q. That makes sense to me now. I didn't understand that
23 your station actually had its own auxiliaries.

24 A. Yes.

25

26 Q. So that's fine. There's a comment on page 23, 106:

27

28 AC said or he knew that on the 20th of the
29 twelfth that we were proceeding towards a
30 major flood event.

31

32 I'm interested as to how you arrived at that --

33 A. It was just in conversation with him, you know,
34 because the ROCC was running, we had floods around the
35 place; again, unless you were deaf, blind and mute - it was
36 on the TV. You had Charleville flooding and it flooded
37 twice; you had Dalby flooding twice; you had Condamine
38 flooding twice. Now, if that wasn't saying that we're
39 heading for a major flood event, I don't know what is. All
40 of the signs, as I keep saying, were trending upwards; all
41 we needed was something to come together and conspire
42 against us, and it was on. The ground, as I said before,
43 was completely saturated.

44

45 Q. Where did you have that conversation with him?

46 A. That would have been down outside the ROCC.

47

1 Q. You've mentioned at page 9, section 44, "And the
2 stations I'm talking about are stations" --

3
4 For whatever reason, on the 10th management
5 failed to act on an operational level to
6 man up the stations where you had your
7 trained assets.

8
9 By that, are you referring to swiftwater --

10 A. That's Stations 11 and 12.

11
12 Q. Talking about swiftwater rescue?

13 A. That's correct.

14
15 Q. And the stations I'm talking about are Stations 21, 11
16 and 12"?

17 A. 21 is Warwick, 11 is Kitchener Street and 12 is Anzac
18 Avenue.

19
20 Q. "They stood up three auxiliary stations. None of them
21 are trained in swiftwater entry."

22 A. That's correct, or awareness.

23
24 Q. I think we discussed that earlier and I am still
25 perplexed as to why they were stood up, other than to help,
26 possibly, for clean up, or whatnot. I'm not sure.

27 A. I have no idea. It's as though they went to sleep.
28 They knew something was coming. As I said before, they put
29 a total of six people at Firecom; they put people in and
30 manned up the ROCC; they didn't establish an ICC on the
31 pretext that something was going; Tom had already stated
32 before that, well, perhaps we need to start dealing with
33 these like we do with the wildfire alerts; in the morning,
34 the acting inspector refused to Mark Hadow, I think, to
35 bring more people in on the station. Then on the day when
36 they got slammed, we've got people sitting around, saying
37 "It's raining. I wonder when we're going to get a call."
38 They never got the call because Firecom was too busy and
39 the other guys were just sitting around in Firecom having a
40 debate on how they should be running it.

41
42 Q. From your point of view, on the 10th were you guys
43 self-tasking? Were you going out and finding your own
44 work?

45 A. It was a mixture. Blind Freddy - when I pulled up at
46 the station, it wasn't hard to realise that something was
47 going on because as I pulled up, across the road there were

1 sheets of asphalt surfing in the water running down the
2 street and then slowly falling backwards over car bonnets.
3 At that station that I pulled up at, the F350 and the Alpha
4 appliance had responded and there were three unmanned
5 appliances still sitting there. So, we could have brought
6 in on both stations probably another five crews to be able
7 to stand by for that day and respond that day.

8
9 As you were saying before, you asked whether we were
10 self-responding or going from one job to the next. In some
11 instances we were. Others, we're driving down the road and
12 here's people hanging off BBQs and all sorts of things.
13 But the bulk of the appliance response was coming out of
14 Firecom and they'd tell us. We were trying to keep it very
15 brief with any situation reports because if you start to go
16 through the whole dance of, "This is 312 Alpha; 312 Alpha
17 is now the ICP", etc, etc, you're cutting into emergency
18 air time that may need to be used.

19
20 Q. Yes, yes.

21 A. And, unfortunately, later on I think I had the delight
22 of being about the first bloke in the State to use a, "Red,
23 red, red."

24
25 Q. We'll go quickly through that shortly. Did you
26 receive any other warnings on the day? Obviously we talked
27 before about Mark Haddow has --

28 A. Has requested.

29
30 Q. Has requested. Specifically, did he ask for
31 swiftwater staff --

32 A. Yes.

33
34 Q. -- to be recalled to duty --

35 A. Yes.

36
37 Q. -- or staff generally to be recalled to duty?

38 A. No. He requested that swiftwater rescue technicians
39 be recalled to duty before it happened. Interestingly
40 enough, there's about 12 level 2 rescue technicians, of
41 which I'm one, and we never received a pager message or an
42 SMS text. The way it's set up, if anything happens and
43 we're required to return to station to respond, we get a
44 text or a pager message. Now, they weren't activated. I
45 just find that, again, very strange.

46
47 Q. Who would be responsible for the activation of those?

1 A. It would come from Firecom at the approval of the area
2 director.
3
4 Q. Didn't you indicate earlier that the area director
5 couldn't be found on the 10th?
6 A. The area director went AWOL.
7
8 Q. To this day, do they know what happened to him on the
9 10th?
10 A. Well, he was in Firecom and then - to use a phrase -
11 he just buggered off and didn't tell anyone. His assistant
12 commissioner didn't know where he was.
13
14 Q. To where?
15 A. No-one knows.
16
17 Q. So who was performing his role in his absence?
18 A. Bruce Smith was sent forward by Mr Dawson and he ended
19 up at the corner of Margaret and Dent Streets with a crew,
20 just reporting back with a mobile phone. I think really
21 the first that the ROCC knew how serious the job was was
22 when they saw a news flash on one of the TV channels on the
23 TV in the ROCC. They weren't situationally aware until
24 they saw the news flash.
25
26 Q. When was Wally Rye next seen again on that day?
27 A. He wasn't.
28
29 Q. Had he finished work for the day or --
30 A. No. He just vanished. I've got no - I'm not going to
31 fabricate anything because I just - nobody knows where
32 Wally went. I don't know whether he went home, whether he
33 went to get a bag of dog food for his dog, bits and pieces
34 for his wine-growing venture - I've got no idea - but as I
35 said to you before, I just can't for the life of me see how
36 the hell a leader of men can bugger off and not tell anyone
37 in the most severe, singular, critical event that Toowoomba
38 has ever faced. He's been promoted now; he's now the
39 inspector at Goondiwindi, area 4.
40
41 Q. We talked earlier, in relation to wildfire events
42 within the south-west, that Mr Dawson has in fact put
43 everyone on standby in regard to Bureau of Meteorology
44 alerts.
45 A. Yep.
46
47 Q. Regardless of the type of incident, as we've talked

1 about, was that done on this occasion?

2 A. No.

3

4 Q. Can you give any reason, do you think, why that
5 wouldn't have been done?

6 A. The only reason - no. Because, on the one hand, they
7 obviously knew something was coming because they were
8 manning up the ROCC, Firecom and manned up three auxiliary
9 stations, so I don't know whether they forgot or thought
10 that they were saving money by not bringing extra staff in.

11

12 Q. From a higher level point of view, would they be
13 required to keep incident management logs or critical
14 decision logs as to why they made certain decisions to
15 start to have staff brought into the ROCC, for argument's
16 sake?

17 A. Yes.

18

19 Q. And why they didn't fire up the ICC or why they
20 haven't called out operational staff, is there anything
21 where they need to record any of that?

22 A. Well, areas you could perhaps go looking is every fire
23 officer has a fire service official notebook. So even if
24 he's sitting, as the acting area director was, on his
25 bedside in Stanthorpe at 12 o'clock at night, he should be
26 recording that he had a conversation with Station Officer
27 John Burrows, who requested an ICC to be kicked up and we
28 need to go to level 2 incident. That's just due diligence.

29

30 In the ROCC, as well as the ICC, they are required by
31 their own training documents to maintain incident logs. So
32 every person who is doing any of the functional roles,
33 whether it's the incident controller, planning officer,
34 logistics - what's the other bloke? I forgot - ops, they
35 are all meant to keep their own operational logs. It's
36 been thumped into them time and time and time again with
37 all of the IMS training.

38

39 Q. You made mention in here with regard to sick leave
40 caps being put on.

41 A. Yep. I think I might have mentioned it was just dumb
42 luck that it happened at the time of the month it did.

43

44 Q. What are sick leave caps?

45 A. Again, it must be just an economy measure but
46 firefighters, the expectation is that when you call them,
47 they are one hundred percent fit. No offence, but I can

1 come into the environment that we're in now with an ingrown
2 toenail, a buggered knee, sore back, headache and I can
3 still pretty much stagger through the day. But if I then
4 go and throw 34 kilograms of firefighting equipment on top
5 of my own personal body and go charging into a structure
6 fire with a little bit of the flu or something, chances are
7 I'm going to fall over myself and let the team down that
8 I'm working with as well. So we are a hazard.

9

10 Yet in Toowoomba they've put on these sick leave caps
11 so that between the two stations, we have 18 sick days for
12 the month. So if we were to get to, say - let's say
13 there's a flu epidemic that comes through and we did try
14 and have the conversation but couldn't get an answer out,
15 and there is a fair number of the staff crook, as soon as
16 we've done the 18 sick days, the response goes back to four
17 officers and firefighters at Station 11 and four at Station
18 12. It means that the special rescue appliance is off the
19 run until the end of the month and we start in the first
20 day of the next month.

21

22 As I say, the analogy is that you don't have teachers
23 saying, oh, I'm sick, you're going to have to send the
24 class home, or a nurse saying, oh, I'm crook, send the
25 patients home. Yet here we are, a frontline emergency
26 rescue service, and we need to be, sort of, telling the
27 public, yeah, if you really get stuck on a complex job,
28 we'll come back to you next month when we've actually got
29 the manning to be able to put the emergency appliance, the
30 rescue, on the road.

31

32 It just seems craziness. They're saying, in one
33 respect, zero harm; we want you to stay home if you're
34 feeling a little bit off. But we're being penalised for
35 exercising due diligence and saying, yeah, I'm feeling a
36 little bit seedy from whatever ailment I've got. It cuts
37 into those 18, bam, as soon as that happens. If that had
38 been later in the month, the rescue wouldn't have gone out
39 the door. We wouldn't have had 10 people on, we would've
40 had eight, and that's why I describe it as "dumb luck".

41

42 I just can't see, for the life of me, why people's
43 lives and their businesses and the environment are being
44 compromised because the firefighters are actually doing the
45 right thing and staying home when they're feeling a bit
46 crook.

47

1 Studies suggest that we're no better and no worse than
2 the average public servant. But the difference with us and
3 a public servant is we're throwing on 32 or 34 kilos of
4 extra gear that keeps heat in, and that sort of carry-on,
5 and we're lumping around cutting tools that are over
6 32 kilograms in weight and having to hold them over your
7 head to cut into a truck or something like that. It's a
8 fairly physical environment, so if you're off, you
9 shouldn't be there.

10
11 Q. I had a couple of quick questions here which were
12 passed on to me by Laura from our legal unit, which we've
13 done.

14 A. Yep.

15
16 Q. Station 11, Kitchener Street, which is permanent.
17 Station 12, which is Anzac Avenue, that's permanent with
18 auxiliaries?

19 A. Yes.

20
21 Q. Station 21 is Warwick auxiliary?

22 A. No, it's a permanent day crew.

23
24 Q. Permanent day crew?

25 A. They used to be 10/14 crew.

26
27 Q. You mentioned that before. 10/14 relates to?

28 A. There's somebody there 24-hours a day, seven days a
29 week. Now, for whatever reason that's been cut back to day
30 response, so the people of Warwick and all the heavy
31 industry and traffic that passes through there, yes, they
32 get a first great response during the day, then --

33
34 Q. Don't crash at night.

35 A. Yeah, don't crash at night. But the normal response
36 out the door of an evening is a seven minute delay. As I
37 said to you before, with things like structure fires, that
38 can mean the difference between life and death.

39
40 Q. You mentioned before in regard to the rescues that the
41 assistant commissioner said that, you know, there'd been
42 90 rescues made, which is more than the house fire rescues
43 in the last ten years.

44 A. No, he didn't say 90. He said we'd done more rescues
45 in swiftwater in the last two months than we had done in
46 structure fires in the preceding ten years.

47

1 Q. What areas was he referring to?
2 A. The State.
3
4 Q. The State?
5 A. The State. He was giving the big rallying of the
6 troops speech; go forth and count houses and spread the
7 word, but I just want to let you know that this is what's
8 happening.
9
10 Q. Were there any other relevant stations that were
11 operating during the floods? Was Oakey up and - were they
12 recalled to duty?
13 A. Everyone was working once it hit the fan. Highfields
14 were but Highfields, I think - did they get caught down
15 towards Murphy's Creek? I think they got - actually, they
16 were fortunate enough that they got cut off by a landslide,
17 and why I say fortunate is because if they'd actually got
18 access down there, I think we would have been talking about
19 four to five firefighters deceased with the - there was a
20 wall of water that went ripping down through there. They
21 actually didn't get in front of the storm event, because if
22 they'd got down there, I don't think they would have got
23 out.
24
25 Q. Okay. So Highfields?
26 A. Highfields, most definitely. I can't recall the rest.
27
28 Q. Oakey?
29 A. I'm not sure because Oakey was in the middle of
30 evacuating a - I was going to call it a 'twilight home' -
31 nursing home.
32
33 Q. Did any of your appliances, during the peak - the 10th
34 and 11th, so to speak - go down the hill at all?
35 A. Yes. Well, there was a - initially, because the storm
36 came in from the north-east --
37
38 Q. Sorry. By "down the hill" I mean leaving Toowoomba
39 and going down into the --
40 A. Going down the Toowoomba Range.
41
42 Q. Yes, down into the Valley.
43 A. Okay. Just with the dynamics of the storm cell that
44 came through, it came in from the north-east. I think
45 Crows Nest, which is 45 minutes out of town, may have got a
46 call. Then Highfields and Toowoomba responded to a
47 swiftwater incident down in Murphy's Creek. As I say,

1 Highfields got stopped because of a landslide. I'm pretty
2 sure --

3

4 Q. Was that on Murphy's Creek Road?

5 A. Yes. I'm pretty sure 311 Alpha heard that they had
6 been stopped and then were about to go around to go down
7 the Range, and 311 Yankee is the call sign, which is just
8 that F350 that I've been talking about before. It went,
9 with Mark Hadow and somebody else, down to the bottom of
10 the range. Stewart Lange had been told to take his car
11 home because he lives at the bottom of the Range. He
12 responded and only got as far as a shop just to the
13 Brisbane side of Withcott, called Tomatoland, and he
14 assisted about 80 people by himself.

15

16 The guys who went down the range, they said that there
17 were cars actually washing past them as they were going
18 down. The only good thing about that appliance was it's a
19 four-wheel drive with duals on the back. They've got down
20 to the bottom, noticed that - they're just about to turn
21 around because they knew that they couldn't get in to
22 Murphy's Creek and then, you know, I've put in the debrief
23 there what Mark Hadow said. He said it was as though the
24 Range was trying to kill them - rocks, logs, walls of
25 water, the lot - and that they battled all the way up to
26 the top, and then he ended up stopping at that intersection
27 of James and Kitchener Streets.

28

29 Q. You've mentioned here that Dave Lethbridge at 1230 and
30 then 1300 had run the senior on-call, which was Wally Rye,
31 to set up the ICC and finally at 1300 he was told he could
32 set it up but not man it. What does that mean?

33 A. It's sort of like an ICC you have when you're not
34 manning an ICC, isn't it.

35

36 Q. Where was the ICC going to be set up?

37 A. Highfields. As I say, it was all prearranged. It's
38 got all the equipment there, as I said before; it's got
39 laptops. Dave said, look, it takes us about 20 minutes to
40 set it up, but for whatever reason - it'd be a bit like
41 saying, yeah, we know we've got the ICC there but we're not
42 going to resource it, and that's exactly what happened.

43

44 Q. Who made that decision? Wally Rye?

45 A. Mmm.

46

47 Q. Do you know when Dave Lethbridge has actually spoken

1 to Wally Rye?
2 A. No. You'd have to talk to Dave. That came out in the
3 debrief itself. I don't know whether I've got any detail
4 on that, but it came up in the debrief. I think I wrote
5 reams, or tried to. It was interesting. In the debrief,
6 management were very, very happy to have a tape recorder
7 there but we weren't allowed to have one.
8
9 Q. When was the ROCC activated for south-west region?
10 A. I couldn't tell you but it would have been in December
11 when the floods were hitting the rest of south-west.
12
13 Q. Where does Firecom for the south-west region operate
14 from?
15 A. It works from over the top of the Herries Street
16 Ambulance Station.
17
18 Q. Where does the duty manager of operations for the
19 south-west region operate from?
20 A. What, duty manager of Firecom?
21
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. It's bizarre, because there's just not enough room --
24
25 Q. No, sorry, duty manager of operations. That would
26 have been Wally Rye, wouldn't it?
27 A. Yes. He works out of Phillip Street.
28
29 Q. Phillip Street. Which is?
30 A. Behind Station 11.
31
32 Q. But lives at?
33 A. Stanthorpe.
34
35 Q. Management did not increase staffing levels by
36 bringing back off-duty personnel.
37 A. No.
38
39 Q. You've talked about that at page 1, area 6. We've
40 talked about it earlier. What should have been done? In
41 our previous conversation, you indicated that they had
42 failed to call anyone back out.
43 A. Well, what they should have done is based on the
44 Bureau of Meteorology reports and all of the trending up of
45 frequency and type of events, including the night before
46 where I think Tony Guse went down and I think he actually
47 saved the lady who then died, the rural firefighter. He

1 saved her the night before and she went the next day, which
2 is pretty tragic.

3

4 Q. Where was that, down at Grantham there?

5 A. Yep. But you'd need to talk to Tony on that - if you
6 are. I don't know whether you are or not, but he would be
7 the one to talk to on the events at Grantham on the night
8 before. Sorry. Where were we again?

9

10 Q. We were just talking about having staff returned to
11 duty.

12 A. Yes. What should have occurred is based on,
13 obviously, the operational tempo and the information that
14 was coming from external sites such as the Bureau of
15 Meteorology. They should have stood up and manned all of
16 the appliances on station. Then, when it hit on the day,
17 knowing what was occurring, they should have then recalled
18 all staff to duty.

19

20 Q. As you mentioned, that wasn't done.

21 A. It didn't happen, and a couple of firefighters, Peter
22 Robinson and Shane Rankin, actually responded to what they
23 were hearing on civilian radio. They thought, no, this is
24 just crazy; we're going to stroll in and see what's
25 happening. Then when they stroll in and ring up Firecom,
26 "Right, you're on duty.", but nobody actively recalled them
27 to duty, they self-responded, which is technically the
28 wrong thing to do but I think, morally, it's the right
29 thing to do, given the circumstance.

30

31 Q. Yes, okay. On the 10th, you mentioned that you went
32 for the DVD.

33

34 A. Yes.

35

36 Q. Then self-responded to the station to the report the
37 airport bus incident?

38

39 Q. Just give me a run-through of what you did for the
40 remainder of the day.

41

42 A. The remainder of the day --

43

44 Q. Which will probably then lead into your --
45 A. Yes. Well, the remainder of the day, I got a bit of a
46 serve because I mentioned the fact that I actually did have
47 two girls in tow, which was my daughter, who's 16 - and
she's got a very mature head on her shoulders - and her

1 mate from across the road. I said, "Girls, if the water
2 starts coming into the fire station, you go up the back
3 ramp of the fire station", which is higher, "and if it
4 keeps coming up, climb up the steel training tower", which
5 is as solid as could be and, you know, if they got swept
6 off the top of that, there would be nothing left of
7 Toowoomba. So they were fine.

8
9 I've rung the job in, the Firecom operator has
10 mentioned to Wally Rye, who was in the Firecom centre,
11 they've gone, "JB's at Station 11.", and he's gone, "Right.
12 Tell him he's on duty. Pete McCarron is coming in." Peter
13 McCarron is another swiftwater rescue technician. So
14 probably a period of about --

15
16 Q. Is he a level 2 or a level 1?

17 A. Level 2. So I said, "Pete", when he finally came in -
18 if you can imagine me trying to fit into a wetsuit your
19 size, it didn't work well but, anyhow, I got into
20 something. I said, "Look, Pete, there's only the two of
21 us. I'll drive, you run the job as the officer." So we
22 went - because by the time he got in, the water was almost
23 coming in the station and, in fact, it was running in a
24 couple of the areas, but the girls --

25
26 Q. Can I stop you there. All the other appliances are
27 gone or tasked?

28 A. No. There were three appliances in the station.

29
30 Q. As in empty or unmanned?

31 A. Unmanned. So there was assets and we're talking some
32 appliances, like 311 Juliet, that are good, deep-fording,
33 large appliances that would not wash off the road. They
34 could have emulated what we've seen in some of the footage
35 and that would be to drive out, basically making a portable
36 work platform, and say, "Here, climb aboard.", and tootle
37 off again.

38
39 Q. James and Kitchener Streets spring to mind for me --

40 A. Yep. We're talking 18 tons of truck. It's just not
41 going to - unless the culvert underneath has collapsed,
42 it's not going to get swept away. Also, the Juliet has a
43 15 metre boom on it, so that you could still park in a safe
44 location, potentially, and extend out over the water, drop
45 in, pick the person up and bring them back. There is a
46 whole multitude of things that could have been done.

47

1 The other appliance that was there was 311 Lima, which
2 is the rescue - it was actually a Kilo because the other
3 rescue was off the run. We have a lemon of an F550 that
4 has cost them a fortune to try and keep on the run and has
5 never been very good or reliable - but, yeah, that's
6 another story. So we had three trucks. There was the
7 potential, if we wanted to, from Station 11 to have fielded
8 another 12 personnel.

9
10 Q. And that just required a recall to duty order?

11 A. A recall to duty. Absolutely. As far as I'm aware,
12 there was another truck still available, which was 312
13 Zulu, at Station 12.

14
15 So anyhow, I got there, was told to wait for Peter,
16 talked to Pete, we got kitted up, we put our PFDs on and
17 not so well fitting jackets, and things, and we then turned
18 out of the station and just - I said, "Look, Pete, let's
19 just go down towards Kitchener and Margaret Streets." Just
20 as we're going out the door, Firecom have responded us to a
21 report of two persons trapped on the top of a roof of a
22 vehicle at the corner of Hill and Dent Streets. We've gone
23 down to the corner of Hill and Dent and got out of the
24 truck. We have no waterproof enclosures for our portable
25 radios.

26
27 Q. Are they on issue?

28 A. No, they're not issued. We haven't got waterproof
29 housings for our portable radios.

30
31 Q. At your station at all?

32 A. No.

33
34 Q. Do they have them in your technicians vehicle?

35 A. No.

36
37 Q. Why is that? Why --

38 A. Obviously an oversight with equipment supply. I know
39 that they've been asked for but, again, somebody further up
40 the food chain has said no.

41
42 Q. Geez. Radios won't work in wet weather.

43 A. Oh, they go all right for a while but, unfortunately -
44 just talking on radios for a second, Mark Hadow was
45 extremely frustrated because his radio had obviously got an
46 absolute flogging and got a gutful, and Firecom could
47 really only hear about every second sentence, and we're

1 talking about the life-critical event that was going down
2 at the corner of Kitchener and James Streets, and he wasn't
3 able to adequately communicate. It was just atrocious, the
4 comms.

5

6 But anyhow, we pulled up around in Hill and Dent
7 Streets. I've said to Pete, "Look, there's nobody else.
8 I'm going to have to back you up." I said, "Look, I've
9 done this stuff before, it's just that these guys don't
10 want to recognise my skills. I'm follow you. I'll have
11 throw bag as well so that if you get swept away, I can
12 throw it to you."

13

14 Anyhow, we tried to go up on the western side of the
15 lee of the buildings on Dent Street to try and use that as
16 a bit of a barrier against the flow of the water. We got
17 up to the corner of a mower shop on the corner there, tried
18 to go around the corner and it was chest deep and just too
19 strong. We saw the two girls sitting on the car and there
20 was all sorts of debris coming down.

21

22 We've elected, well, we're going to have to relocate
23 and go around to Grange Street and Dent Street and as I've
24 turned around, it's just one of those things that flash
25 through your mind, Grand Central Shopping Centre is
26 probably - the carpark there is about four levels high. It
27 looked like a stadium on grand final day, with people just
28 lining up with phones and cameras and just watching the
29 grand spectacle.

30

31 So we've gone back - I've backed up there, gone around
32 to Grange Street, come in through Hertz car rental and went
33 out through a personal door onto Dent Street. The
34 civilians had actually attached probably about a 6mm cord
35 from I don't know where, but somebody out on the pole had
36 tied it off to something loosely. The civilians were doing
37 a top job of holding it fairly taut but the ferry angle
38 meant that if Peter went out there, he would go out there
39 very, very quickly and we wouldn't be able to recover them.

40

41 But the girls - one, the middle-aged woman, she was
42 basically trapped just under breast height and she was
43 being bent in half by the pressure of the water and it was
44 just ballooning over the top of her, and she was in real
45 distress and Pete said, "Look, I'll just have to go." I
46 said, "Mate, I'll put a tether on your back and worst comes
47 to worst, I've got you." But he's just made contact with

1 the girl and another car has come down and crashed into the
2 vehicle. She - and this is what Peter said. She just
3 looked at him and said, "I'm sorry", and let go. Next
4 minute, Peter's gone. Then I'm watching to see what was
5 going to happen with the girl still standing on the roof.
6 Next minute, she's into the water as well. So I've tried
7 to wade --

8
9 Q. Were you still tethered to him at this point?

10 A. I was tethered to him but as soon as I saw it happen,
11 I knew exactly what had happened. We had got these throw
12 bags and PFDs straight from the manufacturers and they'd
13 been sealed so that it kept them dry, because it had been
14 raining so much. As soon as Pete's got swept away, I've
15 gone to hold onto his float rope, the tether rope, and -
16 boom - it's just come undone. Peter said, in hindsight, I
17 just hoped to Christ that JB wasn't going to hang on
18 because there's no way, with the force of water, if I was
19 hanging onto him that he would have been able to survive.
20 But what had happened is the manufacturer had actually tied
21 an overhand rethreaded knot instead of a figure 8 knot and
22 as soon as I've seen it come off him, off the back of his
23 harness, I knew exactly what had gone wrong. The knot had
24 been tied incorrectly and someone --

25
26 Q. So you guys hadn't been responsible to check the --

27 A. We didn't have time to check the gear.

28
29 Q. Okay.

30 A. No, because we were told to get into the truck and go,
31 and assumption, unfortunately, is the mother of all
32 disasters and meant that - well, it was probably fortunate
33 in one respect, as I said, that Peter wasn't retained
34 there, but in it - so I'm left there by myself, I've had to
35 ford back in chest deep water against the current and, as I
36 said in my statement, it would be the longest minute and a
37 half that I've had to do. I didn't have a radio on me and
38 I couldn't have had a radio on me because it would've been
39 drowned.

40
41 I got back to the truck and the radio was just
42 chock-a-block with radio traffic and I've just injected
43 with, "Red, red, red.", which is our call for a firefighter
44 in immediate danger. We do not use it in training. It's
45 only to be used with a real-life emerging incident. So
46 I've reported that Pete's been swept away - that's Peter
47 McCarron - and the two civilians are gone. I've got on the

1 radio and I've said, "Look, I require intercept teams set
2 up down at Margaret and Dent, Russell Street down near
3 Schofield Street and Jellicoe Street.

4
5 Q. Margaret and Dent, is that the corner - is that where
6 the shopping centre is?

7 A. That's right.

8
9 Q. How far upstream were you from the shopping centre?
10 I'm just trying to get my bearings.

11 A. We were one and a half - when we were - we were almost
12 two blocks back, upstream.

13
14 Q. So you've got Repco and those areas there. Are they
15 further - the shopping centre car park --

16 A. You have Herries Street, Grange Street heading north,
17 then Hill Street heading north again, then you have
18 Margaret Street, which is the other side of Grand Central.
19 So you have Hill Street, which runs on the south side of
20 Grand Central, Dent Street runs north/south and, yes, he
21 was basically two blocks back. I didn't know, because we
22 hadn't seen them pull up there at that stage, but 311 Alpha
23 was actually downstream.

24
25 Q. Do you know who the two females were?

26 A. Not at the time.

27
28 Q. Have you since --

29 A. Peter came out and he was absolutely shattered. He's
30 come out - and I'm sorry if I offend - and he's gone, "JB,
31 I don't just want to fucking do this shit. This is
32 bullsh*t." For a little while - it took him a while to get
33 back onto a level playing field again. He rang his wife
34 very, very upset because he thought at that stage that he'd
35 made contact and lost two patients in the water.

36
37 Q. Did he get swept - how far down did he --

38 A. He went from Grange to Hill Street. He eddied out, as
39 we call it. In other words, he went into a survival float
40 position, which is on your back, your feet down, watching
41 for obstacles. Then when he's seen the chance, he's rolled
42 over onto his stomach and swam with the current, at a
43 diagonal, into Hill Street. I thought I'd lost him. By
44 the time I'd backed the truck up, because there was only
45 me, and they've got plenty of people wanting to come down,
46 and I'm tooting the horn and backing up - I didn't hit
47 anything, which I thought was pretty good - and next minute

1 Pete comes tootling around the corner in a wetsuit,
2 muttering and cursing.

3

4 Q. Where were the two girls?

5 A. The two girls - one - I think both of them ended up
6 being picked up at Margaret and Dent Streets, but I'm not
7 sure.

8

9 Q. Do we know who rescued those two girls?

10 A. I don't know. I don't know whether they self-rescued
11 or were recovered or not. But for some time after that we
12 were really unsure as to whether we'd lost the two or not.

13

14 Q. As well as Peter, obviously?

15 A. Yes.

16

17 Q. So when you've got onto the radio and called --

18 A. "Red, red, red."

19

20 Q. -- "Red, red, red.", what happened from there?

21 A. Again, the operational crews on the day were
22 brilliant. There was no ifs, buts or maybes. Everyone
23 said, righto, 311 Alpha is going to here; I think 12 Alpha
24 went down to Russell Street; I think 17 Victor went to
25 Jellicoe Street. It just worked well. It hadn't been
26 preplanned, it just ended up being what I asked for.
27 Unfortunately, within the services, if one of your own
28 looks as though they're in strife, everyone tends to rally
29 and that's exactly what they did. They didn't drop the
30 ball on the other rescues that had to be performed, but we
31 knew that within the mix and the chaos, we had one of our
32 own going down the stream as well.

33

34 Q. What's the time period between him losing his feet and
35 going and then coming back to you?

36 A. Five minutes.

37

38 Q. That's a long time.

39 A. It is a long time.

40

41 Q. He has no communications at that point?

42 A. He had no communications, and I had no communications
43 until I got back to the truck. So I've climbed back in the
44 truck soaking wet, called the "Red, red, red.", and, as I
45 say, by the time I've backed it up, which would have been
46 about five minutes to get all the way up, after walking
47 out, Pete's just coming around the corner, muttering and

1 cursing about the whole deal .
2
3 Q. Do we know the names of the two girls? I don't think
4 we do.
5 A. I don't.
6
7 Q. So they've turned up down at Margaret and Dent?
8 A. Yes.
9
10 Q. Not sure how?
11 A. I don't know how.
12
13 Q. What equipment would have made a difference to you at
14 that time?
15 A. More staff.
16
17 Q. No, I mean from an equipment point of view. We'll
18 come to the staff. First off, you mentioned the lack of
19 comms.
20 A. Well, if we had some sort of a boat.
21
22 Q. So the platform?
23 A. A work platform.
24
25 Q. Which would entail what, an IRB style that we
26 discussed before?
27 A. Sorry. Can we just - I need to have a break again.
28
29 DET SNR SGT REID: No dramas. The time now is 2.50pm and
30 we'll take a short break.
31
32 SHORT ADJOURNMENT
33
34 DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 2.55pm. We took a short
35 comfort break.
36
37 Q. As I said, we're not far away.
38 A. Yep.
39
40 Q. We've looked at our control and command issues, we've
41 looked at our supervision, perhaps, and a lot of other
42 issues. We'll go through and just finish your role in
43 regard - yours and Peter's on the day.
44 A. Yes.
45
46 Q. We were up to, if I remember rightly, IRBs I think.
47 A. Yeah. But, see, to deploy that you need a certain

1 number of people as well.

2

3 Q. Correct.

4 A. As I said before, for each effective rescue, you
5 needed to have had six people per rescue site to do it
6 safely and to do it within our own guidelines, and to have
7 - pretty much the only crew on were the on-duty crew.
8 That's an ask too far and that's why Peter and myself went,
9 as we did, with only two. Yes, a work platform would be
10 sensational.

11

12 Q. Bags for the radios?

13 A. Waterproof enclosures for the radios; spare equipment
14 on the stations so that if you do actually get called in
15 and you haven't got your gear with you, you can dive into a
16 set of kit.

17

18 Q. Do each of you guys have PFDs and wetsuits at home?

19 A. Some elect to store it at the station they're
20 currently working at, so they may have been, in fact, at
21 Station 12 and they may not have been able to get across to
22 Station 11 to get their gear.

23

24 Q. Ideally, you should have more than one set, by the
25 sounds of it?

26 A. Yes. As I said before, even with some of the stuff
27 that we looked at, there had been no thought to, well, what
28 happens if we have children, which we did have at James and
29 Kitchener. There was no juvenile or paediatric PFDs.
30 Comms was impossible. A lot of the guys were using their
31 own mobile phones to contact people.

32

33 Q. Do they have mobile phones in all the trucks?

34 A. At that stage it was a bit of a yes and no. There
35 seems to be a bit of a predisposition to only putting
36 mobile phones in the trucks that are going out the door all
37 of the time, which means that the other trucks that are
38 sitting back doing nothing, if they're actually going to be
39 used, they may or may not have a phone in them. So it's a
40 bit of a random harvest. But, as I say, other than
41 requiring more physical resources - human resources on the
42 site --

43

44 Q. Well, as you've pointed out with the boat, all the
45 equipment in the world would be great but if it's not
46 underpinned by adequate staff --

47 A. A resource to respond.

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47

Q. -- or skilled staff --

A. That's right.

Q. -- it's a waste of time.

A. It goes very moot, and I suppose that can be evidenced if we go back to the Dalby incident.

Q. Yes.

A. They have a beautiful flood boat but nobody responded. So you can have the best of intentions in the world but if you're not prepared to resource with the human element, that asset, it may as well sit down at the boat show.

Q. Yes. In hindsight, do you have a list or recommendations for a list that needs to be looked at, probably with people like Stewart Lange and some of the other officers. Is that something that will be looked at for the resourcing, say, for next year, the upcoming storm season or fire season?

A. There's been wish - sorry, there's been recommendations made to special operations at Cannon Hill but, as far as I'm aware, there's been no supportive equipment purchased, supplied or even any intention given from local management. Yeah, well, we survived that and I think, unfortunately, the mindset is that that's a 1 in 500 year event, we won't need that stuff again.

Q. What about staffing?

A. Well, they say they're supportive but talk's cheap. Unless we've got the boots on the ground, as the Army saying goes, it's moot. Unless we've got extra staffing, extra stations - and with the stations, if you put them at the corners of the compass, so to speak, of course you're going to have a more robust response capacity because then if one part of the road is blocked, another vehicle can come in. You can come in on the left and right-hand sides of the swiftwater in this case. They're going around in circles, doing a lot of talking, but there's not much action actually happening.

The overriding thing is that I personally believe that if anyone wants to be a swiftwater rescue technician and make entry into the water, they should be allowed to undergo that course and just do a basic upskills in the roping area. The bulk of the rescues don't involve three dimensional roping-in to get the person out, and that, as I

1 said before, could be quite adequately supervised or
2 conducted by one or two of the rope technicians who would
3 be on scene as well.

4
5 Q. The rescue of the SES person from down - it looks like
6 Margaret --

7 A. Yes.

8
9 Q. Was that Margaret and Dent?

10 A. Margaret and Dent, yes.

11
12 Q. It was quite well filmed, from what I understand.

13 A. Yes. He was just lucky that the tree that he was
14 bear-hugging didn't collapse like the previous two that
15 were swatted.

16
17 Q. Yes, on either side.

18 A. And unfortunately he said to one of the civilians, "I
19 know what I'm doing in water.", and off he tootled. I
20 don't know what he was doing in the water but if he'd
21 actually got swept away, he would've been in a world of
22 hurt.

23
24 But anyhow, we went round to - after I picked Pete up,
25 we went round to Jellicoe Street because I thought, with
26 the speed of the water, if they're still in the water, that
27 might be where we'd see them. But when we got there, it
28 was just rooster-tailing across the bridge there. It would
29 have been three to four metres over that point there and
30 just careering through, just rooster-tailing. With all the
31 debris and everything else, we said, well, if somebody is
32 in there, there is no way - short of a helicopter - we
33 could get them out.

34
35 We then went back to the Toowoomba railway station
36 adjacent to Russell Street, in the car park there, stood up
37 on a platform and had a look to see if we could see
38 somebody. It had actually slowed up a bit because it went
39 out on the broad expanse of the rail yard. We wanted to
40 see if we could see anyone sitting up in the rail yard, and
41 that sort of carry-on. I tried to use the binoculars and
42 they were absolutely useless.

43
44 One of the recommendations I made out of a job before
45 that is that we actually bought a decent day/night spotting
46 scope with thermal imaging capacity on it, so that you can
47 go, yep, there's a heat source over there; is it a dog or

1 is it a person. Why I dropped onto that is because a bloke
2 from Channel 9 news at that Oakey Pittsworth job was able
3 to count how many people were in each of the cars from 700
4 metres away, using his camera on a tripod.

5

6 Q. At night?

7 A. At night. Whereas we're looking like the keystone
8 cops. We had no idea how many people were out there, but
9 he could see. He came up to me and he said, "JB" - because
10 I get on with him pretty well. His name's Peter Collins.
11 He'd have the footage of that one. He said, "Look, there's
12 two in this", "There's three in that", sort of thing.

13

14 Q. Okay. I'll chase that up.

15 A. Peter Collins. I can probably even give you his
16 number, if you want.

17

18 Q. The Oakey rescue, Peter Collins, and he's Channel 9?

19

20

21 Q. So Stewie --

22 A. I was just going to get Pete's number.

23

24 Q. Actually, I'll grab that off you at the end.

25 A. Okay. So anyhow, we went back to the rail yard and
26 then I'm standing next to the Norville Hotel, which had
27 been slammed pretty much, and across the stream there's two
28 guys - I'm fairly sure that they were in an intoxicated
29 state - just in shorts, standing on top of a two-storey
30 structure. It was just a flat deck that they were standing
31 on. They hadn't realised the entire western side of the
32 structure had been washed away, so it's hanging like a
33 loose tooth. We had no adequate loud hailer, the truck
34 that I had, its siren and PA were out of operation and so
35 it was extremely hard to get their attention to go, hey,
36 gentlemen, get off where you are, it is extremely dangerous
37 - and it took a fair bit to do that. So we finally did
38 that.

39

40 We went around, back past Dent and Margaret Streets
41 and I was really amazed that what probably 20 minutes
42 before that was an absolute raging torrent, it looked as
43 though the tide had gone out at the English Channel. You
44 had little bits of debris sitting around, cars sitting on
45 their roofs, and that sort of carry-on, and people going --

46

47 Q. "What the"?

1 A. "Did we just see that, or what?" So Pete and I then
2 went east up Margaret Street, got up to as far as Hume
3 Street thinking that life was wonderful, then we got
4 redirected to five people standing on a four-wheel drive's
5 roof in - I call it the Defiance Flour Mill but it might be
6 the Allied Flour Mill, or something, on the corner of --
7

8 Q. It is Allied.

9 A. -- Chalk and Ruthven Street. So we've gone in there.
10 317 Alpha, with Captain Lethbridge in charge, was there. I
11 strolled in and started to take a little bit of control
12 with Pete. Pete was still very shocked with what he'd seen
13 because he still thought that he'd lost the two.
14

15 Q. Lost those two girls, yes.

16 A. So I was, to a degree, being a little bit insular of
17 Pete and didn't want to push him into going out. We had
18 another couple of crews come in who were swiftwater
19 technicians. They escorted those five people out to
20 safety. That's when I noticed we had these rural guys
21 running around in the water. I don't know what they were
22 doing but they had apparently been sent out from the ROCC
23 to do something.
24

25 Then I'm walking around the side of the silo, just to
26 see if there was anything else happening, and some people
27 who were standing on a two-storey office block to the west
28 side of the site were, sort of - as the water was going
29 down very quickly one of them said, "Look, I think there's
30 somebody underneath the slab over there." So I stayed on
31 the concrete, walked around and that's when I found the
32 middle-aged lady and she'd been jammed under a piece of -
33 well, two slabs of concrete that only had a gap about this
34 far apart, and up against a piece of RSJ steel and been
35 jammed in there. If the steel hadn't caught her, she would
36 have been pushed right up underneath and you wouldn't have
37 found her until, unfortunately, someone had detected an
38 odour.
39

40 We handed that over to QPS when they got there, and
41 the ambulance. I'd checked for signs of life and there was
42 none that I could detect, and the way that she was
43 contorted anyway, and that, you know you are just going
44 through the process.
45

46 Q. Yes, yes.

47 A. So we then went back to - got on the truck and I said,

1 "Look, Pete's pretty upset." So I took him back to the
2 station about 4.30, went home, got a quick shower, then
3 went back to work and started at 5 o'clock at Anzac Avenue
4 Fire Station, and then worked until 9.30 the next morning
5 and we had another swiftwater rescue out at Westbrook. I'm
6 still, to this day, convinced that there's somebody sitting
7 in a car in one of the very deep holes in Westbrook Creek
8 that hasn't been found yet because the two people who
9 reported it were standing up on an elevated house, looking
10 straight down the creek and they were adamant that they saw
11 a person on the bank in conversation with a person in the
12 car and the car has just vanished. That's pretty much the
13 end of it, other than the job we all went out to.

14
15 Q. So we've just discussed equipment. It simply came
16 down to not enough staff on and not enough planning?

17 A. Not enough staff, not enough equipment, not enough
18 planning, not enough preplanning. We do what are known as
19 local area plans for structure fires, industrial incidents,
20 and those sorts of things. Myself and Peter Bradow had a
21 fairly decent discussion with our rescue coordinator and we
22 said, "Why haven't we got local action plans for swiftwater
23 events?" Up until after they'd had the debrief, they
24 weren't going to happen. Now I'm led to believe that
25 they're working flat out doing local action plans.

26
27 Q. Who is preparing those? Who would be responsible for
28 those?

29 A. I had heard - the person who's writing them up is
30 Cameron Ashmore but I think, ultimately, it then has to be
31 signed off by the assistant commissioner. But my training
32 from 15 years ago said that if you're going to do this
33 properly, you plan it. That's the point of origin there.
34 Right. Pull out the play sheet. Righto. You see it down
35 the beaches, for instance. You have those signs that give
36 reference points.

37
38 Okay, you don't need the signs but at least you go,
39 righto, we're at the corner of Herries and Kitchener
40 Streets; that might be local action plan number 10. Pull
41 it out. Right. Okay. One truck goes there, next truck
42 goes to Margaret Street, next one goes down to the bottom
43 end of Neil at Dent so they can do a bridge intercept. All
44 those sort of features are already preplanned into the
45 process. But that sort of thinking hadn't been put out
46 there. It was reactive rather than proactive.

1 Q. You made reference in here to the male clinging to the
2 tree. You mention "Stewie". Is that Stewart Lange? You
3 have here that he had to elect to have a level 1 assist, a
4 level 2 in the water, due to the width of the water, a
5 dynamic rescue assessment was conducted - oh, it is.
6 Stewie Lange was the person who called in the south-west
7 technicians.

8 A. Yep.

9

10 Q. And the seniors didn't know. What does that mean?

11 A. The seniors didn't know that he'd called them in
12 because they just - there was obviously a communication
13 breakdown somewhere. The guys on the floor knew that
14 things were going to hell in a handbasket but, as I said to
15 you before, from what I'm aware, the assistant commissioner
16 didn't know how bad it truly was, even though the radios
17 were running off the scale, until he saw it on TV.

18

19 Q. You mentioned that twice in one day you had "Red, red
20 red." What was the second case?

21 A. No, I only went "Red, red, red" once.

22

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. There was a second time and I think it was just before
25 he vanished. I didn't hear it but a number of the guys at
26 the debrief said they heard it. Wally Rye had called "Red,
27 red, red.", and everyone's gone, oh, a firefighter in
28 immediate distress. "Righto, crews, I want to know where
29 you all are." He just used it to find out where everyone
30 was, which is a totally inappropriate usage of that because
31 if you start doing it, it buggers up the impact and the
32 urgency of a red, red, red. A red, red, red is exclusively
33 for a firefighter in immediate danger, for every other
34 firefighter to basically rally and support and try to save
35 him. The way we work within the fire service is rescuer
36 first, bystanders second, the victim or the patient third
37 because usually in some way, shape or form they've had some
38 part in their own predicament.

39

40 Q. In regard to Peter McCarron's incident with the
41 equipment coming loose, is that something that's going to
42 be addressed in future in regard to safety for the
43 officers? Is the equipment going to be checked in advance
44 and --

45 A. It should be but it can actually be fixed, because you
46 know - it's what's known as a terminal end on a line, so
47 there's no reason why you can't get a thimble and a swage

1 put in there to get rid of the human factor of the knot
2 being tied correctly or not. So it can actually be put
3 there so it's there, clip on, clip to the person and it's
4 done.

5
6 Q. What are you guys going to do for future reference,
7 say, for that particular piece of equipment?

8 A. I don't know. I'm only a level 1 in that particular
9 instance, so I have no sway in that.

10
11 Q. Is that something they will address, though, I would
12 think?

13 A. I don't know. I don't know.

14
15 Q. You mentioned earlier about your fire service
16 personnel who are good swimmers but don't want to --

17 A. Climb a rope.

18
19 Q. -- be involved in vertical rope climbing training, and
20 whatnot. What do you propose or what do you think should
21 be done in regard to that?

22 A. Well, I think that's a matter of urgency because it's
23 going to take the lead-up to the next time it rains which
24 could be today, tomorrow or nine months time when we start
25 to get into the wet season again. Those people who say,
26 "I'm quite happy to put my hand up to become a swiftwater
27 rescue technician.", should be encouraged to do the course
28 and there be no cap or limitation on how many people do the
29 course, because what we're doing is we're reducing the
30 human asset that we can deploy onto the job.

31
32 Q. I think we discussed road closures earlier, but what
33 would you like to see in future from the ROCC point of view
34 about trying to keep up-to-date with the road closures, and
35 whatnot? Is that something that needs to be addressed from
36 the local --

37 A. Well, what the ROCC needs to actually do is instead of
38 being in this - whatever brief they call it, a watching
39 brief or a shits and giggles brief, or something, they need
40 to actually do their job diligently. If ICCs are up around
41 the place, they need to be supporting the ICCs with the
42 correct intelligence, and that is including road closures,
43 weather prediction and all those sorts of things. They
44 shouldn't, particularly in Toowoomba, be trying to do an
45 ROCC and an ICC rolled into one. It is a recipe for
46 disaster.

47

1 Q. So they should be kept --

2 A. Separate.

3

4 Q. A demarcation between the two?

5 A. All of the documents say that that's what you do; you
6 don't throw it into the mix. You then can't have objective
7 decision making occurring if they're trying to do
8 on-the-spot tactical decision making. They're meant to be
9 doing strategic not tactical.

10

11 Q. Would you like to see the officer that's attending the
12 local disaster management group meetings filtering the
13 information down to the station level?

14 A. Absolutely, because --

15

16 Q. Is that happening?

17 A. It didn't until after the event and it's stopped
18 again. Now it just seems to have dried up.

19

20 Q. Is that something that needs to be addressed, to
21 improve that flow of information from a multi-agency group
22 down to your --

23 A. Another one of the principles of operations that was
24 hammered into me 40-odd years ago: communications is the
25 lifeblood of operations. Invariably, where things fail is
26 where communications weren't occurring; whether they
27 weren't hearing the requests from the floor up or the other
28 way down, but it was one of those principles that still
29 stands me in good stead. Communications is the lifeblood
30 of operations.

31

32 Q. Moving on to communications, would you like to see the
33 region looking at your station officers meetings to return
34 to some semblance of order, so you're meeting on a regular
35 basis with the other station officers to discuss, you know,
36 current issues or concerns?

37 A. It's vitally important. It has to happen. Again,
38 they're throwing their own business rule out the window but
39 they're quite happy to go and hang people out to dry if
40 they breach it in other areas.

41

42 Q. Is that something that your group are going to push
43 from a station officers point of view?

44 A. Well, they've all been requesting for the last three
45 and a half years to the point where they've just given up
46 asking because it's falling on deaf ears. We were told
47 there was meant to be one in March this year and it's never

1 happened. How can you communicate if you're not getting
2 together?

3

4 Q. Yes, I agree. There's another note that's been made
5 here that important decisions were made by management in
6 locations removed from the event without acting on the
7 advice of operational staff. I think we've probably done
8 that one to death in regard to our earlier conversations
9 about --

10 A. But me, as a middle level manager, I've been away and
11 done assessment to be able to handle a certain number of -
12 or size incident. I've got a tick in the box; I've been
13 accredited to do that. What I think unfortunately needs to
14 occur is that until the senior on-call or the senior
15 officer physically arrives at the incident scene, he has to
16 implicitly take for granted that if I say, "Look, I want
17 ten appliances", John gets 10 appliances until he goes and
18 says, "No, he actually needs eight because I've just pulled
19 up and had a chat and asked what he's going to do with
20 ten." But until he verifies the request physically, by
21 attending, I believe that there shouldn't be this
22 operational override from people who are kilometres away.

23

24 Q. That, of course, will require a change in the way that
25 they have their on-call staff or senior staff? They've got
26 to be somewhere near where you are?

27 A. Not necessarily.

28

29 Q. Well, how is a fellow from Charleville going --

30 A. They trust the person who has been trained to make the
31 tactical decision.

32

33 Q. Oh, no, no, sorry. You're misinterpreting the
34 question.

35 A. Oh yeah.

36

37 Q. When you talk about the command and control of an
38 area, I think they're going to have to look at assessing
39 how and where your seniors are actually operating, if
40 they're going to continue to use the model that you've --

41 A. Yes, this east/west model. They've chopped it pretty
42 much in half, so west makes a decision and then east. Yes,
43 it means that they might have to get back to being on call.
44 If they're the area director of area 1, they're on call.

45

46 Q. For their own area. We talked about the rural fire
47 brigade staff who were deployed first in the ICC and then

1 from the ICC down --
2 A. In the ROCC.
3
4 Q. Sorry, the ROCC. Then they were deployed with you -
5 well, not with you, but down into the floodwaters. How do
6 you think they're going to address using those staff in
7 future?
8 A. I don't, because they clearly breach their own zero
9 harm policy. They did not have the correct attire, all
10 they had was wet weather gear on and structural helmets,
11 which told me in spades that they had not been trained
12 because that's not what you're meant to wear in that
13 environment. You're dressed down so that if you actually
14 do happen to fall in, you might have half a show of
15 swimming. What they were doing there, I have no idea.
16
17 Q. What are ADSOs and BITSOs?
18 A. ADSO is acting - AD - hang on. I'll write it down.
19 What were they?
20
21 Q. BITSO.
22 A. The BITSO is a brigade training rural officer or fire
23 officer and the other one is a higher level of training
24 officer. They're just rural training officers. They're
25 just employed to train rural firefighters in vegetation
26 fire suppression.
27
28 Q. Are they QFRS staff?
29 A. Yes, they're full-time but they're not urban
30 firefighters, they're not urban trainers, and that's the
31 distinction. They train the guys in the yellow trucks who
32 do a top job to put out vegetation fires and to hopefully
33 stop a fire moving into a structure. As soon as it goes
34 inside a structure, it is urban because they haven't got
35 breathing apparatus, thermal imaging cameras and all sorts
36 of other equipment required to keep them safe.
37
38 Q. We talked about communications earlier. The Firecom
39 network was overloaded. You talked about what they tried
40 to do to repair that. I think we also discussed that the
41 people who they put in to help Firecom were arguing in the
42 background and the noise became --
43 A. Yep.
44
45 Q. Possibly not the right people to have been there and
46 not the right environment to have put them in?
47 A. That had occurred in prior incidents and senior

1 management defended their actions by saying, "We'll go
2 wherever we like." Now whether it's operationally sound,
3 they wouldn't, sort of, entertain for a second that with
4 all these people standing having a conference quite
5 literally at the backs of the chairs of the operators was
6 being counterproductive to the output of the room.

7

8 Q. One of the last issues --

9 A. Sorry. On Firecom, it is plain as the nose on your
10 face that it needs to be relocated. It is no longer fit
11 for purpose. If you're going to want to even put the
12 Firecom supervisor, who sits over in regional headquarters
13 - I think you asked that but we never answered that. She
14 sits a kilometre away, so she actually hasn't got any
15 day-to-day input into what the hell is happening.

16

17 Q. So they should be taken out of that emergency services
18 environment and go into a purpose-built --

19 A. Into a purpose-built fire communications centre.
20 There is plenty of room down the back of Anzac Avenue Fire
21 Station to go over the ROCC, so that if you wanted to walk
22 on the wildside and have a continuity person, one of the
23 Firecom operators who have taken the initial calls, when
24 another relief person comes in, can walk downstairs into
25 the ROCC and can say to any of the senior officers, "This
26 is what's been happening so far." So they are potentially
27 the most informed two-legged asset that they could have and
28 then it's a nice secure site where they would have plenty
29 of room. It's been talked about on and off ad nauseam for
30 probably the last 12 years.

31

32 Q. We've talked about equipment and once again all the
33 best equipment in the world needs to be underpinned with
34 the suitable staff.

35 A. We need to have enough staff to be able to deploy the
36 equipment.

37

38 Q. We've covered a few areas that you think, on the
39 short-term, would be essential pieces of equipment.

40 A. Yes.

41

42 Q. That being communications equipment, thermal imaging
43 equipment --

44 A. Yes, day/night thermal scopes.

45

46 Q. We talked about aerial appliances.

47 A. Yep.

1
2 Q. Water-based appliances.
3 A. Yes, either --
4
5 Q. Have I missed anything there?
6 A. Either manually propelled or IRB.
7
8 Q. Once again, suitable staff to be able to operate and
9 manage those appliances.
10 A. Yes. I wouldn't think it would be hard to get too
11 many volunteers if you say, righto boys, we're down to
12 Surfers beach for the weekend to learn how to work an IRB.
13 I think there would be a queue at the door.
14
15 Q. They talk here about operational equipment being
16 removed from 311 Lima or Kilo and it was being taken out
17 west.
18 A. That's right. We didn't have enough equipment so they
19 were quite literally thieving.
20
21 Q. Robbing Peter to pay Paul?
22 A. Yes, which meant they'd left us short on the appliance
23 that we got caught on.
24
25 Q. Have they addressed that situation?
26 A. No, not that I know of.
27
28 Q. Are they going to address that situation?
29 A. I don't know. It's another one on the wish list.
30
31 Q. Who will be responsible for addressing that?
32 A. The assistant commissioner because he ultimately signs
33 off on any equipment purchases. It's not the person who
34 would be out slopping around in the water who could sign
35 off on that; he has to get the approval of the big boss.
36
37 Q. Swiftwater boats we've talked about. Helicopter
38 resources we've talked about.
39 A. Vital. It is vital and I just find it lunacy that in
40 a State the size of Queensland, with the population
41 densities that we have in some areas and then also the
42 tyranny of distance in other areas, that we haven't got a
43 police chopper that's fitted with fit-for-purpose FLIR
44 system - forward looking infrared - to be able to spot at a
45 distance somebody clinging to a stock feeder or the roof of
46 a car because, if nothing else, a human body stands out
47 like a beacon. Even the thermal imaging handheld stuff

1 that we've got on the trucks is only limited, with a fairly
2 short range, but it can pick up a half a degree temperature
3 variation. So if they're still alive or just recently
4 deceased, we're going to spot them - or somebody is going
5 to spot them.

6
7 Now, whether that helicopter asset is actually,
8 potentially, in disasters like this cross-crewed where you
9 can put a couple of swiftwater technicians up with QPS
10 officers, I don't care either way. Again, as I said before
11 in my submission, we seem to have this logjam where we have
12 beautiful rotary assets - and we're very fortunate in
13 Toowoomba - sitting at Oakey but we can't employ them
14 because of the bureaucratic logjam you have to get through
15 to get stuff up there.

16
17 Q. You were going through the directive earlier and it
18 was quite obvious that as long as it's under two hours,
19 that you or the station officer should be able to delegate
20 them if they're available?

21 A. Yes, but that's only for the ones that we hire or a
22 civilian one that we drag in. We can't access the military
23 stuff. In talking to one of the ex - well, he was the CO
24 at the time out at Oakey, Rocky Hill, who is the commander
25 out there, he said "Nothing would please me more than to be
26 able to say to the boys, righto, we've now got a civilian
27 rescue scenario on the books." He said instead of flying
28 aimless circuits around and around, the crews love the
29 challenge. Right, we have to throw this off, the fuel
30 tanks on, spec it up; we're now doing this sort of mission.

31
32 Q. That's something that needs to be addressed,
33 obviously, at a higher level than you and I?

34 A. Oh, yes.

35
36 Q. But something for consideration at least?

37 A. Yes, because we've got all of this buck sitting out
38 there but we're getting no bang out of it. It's just
39 sitting there.

40
41 Q. Yes, definitely. I've covered everything that I had
42 made note of and that Laura had made note of. Is there
43 anything in particular that you feel we haven't covered?

44 A. No, I think we've --

45
46 Q. Gone through it all?

47 A. -- gone through it.

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Q. I think we might finish then. As I said, I'd like to thank you for your time. We really appreciate everything. You've been very meticulous in the information that you've brought and it's really helped me, from an understanding point of view, so I have no doubt it will help the Commission, once they get the opportunity. If you or I, over the next day or two, could address those couple of issues and mainly in regards to dates, and whatnot?

A. I actually won't be back to access anything until Sunday of this coming week.

Q. That's okay. If that's the case --

A. So I'll probably need - well, not "probably". I'll need your email or contact number, whatever works.

Q. I will give you both at the end of the interview.

A. And I was going to get that contact for you, wasn't I. Channel 9 news, Peter Collins.

Q. Yes, indeed.

A. It's 0439709526.

DET SNR SGT REID: Fantastic. As I said, thanks very much for your time today. It is right on 3.30 and we will terminate the interview.

AT 3.30PM, THE INTERVIEWED CONCLUDED.

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This Just seems Strange

"D-1"

How Safe do you feel?

The United Firefighters Union believe that the public that live and travel through Toowoomba and surrounding communities are at risk from injury or death due to a chronic shortage of operational, front line firefighters who's crewing levels have remained unchanged since 1975 which is two front line fire fighting /rescue pumpers.

It appears to the public that the fire stations have plenty of fire appliances, which is correct, but the reality is we have no first response firefighters to respond in them.

In the Toowoomba area

- Current crewing levels only permit safe operations to be carried out at one incident at a time.
- Highest road traffic crash rate per capita in Queensland
- the population has grown by 2.5 times to 144,000
- The traffic volume has increased to a heavy transport passing any given point in James St, every 20 seconds, 24 hours/day on average

How Lucky Do You Feel?

Do you realise that depending on what time of the month you may get a limited response to your emergency?

In South West region we have 18 sick relief days per month.

When we have run out of sick relief days the specialists appliances are taken off the road. These appliances are cross crewed with 1 Station Officer+1 Firefighter for the four appliances leaving the other 3 un-crewed in there event of another emergency the levy paying public will have to wait for specialist appliances from Brisbane

- 311L (Heavy rescue/technical)
- 311S (Breathing Apparatus/Hazardous materials/Command and Control)
- 311Y (4x4 Bushfire/Grassfire Light Attack)
- 311J (Telescopic aerial pumper)

This means that the new station looks impressive, but in reality is a high priced storage shed.

We as firefighters are no fitter or slacker than the general population when it comes to work absences and illness but we have a draconian system that to the United Firefighters Union seems to completely over look the basic reason why we are here, and that is to serve the public who pay for our emergency response. You won't die from a paper cut if you've got a head cold, but you can sure as hell pay the price if you're wearing breathing apparatus at a structure fire!!

If a teacher books in sick they don't send the class home!

If the local council has a report of sewerage running down the streets they don't say "we're out of sick leave, see you next month!!"

It seems absolutely absurd that the public we are chartered to serve under an Act of Parliament are now accepting the following situations:-

1. If you are going to have a Heavy Rescue incident, make sure its early in the month (we can't guarantee a response at all latter in the month)
2. If we have a grass fire/bushfire make sure it's early in the month.
3. A Hazardous Materials Incident make it early in the month.
4. Technical rescue (Swift water, Cliff Rescue, Trench and Confined Space Rescue) make sure you book them early in the month.

The possibilities are endless, but in the interests of cutting to the chase the following has occurred and the U.F.U. would like to know why these types of managerial frugality are occurring?

- Assistant Commissioner breeches agreement and won't pay for operational backfill?
- Protracted incidents with no coverage in your area of response?
- Slow Auxiliary responses to pagers (up to 28mins to crew up at station)?
- Removal of Operational crew from the duty crew to day work, with no notice?
- On a regular basis there is no heavy rescue response capability between Brisbane and the N.T, and N.S.W Borders (an area 1.5 times the size of Victoria)

The United Firefighters Union find it obscene that management are playing Russian Roulette with people's lives, breach their own agreements and hide under the fact that the caring and compassionate side of the average fire-fighter will get them out of any liability because we will still have a go with the limited crew available.

If we get away with the emergency response without injury or loss of life we've saved management from their failure to act responsibly in the interests of the community. If a fire-fighter is injured in the attempt to save life of property, management hide under the

"Zero Harm" and WH&S legislation and the 90 percentile and will use the Incident Controller and crew as scapegoats to cover their willingness to gamble with the public and firefighters lives.

Management have now directed that the specialist/s appliances will be taken of the road and unavailable for response instead of maintaining crewing levels in order to save lives.

Management are hell bent on saving Dollars instead of saving lives.

Are the United firefighters Union the only ones to believe that we should have robust crewing on ALL appliances?

The United firefighters Union have nothing to gain other than increasing the safety of the community and firefighters.

John Burrows

Toowoomba Brief

Background

Toowoomba and the areas of response have doubled in population since the last increase in manning to approx 155,000 people.

This increase occurred when Anzac Ave Fire Station was built in 1974 and a crew of 4 were relocated from Kitchener St. At this time the operational crew numbers were 60, this has decreased until today we only have 48 operational fire-fighters and officers.

During this time the Administration staffing levels have increased from 1.5 people to an estimated Administration staff number of approx 73 people.

Current Situation

The QFRS Assistant Commissioners View's

I making this submission we totally support the Assistant Commissioners views relating to the increase in appliance numbers and crewing and are not at odds with his views:-

Assistant Commissioner Tom Dawson was quoted as saying in The Chronicle June 10, 2010:-

He said he had been lobbying the Commissioner in Brisbane for more resources in his five years in the job.

"I am optimistic we are getting close to some growth in Operational capacity" Mr Dawson said.

Capacity

When making a capability comparison between the other emergency services:-

Police – can respond to multiple incidents.

Ambulance - can respond to multiple incidents.

QFRS – has only the capacity to respond to (1) one house fire/car accident at once.

Toowoomba also has the Regional responsibility of the provision of Specialist Response equipment(4hrs by road, rest of Region fly out) such as :-

- Heavy Rescue Response

- Technical Rescue :-
 - Swiftwater rescue
 - Trench rescue
 - Industrial rescue
 - USAR
 - Vertical rescue
 - Confined Space rescue

- Breathing Apparatus support
- Hazardous Materials incident support
- CBR technical response
- Command and Control

While the crews have no hesitation in responding to these complex incidents it comes at a cost and that is the available on shift crew manning will drop from 10 between the 2 stations to 8.

We have now been advised that even due to operations there will be NO call back to man the remaining Specialist appliances once the 1st Specialist crew have gone.

As recently as 10/6/2010 this drop in operational capacity was highlighted when a chemical incident closed the Gore Highway at Millmerran and the Specialist crew from Toowoomba were on scene for 20 hrs. This meant that while the Breathing Apparatus/ Hazmat appliance was at this incident, management refused to provide crewing for the Regional Heavy Rescue appliance.

Other impacts

Thinning of Resources

The satellite townships of Pittsworth, Oakey, Goombungee and Highfields ALL have suffered from lack of response capacity due to low or NO manning which results on an increasingly regular basis in one or both of the Toowoomba Area appliances being out of town for extended periods of time leaving Toowoomba with only one pumping appliance.

The staff call back or Auxiliary call back system is slow and in the case of the Toowoomba Auxiliary's the average response time to leave the station is 16.5 mins, and on scene time is 24mins. Additionally the response numbers are not always at the standard required for Queensland's largest inland city.

Transport Risks

In conducting a draw down from the Dept of Transport website there is now a heavy transport travelling through the main feeder of the Warrego Highway (James St, Toowoomba) every 20 seconds with every conceivable type of Dangerous Goods load.

This volume is increasing exponentially at 21% per year.

Highfields

This area is increasing rapidly and is currently not being serviced correctly in line with the Fire Service Levy.

The Levy that is being charged is a A2 Class, which means that this satellite town (17kms from Toowoomba) should be staffed by 24/7 crews is currently not, and is in fact being serviced by what is the equivalent of a D Class levy.

Charlton Transport Interchange and Industrial Area

This area located on the western fringe of Toowoomba has been earmarked as the location for the major transport interchange and is developing rapidly.

There is a number of hazardous transport or chemical storage facilities in this area; one has 19,000t of hazardous materials in storage.

Rapid Coal and Gas Industry Expansion

As has recently been announced by Government the South West Region is undergoing exceptional growth in the areas of Power generation, Coal mining and transport, Ethanol production and Coal Seam gas production.

The knock on effect is an increased risk potential in:-

- Transport Incidents (Road and Rail and gas pipelines)
- 34, 000 gas wells to be drilled in the next 10 years
- Heavy rescue incidents at Power stations, Coal mines or gas well heads
- Increasing volumes of Hazardous materials being produced or transported such as:-
 - Ammonia
 - Ethanol (15 – 20 million litres/ plant, one in operation 8 are planned)
 - Explosives

Conclusion

Currently in the Toowoomba area we have a very limited operational capacity to service anything other than one house fire, one hazmat incident or road traffic crash.

The community to which we serve and are part of deserves a far better response capacity in a timely manner than is currently served with a minimalist service that has no reserve capacity to respond to more than incident at once safely.

Finally we have been advised by our Assistant Commissioner that we should wait until a 3rd appliance arrives before interior operations commence at a structure fire to reduce Firefighter injuries under Zero Harm.

Knowing that the 3rd Pumping appliance will take an average of 24 mins to attend, how defensible will be our current position be when we inform the public that due to economic rationalism a internal rescue will not occur and a person dies, or a person trapped under a truck or train is going to have to wait until Ipswich get there if there is no crewing available for that rescue appliance.

The list of potential news headlines goes on and on, Dalby can get more people and appliances out the door to an incident.

We need a 3rd fully crewed 24/7 pumping appliance NOW, not 10 years from now, as not only has the horse bolted, but its died of old age.

"D-3"

John Burrows

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson
Cc:
Subject: RE: Breach of Business rules
Attachments:

Sent: Fri 1/01/2010 5:08 PM

A meeting would be good with yourself as there are a number of issues to be discussed

John Burrows
 Station Officer
 Queensland Fire and Rescue
 Mobile [REDACTED]

From: Tom Dawson
Sent: Thu 31/12/2009 6:00 PM
To: John Burrows
Subject: Re: Breach of Business rules

Good afternoon John
 I can assure that there has not been any breach of any business rules.

My understanding is that appropriate shift meetings have occurred in recent years. Such areas under SIOPP have been covered and I can also provide feedback that targets in Areas 1 and 2 have been sound.

John I would appreciate talking with you regarding this area. Remco is also seeking a meeting so let's get one organized. How is the first week in 2010 for you?

Also John the Station Officer meeting arrangements that I experienced over 4 years ago were a real concern to me that's why I strongly support the shift and SIOPP approach.

Any way John I look forward to our meeting.

Tom Dawson
 AC SWR

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson
Cc: Tim Akers; Paul Cannington; Darrin Kerr; Warren Buckley; Robert Buckley; Timothy Connolly; Robert Wing; Athol Knox; Steven Horvath; Neil Goodman; Cameron Ashmore; Grant Hodges; Peter Werder; Gervase Pauli; Stewart Dundas; Peter McCarron; Peter Bradow
Sent: Thu Dec 31 16:36:03 2009
Subject: Breach of Business rules

Tom,
 It has now been almost 3 years since our last Station Officers meeting.

Numerous S/O's have approached me to determine what is going on?

In looking through the Business Rules it appears that at a min there should be:-

- 4 Stations Officers Meetings (one/quarter as a min)
- 1 meeting to discuss the MFO's etc

Why havent the required number of meetings been conducted, and when is the next meeting to be held as per the business rules?

I look forward to hearing from you in the New Year

John Burrows
UFU Toowoomba Officers Representative

"D-4"

	Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Operations Doctrine	Rescue
	FIRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE DIRECTIVE Version: 1.0 Valid from: 01/01/2008	Rescue Water All Types FCCD-Q-3.13

1. PURPOSE

To provide information and guidance when responding to emergency calls for assistance to incidents involving the rescue of persons from swift or static water.

2. APPLICATION

Applies to all Fire Communications personnel who manage emergency calls for assistance.

3. DIRECTIVE

RWATER – Rescue Water All Types

All QFRS Firecom personnel will adhere to the following procedures when responding to this problem type.

This procedure applies to incidents involving the rescue of persons from water including swift water rescue. This may have occurred due to flooding, storm water, swift water, difficulties in surf, possible drowning, falling into a river, lake, flooded drain, etc. Also includes incidents in static non-domestic water supplies such as dams and reservoirs.

Water rescues require the attendance of specially trained Swiftwater Floodwater Rescue (SFR) Technicians and Equipment. Firecom personnel should anticipate potential swift water rescues by monitoring weather situations such as prolonged heavy rain, impending storm activities or flooding.


4. PROCEDURE

The following information provides the minimum response to this incident type:

- **Call taking:**
 - Answer the call as per Emergency Call Management
 - When you have confirmed the problem type and location: -
 - Ask the caller
 - **What** happened?
 - **Where** exactly is the person/s? Is the person/s in the water, in a tree, in or on a vehicle?
 - **How** many persons are involved?
 - **Type** of watercourse (i.e., river, dam, floodway or seaway)?

- **What is the best access for rescue vehicles?**
- **Is the person injured?**
- **Can you communicate with the person?**
- **Is the water rising or falling?**
- **Which bank is the person closest to? *River Left Bank or River Right Bank?***

Caller to face downstream and advise which bank the person is closest to




- **Instruct** the caller to meet the brigade
- **Despatch:**
 - Initial Assignment:** One pumper on turnout
One specialty rescue/rescue appliance on turnout
 - Notify:** QPS
QAS
 - QFRS Notify:** Senior Officer
 - Consider:** Technical Rescue response procedures
Contacting Local Government Authority
Accessing flood boats or helicopter
- **Record:**
 - All actions on CAD
- **Action:**
 - All requests from attending crews

5. POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS

- Was the call managed appropriately? If not, what action needs to be taken?
- Did Firecom personnel follow the correct procedure for this incident? If not, what action needs to be taken?
- Does the procedure require review?
- Has all the relevant information been added to the incident report?
- Is a debrief appropriate for this incident?

6. QFRS FIRE COMMUNICATION CENTRES RELEVANCY

1	Regions							
	1	2	3	4	5 N	5 S	6	7
Urban	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rural	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Not Applicable								
May Apply*								



Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner

REFERENCES

Operations Doctrine IAG 3.4 and 3.5
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material



"D-5"

	Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Operations Doctrine	Coordination & Control Centres
	INCIDENT DIRECTIVE	ICC Activation Protocols
Version: 1.0 Valid from: 01/05/2009		INCDIR 7.3

1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the activation protocols for an Incident Control Centre (ICC) within a region.

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to fire officers and volunteers involved in the activation and operation of an ICC.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

- (a) **The Incident Controller must be aware of incident developments and be prepared to increase management capability to ensure effective control and command.** Maintaining situational awareness will assist the Incident Controller in the anticipation of incident growth beyond the immediate resourcing and functional management support.
- (b) When required the Incident Controller will seek to establish greater incident management capability by transferring incident management from the ICP to a dedicated mobile control/command vehicle or an ICC (either pre-determined or improvised).
- (c) When required, the QFRS will provide a QFRS Liaison Officer to any other agency involved in managing the incident and specifically the Local Disaster Management Group (if activated).
- (d) The functional standards of an ICC are detailed in Incident Management System 2.7.1.

4. DIRECTIVE

4.1 Transfer from an Incident Control Point

- (a) Control of the incident will be maintained by the Incident Controller at the ICP until such time as the ICC is fully functional.
- (b) Relevant functional roles in the Incident Management Team (IMT) will be delegated and all incident information will be made available to the team prior to activation of the ICC.
- (c) The person identified as the Incident Controller will maintain command and control during the transfer from the ICP to ICC or a new Incident Controller will assume command and control at the ICC.
- (d) Transfer of command and control from the ICP to the ICC will be communicated to the relevant senior officer and Fire Communications Centre and to all personnel (QFRS and other agencies) on the incident ground.

4.2 Activation

- (a) The activation level of an ICC will be determined by the relevant senior officer after an assessment of the incident or emergent situation; and will notify the Assistant Commissioner of the activation. For wildfire incidents, the Assistant Commissioner will consult with the Regional Manager Rural Operations in determining the level of activation and taking into consideration the Wildfire Alert Level for identified areas.
- (b) When an ICC is activated, the Incident Controller is responsible for the appointment of appropriately qualified officers to perform the role of the Incident Management Team (IMT).

4.3 Stages of Activation

- (a) The activation levels of an ICC include the following:
 - Alert
 - Activation
- (b) **Alert** - involves ensuring an ICC is ready to be activated. During *alert* the nominated person will ensure the following is carried out:
 - Check, prepare and verify the ICC can be activated, e.g., check inventory, communications and other infrastructure.
 - Check the availability and accessibility of the current incident management forms, i.e. INCFORMs, and incident management room tabards and brassards.
 - Identify staff who can attend the ICC within 1 hour to perform the relevant functional and support roles.
 - Continue to monitor the developing situation/s either on-site or off-site.
 - Regularly inform the relevant Assistant Commissioner and other stakeholders of unfolding events.
 - The nominated person is not required to remain in the ICC.
- (c) **Activation** - involves expanding the operations and staffing of the ICC to meet the current and projected situation. The nominated person is to remain in the ICC during all hours.

4.4 Stand Down

- (a) The stand down of the ICC will be determined by the Incident Controller considering the size and scale of the operations. Stand down of the ICC may be staged at the discretion of the Incident Controller. Debriefing of the ICC operational activities will follow the full stand down of the ICC.

4.5 ICC Relationship with the ROCC

- (a) An ICC provides a vital role in communicating incident information to the ROCC (if activated), the Assistant Commissioner and Fire Communication Centre; and confirming the receipt of information from the ROCC.
- (b) An ICC receives support from the ROCC for the management of the incident(s).
- (c) An ICC does not generally communicate with another ICC, however it is the responsibility of the ROCC to share information between ICCs when necessary.

4.6 Reporting Requirements

- (a) The first report from the ICC to the ROCC (if activated) or to the regional fire communications centre must be issued within the first two hours using the Situation Report (INCFORM 15).
- (b) After the initial Situation report, an Incident Action Plan (INCFORMS 1-7) is then required for:
 - Every operational period; or
 - More frequently if a major change has occurred or a notifiable event such as significant injuries, fatalities, service vehicle accidents, significant structural loss, stock loss.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

INCDIR 7.3	URBAN		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	iZone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Not Applicable								✓
May Apply *						✓	✓	

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES

The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides



Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
 Commissioner



11D-6"

Queensland Fire and Rescue Service - Incident Report

Incident No: QF3-10-111965

Status: COMPLETED

Start Date: 26/12/2010

Completed Date: 23/02/2011

Confidential Information for internal use only

Incident Details

Incident Number:	QF3-10-111965	Firecom Region:	3
Incident Status:	Completed	Response Area:	IRONGATE ROSSVALE RFB
Incident Level:	1	Levy Class:	
Alarm Level:	1	Duties Compl. Date:	26/12/2010 23:18:42
Dispatch Level:	Normal	End Date:	26/12/2010 23:18:42
Start Date:	26/12/2010 21:00:17	Last Updated:	23/02/2011 17:13:57
Stop Date:	26/12/2010 23:12:40	Total Time:	0 Days, 2 Hrs, 18 Min, 25 Sec
Alarm Raised By:	99-Other agency not classified above		
Notification Method:	11-Exchange telephone call direct to authority		
Reporting Officer:	Mason, Rodney Alan		
Entering Officer:	Burrows, John Douglas (SO2)		
FIU Officer:			

Attendance Information

Attendance No:	1	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:02:02
Callsign/Rego:	314A	Mobile Time:	26/12/2010 21:09:05
Appliance Type:	Urban pumper with RAR Capability	Arrival Time:	26/12/2010 21:25:28
Description:		RTS Time:	26/12/2010 23:17:15
Primary Capability:		To Station Time:	
Org Unit:	SW114 Oakey	Code 30:	No
Mode:	Attended	Code 40:	No
Name:	Williamson, Michael Dennis	Driver?	Yes
Payroll:	008068	BA Worn?	No
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-L	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:03:00
Crewed:	Yes	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:17:15
	Shift: AUX	Total Time:	2 hours 14 minutes 15 seconds
Name:	Weise, Jason Lance	Driver?	No
Payroll:	025921	BA Worn?	No
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF2	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:03:00
Crewed:	Yes	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:17:15
	Shift: AUX	Total Time:	2 hours 14 minutes 15 seconds
Name:	Toms, Steven John	Driver?	No
Payroll:	025864	BA Worn?	No
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF1	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:03:00
Crewed:	Yes	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:17:15
	Shift: AUX	Total Time:	2 hours 14 minutes 15 seconds
Name:	Mason, Rodney Alan	Driver?	No
Payroll:	007249	BA Worn?	No
Position/Rank:	OIC / AUX-C	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:03:00
Crewed:	Yes	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:17:15
	Shift: AUX	Total Time:	2 hours 14 minutes 15 seconds

Name: Langton, Paul Anthony Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 001429 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:03:00
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF2 Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:15
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 14 minutes 15 seconds

Attendance No: 2 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Callsign/Rego: 313A Mobile Time: 26/12/2010 21:15:57
Appliance Type: Urban pumper with RAR Capability Arrival Time: 26/12/2010 21:33:41
Description: RTS Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Primary Capability: To Station Time:
Org Unit: SW113 Pittsworth Code 30: No
Mode: Attended Code 40: No

Name: French, Peter William Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 024861 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF1 Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Name: Huggins, Jason Alan Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 009480 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: OIC / AUX-C Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Name: Lissimore, John Charles Thomas Driver? Yes BA Worn? No
Payroll: 025039 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF2 Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Name: Rule, Michael John Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 014231 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF2 Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Name: Burton, Geoffrey Bruce Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 027042 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF2 Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Name: Maxwell, Douglas Driver? No BA Worn? No
Payroll: 021341 Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:08:11
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-L Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:13:51
Crewed: Yes Shift: AUX Total Time: 2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds

Attendance No: 3
Callsign/Rego: 311Y
Appliance Type: Light-weight quick response (2 & 4WD)
Description: Urban Light Attack - Light - Urban
Primary Capability: Special Appliance
Org Unit: Specials
Mode: SW111 Toowoomba
Attended

Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:04:00
Mobile Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:33
Arrival Time: 26/12/2010 21:34:55
RTS Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:30
To Station Time:
Code 30: No
Code 40: No

Name: Frame, Scott Douglas
Payroll: 008361
Position/Rank: FF / S-FF
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? Yes **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:00
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:30
Total Time: 2 hours 12 minutes 30 seconds

Name: Lange, Stewart Theodore
Payroll: 017187
Position/Rank: OIC / SO1
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? No **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:00
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:30
Total Time: 2 hours 12 minutes 30 seconds

Attendance No: 4
Callsign/Rego: 312A
Appliance Type: Urban pumper with RAR Capability
Description:
Primary Capability:
Org Unit: SW112 Anzac Avenue
Mode: Attended

Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:28
Mobile Time: 26/12/2010 21:06:10
Arrival Time: 26/12/2010 21:39:24
RTS Time: 26/12/2010 23:18:42
To Station Time:
Code 30: No
Code 40: No

Name: Lobwein, Gary John
Payroll: 001460
Position/Rank: FF / FF-1
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? No **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:28
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:18:42
Total Time: 2 hours 13 minutes 14 seconds

Name: Sullivan, Chris
Payroll: 017105
Position/Rank: FF / FF-1
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? Yes **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:28
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:18:42
Total Time: 2 hours 13 minutes 14 seconds

Name: Burrows, John Douglas
Payroll: 012740
Position/Rank: OIC / SO2
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? No **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:28
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:18:42
Total Time: 2 hours 13 minutes 14 seconds

Name: Douglas, Paula Jane
Payroll: 023390
Position/Rank: FF / FF-1
Crewed: Yes **Shift:** B10

Driver? No **BA Worn?** No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:28
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:18:42
Total Time: 2 hours 13 minutes 14 seconds

Attendance No: 5	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 21:31:52
Callsign/Rego: 317V	Mobile Time:	26/12/2010 21:38:32
Appliance Type: Water tanker (including 4x4 and 6x4)	Arrival Time:	26/12/2010 22:49:59
Description:	RTS Time:	26/12/2010 23:16:56
Primary Capability:	To Station Time:	
Org Unit: SW117 Highfields	Code 30:	No
Mode: Attended	Code 40:	No
Name: Noble, Karl Maxwell	Driver? Yes	BA Worn? No
Payroll: 007127	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 23:15:00
Position/Rank: FF / S-FF	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:16:56
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10	Total Time:	1 minute 56 seconds
Name: Ashmore, Cameron James	Driver? No	BA Worn? No
Payroll: 002361	Dispatch Time:	26/12/2010 23:15:00
Position/Rank: OIC / SO1	Att. End Time:	26/12/2010 23:16:56
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10	Total Time:	1 minute 56 seconds

Other Attendance

Other Agencies Notified?	Yes	Last updated by:	jburrows
Notified by Firecom?	Yes	Last updated date:	1/2/11 9:02 PM

Agency	Name	Notification	By Firecom
A56 Electricity		Not Notified	No
A57 Gas		Not Notified	No
A58 Water		Not Notified	No
A59 Police	QPS	Notified & Attended	Yes
A60 Ambulance	QAS	Notified & Attended	Yes
A61 SES		Not Notified	No
A62 Other Fire Service		Not Notified	No
A63 DERM		Not Notified	No
A64 Voluntary Rescue		Not Notified	No
A65 Charities		Not Notified	No
A66 Gov Welfare		Not Notified	No
N/A Fire Investigation Unit		Not Notified	No

Police Attendance

Station Name	Name	Phone Number
TOOWOOMBA	NA	

Event 1 of 1

Exposure Number: 0 HazMat Involved: No
Firecom Problem Type: RESCUE WATER ALL TYPES Mob. Property Involved: Yes
Incident Type: 363-Swift water rescue
Actions Taken: 210-Rescue, provide assistance, remove from harm

Block A

Major Event
Most Serious Event 363 Swift water rescue
A9 Method of Notification 11 Exchange telephone call direct to authority
A10 Agency/Person Raising Alarm 99 Other agency not classified above
Callers Name PHIL BICK
Address [REDACTED]
A12 Local Government Authority TOOWOOMBA
A14 Occupant's Name NA
A19 Complex Type Code 96 Road complex
A20 Fixed Property Use Code 962 Street, road, way (public)
A21 Type of Owner 200 Local Government
A22 Type of Occupant 100 Private
A6 Date of Call 26/12/2010
A8 Time of Call 21:00:17
A25 Stop Date 2010-12-26 00:00:00.0
A26 Stop Time 23:12:40
A27 Duties Completed Date 26/12/2010
A28 Duties Completed Time 23:18:42
End Date 26/12/2010
End Time 11:18:42
Total Incident Time 0 Days, 2 Hrs, 18 Min, 25 Sec
Latitude -27.552931
Longitude 151.612839
UBD Grid Reference
iZone Classification NA
In urban levy area? No
ARIA Remoteness
A39 Number of CABAs Worn at the Incident 0
A29 Peak num. personnel at scene 19
A35 Mutual Aid 3 No mutual aid
A36 Weather Conditions 3 Rain
A37 Delayed Arrival 71 - Weather, severe conditions incl. flooding
A42 Problem Encountered 20 Lack of on-scene information; i/i
Problem Encountered Details UNABLE TO DETERMINE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN WATER DUE TO APPROX 500-600M FLOODWAY

Block D

Casualties 0 No injuries or fatalities

Rescues

Num. Persons Extricated		4
Num. Persons Released		4
D7 Reason for Rescue	7	Rescue due to natural events such as storm, flood, earthquake
Num. Persons Medically Assisted		0
Evacuations		None

Block J

Mobile Property 1 of 3

Property Type	10	Passenger road transport vehicles; i/i
Make		Mitsubish
Model		Triton
Registration Number		██████████
Owner Name		NA
Phone Number		NA
Owner Address		Unobtainable - Person on other side of flooded water unable to get details

Mobile Property 2 of 3

Property Type	10	Passenger road transport vehicles; i/i
Make		Ford
Model		Ranger
Registration Number		██████████
Owner Name		Toowoomba Regional Council
Phone Number		07 4691 1388
Owner Address		Campbell Street Oakey QLD 4401

Mobile Property 3 of 3

Property Type	10	Passenger road transport vehicles; i/i
Make		Toyota
Model		Landcruiser
Registration Number		██████████
Owner Name		NA
Phone Number		NA
Owner Address		Unobtainable - Person transported by QAS before details were able to be taken

ESCAD Wordback

26/12/2010 21:00:20		Multi-Agency QAS Incident #: 02188369
26/12/2010 21:00:43		LINTHROPE CREEK. 3-5KMS SOUTH OF CECIL PLAINS RD. 50CM WATER. CAR STALLED IN WATER. PITTSOWRH QPS RESPONDING. 1 MALE IN CAR. UTE.
26/12/2010 21:02:02		[Page] Dispatch page sent to Unit:314A, Sent From: BNEVCPRSTO
26/12/2010 21:02:13	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:03:15	ANA	[!ANA] QAS Advised. RAE- UPDATED ON INC
26/12/2010 21:03:15		[Page] Dispatch page to Unit:314A complete to PIN 0092590: 11422846 Message sent successfully.
26/12/2010 21:04:01	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:05:29	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:05:34	TO	311Y [!TO] Vehicle Responding.

26/12/2010 21:05:56	WB	311Y [!WB] RESPOND 312A
26/12/2010 21:06:11	TO	312A [!TO] Vehicle Responding.
26/12/2010 21:07:10		MTEL SENT STN 12 AUX
26/12/2010 21:07:30		Address LINTHORPE CREEK verified by Latitude / Longitude
26/12/2010 21:07:30	AX	[!AX] Auxiliaries Notified. STN MANNED AND ADVISED
26/12/2010 21:08:11	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:08:11		[Page] Dispatch page sent to Unit:313A, Sent From: BNEVCPRSTO
26/12/2010 21:08:11	WB	312A [!WB] COULD YOU GIVE BEST ACCESS FROM STN 12 PITTSWORTH OR OAKEY
26/12/2010 21:09:05	TO	314A [!TO] Vehicle Responding. CREW 5 CAPT MASON OIC
26/12/2010 21:09:53		[Page] Dispatch page to Unit:313A complete to PIN 0092027: 11422907 Message sent successfully.
26/12/2010 21:11:21	OI	311U [!OI] 311Y ATTENDED INCIDENT
26/12/2010 21:11:44	WB	314A [!WB] IS INC LOC ON OAKEY PITTSWORTH RD OR LINTHROPE RD. ADV CORRECT LOC. ACCESS FOR TOOWOOMBA APP VIA TOOWOOMBA CECIL PLAINS RD
26/12/2010 21:11:51	WB	312A [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:12:13	WB	311Y [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:12:43	WB	312A [!WB] REQ 2 MEN RECALL FOR REPLACEMENT OF LIMA
26/12/2010 21:13:54	WB	311Y [!WB] DO WE HAVE ANY WORD AS TO NUMBER OF OCC. FCO ADV AS 1
26/12/2010 21:14:32	WB	311Y [!WB] WE HAVE PERMISSION FROM SUPT FF CRIGHTON FROM PITTSWORTH TO RESPOND AS LEVEL2 ON THE PITTSWORTH SIDE
26/12/2010 21:14:41	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:14:57	WB	312B [!WB] CREW 4
26/12/2010 21:15:22	WB	312A [!WB] ADV 314A THAT ONE FF ARE TO ENTER WATER
26/12/2010 21:15:33	WB	314A [!WB] ROGER COPIED LAST
26/12/2010 21:15:53	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE NOTIFIED OF INC. DENIED CALL BACK CREW FOR LIMA
26/12/2010 21:15:57	TO	313A [!TO] Vehicle Responding. CREW 5 ACK LAST MESSAGE
26/12/2010 21:17:01	WB	312A [!WB] REQ PERMISSION TO SPEAK DIRECT 313A
26/12/2010 21:17:12	WB	313A [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:18:07	WB	312A [!WB] FF CRIGHTON RESP FROM PITTSWORTH. 312A ADV 313A NO FF TO ENTER WATER WHO AREN'T SWIFT WATER TRAINED
26/12/2010 21:21:10	WB	314A [!WB] PASS ON TO QAS IF THEY APPLICANCES RESPONDING WATER OVER ROAD JUST AFTER AUGBINEY
26/12/2010 21:21:23		QPS - HAVE SPOKEN TO OCC IS SITTING ON TOP OF CAR. A 2ND CAR HAS BECOME STUCK - UNKNOWN NUMBER OF OCC. ACUTAL INC IS LOCATED ON OAKEY PITTSWORTH RD.
26/12/2010 21:22:10		DAVID CRIGHTON ADV HE IS RESPONDING IN OWN VEH
26/12/2010 21:22:38	ANA	[!ANA] QAS Advised. DEE ADV OF LAST AND THAT 2ND CAR NOW ALSO TRAPPED IN WATER AT SAME AREA
26/12/2010 21:23:35	WB	313A [!WB] PLS LOGG WATER OVER RD ;PITTSWORTH OAKEY RD LEARMONTHS RD

26/12/2010 21:24:35	CM	[ICM] FYI 2ND VEH NOW ALSO TRAPPED
26/12/2010 21:25:06		ADV 6 AUX FF STANDINGBY AT STN 12. SO ASHMORE ARRIVED AT STN 12. RETURNING HOME
26/12/2010 21:25:28	K2	314A [!K2] Vehicle At Scene - Incident in evidence. VEH LOCATED APPROX 1ST VEH 3-00400 MT AWAY FROM 5./600 METER AWAY STANDING BY AWAITING ARRIVAL SWIFT WATER TECHS
26/12/2010 21:26:35	WB	313A [!WB] CONFIRM LOC IS AT MOTLEY FLAT
26/12/2010 21:26:59	WB	314A [!WB] AFFIRMATIVE LAST. INC LOCATED AT MOTLEY FLAT
26/12/2010 21:27:05	WB	313A [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:28:26	WB	314A [!WB] THIS INC KNOWN AS MT TYSON CONT. CAPT MASON OIC. CONTROL VEH 314A. 2 VEH INSITGHT. 1ST 3-500M 2ND 6-700M CAN SIGHT 1 PERSON ON ROOF OF ONE VEH CURRENTLY TRYING TO GET CONTACT WITH THAT PERSON
26/12/2010 21:28:49	IC	[!IC] Incident Controller Name - : MOUNT TYSON
26/12/2010 21:29:41	WB	314A [!WB] HAVE ACK FROM PPL ON VEH. THRU FLASH LIGHT AND PA SYSTEM ON TRUCK RELAYING STANDBY UNTIL SWIFT WATER ARRIVE AT INC
26/12/2010 21:30:02	WB	312A [!WB] QPS REQ. ADV QPS ON ROUTE TO INC
26/12/2010 21:31:50	WB	311Y [!WB] HAVE 2 LEVEL ON STAND BY AT STN 11 RESPOND SO ASHMORE PICKED UP BY 311L. CARL AND TONY GOUSE IF THEY CAN RESPOND IN 317V
26/12/2010 21:31:52	NR	[!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:32:39	CM	[!CM] SO GUSE RESPONDING AS REQUESTED
26/12/2010 21:33:09	WB	312A [!WB] CONT 313A AND INQ IF THEY HAVE VHF RADIO GO TO CH 69
26/12/2010 21:33:32	WB	313A [!WB] ACK LAST. K8 CH 1 AND CH 69 VHF
26/12/2010 21:33:41	K8	313A [!K8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge.
26/12/2010 21:34:13	CM	[!CM] INSP RYE ADVISED ALL DETAILS
26/12/2010 21:34:55	K8	311Y [!K8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge. MESSAGE BROKEN
26/12/2010 21:35:02		ATHOL NOTIFY SOC CALLED BACK ANOTHER OFFICER FOR 311L DUE TO 317V RESPONDING TO JOB
26/12/2010 21:35:27	WB	313A [!WB] ADV 312A 69 VHF UNREADABLE REVERT TO FIRECOM
26/12/2010 21:36:16	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. DRO HACKET INFORMED
26/12/2010 21:36:28	WB	312A [!WB] REPEATED LAST FROM 313A. ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:36:58	WB	314A [!WB] QPAS QPS ON SCENE ALSO ALL APPLIANCE FIREGROUND CH1
26/12/2010 21:37:42	WB	313A [!WB] 2 QPS ON SCENE FF CRIGHTON ON SCENE
26/12/2010 21:38:32	TO	317V [!TO] Vehicle Responding. MOBILE TO STN12 PICK LEVEL2 SWIFT WATER
26/12/2010 21:38:46	IC	[!IC] Incident Controller Name - : SO BURROWS
26/12/2010 21:38:59	CV	[!CV] Control Vehicle - 312A Primary Unit set to 312A (previously 314A).
26/12/2010 21:39:24	K8	312A [!K8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge. IC IS NOW 312A. AT THIS STAGE ONLY ABLE TO CONFIRM NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN WATER. ABLE TO CONFIRM 2 VEH
26/12/2010 21:39:46	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE UPDATED ON INC - REQ NOTIFIECATION ASAP OF NUMBER OF PPL IN WATER

26/12/2010 21:42:25	WB	312A [!WB] IAP IS SW TECHS DONNING UP FF CRIGHTON TO STH 2 L2 TECH TO NTH INFLATING THE BOAT AND MAKING PREPS TO ENTER WATER
26/12/2010 21:43:56	WB	312B [!WB] NOTIFIED OF SOC RYE REQ ALL 6 AUX TO REMAIN ON STN
26/12/2010 21:45:58	WB	312A [!WB] ADV RESP CREW ON ARRIVAL DONE LEV 2 SWIFT WATER EQUIP. AND BE THE IN WATER SAFETY TEAM FOR SWIFT WATER TEAM 1
26/12/2010 21:46:42	WB	317V [!WB] WITH 2 LEVEL TWO ON BOARD RESP. REQ IF COPIED LAST FROM 312A. ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:47:52	WB	312A [!WB] FROM SW TECH CRIGHTON STH OF FLOOD WATER 1 MOTHER 1 DEFACTO AND 1 CHILD MISSING INFORM SOC
26/12/2010 21:50:29	ANA	[!ANA] QAS Advised. MIKE ADVISED OF LAST
26/12/2010 21:51:20	ANP	[!ANP] QPS Advised. NO ANSWER FROM COMMS TO VERIFY MISSING PAX
26/12/2010 21:52:02	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. UPDATED ON INC - REQ A BANK SEARCH ONCE RESCUED 1 PERSON ACC FOR
26/12/2010 21:52:26	WB	317V [!WB] VIA PHONE - REQ DIRECTIONS. REQ BEST ACCESS ACCORDING TO LAST WB - MISSING FAMILY
26/12/2010 21:54:43	ANP	[!ANP] QPS Advised. TONY ADVISED THEY WERE UNAWARE OF MISSING OCCS - TECH RESCUE NUMBER GIVEN TO QPS COMMS
26/12/2010 21:55:06	WB	312A [!WB] REQ 317V GO TO SOUTHERN SIDE AND LIASE WITH 313A AND ADV - MESSAGE BROKEN - UNABLE TO CONFIRM ON RADIO
26/12/2010 21:56:43	WB	312A [!WB] AFFIRMATIVE TO LAST MESSAGE
26/12/2010 21:56:48	WB	317V [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 21:59:29	WB	312A [!WB] ADV 317V WHEN THEY ARRIVE K8 STH SIDE TO REPORT SECTOR COMMANDER CRIGHTON FOR TASKING
26/12/2010 21:59:42	WB	317V [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 22:01:29		2 FF STANDING BY AT STN 13
26/12/2010 22:06:34	WB	312A [!WB] 4 PAX RECOVERED CONFIRMED ALL PAX ACCOUNTED FOR 317V STILL TO PROCEED TO STH END AND LIASE WITH SECT CONTROLLER
26/12/2010 22:06:49	WB	317V [!WB] COPIED LAST
26/12/2010 22:07:33	ANA	[!ANA] QAS Advised. MIKE ADVISED OF LAST
26/12/2010 22:08:09	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE UPDATED ON INC - DOES NOT WANT STUFF TO HANG AROUND UNNECESSARILY
26/12/2010 22:08:32	ANP	[!ANP] QPS Advised. TONY ADVISED OF LAST
26/12/2010 22:09:52	WB	312A [!WB] ETA 317V TO STHERN SECTOR
26/12/2010 22:10:33	WB	317V [!WB] APPROX 20MINS
26/12/2010 22:10:48	WB	312A [!WB] COPIED LAST - FURTHER CARRYING OUR SEC SEARCH SW T 1 ENTRYING FROM NORTH SIDE
26/12/2010 22:16:25	WB	312A [!WB] ADV TRC THAT THEIR CREW ON SITE ARE SAFE AND THE UTE IS ABOUT TO BE SWEEPED OF THE CAUSEWAY
26/12/2010 22:17:24	AN	[!AN] Authority Notified KAREN FROM TRC - NOTIFIED OF INC
26/12/2010 22:31:17	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE PHONED TO SEE WHERE CREWS WERE AT
26/12/2010 22:33:37	WB	317V [!WB] CHECKING RADIO CH IN PITTSWORTH. ADV UHF CH IN PITTSWORTH. FOR 312A ADV TURNING INTO OAKEY PITTSWORTH RD

26/12/2010 22:35:40	WB	312A [!WB] ADV TO CONTACT COMMS VIA LANDLINE. ADV 317V WHEN THEY GET TO SEC STH TO TAKE UP WITH SW TECH CRIGHTON WATER SHOULD NOT EXCEED HEIGHT FOR VEH TO CROSS THROUGH SAFELY. TO DO A SLOW SEARCH TO NORTH TO SCH FOR ANY OTHER VEH IN WATER
26/12/2010 22:45:00	CM	[!CM] FROM SOC CAN YOU ADV ESTIMATED TIME OF SEC SEARCHES
26/12/2010 22:45:05	WB	312A [!WB] SEC SEARCH HAVE BEEN COMPLETE REVISED IAP I REQUIRE 317V TO BE USED AS WORK PLATFORM TO TRAVERSE ROADWAY TO ENSURE NO OTHER VEH HAVE BEEN SWEEP OFF THE FLOODWAY
26/12/2010 22:45:22	WB	312A [!WB] RECOVERED A TOTAL OF 4 CAS FROM 3 VEH
26/12/2010 22:50:00	K8	317V [!K8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge.
26/12/2010 22:50:17	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE ADVISED DIRECT ORDERS THAT ALL APPLIANCES ARE TO BE BACK IN AREAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
26/12/2010 22:53:27	CM	[!CM] DIRECT ORDERS FROM SOC RYE - ALL APPLIANCES TO RETURN ASAP
26/12/2010 22:55:01	WB	312A [!WB] ROGER INFORM SOC ALL APPLIANCES WILL BE RELEASED WHEN WE HAVE FINISHED IN WATER OPERATIONS
26/12/2010 22:55:13	WB	312A [!WB] INFORM SOC IF HE WISHES HE CAN ATTEND. FCO INQ AFTER DELAY FOR INC. HOPING FOR 15MIN
26/12/2010 22:56:20	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. ADV APPROX 15MIN DELAY AT THIS STAGE
26/12/2010 23:00:08	WB	313A [!WB] REQ TO STANDDOWN FROM INC AS THEY ARE NOT REQ AND THE CREEK ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEM IS RISING
26/12/2010 23:03:04	WB	312A [!WB] INQ IF 313A TO REMAIN AT INC. THAT IS AFFIRM ALL UNITS AT THIS STAGE ARE ON INC TILL THE STOP IS PUT IN WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN AS YET
26/12/2010 23:04:13	CM	[!CM] FCO ADV REQ TO STANDDOWN CAME FROM 313A AS CREEK IS RISING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEM ON OAKLEY PITSWORTH RD
26/12/2010 23:05:08	WB	312A [!WB] WILL GET THEM TO STAY UNTIL 317V FORDS THIS SIDE GET 317V THEN TO TURN AROUND THEN ESCORT THEM OUT
26/12/2010 23:05:21	WB	313A [!WB] ACK LAST
26/12/2010 23:06:54	WB	312A [!WB] 317V IS TRAVERSING WATER CARRYING OUT FINAL SEARCH
26/12/2010 23:12:40	ST	312A [!ST] OAKLEY PITSWORTH INC STOP 313A IS BEING RELEASED ALL OTHER VEHS MAKING UP
26/12/2010 23:13:39	WB	313A [!WB] RETURNING TO STN ON DELAYED RESPONSE DUE TO WATER ACROSS ROAD K4
26/12/2010 23:13:51	K4	313A [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.
26/12/2010 23:16:56	K4	317V [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.
26/12/2010 23:17:15	K4	314A [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.
26/12/2010 23:17:30	K4	311Y [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.
26/12/2010 23:17:33	ANDMO	[!ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE UPDATED ON INC
26/12/2010 23:17:48	OI	312B [!OI] DID NOT RESPOND
26/12/2010 23:18:51	K4	312A [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.

"D-7"

Senior Officer ON - CALL July 2010 to December 2011

July		August		September	
6-12	Area Director 1* Area Director 4 <i>McGRATH 9/7</i>	03-09	Area Director 4* Area Director 1	31-06	Area Director 1* Area Director 4
13-19	MCS* Area Director 5 C.S.	10-16	Area Director 5* C.S. MCS	07-13	C.S.* MCS Area Director 5
20-26	MBO* Area Director 3 MSD	17-23	Area Director 3* MSD MBO	14-20	MSD* MBO Area Director 3
27-02	Area Director 2* Area Director 6 MRT	24-30	Area Director 6* MRT Area Director 2	21-27	MRT* Area Director 2 Area Director 6
				28-04	Area Director 4* Area Director 1
October		November		December	
05-11	MCS* Area Director 5 C.S.	02-08	Area Director 5* C.S. MCS	30-06	C.S.* Area Director 5 MCS
12-18	MBO* Area Director 3 MSD	09-15	Area Director 3* MSD MBO	07-13	MSD* MBO Area Director 3
19-25	Area Director 2* Area Director 6 MRT	16-22	Area Director 6* MRT Area Director 2	14-20	MRT* Area Director 2 Area Director 6
26-01	Area Director 1* Area Director 4	23-29	Area Director 4* Area Director 1	21-27	Area Director 1* Area Director 4
				28-03	MCS* Area Director 5 C.S.

July 2010 to June 2011 Senior On - Call Roster -

Approved By: _____
Chief Superintendent

Date: / /

"D-8"



1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the requirements for the activation of aircraft, including QFRS Contract, Call When Needed and Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network aircraft for fire suppression and/or reconnaissance.

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to all fire officers who require the assistance of aircraft for fire suppression and/or reconnaissance.

3. DIRECTIVE

- (a) Aircraft are available for operational support and must be managed in accordance with this Directive.

3.1 Activation

- (a) All requests for aircraft support are to be made through the relevant Firecom dispatching resources to the fire or the relevant Regional Fire Coordination Centre, if established.
- (b) Request for aircraft support may be made by the Incident Controller. The requesting person must state:
 - Type of support required (e.g. water bombing, reconnaissance/observation, transport);
 - Incident Control Point/Incident Controller name;
 - Grid reference of UBD or specified map latitude and longitude (if available) or specific location;
 - Fire ground channel to be used; and
 - Location of water source if known and applicable.
- (c) Firecom will obtain authorisation for deployment of aerial resources from the relevant Senior Rural Officer or Senior Urban Officer and will notify the relevant Assistant Commissioner and the State Air Operations Coordinator (SAOC) immediately the authorisation has been given.
- (d) Aircraft operations extending beyond two (2) hours must be authorised by the relevant Assistant Commissioner (or the regional authorised delegate, e.g., Regional Manager Rural Operations).
- (e) QFRS personnel are only permitted to travel in aircraft operated by operators who are pre-qualified by the QFRS Air Operations Unit. This does not apply to personnel travelling on aircraft operating as regular commercial passenger services.

(f) Firecom will contact the State Air Operations Coordinator via any of the following means in priority order, ensuring that the coordinates of the fire are given in latitude and longitude in degrees minutes and decimal of minutes.

- Phone: [REDACTED]
- Pager: [REDACTED]
- Fax: [REDACTED]
- Email: [REDACTED]

(g) The requesting centre must ensure sufficient detail is provided for aircraft to respond to the incident and communicate with the Incident Controller or other authorised person.

(h) Where required, the State Air Operations Coordinator will identify suitable resources in accordance with the notified requirements and will provide the deployment details to the requesting centre.

(i) Where Incident Control Centres are established, details must include the Communications Plan and the nominated air base, if applicable.

(j) Appendix 1 presents the flowchart for activating QFRS contract aircraft (including Call When Needed aircraft on active standby and Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network aircraft) and Appendix 2 presents the flowchart for activating Call When Needed aircraft on *ad hoc* hire.

3.2 QFRS Contract Aircraft

(a) Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters with a variety of roles) may be contracted and placed on activate standby for exclusive use to support QFRS operations during the fire season or in response to any other forecasted significant fire weather event.

(b) Aircraft may be based in a number of areas around the state, and can be relocated in response to potential or actual threats.

(c) Regions may seek the support of any aircraft via Firecom who will contact the State Air Operations Coordinator who will coordinate deployment and tasking.

(d) Contract aircraft are available to assist other agencies.

(e) Contract aircraft will require significant logistical support that will be coordinated by the State Air Operations Coordinator with the Regional Fire Coordination Centre or the Incident Management Team (refer Incident Directive 1.14).

(f) Contract aircraft are fitted with QFRS radios and are required to maintain communications with a Firecom Centre at all times except when allocated to an incident and under the tasking of the Incident Management Team (refer Incident Directive 1.9).

(g) Regions are required to establish Flight Following Watch procedures initially via Firecom for any supporting aircraft. These arrangements must be discussed with the State Air Operations Coordinator.

3.3 QFRS Call When Needed (CWN) Aircraft

- (a) Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters with a variety of roles) may be called to respond as a result of an activation request by an Incident Controller and may take some time to be available to respond. These aircraft would be on an *ad hoc* contract arrangement.
- (b) Aircraft are accessed as per 3.1 above.

3.4 Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network (QEHN)

- (a) There are six (6) providers of emergency helicopter services within the network, including four (4) community helicopter providers:
 - EMQ Helicopter Rescue (Brisbane, Townsville and Cairns). State Government owned and operated.
 - Australian Helicopters Pty Ltd (Torres Strait and Northern Peninsula). Fully funded under contract with EMQ, DES.
 - Careflight Queensland (Gold Coast and Toowoomba).
 - Sunshine Coast Helicopter Rescue, also known as Energex Community Rescue (Sunshine Coast and Bundaberg).
 - Capricorn Helicopter Rescue Service (Rockhampton)
 - Central Queensland Helicopter Rescue Service (Mackay)
- (b) Firecom personnel must be aware of the primary response for aircraft (on Government contract) in the region.

4. QFRS RELEVANCY

	URBAN		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	iZone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Not Applicable								
May Apply *								

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.




Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner

REFERENCES


The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides



Appendix 1: Activation of QFRS Contracted Aircraft
 (including CWN Aircraft on Active Standby and QEHN Aircraft)



Appendix 2: Activation of Call When Needed (CWN) Aircraft on Ad Hoc Hire





INCIDENT DIRECTIVE

Regional Support for Aircraft

Version: 2.0
Valid from: 01/05/2006

INCDIR 1.14

1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the requirements for initial support of aircraft by Regions and Districts.

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to all QFRS personnel.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

- (a) Aircraft will require logistical support from regions and districts. Support may be required during fire detection flights or during the initial phase of fire, before the arrival of specialist support personnel. QFRS stations/brigades, in close proximity to local airports, may be requested to provide support that may include.
- Provision of foam and water.
 - Assistance with refuelling.
 - Airfield support.
 - Accommodation and transport.

4. DIRECTIVE

- (a) The appropriate Senior Officer of the Region/District is to be advised by the State Air Operations Coordinator to coordinate logistical support when QFRS tasked aircraft are operating in the vicinity of the Region/District.

4.1 Fuel

- (a) The Region/District will obtain information (in Region Operational Plans) on availability of Avgas or Jet A1 fuel at the airport or within the district and will ensure that suppliers are notified of the requirement and trained personnel available to assist with refuelling.

4.2 Local Airport Use

- (a) All operations at the local airport shall be conducted in a safe manner and any local airport operational requirements shall be adhered to.
- (b) Regions/Districts should become familiar with the Airport Emergency Plan and any other operational procedures of the local airport.
- (c) The airport manager or supervisor will be advised that water-bombing support activities are to be conducted at the local airport.


4.3 Suppressant (Foam/Water) Supply Requirements

- (a) The aircraft pilot shall determine the quantity of water or water foam mix that is to be loaded into the aircraft. Crews loading suppressant should work under the pilot's direction at all times.
- (b) QFRS or Council water tanker(s) may be required to provide water supply (est.2000-3000 litres per load) if the main water supply is not available.
- (c) Contract aircraft are required to carry CAMLOK to 64mm QRT Adapter. The connection to these aircraft will be a 2-inch CAMLOK or a 64mm QRT Adapter. Local agricultural aircraft may have different fittings.
- (d) Should foam be needed, then a 0.5% concentration of BFFF foam will be required. For a 2000-litre load of water, 10 litres of foam shall be added to the filling hose before water is pumped into the aircraft.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

	Urban		Rural			
	Full time	Part time	Class 4 Brigade	Class 3 Brigade	Class 2 Brigade	Class 1 Brigade
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Not Applicable						
May Apply *						

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with the District Inspector for additional information.



Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner

REFERENCES

The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides



"D-9"

Queensland Fire and Rescue Service - Incident Report

Incident No: QF3-11-002953

Status: COMPLETED

Start Date: 10/01/2011

Completed Date: 25/02/2011

Confidential Information for internal use only

Incident Details

Incident Number: QF3-11-002953
Incident Status: Completed
Incident Level: 1
Alarm Level: 1
Dispatch Level: Normal
Start Date: 10/01/2011 17:38:29
Stop Date: 10/01/2011 17:59:54
Alarm Raised By: 31-Traveller, passer-by, neighbour
Notification Method: 71-000 - The reporting person dials 000 or mobile on 112
Reporting Officer: Burrows, John Douglas
Entering Officer: Burrows, John Douglas (SO2)
FIU Officer:

Firecom Region: 3
Response Area: CAMBOOYA RFB
Levy Class:
Duties Compl. Date: 10/01/2011 18:13:09
End Date: 10/01/2011 18:13:09
Last Updated: 25/02/2011 15:40:52
Total Time: 0 Days, 0 Hrs, 34 Min, 40 Sec

Attendance Information

Attendance No: 1
Callsign/Rego: 312A
Appliance Type: Urban pumper with RAR Capability
Description:
Primary Capability:
Org Unit: SW112 Anzac Avenue
Mode: Attended

Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:43:30
Mobile Time: 10/01/2011 17:44:06
Arrival Time: 10/01/2011 17:59:42
RTS Time: 10/01/2011 18:13:09
To Station Time:
Code 30: No
Code 40: No

Name: Burrows, John Douglas
Payroll: 012740
Position/Rank: OIC / SO2
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10

Driver? No BA Worn? No
Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:43:30
Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:13:09
Total Time: 29 minutes 39 seconds

Name: Douglas, Paula Jane
Payroll: 023390
Position/Rank: FF / FF-1
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10

Driver? Yes BA Worn? No
Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:43:30
Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:13:09
Total Time: 29 minutes 39 seconds

Attendance No:	2	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:19
Callsign/Rego:	312B	Mobile Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:35
Appliance Type:	Urban pumper with RAR Capability	Arrival Time:	
Description:		RTS Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:01
Primary Capability:		To Station Time:	
Org Unit:	SW112 Anzac Avenue	Code 30:	No
Mode:		Code 40:	Yes

Name:	Wensley, John Colin	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	002168	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:19		
Position/Rank:	OIC / SO3	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:01		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	B10	Total Time:	7 minutes 42 seconds

Name:	Crighton, Mark Phillip	Driver?	Yes	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	019159	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:19		
Position/Rank:	FF / FF-1	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:01		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	B10	Total Time:	7 minutes 42 seconds

Name:	Sullivan, Chris	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	017105	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:19		
Position/Rank:	FF / FF-1	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:01		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	B10	Total Time:	7 minutes 42 seconds

Name:	Robinson, Peter (Robbo) Christopher	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	002537	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:52:19		
Position/Rank:	FF / S-FF	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:01		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	B10	Total Time:	7 minutes 42 seconds

Attendance No:	3	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59
Callsign/Rego:	313A	Mobile Time:	10/01/2011 17:55:04
Appliance Type:	Urban pumper with RAR Capability	Arrival Time:	
Description:		RTS Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07
Primary Capability:		To Station Time:	
Org Unit:	SW113 Pittsworth	Code 30:	No
Mode:		Code 40:	Yes

Name:	Kahler, Rodney Graham	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	017841	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF2	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX	Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds

Name:	Lissimore, John Charles Thomas	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	025039	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF2	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX	Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds

Name:	Beil, Jamie Scott	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	011414	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-L	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX		
Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds				
Name:	Rule, Michael John	Driver?	Yes	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	014231	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF2	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX		
Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds				
Name:	French, Peter William	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	024861	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-FF1	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX		
Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds				
Name:	Huggins, Jason Alan	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	009480	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	OIC / AUX-C	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX		
Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds				
Name:	Maxwell, Douglas	Driver?	No	BA Worn?	No
Payroll:	021341	Dispatch Time:	10/01/2011 17:54:59		
Position/Rank:	FF / AUX-L	Att. End Time:	10/01/2011 18:00:07		
Crewed:	Yes	Shift:	AUX		
Total Time:	5 minutes 8 seconds				

Other Attendance

Other Agencies Notified?	Yes	Last updated by:	jburrows
Notified by Firecom?	Yes	Last updated date:	1/12/11 8:17 AM

Agency	Name	Notification	By Firecom
A56 Electricity		Not Notified	Yes
A57 Gas		Not Notified	No
A58 Water		Not Notified	No
A59 Police	TOOWOOMBA	Notified & did not attend	Yes
A60 Ambulance	QAS	Notified & did not attend	Yes
A61 SES		Not Notified	No
A62 Other Fire Service		Not Notified	No
A63 DERM		Not Notified	No
A64 Voluntary Rescue		Not Notified	No
A65 Charities		Not Notified	No
A66 Gov Welfare		Not Notified	No
N/A Fire Investigation Unit		Not Notified	No

Event 1 of 1

Exposure Number: 0 HazMat Involved: No
Firecom Problem Type: RESCUE WATER ALL TYPES Mob. Property Involved: No
Incident Type: 363-Swift water rescue
Actions Taken: 210-Rescue, provide assistance, remove from harm

Block A

Major Event
Most Serious Event 363 Swift water rescue
A9 Method of Notification 71 000 - The reporting person dials 000 or mobile on 112
A10 Agency/Person Raising Alarm 31 Traveller, passer-by, neighbour
Callers Name MCCORMACK, CHRISTOPHER
Address [REDACTED] Wellcamp,
QLD 4350
A12 Local Government Authority TOOWOOMBA
A14 Occupant's Name ANDREW PHIEDKE
A19 Complex Type Code 96 Road complex
A20 Fixed Property Use Code 962 Street, road, way (public)
A21 Type of Owner 200 Local Government
A22 Type of Occupant 100 Private
A6 Date of Call 10/01/2011
A8 Time of Call 17:38:29
A25 Stop Date 2011-01-10 00:00:00.0
A26 Stop Time 17:59:54
A27 Duties Completed Date 10/01/2011
A28 Duties Completed Time 18:13:09
End Date 10/01/2011
End Time 06:13:09
Total Incident Time 0 Days, 0 Hrs, 34 Min, 40 Sec
Latitude -27.546438
Longitude 151.852524
UBD Grid Reference
iZone Classification NA
In urban levy area? No
ARIA Remoteness
A39 Number of CABAs Worn at the Incident 0
A29 Peak num. personnel at scene 2
A35 Mutual Aid 3 No mutual aid
A36 Weather Conditions 3 Rain
A37 Delayed Arrival 92 - Due to distance travelled
A42 Problem Encountered 08 No problems encountered

Block D

Casualties 0 No injuries or fatalities
Rescues No rescues
Evacuations None

Event Comments

OWNER OF HONDA MOTORBIKE HAD ATTEMPTED TO CROSS A FLOODED CAUSEWAY THAT WAS 1.5M DEEP AND STALLED. A TRUCK DRIVER THEN DROVE IN AND EFFECTED A RESCUE. jburrows
12/01/2011 08:20

** RECOMMEND THAT RIDER BE FULLY CHARGED FOR ALL QFRS RESOURCES THAT RESPONDED**

HIS ADDRESS IS [REDACTED]

ESCAD Wordback

10/01/2011 17:38:31 Multi-Agency QAS Incident #: 02224195

10/01/2011 17:44:06 TO 312A [!TO] Vehicle Responding. SWIFT TECHS TO THIS LOCATION

10/01/2011 17:46:52 WB 312A [!WB] COPY FIREBIRD AVAIL FOR TASKING IF AVAIL FOR - WOULD BE HAPPY IF AVAIL DARK IN 3/4 HR

10/01/2011 17:47:39 ANA [!ANA] QAS Advised.SUE ADVISED

10/01/2011 17:51:02 317C AT STN 12 ADVISED NO LEVEL 2 TECHS

10/01/2011 17:52:19 NR [!NR] Unit Assigned to Incident.

10/01/2011 17:52:36 TO 312B [!TO] Vehicle Responding.CR WENSLEY CRIGHTON ZIMMERLE ROBINSON

10/01/2011 17:52:50 OI 317C [!OI] UNIT 312B RESPONDED

10/01/2011 17:53:37 GOWR41 IS LISTENING CAN RESP FOR TRAFFIC CONTROL IF NEEDED - FCOM ADVISED WILL ADVISE

10/01/2011 17:55:00 [Page] Dispatch page sent to Unit:313A, Sent From: BNEVCPRSTO

10/01/2011 17:55:04 WB 312A [!WB] REQ 314A TO ASSSIT CREW

10/01/2011 17:55:05 TO 313A [!TO] Vehicle Responding.CREW 6

10/01/2011 17:55:19 CM [!CM] 314A CAPT MASON ADV NOT ABLE TO RESPOND - OAKEY CUT OFF

10/01/2011 17:55:24 WB 312A [!WB] RESPOND CECIL PLAINS

10/01/2011 17:55:34 CM [!CM] ADV CECIL PLAINS RD ALSO BELIEVED CUT

10/01/2011 17:55:54 [Page] Dispatch page to Unit:313A complete to PIN 0092027: 11586261 Message sent successfully.

10/01/2011 17:59:43 K2 312A [!K2] Vehicle At Scene - Incident in evidence.INC STOP MOTORBIKE RIDER HAS BEEN RECOVERED - COUNCIL NEEDS TO CLOSE RD

10/01/2011 17:59:54 ST 312A [!ST] No further assistance required from responding units.

10/01/2011 18:00:01 K40 312B [!K40] Vehicle Not Required.

10/01/2011 18:00:08 K40 313A [!K40] Vehicle Not Required.

10/01/2011 18:00:46 WB 312A [!WB] QPS REQ TO SCENE


10/01/2011 18:01:37 ANP [!ANP] QPS Advised.PHONE RANG OUT

10/01/2011 18:03:09 QAS REQUESTED IF QAS STILL REQ AT SCENE

10/01/2011 18:03:46 WB 312A [!WB] NEG HAVE SPOKEN TO VICTIM NO WATER INDUSED - REQ QPS TO GIVE HIM A TICKET

10/01/2011 18:04:02 QAS STEVE ADVISED NOT REQ

10/01/2011 18:04:08 QAS STEVE ADVISED NOT REQ

10/01/2011 18:06:02	ANP	[!ANP] QPS Advised. THEY CAN'T ATTEND - REQUESTED REGO FOR QPS - JOB 1881
10/01/2011 18:06:21	AN	[!AN] Authority NotifiedTRC ADV
10/01/2011 18:07:43	WB	312A [!WB] ADVISE ERGON CREEK HIGH VOL AND LOW VOL ABOUT TO BE KNOCKED OVER BY WATER - WESTBROOK BRIDGE
10/01/2011 18:09:26	ANE	[!ANE] Power Authority Notified.
10/01/2011 18:09:46	WB	
10/01/2011 18:11:13	ANP	[!ANP] QPS Advised.PHONE RANG OUT
10/01/2011 18:13:14	K4	312A [!K4] Vehicle leaving scene, available.AWAIT FURTHER TASKING

110-10"



 Queensland Government
Department of Emergency Services

Statewide Integrated Operational Planning Process

Making TSWL & Functional Management Simpler & More Consistent

Regional Functional Plan 2009 – 2010

South Western Region

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Wildfire Operational Plan

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In order to ensure a coordinated response to wildfires, it is essential that all staff within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) South West Region (permanent, auxiliary and volunteers) operate according to policies, procedures and practices as prescribed in the:

- QFRS Operations Doctrine Manual
- Region iZone Plan 2009-2010
- Region Wildfire Management Plan 2009-2010.

1.1 Scope

This plan will operate from 1 August 2009 to 30 July 2010 and applies to all permanent, auxiliary and volunteer Officers and Fire fighters in South Western Region.

This plan is restricted to managing wildfire operations and excludes:

- (a) Training associated with fighting wildfires
- (b) Community education.

This plan will be implemented in the areas identified in the plan, it must be noted that with such a large Region there will areas where the plan is not applicable.

1.2 Associated Documents

Doc Ref	Title
1	Regional iZone Plan 2009-2010
2	Operations Doctrine Manual
3	State Operations Coordination Centre Operational Procedures
4	Regional Fire Coordination Centre Activation Procedures
5	Commissioners Priorities

2.0 OBJECTIVES

To ensure the required infrastructure for the Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC) and pre-determined Incident Control Centres (ICC's) are in a constant state of readiness, thereby minimising the risk to fire officers and the community.

This plan has been developed to provide a holistic approach to wildfire operations that includes:

- Wildfire preparedness (infrastructure & resources)
- Proactive strategies (including pre-emptive activities to manage response to wildfires along with weight of initial attack process and activities in place). It is now QFRS policy where possible to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires while they are still in a containable situation. This approach is to remove the threat of wildfires escalating to a point beyond human control in conditions that are severe or are predicted to deteriorate.
- Coordinated wildfire response (permanent, auxiliary and volunteer staff)
- Coordinated wildfire operations at the:
 - Fire ground ;
 - Operations Point;
 - Incident Control Centres; and
 - Coordination Centres (Regional and State).

Regional Outcomes

- The ROCC and ICC's operating according to pre-determined stages, including the required:
 - Staffing
 - Infrastructure
- Meeting the requirements as described in the Operations Doctrine Manual.

Measures

- ROCC infrastructure in place and operational all year round
- Pre-determined ICC infrastructure in place and operational all year round
- Implementation of all aspects of this Wildfire Operational Plan in accordance with the criteria described in the wildfire alert levels.

3.0 LINKAGE TO STRATEGIC PLANS

This Wildfire Operational Plan contributes towards the requirements to achieve:

- Whole-of-Government Priorities
- Department of Emergency Services Corporate Plan 2008-2012
- QFRS Strategic Plan 2004-2008

QFRS Strategic Plan 2008-2012

- **QFRS Goal 2 – Emergency Response**
To provide effective and efficient operational service delivery
 - Strategies:
 - Strategy 2.1 Use appropriate resources and a flexible approach to service delivery that matches community needs
 - Strategy 2.2 Provide integrated service delivery that is responsive to the diversity of Queensland communities
 - Strategy 2.3 Provide operational best practice equipment, communications and technology to support service delivery

4.0 LINKAGE TO SIOPP- AREA REFERENCE MANUAL

- To complement activities undertaken at station, brigade and regional level under Functional Management the following business rules support this plan.

Operations Management

A1

- A 1.8 Participate in Regional Planning-Operations Management
- A 1.9 Ensure operational readiness

Operations Management

A2

- A 2.1 Monitor and report seasonal conditions for Bureau of Meteorology
- A 2.2 Manage education programs for Bushfire prepared communities.
- A2.3 Identify, Develop and maintain Local Area Plans of risks in your patch
- A2.6 Apply Operations Doctrine to manage response
- A2.7 Implement Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early

5.0 WILDFIRE OPERATIONAL PLAN


OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT	Wildfire Operational Plan	Preparedness and Response		
<p>General Description: This Plan provides for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wildfire preparedness (infrastructure & resources) • Proactive strategies (including pre-emptive activities to manage response to wildfires) • Coordinated wildfire response (permanent, auxiliary and volunteer staff) • Coordinated wildfire operations at the: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fire ground; ○ Incident Control / Operational Point ; ○ Incident Control Centres; and ○ Coordination Centres (Regional and State). <p>Outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ROCC and ICC's operating according to pre-determined stages, including the required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Staffing ○ Infrastructure • Meeting the requirements as described in the Operations Doctrine Manual. 				
<p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROCC infrastructure in place and operational • Pre-determined ICC infrastructure in place and operational • Implementation of all aspects of this Wildfire Operational Plan in accordance with the criteria described in the wildfire alert levels. 				
Activity and Measure	Target	Due Date	Action Officer	Comment
ROCC infrastructure in accordance with operational requirements to coordinate information and activities between ICC's and State Operations Coordination Centre	Toowoomba ROCC	1 August 2009	Manager Regional Training	Completed and tested
Pre-determined ICC infrastructure (as per ICC standards) in place and operational	6 pre-determined ICC's	1 August 2009	Area Directors Urban and Rural	Mobile ICC Kits completed and allocated
Wildfire Operational Plan managed in accordance with stated requirements (see Management of Plan) & associated alert levels (see Wildfire Alert Levels)		On-Going	Area Directors Urban and Rural	Utilise information from Mobilisation Plan and ROCC Activation Plan

5.1 Management of Plan

This Wildfire Operations Plan is for the 2009/2010 financial year. The "fire season" is expected to last from August to December however, the actual duration will depend upon prevailing weather conditions. The Area Directors Urban and Rural will provide advice to the Regional Assistant Commissioner on the progression and severity of the fire season.

Refer to the flow chart below and Section 7.5 (Wildfire Alert Level's Activation Table) for guidance on implementing this plan.

During the fire season, weekly planning meeting will be conducted at the ROCC for the purpose of updating information and group decisions on recommended alert levels.



5.2 Distribution

Name/Title	Position/Location
Tom Dawson	Assistant Commissioner Regional Office Toowoomba
Area Directors	All Functional Managers & Area Directors Urban and Rural, South Western Region
Fire Stations	Anzac Avenue, Kitchener Street and Warwick Fire Station
Rural Fire Brigades	All Rural, Village and Izone brigades and Groups
Wayne Waltisbuhl	Regional Manager Rural Operations Regional Office Toowoomba
Laurie Bill	Manager Strategic Development, Regional Office Toowoomba
ROCC Co-ordinator	Regional Coordinator Regional Fire Coordination Centre, Anzac Avenue
Firecom Manager	Firecom, Toowoomba
Incident Control Centres	Toowoomba, Crows Nest, Stanthorpe, Warwick, Tara and Millmerran
Director Operations	State Operations Coordination Centre
Director Rural Operations	Rural Operations Central Office Kedron
State Coordinator	State Operations Coordination Centre
Director	Organisational Performance Unit

6.0 INCIDENT CLASSIFICATIONS

There are three levels of incident classifications related to wildfires. These are:

Level 1

- Small to medium fires that will be contained by the initial attack resources. These are expected to be solely QFRS resources.
- Typically, these fires can be controlled within 12 hours.
- These will be managed by mobile control or an Incident Control Centre using local resources.

NB. A wildfire may exceed this time scale and still remain a Level 1 incident if located in inaccessible terrain and not threatening or damaging assets.

Weather characteristics associated with level 1 are:

- (a) Temperatures around 30°C
- (b) Humidity less than 30%
- (c) Dew point less than 15°C
- (d) Wind 20km/h or more NNW to SSW
- (e) Drought Index over 80

Level 2

- Fires that are medium to large may require extended attack and likely to involve multiple agencies.
- Assets that are at risk possibly including those assets with environmental cultural and heritage significance.
- Typically, these fires can be controlled within 12 to 24 hours.
- An Incident Control Centre should be implemented using local and regional resources.

Weather characteristics associated with level 2 are:

- (a) Temperatures in the mid 30°C's
- (b) Humidity is less than 20%
- (c) Dew point in single figures or in the minus
- (d) Wind 25 to 35km/h NW to SW
- (e) Drought Index is over 100

Level 3

- Large and complex fires that may take several days to control and suppress.
- Likely to occur at times of very high or extreme fire weather conditions, with a significant fire risk and potentially uncertain fire behaviour.
- Significant assets at risk with potentially high suppression costs. May also apply when significant environmental, cultural or heritage assets are at risk.
- This type of incident is where the State Incident Management Team (SIMT) could be deployed [supported by local and regional resources].

Weather characteristics associated with level 3 are:

- (a) Temperatures are usually in the mid to high 30°C's
- (b) Humidity is less than 10%
- (c) Dew point is below -5°C
- (d) Wind is often above 30km/h and is land based WNW
- (e) Drought Index is over 120

In these conditions all fuel becomes available. Usually, only defensive strategies should be employed. Back-burning or burning out areas should not occur, as containment would almost be impossible. Suppression is expected to be very difficult to achieve.

7.0 WILDFIRE ALERT LEVELS

Wildfire Alert Levels are based on the Fire Danger Ratings (FDR) from the Macarthur Forest Fire Danger Meter Mark 5. The ranging from Low to Extreme FDR's are the primary basis for developing and determining a level of pre-emptive response to wildfire management in the Region.

All current and forecasted weather are taken into account when determining the FDR as well as current fire activity.

RMRO, ADRO's and MSD will monitor the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) weather forecast and local Drought Indexes.

The MSD and RMRO will liaise daily during the fire season to **determine** the alert level the Region should activate.


Operating in conjunction with the Wildfire Alert Levels are pre-emptive regional activities in accordance with the table below.

Southwest Region WAL covers the whole Region. All resources will be at the same alert and preparedness level to meet the highest risk that the Region has to manage.

Part 1 - WILDFIRE ALERT LEVELS

There is an indirect correlation between the Fire Danger Rating Index (FDRI) and the Wildfire Alert Level (WAL). This allows Regions to apply local knowledge to local conditions, with available resources in determining the appropriate WAL and therefore activation.

The decision process for determining the WAL is a combination of:



The Regional Manager, Rural Operations (RMRO) to consult with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) before endorsing the WAL for the whole Region.

Part 2 - WILDFIRE ALERT LEVEL ACTIVATION TABLE

Wildfire Alert Level Activation Table for a Region									
ALERT LEVEL	WILDFIRE ACTIVATION ACTIVITIES - #								
	Staff and Agencies	Weight of Initial Attack *	Rural Region Reporting **	Resources Prepared	Community Warnings ***	Fire Permits +	ICC	ROCC	SOCC
4	Notify and activate relevant staff and agencies	Maximise initial response	RMRO Liaise with Region AC	Optimum resources staged where appropriate	Issue Community Warnings	Implement Fire Ban	Standby	Activated	Alert
3	Notify relevant staff and agencies	Increase initial response	RMRO Liaise with Region AC	Additional resources verified	Contact key stakeholders Consider Issuing General Community Advice & Warnings	Consider Local Fire Permits Restrictions	Alert	Alert/ Standby	Watching brief
2	Notify relevant staff	Normal response	Liaise Through RMRO	Additional resources identified	Provide general Community Safety information and advice	Ensure Adequate Fire Permit Conditions	Alert	Watching brief	Watching brief
1	NORMAL BUSINESS								

- # **These are the minimum activity requirements.** Regions may increase these activity categories (columns) based on local conditions (but may not increase or decrease the Alert Levels 1 to 4)
- * **Weight of initial attack:** Regions should consider additional appliances and air attack based on the risk and available resources.
- ** Rural reporting to the Region AC at WAL 3 and 4 because Level 2 or 3 incident (s) are expected to occur or have occurred.
- *** **Community Advice and Warnings:** Community advice and warnings should escalate with increasing WAL as described in the Regional Wildfire Readiness Plan
- + **Permit Restrictions and Fire Bans:** RMRO or designate to solely handle attaining Fire Ban approvals along with implementation of Fire Permit variations and instructions in a Region.

7.1 Wildfire Alert - Level 1

Characteristics of Level 1

Fire Danger Rating Index	+	Variables	=	Wildfire Alert Level
Temperatures <30oC Humidity > 40% Dew Point > 20oC Wind <15 kmh Drought Index < 80		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire activity • Fuel • Fire history (in the local area) • Seasonal developments • Local Knowledge • Potential community risk 		Level 1

Alert Level 1 is normal conditions and fire activity is normal for that time of year or conditions are such that there is no adverse threat of fire. Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team consult regularly to establish future forecasts.

7.2 Wildfire Alert - Level 2

Characteristics of Level 2

Fire Danger Rating Index	+	Variables	=	Wildfire Alert Level
Temperatures around 30o C Humidity less than 30% Dew Point less than 15oC Wind 20 klm/h Drought Index over 80		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire activity • Fuel • Fire history (in the local area) • Seasonal developments • Local Knowledge • Potential community risk 		Level 2

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team with consideration given to the number of active fires in the Region.

7.3 Wildfire Alert - Level 3

Characteristics of Level 3

Fire Danger Rating Index	+	Variables	=	Wildfire Alert Level
Temperatures in the mid 30o C Humidity less than 20% Dew Point in single figures or in the minus Wind 25 - 35klm/h Drought Index over 120		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire activity • Fuel • Fire history (in the local area) • Seasonal developments • Local Knowledge • Potential community risk 		Level 3

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team and consideration given to complexity and number of fires burning in the Region.

7.4 Wildfire Alert - Level 4

Characteristics of Level 4

Fire Danger Rating Index	+	Variables	=	Wildfire Alert Level
Temperatures in the mid 30o C Humidity less than 10% Dew Point less than -5oC Wind is often 30km/h Drought Index over 120		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire activity • Fuel • Fire history (in the local area) • Seasonal developments • Local Knowledge • Potential community risk 		Level 4

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team. This is the highest level of alert and consideration will include Fire-fighter safety and communities at risk.

7.5 COMMON ACTIVATION DEFINITIONS

To accommodate the wide variance of emergency situations and events the ICC, ROCC and SOCC common activation levels will be:

- Watching Brief
- Alert
- Standby
- Activation

Watching Brief

The Watching Brief involves monitoring the warnings about a potential incident that may require activation of all or part of a ROCC.

During the Watching Brief the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:

- Watch the developing situation/s during normal business hours and under normal operating conditions and,
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ROCC during normal business hours in Alert
- Keep the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: The Watching Brief **does not** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC

Alert

Alert involves ensuring the ICC, ROCC or SOCC is ready to be activated.

During Alert the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:

- Check, prepare and verify the ICC and ROCC can be activated (check that phone lines and faxes will work, emails will work, etc)
- ICC kits are checked for accessibility and completeness
- Watch the developing situation/s during all hours (either on site or off site) and,
- Identify ICC or ROCC staff who can attend the centre within 1 hour
- If not done so in your plans a coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ROCC during all hours in Standby
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ICC during normal business hours in Standby
- Keeps the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: Alert **does** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC during normal business hours only

Alert **does not** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC

Standby

Standby involves the initial opening the ICC, ROCC or SOCC so it is ready to be fully activated within 60 minutes.

During Standby the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:

- Open the ICC or ROCC (make sure that phone lines and faxes are working, emails are working, etc)
- Watch the developing situation/s during all hours and,
- Identify ICC or ROCC staff who can attend the centre within 1 hour
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ICC during all hours in Activation
- Keeps the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: Standby **does** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC during all hours

Standby **does** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC during normal business hours only

Activation

Activation involves expanding the operations and staffing of the ICC or ROCC to meet the current and projected situation.

Note: Activation **does** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC during all hours of its operation

Activation **does** require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC during all hours of its operation.

Scale Down


Scale Down will be advised when the ICC or ROCC is to begin demobilisation. The scale down of the ICC or ROCC may be staged by functional area at the discretion of the coordinator. Debriefing of the operational activities of the ICC, ROCC and SOCC will follow the final stand down.

Approval Process for Activation Levels

The approval process to move into a Watching Brief and then between activations is dependant on the situation. **If it is a Wildfire, then:**

- The RMRO*, for the Region consults with the AC before deciding on the WAL for the whole Region
- For the SOCC, it involves the approval by one of the following Senior Managers, Deputy Commissioner, QFRS, QAS or Deputy Executive Director, EMQ. The Deputy Commissioners or Deputy Executive Director will delegate a person to activate the SOCC.

7.6 Wildfire Activation Process



7.7 Fire Behaviour

Fire behaviour is influenced by a number of factors:

- Fuel – type, arrangement and quantity.
- Topography, Slope and Aspect – flat, undulating, hilly, north and west, south and east.
- Weather conditions – temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, atmospheric stability and diurnal effects.
- Drought factor and seasonal effects, such as prolonged drought and soil moisture profile.
- Fuel moisture content

Strategies employed will depend on consideration of these factors during the course of the incident.

All of the inputs are variable throughout the day and therefore must be continually monitored during an incident. A sudden drop in humidity can rapidly change the Fire Danger Index and rating and give erratic fire behaviour. Changes in temperature have little or no effect on fire behaviour.

The key elements in the weather to monitor are sudden drops in Relative Humidity and an increase in wind strength. These 2 factors will have an effect on fire behaviour.

The Dew Point should also be observed when planning for night time burning out operations.

7.8 Weight of Initial Attack

Under certain conditions small incidents or incidents of low community impact may develop into devastating fires. Therefore it is critical in times of high fire danger to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires whilst in a containable situation.

It is now QFRS policy where possible to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires whilst in a containable situation. This approach is to remove the threat of wildfires escalating to a point beyond human control in conditions that are severe or are predicted to deteriorate.

The policy of the QFRS response during times of high fire danger (eg Wildfire Alert level 3 and 4) is to attack bushfires:

- Hard,
- Heavy, and
- Fast

Air Operations are recommended to be called in as an initial response along with a heavier number of appliances to all bushfires to quickly extinguish the fire before it has a chance to escalate. This policy would involve FireCom automatically calling in an extra appliance or two to an initial bushfire incident and air support if available. Activation of Aircraft must be in accordance with Operations Doctrine (Aircraft operations activation INCDIR 1.1)

As with all incident response, the use of RECEO, PACT and LCES will continuously identify hazards, assess the risk, prioritise objectives and apply tactics to control and resolve the incident.

From the initial response, the Incident Management System (IMS) should expand to maintain control and coordination of resources, identifying and achieving objectives.

The rapid suppression of wildfire incidents may have immediate benefits but there must be the realisation that as fires are suppressed quickly before spreading, the unaffected areas will show an increase in fuel loading. Therefore any strategy of swift and overwhelming action must be supported by land management techniques to reduce the cumulative effect of unburnt fuel loads across a region.

8.0 Wildfire Alert Level's Activation Table

	Alert level 1 activities	Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)	Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)	Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)
Brigades	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All equipment checked and appliances in a complete state of readiness Consider ceasing hazard reduction burning Contact with Fire Wardens to discuss local conditions Brigade area familiarisation and awareness of local area conditions Assessment of water points (dams, creeks, pools etc) Update risk assessment of known hazards Ensure adequate supply of PPE and drinking water in store 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct Brigade area inspections and patrols Develop availability lists Develop team roster Be prepared to back up urban crews Be aware, two Brigade response now active Recommendation of 2 Brigade response to all wildfires Strike Teams on Standby 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All members be prepared and advise First Officer of unavailability Fire-fighters to keep hydrated Where possible, have a crew on standby Strike Team Activated where required
Stations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All wildfire equipment checked and appliances in a complete state of readiness All staff to keep hydrated Ensure adequate supply of PPE and drinking water in store and on appliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desist from issuing new permits and cancel all existing permits Where possible, take early lunch break Strike Team on Standby/Activation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Re-schedule all non-essential activities All crews to keep hydrated
Group Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contact with brigades and develop Strike Team format Review of Regional Plan at Group Meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activate Strike Teams at Stage 1 or 2, as directed Keep daily contact with Area Director Rural Operations Group command vehicle to respond to incidents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily contact with Duty Officer or Inspector Strike Teams activated at Stage 2

	Alert level 1 activities	Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)	Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)	Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)
Rural Area Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor Drought Index throughout Area Undertake weekly curing rate assessment Undertake weekly contact with other Agencies Monitor weather patterns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure appropriate staff proceed to ROCC if required. Re-schedule all non-essential activities Frequent monitoring throughout the day of BOM site Contact with fire wardens re: Permit cancellation or local restrictions Deploy staff as required throughout Area Consider contact with all permit holders who contact Firecom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Area Director Rural Operations to ICC as per plan Re-schedule all non-essential activities Operational staff to be stationed throughout Area Administration staff to assist with recording of resource movements across Area Obtain extra Administration staff Re-schedule all training activities Cancel all Fire Permits Daily contact with QPWS and DPI Recommend fire bans
Area Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure all ICC's in zone are resourced Ensure adequate supply of PPE, drinking water and Class "A" foam concentrate in store at Area Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure ICC's in zone are fully operational at Stage 1 alert Consider re-scheduling all non-essential duties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure nominated ICC's in zone are operational in accordance with Stage 1 or Stage 2 activation Re-schedule all non-essential duties
Regional Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise all non-operational staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider re-scheduling all Regional training Community Safety and Regional Training staff on standby (but to continue functional roles) Notify EMQ Area Director of fire weather 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Re-schedule all Regional training activities and building inspections Ensure ROCC is staffed and replacement roster completed
Manager Regional Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure ROCC is in a state of readiness and activated at Stage 1 Notify Duty Officer at State Operations Coordination Centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROCC is activated at Stage 1 or Stage 2 and replacement roster completed if required Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC's Notify Workshops/technicians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activate ROCC at Stage 3 Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC's

	Alert level 1 activities	Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)	Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)	Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 & 3 activities)
Regional Manager Rural Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Duties and monitoring weather and any active fires Liaise with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO's of adjoining Regions Group SMS to all Operational staff Ensure Regional Air Ops plans are in place Co-ordinate Air ops roster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discuss weather forecasts a.m. and p.m. with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO. Contact ROCC as required Monitor any active fires Advise DDMG's and LDMG's Audit all level 2 and 3 IMT's Liaise with State Air Desk Ensure remote air base is in readiness for activation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participate in Teleconferences Implement fire bans Re-schedule all non-essential tasks Ensure a roster for Air Attack supervisors is in place Review community warning alerts and adjust accordingly
Manager Strategic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Duties and monitoring weather and any active fires Liaise with Assistant Commissioner Discuss weather forecasts a.m. and p.m. with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO relative to forthcoming fire conditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In consultation with AC ensure ROCC is activated and that Ministerial documentation is readied. Mobilise to incident with Minister if required. Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC's and ROCC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor any active fires and prepare Ministerial documentation Participate in Teleconferences
Assistant Commissioner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise QAS, EMQ & QPS Mobilise to incident with Minister if required. Advise Media Unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise QAS, EMQ, QPS Mobilise to incident with Minister if required. Advise Media Unit
Firecom - Weight of Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normal Business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances & air support as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances & air support as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident
Air Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fire Spotter Recon as required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily Recon Morning & Evening Air Attach as required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily Recon Morning & Evening Air Attach as required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily Recon Morning & Evening Air Attach as required

9.0 ACTIVATION DESCRIPTORS

To assist with the implementation of this Plan, the following descriptors provide guidance to fire officers.

9.1 Strike Teams

The following are considered the minimum numbers available. The Regional Coordinator in the Regional Fire Coordination Centre will assemble additional Strike Teams as required to manage the number and scale of wildfire incidents.

9.1.1 Rural Strike Teams

- Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
Assembly point – Fire Station
- Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
Assembly point – Fire Station
- Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
Assembly point –

9.1.2 Urban Strike Teams

Strike Teams are assembled at these identified areas within South West Region: Area One Strike Team will be assembled at Kitchener Street Fire Station and deployed as required.

Area Two Strike Teams are assembled at Warwick Fire Station and deployed as required.

Area Three Strike Teams will be assembled at Dalby Fire Station and deployed as required.

Note when strike teams are deployed within the Region strike team members can expect to work 10 – 12 hour shifts and all team members should be prepared for 72 hour deployment. Once the appliances have been deployed to an Incident, change over

Staff may be transported by bus to the Incident.

Stage 1 Activation

- Urban Strike Teams - Team Leader and crews notified by Regional Coordinator and placed on standby
- Rural Strike Teams - Team Leader and crews notified by Area Director Rural Operations and placed on standby/alert

Stage 2 Activation

- Strike Teams mobilised as required and placed on standby at designated locations.
- For Rural Strike Teams, it will be in accordance with 9.1.1, above.

- For Urban Strike Teams, it will be at Anzac Ave, Goondiwindi, Dalby or Warwick Fire Stations. This will be determined by the Assistant Commissioner and the Regional Coordinator depending upon the destination of the Strike Team.

9.2 Incident Control Centres

South Western Region has 6 Incident Control Centres (ICC's) capable of managing Level 3 wildfire incidents. These are located at Highfields, Crows Nest, Warwick, Stanthorpe, Millmerran and Tara (Refer Sections 10.0 and 11.0). Supporting these Centres are numerous Incident Control Centres capable of managing Level 2 wildfire incidents. Level 1 wildfire incidents will be managed from mobile resources.

There are two stages of activation for the 6 pre-determined ICC's, being Stage 1 and Stage 2. Activation is by the Team Leaders, after advice received from the Regional Coordinator and Area Director Rural Operations (based on weather conditions and fire activity),

Stage 1 Activation

Team Leaders ensure that their ICC's are fully resourced with equipment and staff identified to assume functional roles in an Incident Management Team. Refer to the Table in Section 7.5 for instances when this occurs.

Stage 2 Activation

The pre-determined ICC's are operational with staff and volunteers. This level of response can be for going fires or as a pre-emptive action due to Wildfire Alert Levels 2 or 3 being determined as required to be activated. Each of these levels of activation may be at either high or low levels. Refer to the Table in Section 7.5.

9.2.1 Activation of pre-determined Incident Control Centres

A pre-determined ICC will be activated:

- When two or more Incident Control Centres (fixed or mobile) are operating in a zone covered by a pre-determined ICC.
- When an incident escalates to Level 2 or Level 3.
- At the direction of the Assistant Commissioner, Area Directors or the Regional Fire Coordination Centre.

9.3 Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC)

9.3.1 Activation of ROCC

There are three stages of activation for Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC), being Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3. Activation is by the Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations and is in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria.

Stage 1

The Regional Coordinator, Planning Officer and RMRO are liaising and monitoring weather conditions and wildfire activity in the Region. This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.5. This does not necessarily require the ROCC room to be opened.

Stage 2

The ROCC is activated with 4 staff assigned to monitor and support incidents or in preparation of fire outbreaks due to predicted fire weather. The staff should consist of:

- Manager Regional Training
- Manager Strategic Development
- Planning Officer
- Admin Officer

This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.5.

Stage 3

The ROCC is fully operational with a minimum of 4 staff, all with specified roles. Refer Section 12.5 for details on the management of the ROCC.

This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.6.

Regional Manager Rural Operations to have All Air Observers in Southwest Region on standby


10.0 REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

To provide the appropriate levels of command, control and coordination of wildfires, the following infrastructure has been developed:

- Pre-determined Incident Control Centres (ICC's), located at:
 - Highfields Fire Station
 - Crows Nest (Council Office)
 - Warwick Fire Station
 - Stanthorpe Fire Station
 - Millmerran (Council Office)
 - Tara (Council Office)
- Regional Operations Coordination Centre, located at Regional Training Anzac Avenue

10.1 Overview

The following is an overview of the regional infrastructure.



11.0 PRE-DETERMINED INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRES

It is expected that wildfire activity will commence at the lower, or Level 1, stage of incident progression. Statistics indicate that approximately 96% of wildfires will not progress beyond this level of activity.

However, depending upon the weather conditions, fuel load and curing rate, approximately 3% will progress to Level 2 stage. In this stage, the appropriate Incident Control Centre should be activated to manage the incident.

Further, approximately 1% of wildfires will progress to the Level 3 stage. In the event of this occurring, the Incident Control Centre will either be discontinued or revert to a Divisional Command and control will be transferred to one of the pre-determined ICC's capable of managing a Level 2/3 incident.

11.1 Geographical areas managed by pre-determined ICC's

When one of the 6 ICC's is established, it will manage all wildfire activity in the local authority's area in which it is located. Responsibility for managing wildfires in specific geographical areas is the relevant Command Area Director and/or Area Director Rural Operations. Coordination of urban and rural resources will be used to protect life, property and the environment, regardless of whether the wildfire is in an urban or rural area.

11.1.1 Toowoomba ICC (Highfields Station)

The Toowoomba ICC will manage Level 2 and 3 wildfires throughout Area One Toowoomba, including the localities of:

- Toowoomba Area
- The Area identified as the Escarpment Area
- Crows Nest area
- Cambooya area
- Rosalie area

Team Leader

- Area Director, Area 1 Toowoomba

Staging

- Highfields Fire Station.

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Highfields ICC IMT	VHF repeater	Fireground UHF	UHF SES (portable repeater)	ICC Contact Numbers
Fireground to ICC	69 67 71	Talk around and 1/3	11, 12	
Incident Controller				
Operations				
Planning				
Logistics				
ICC Fax				

Email: iccsouthwesttoow@emergency.qld.gov.au

User name: iccsouthwesttoow

Password: iccsouthwesttoow

QFRS Rural Brigades	Fire Ground VHF	Contact
Cabarlah	12	
Peachy Groomesville	19	
Wagners Flat	19	
Crows Nest	17	
Goombungee	20	
Gowrie Little Plain	15	
Cambooya	20	
Anduramba	15	
Cooyar Town	16	
Cooyar District	13	
Southbrook Linthorpe	13	
West Pittsworth	15	
Irongate Rossvale	18	
Gowrie Mountain & Wagners Flat	19	
Peranga	12	
Hampton	13	
Ravensbourne	13	
Pinelands	14	
Gomaren	16	
Haden & District	18 see above	
Maclagen	19	
Mount Binga	20	
Emu Creek	21	

QFRS Urban Brigades	Fire ground UHF	Voting
Kitchener Street Station	CH 1/3	82 (46 & 61)
Anzac Avenue Station	CH 1/3	82 (46 & 61)
Pittsworth Station	CH 1/3	
Oakey Station	CH 1/3	

Goombungee Station	CH 1/3	
Crows Nest Station	CH 1/3	
Highfields Station	CH 1/3	

Other Agencies	Radio Channel	Contacts
QPWS	Ch 111 vhf	
Toowoomba Office		
DPI Forestry Pechey	(100 ch/1000ch) VHF 85/123 114	
Yarraman	VHF 86/125	
SES (SES Ch's 11&12) Repeaters	UHF 194/ 195	
Toowoomba	UHF 2(5,1,3) 202	
Pittsworth	UHF 5 (1,3) 205	
Crows Nest	UHF 4 (5) 204	
Cambooya	UHF 1(2,3) 201	
Rosalie	UHF 5 (2,4) 205	
CrowsNest Council service centre	VHF 90	
Cambooya Council service centre	VHF 93	
Police		
QPS Comms Toowoomba	Ch 34 (Repeater)	

UHF repeaters – Mt Kynock 46
 Picnic Point 61
 Bald Hill 60

VHF repeaters – Anduramba (Local Repeater 71)
 Picnic Point (Local Repeater 69)
 Pittsworth (local Repeater 67)
 Perseverance (Local Repeater 35)

11.1.2 Warwick ICC (Warwick Training Room and Area Office)

Warwick ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout Warwick Shire, including the localities of:

- Allora;
- Clifton;
- Killarney;
- Inglewood (minimal Fire ground use Forestry VHF 115)
- Warwick.

Warwick ICC IMT	VHF	Fireground UHF	UHF SES (portable)	ICC Contact Numbers
Fireground to ICC	66,61,67,65	1/3	11, 12	Sat Phone (CUG)
Incident Controller				
Operations				
Planning				
Logistics				
ICC Fax				

NB Last 4 digits of phone number is code for displan line activation

Email: [REDACTED]
 User name: [REDACTED]
 Password: [REDACTED]

Team Leader

- Area Director, Warwick and nominated Station Officer, plus Regional Support.

Staging

- Can be facilitated at Warwick Fire Station or local Council facility.

QFRS Urban Brigades	VHF (local repeater)	Fireground UHF	UHF	Channel 83 - Voting
Allora	66 / 61	1/3/5 42, 44 talk around	83	42, 44
Clifton	66 /61	1/3/5	82,83	46, 61 and 42, 44
Killarney	66 /65	1/3/5 42, 44 talk around	83	42, 44
Inglewood	61	1/3 54 talk around	54	NA
Warwick	66	1/3 42, 43, 44 talk around	83	42, 43, 44

UHF Repeater sites: Bacons Hill (42), Passchendale (43) Bony Mountain (44), Bracker Forest (54)

VHF Repeater site: Braeside Ch 66, Pittsworth 67, Karara 61, Killarney 65

QFRS Rural Brigades	Firecom	UHF CB	Fireground VHF	Contacts
Massie	44	7	12	John Davis [REDACTED] Tom Willet Mob [REDACTED]
Allora	44	7, 20	18	Don Burge [REDACTED] Len Chandler [REDACTED]
Freestone & District	44	5, 7	21	Alan Payne [REDACTED] Rod Austin [REDACTED]
Leslie			16	Tim Johnson [REDACTED] E Benz [REDACTED]
Pratten Bony Mountain	44	20	11	Jeff Clegg H [REDACTED] Mob [REDACTED] Mark Paroz [REDACTED]
Karara Leyburn	44	9, 20	15	Michael Welsh [REDACTED]
Leyburn Town	44		19	Stephen Evans [REDACTED] Robert Blackett [REDACTED]
Greymare	44	20	17	Don Marshall [REDACTED]

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				Mal Marshall [REDACTED]
The Glen	44		19	Mark Saunders [REDACTED]
Wildash	44		13	John Mayer [REDACTED] Peter Keogh [REDACTED]
Swan & Emu Creek	44		15	Graham Hoffman [REDACTED] Robert Bradford [REDACTED]
Killarney District	44	11	17	Bruce Gustafson [REDACTED] Rod Peterson [REDACTED]
Dalveen	44		18	Jim Mitchell [REDACTED] Nigal Shatte [REDACTED]
Gladfield Maryvale	44	7, 14	19	Mal Stacey [REDACTED]
Warwick Group/Support	44	20, 10	66, 19	Alan Payne [REDACTED] Mal Stacey [REDACTED] Michael Welsh [REDACTED]

Other Agencies	Radio Ch (100/1000)	Contacts
Forestry Passchendale	VHF 75/111	Howard Ward [REDACTED]
Inglewood	VHF 79/115	Mark Wren [REDACTED]
QPWS	VHF 118,119,120	Martin Ambrose [REDACTED]
SES Warwick	SES UHF 1, 11, 12 Firecom UHF 94=SES 11 95=SES 12 201= SES 1	[REDACTED] John Newly [REDACTED]
Southern Downs Council Warwick Council service centre	VHF 92 (QRFS INC CH. 98/92)	[REDACTED] Peter See- Dir. Eng. Services [REDACTED] Brian Weeks - Tech. Officer [REDACTED]

Clifton Council service centre	VHF	[REDACTED] John keen [REDACTED] Ron Gurney (2IC) [REDACTED]
Goondiwindi Regional Council Inglewood service centre	VHF	Ian Badham – Branch Manager [REDACTED] Peter Crisp – Dist Engineer [REDACTED]
QAS Warwick	VHF 52	[REDACTED] Geoff Dunning [REDACTED]
Police Warwick	UHF 90 (190)	[REDACTED] District Inspector [REDACTED]

11.1.3 Stanthorpe ICC (Stanthorpe Fire Station)

The Stanthorpe ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout the Stanthorpe Shire, including the localities of:

- Stanthorpe;
- Happy Valley;
- Sugarloaf;
- Wallangara; and
- Ballendean.

Stanthorpe ICC IMT	VHF (Mt Dillion and Christies Target, local repeaters)	Fireground UHF	UHF SES (portable repeater)	ICC Contact Numbers
Fireground to ICC	58, 59, 63	Talk around and 1/3	11, 12	Sat Phone (CUG)
Incident Controller				[REDACTED] and IC normal phone
Operations				[REDACTED]
Planning				[REDACTED]
Logistics				[REDACTED]
ICC Fax				[REDACTED]

Email [REDACTED]
 User name: [REDACTED]
 Password: [REDACTED]

UHF Repeaters: Mt McKenzie (40), Mt Marley (41), Passchendale (43)
 VHF Repeaters: Christies Target 58, Mt Dillon 59, Amiens 63

Team Leader

- Area Director Warwick and nominated Station Officer plus Regional Support.

Staging Area

At the rear car park of Stanthorpe Fire Station and Council depot or shopping centre car park if required.

QFRS Rural Brigades	Fireground VHF	Contact
North Granite Belt	21	Michael Caitlin [REDACTED]
Drumsleed	13	Gordon Smith [REDACTED]
Applethorpe	14	Scott Rogers [REDACTED]
Broadwater-Amiens	17	Howard Sweet [REDACTED]
Mallow	20	Edward Boyce [REDACTED]
Sugarloaf	16	Peter Neville [REDACTED]
Thorndale Glen Applin	12	David (Ian) Townsend [REDACTED]
Severnlea West	11	Tony Scuderi [REDACTED]
Glenlyon	15	William (John) Pratt [REDACTED]
Severnlea East and Mt Tully	11	Michael Boucher [REDACTED]
Eukey	19	Robert Pugno [REDACTED]
Ballandean	13	Allan Taylor [REDACTED]
Wyberba	18	Greg Saxby [REDACTED]

QFRS Urban Brigades	Fireground UHF	UHF	Voting
Stanthorpe	1/3	41, 43	NA
Wallangarra	1/3	40	NA

Other Agencies	Radio Ch	Contacts
Forestry Passchendale	VHF111	Howard Ward [REDACTED] Mob [REDACTED]
QPWS Girraween	VHF 111, 113 UHF 12	[REDACTED] John Cowburn [REDACTED] Jolene McLellan [REDACTED]
SES Stanthorpe	UHF 10 (210)	[REDACTED]

Southern Downs Regional Council Stanthorpe	91	██████████ day time After hours contact ██████████
QAS Stanthorpe	VHF 43 VHF 49 (Passchendale)	██████████ Bill Martin (OIC)
Police Stanthorpe	UHF 90 (190)	██████████ Darryl Coleman (OIC)

11.1.4 Millmerran ICC

Millmerran ICC will manage Level 2/ 3 wildfires throughout the Shire of Millmerran in the localities of:

- Scrubby Creek
- Burnt Brigalow
- Captains Mountain
- Yandilla
- Forest Pines
- East Millmerran
- North Millmerran
- Bringalilly & Weir River
- Leyburn Town
- Pampas
- South Millmerran

Team Leader

Area Director Goondiwindi and Auxiliary Captain and Rural Operations Toowoomba Area Office.

Staging Area

Millmerran Fire Station

Rural Brigades	Fireground VHF	Contact
Scrubby Creek	11	Dennis Dwyer ██████████
Burnt Brigalow	12	David Anderson ██████████
Captains Mountain	13	Paul Antonio ██████████
Yandilla	14	Marcus Salomon ██████████
Forest Pines	15	David Downing ██████████
East Millmerran	16	Lindsay Simmons

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North Millmerran	17	Keith Lindenmayer
Bringalilly	18	John (Graham) Chandler
Weir River	18	Peter Markham
Leyburn Town	19	Stephen Evans
Pampas	20	Michael Hegarty
South Millmerran	21	Philip Thornton

Urban	Fireground UHF	UHF
Millmerran	1/3	62

Other Agencies	Radio Ch (100/1000)	Contacts
Natural Resources & Minerals Previously DPI	80/118	Wayne Kapernick
Western Creek (Repeater)	80/118	
	82/115 – 119 (RTA)	
Karara (Repeater)	76/112	
	78/110 – 113 (RTA)	
Police	UHF 90 (190)	SA Ryan
QPWS		Martin Ambrose
Millmerran Service Centre Council		
Overseer	WL Johnson	
SES Local Controller	WL Johnson	

QAS	Ian Thompson	
Millmerran Hospital	P Le Griffon	
Disaster Management Officer	R Cox	
Millmerran & Dist Community Support Services	G D Fogarty	

UHF repeaters: Mt Domville 62

VHF repeaters: Captains Mtn 57

Email: [Redacted]

User name: [Redacted]

Password: [Redacted]

Millmerran ICC IMT	VHF	Fireground UHF	UHF SES (portable repeater)	ICC Contact Numbers
Fireground to ICC	118	Talk around and 1/3	11, 12	Sat Phone (CUG)
Incident Controller				
Operations				
Planning				
Logistics				
ICC Fax				
Spare No's				
Line 4				

**NB. LAST 4 DIGITS OF PHONE NUMBER ARE DISPLAN CODE NUMBERS TO
ACTIVATE PHONE**

AIRSTRIPS \ WATER SUPPLIES \ STAGING AREAS \ SAFEHAVENS

SITE	TYPE	ADDRESS	GPS COORDINATES
Millmerran Airport	Airstrip	Cecil Plains Road	S27.86362 E151.27574
SSAA Phil Commens [REDACTED]	Airstrip & Staging Area	Moffat Road Rural No. 10125	S27.98541 E151.09818
Repeater Site		Blackwell Road Rural No. 113	S27.92934 E151.18318
Water Supply 1	Dam Heliattack	Blackwell Road Rural No. 113	S27.98652 E151.09335
Water Supply 2	Dam Heliattack	Blackwell Road Rural No. 113	S27.98768 E151.08023
Water Supply 3 Harry Dislers [REDACTED]	Dam Heliattack	Kimberley Fields Drive, Lot 33	S27.97187 E151.03027
	Alternate supply Safehaven		S27.97358 E151.02925
Water Supply 4 Mr Dawson [REDACTED]	Dam Heliattack	Lot 16 Rd No. 257, Rosella Avenue, Forest Pines	S27.97692 E150.95700
Water Supply 5	Bore & tanks	Poola Macca Drive, Scrubby Creek	S27.98496 E151.06721
Water Supply 6	Bore & tanks	Cnr Thyme Rd & Basil Dr, Forest Pines	S27.96258 E151.01520
Scrubby Creek Community Hall	Staging Area	Cnr Primrose Dr & Camellia Crt, Scrubby Creek	S27.97834 E151.05652
Forest Pines Rural Brigade	Staging Area	Cnr Gore Hwy & Rosella Av, Forest Pines	S27.97970 E150.98116

11.1.5 CROWSNEST ICC

Crowsnest ICC will manage Level 2/ 3 wildfires throughout the localities of Crowsnest, parts of Rosalie in the localities of:

- Northern part of Toowoomba escarpment
- Hampton
- Ravensborne
- Cooyar
- Mt Binga
- Emu Creek

Team Leader

Area Director Rural Operations supported by the Crowsnest Rural Fire Brigade Group Officer

Staging Area

Crowsnest Showgrounds

QFRS Rural Brigades	Fire Ground VHF	Contact
Cabarlah	12	
Peachy Groomesville	19	
Wagners Flat	19	
Crows Nest	17	
Goombungee	20	
Anduramba	15	
Cooyar Town	16	
Cooyar District	13	
Irongate Rossvale	18	
Gowrie Mountain & Wagners Flat	19	
Peranga	12	
Hampton	13	
Ravensbourne	13	
Pinelands	14	
Gomaren	16	
Haden & District	18 see above	
Maclagen	19	
Mount Binga	20	

QFRS Urban Brigades	Fire ground UHF	Voting
Goombungee Station	CH 1/3	Ch 60
Crows Nest Station	CH 1/3	Ch 60
Highfields Station	CH 1/3	V82

Crowsnest Rural Fire Brigade Timber Road Crowsnest Ph 4698 1133

Other Agencies	Radio Ch (100/1000)	Contacts
Forestry Pechey	Ch123 vhf	Office [redacted] RIC mob [redacted] David Adam [redacted] Greg Stuckey [redacted]
Police		[redacted]
Crowsnest Council	VHF 90	[redacted]
SES	UHF 204	Les King [redacted]

UHF repeaters: Picnic Point Ch 61, Mt Kynock Ch 46, Bald Hill Ch 60,
Perserverance Ch 26

VHF repeaters: Mt Perserverance Ch 35, Anduranba Ch 71, Picnic Point Ch 69

Crowsnest Incident Control Centre
Toowoomba Council Building
Crowsnest

Crowsnest ICC IMT	VHF	Fireground UHF	UHF SES (portable repeater)	ICC Contact Numbers
Fireground to ICC	Ch35/71	Talk around and 1/3	11, 12	[redacted]
Incident Controller				[redacted]
Operations				[redacted]
Planning				[redacted]
Logistics				[redacted]
ICC Fax				[redacted]
Data lines Ops				[redacted]
Data lines Logs				[redacted]
Data line IC				[redacted]

Council chambers layout

The training room **Operations and Planning**
The Chambers **Logistics**
The meeting Room **Incident Controller**

Building entry key Janelle Schmaling
IT/Comms assistance Michael Swindells
 Brent Moore



Email: [redacted]

11.1.6 TARA ICC

Tara ICC will manage Level 2/ 3 wildfires throughout most parts of the Dalby Regional Council.

A backup location to set up an ICC is at the Council Chambers in Tara. Contacts for the use of this building.

Doug Bogoure Office [REDACTED]
 Mob [REDACTED]
 Home [REDACTED]

Team Leader

- Area Director Dalby, and Area Director Rural Operations Toowoomba and support staff

Staging Area

- Tara Showgrounds

QFRS Rural Brigades	Fireground VHF	Contact
Bennett's School Road	13	[REDACTED]
Wieambilla South	17	[REDACTED]
Weranga Goramba	15	[REDACTED]
Tolmah	16	[REDACTED]
Kogan Condamine	18	[REDACTED]
Condamine	19	[REDACTED]

QFRS Urban Brigades	Fireground UHF	Voting
Tara	1/3	

Other Agencies	Radio Ch (100/1000)	Contacts
Forestry		Mark Wren [REDACTED]
DPI Inglewood	77/115	
DPI Merinda	78/116	
DPI Karara	76/112	
DPI Western Creek	80/118	
DPI Kumbarilla	81/119	
DPI Bunya Mountains	83/120	
Forestry Talk Around (RTA)	78/110 – 113 (RTA) 82/ 115 – 119 (RTA) 84/ 120 – 121 (RTA)	
SES	87/122-127 RTA	[REDACTED]
Tara Shire Council		[REDACTED]
Police	UHF 90 (190)	[REDACTED]

UHF Repeaters: Nil in area closest Mt Kiangarow 50

Bennett RFB Tara shed Chinchilla 51
 Miles 52
 Dalby 48 (NIS)

VHF Repeaters: Bennett RFB Shed Tara 27. Bunya Mtns 73

Email: [REDACTED]

12.0 REGIONAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTRE

The Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC) forms an integral part of wildfire management in South Western Region. The ROCC can assist Incident Controllers to meet incident management resourcing issues, and to assist regional requirements to report the current status of all incidents to the State Operational Coordination Centre (SOCC). These functions directly assist in managing demands placed on individual Incident Controllers by the complexity of the incidents being managed.

12.1 Purpose of Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC)

The purpose of the ROCC is to:

- Provide strategic direction and operational support to IMT's operating within South West Region; and
- Receive and supply relevant information from/to the SOCC) and Assistant Commissioner (see flowchart in Section 12.6 and refer to Operations Doctrine).

12.2 Location of ROCC and resources

The Regional Operations Coordination Centre is located at:
Regional Training
201 Anzac Avenue


Coordinator

(Teleconferencing Facility)

This location also provides access to computers linked to Firecom Brisbane, Firecom Southeast, Firecom North coast and Firecom South West to enable the ROCC team to monitor all available resources.

Also available are desktop computers, scanner, maps of South West Region, Regional LSOPS, VHF and UHF radio capability all forms manual and electronic and stationery.

12.3 ROCC Team



12.4 Staffing of ROCC

The following teams will be used when Stage 3 activation of the ROCC occurs.

Role	Team 1
Regional Coordinator	Manager Strategic Development
Media	Community Liaison Officer
Ministerial Liaison	
Other Agency Liaison	
Planning Coordinator*	Planning Officer
Management Support	
Administration	Admin Officer Regional Training
Incident Data Entry	
GIS	
Resources	
Information	
Operations/Liaison Coordinator	Area Director Toowoomba- Area 1
SOCC Liaison	
FireCom Liaison	
ICC Liaison	
ICC Liaison	
ICC Liaison	
Logistics Coordinator	Regional Admin support As required
IT/Comms Support	Manager Regional Communications
Finance	
Supplies/Resources	
Catering	

Regional Manager Rural Operations (RMRO) to audit and mentor IMT's and report to the Regional Co-ordinator at the ROCC on future requirements of resourcing for incidents and operational effectiveness.

12.5 Roles & Responsibilities of ROCC Team Members

Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC. NOTE – the Optimum, Standard and Basic examples provided in Operational Guide # 3 to allow for different resources available in each Region and to allow the ROCC to grow and contract depending on the level of incidents occurring.

12.5.1 Regional Coordinator

The Regional Coordinator reports directly to the Assistant Commissioner QFRS.

The functional duties of the Regional Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC.

12.5.2 Regional Planning Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Planning Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the RFCC

- **Administrative Support (reports to Planning Coordinator)**

The functional duties of the Administrative Support include the following tasks:

Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC

12.5.3 Regional Operations/Liaison Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Operations/Liaison Coordinator include the following tasks:

Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the RFCC

12.5.4 Regional Logistics Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Logistics Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide # 3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC

<p>NOTE – these are the suggested minimum positions in the ROCC as shown in the basic example in Operational Guide # 3. Please feel free to add more positions as may be required for your Region but only as per those outlined in Operational Guide # 3.</p>
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
12.5.5 Communications Officer

12.5.6 Data Support Officer

12.5.7 Agency Liaison Officer

12.5.8 Finance Officer

12.6 Reporting & Communications Structures



12.7 De-Commissioning of ROCC

- (a) The Assistant Commissioner is to be advised that ROCC is closing down
- (b) Make an entry on the general log that ROCC is being deactivated
- (c) Make up Room and return all equipment to storage areas.
- (d) Print out required data from the electronic white board. Print and put with hard copy of general log attached.
- (e) Hard copy documentation sent to RHQ for archiving and future reference
- (f) Clean off any unnecessary details from white board and table top
- (g) Return all keys to Regional Training
- (h) Clean up room and return condiments to storage cupboard.
- (i) Restock regional PPE supplies as required

12.8 Preparedness and Maintenance of ROCC

In order to ensure the ROCC is in an operational mode at all times, it is essential that the ROCC is checked on a regular basis and the process of checking is recorded.

This will be completed once every three months (or more often in times of adverse weather conditions).

The Manager Regional Training, in conjunction with the Planning Officer will manage these duties

The purpose of this preparedness and maintenance procedure is to:

- (a) Test the functionality of all equipment; and
- (b) Provide a competency maintenance program for all personnel who may be deployed to the ROCC
- (c) To periodically test the procedures in this document, including those that are outlined in the Regional Operations Coordination Centre Activation Plan.

These directives ensure the Assistant Commissioner's priorities of maintaining an efficient and effective operational response capacity is in place and managed.

13 Regional Teams

13.1 Incident Management

The following positions have been identified as pre-planned Incident Management Teams

Team 1

Area Director Rural Operations Toowoomba
Manager Community Safety
Area Director Dalby
Area Training and Support Officer Rural Operations Toowoomba
Area Director Warwick
Admin Officer
Local Rural Fire Brigade rep
Other agencies as required

Team 2

Area Director Rural Operations Roma
Area Director Goondiwindi
Regional Training Officer
Izone Officer
Area Director Roma
Admin Officer
Local Rural Fire Brigade rep
Other agencies reps as required

Support Staff to Team 1 and 2

Manager Regional Training
Area Director Charleville
Brigade Training and Support Officer Rural Operations Toowoomba x 2
Safety assessment Officer x 2
Regional Training officers x 2
Building assessment officer x 2

14 Air Operations.

14.1

The Southwest Region Air operations is managed and co-ordinated by the Regional Manager Rural Operations (RMRO).

All requests for air operations must follow the correct procedure - Incident Directive 1.3

The RMRO will take pre-emptive actions during the fire season and dispatch an air observer to provide quick detection of any wildfires. In these cases the air observer will communicate directly with Firecom in the absents of an IMT operating. The air observer will also advise Firecom Southwest of the aircrafts flight plans.

In the event that an ICC is established and functioning, the aircraft will communicate with the incident controller for tasking.

14.2

The team of air observers in Southwest Region is as follows:

Warren Buckley	SO Toowoomba
Scott Frame	Senior Fire Fighter Toowoomba
Mark Haddow	Senior fire fighter Toowoomba
Col Neal	ATSO Roma
Dave Downing	First Officer Forest Pines Rural Fire Brigade
Peter Crisp	Volunteer fire fighter
John Boucher	Volunteer fire fighter

Air Attack supervisors

Warren Buckley
Col Neal

14.3

Equipment.

A cache of equipment has been developed to support the establishment of an airbase. Currently this is in a trailer located at the ROCC.

An aircraft radio pack is located in the Roma Area office.

An Air Observer cache is located in the cabinet in the Regional Training Kitchen. Access is via the external door using the keypad. Each observer has a key for the cabinet.

15. Communication Plans

The following are radio communication plans assigned to each of the designated Incident Control Centers

Toowoomba (Highfields)

Warwick

Stanthorpe


Millmerran

Tara

Crowsnest



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Highfields ICC**




Command Channels
 VHF 69 Picnic Point Repeater
 VHF 35 Perseverance Repeater
 VHF 67 Mt Parker, Pittsworth
 VHF 71 Anduramba
Alternative Command Channels
 Forestry VHF 114 Pechey
 Forestry VHF 123 Pechey
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command

**Rosalie, Crowsnest and Pittsworth
 Group Rural Fire Brigades.
 Cambooya Rural Fire Brigade**

**Toowoomba (stations 11 and 12,
 Highfields, Pittsworth and Oakey
 Urban stations**



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Warwick ICC**




Command Channels
 VHF 66 Braeside Repeater
 VHF 61 Karara Repeater
 VHF 65 Killarney Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
 Forestry VHF 113 Cunningham Range
 Forestry VHF 112 Karara
 Forestry VHF 117 Karara
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command.

Warwick Group Rural Fire Brigades

 Warwick, Allora, Clifton, Killarney
 and Inglewood Urban stations



Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Stanthorpe ICC




Command Channels
 VHF 63 Amiens Repeater
 VHF 58 Christie's Target Repeater
 VHF 59 Mt Dillon Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
 Forestry VHF 111 Passchendale
 QPWS VHF 110 Christie's Target
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (**simplex channels 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised**)
 Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if not used for command.

Stanthorpe Group Rural Fire Brigades

Stanthorpe, Warwick and Wallangarra Urban stations



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Millmerran ICC**




Command Channels
 VHF 57 Captains Mountain Repeater
 VHF 67 Pittsworth
Alternative Command Channels
 Forestry VHF 118 Western Creek
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command.

**Millmerran Rural Residential Rural
 Fire Brigades.**

**Millmerran and Pittsworth urban
 brigades**



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Dalby ICC**




Command Channels
 VHF 55 Kumbarilla Repeater (NIS)
 VHF 73 Bunya Mountains (NIS)
 For VHF 120 Bunya Mountains
 For VHF 119 Kumbarilla
Alternative Command Channels
 As above
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
**1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised**)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command.

**Wilkie Creek, The Ridge, Bell
 Centre, Kaimkillenbun, Warra and
 Tara Blocks Rural Fire Brigades.**

**Dalby, Jandowae, Chinchilla and
 Cecil Plains urban brigades**



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – (Wieambilla South ICC)
TARA**




Command Channels
 VHF 27 Bennett Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
 Kumbarilla Forestry VHF 119
 Western Creek Forestry VHF 118
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 11, VHF 12, VHF 13, VHF 14
 VHF 15, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command.

Tara Rural Fire Brigades
 Weranga Goranba Bennett,
 Wieambilla South, Tolmah, Kogan
 and Tara and Chinchilla Urban
 Stations



**Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Crowsnest ICC**



Command Channels
 VHF 71 Anduramba Repeater
 VHF 35 Perseverance Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
 Forestry VHF 114 Pechey
 Forestry VHF 123 Pechey
Alternative Fireground Channels
 VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
 VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
 Portable UHF Fireground repeater
 channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
 repeater channels are utilised)
 Alternative Command Channels can be
 used for Fireground communications if
 not used for command.

**Rosalie and Crowsnest Group Rural
 Fire Brigades.**
 Toowoomba (stations 11 and 12),
 Highfields, Crowsnest and
 Goombungee Urban stations

South West Region radio channels and Station Identifiers

Area / Stations		UHF	VHF	Rpeat Location	Forestry
Area 1 Toowoomba		Vote 82			
Kitchener st	11	46,61	69	Picnic Point	
Anzac Av	12	46,61	69	Picnic Point	
Pittsworth	13	46,61	67	Pittsworth	
Oakey	14	46,61	67	Pittsworth	114&123 Pechey
Goombungee	15	60	67	Pittsworth	114&123 Pechey
Crows Nest	16	60	71	Anduramba	114&123 Pechey
Highfields	17	46,61	69	Picnic Point	114&123 Pechey
Toowoomba East			35	Mt Perseverance	
Toowoomba East			39	Mt Glorious	122 Mt Glorious
Area 2 Warwick		Vote 83			
Warwick	21	42	66	Braeside	113 C'ham Range
Warwick			65	Killarney	
Warwick			61	Karara	112&117 Karara
Clifton	22	44	67	Pittsworth	
Allora	23	44			113 C'ham Range
Killarney	24	42	66	Braeside	113 C'ham Range
Stanthorpe	25	41	59	Mt Dillon	111 P'daele
Stanthorpe			63	Ameins	
Wallangarra	26	40	58	Christies Target	110 C' target
Inglewood	27	54			115 Inglewood

South West Region radio channels and Station Identifiers

Area / Stations		UHF	VHF	Rpeat Location	Forestry
Area 3 Dalby					
Cecil Plains	31	43	73	Bunya Mt	118 West Creek
Dalby	32	43	73	Bunya Mt	120 Bunya Mt
			55	Kumbarilla (NIS)	119 Kumbarilla
Tara	33	48/51	27	Bennetts Rd	
Jandowae	34	43	73	Bunya Mt	120 Bunya Mt
Chinchilla	35	43/ 51/52	27	Bennetts Rd	121 Barakula
Miles	36	52			121 Barakula
Meandarra	37		27	Bennetts Rd	
Area 4 Goondiwindi					
Goondiwindi	41	56			
Yelarbon	42				
Texas	43	54/62			
Millmerran	44	62	57	Captains Mt (NIS)	118 West Creek
Dirranbandi	45				
St George	46				
Bollon	47				

South West Region radio channels and Station Identifiers

Area / Stations		UHF	VHF	Forestry
Area 5 Roma				
Roma	51	54		
Injune	52			
Surat	53			
Wallumbilla	54			
Wandoan	55			
Taroom	56			
Dulacca	57			
Area 6 Charleville				
Charleville	61	54		
Quilpie	62			
Augathella	63			
Mitchell	64	254		
Cunnamulla	65			
Morven	66			
Mungallala	67			

"D-11"

John Burrows

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson; Remco Speekenbrink; Iain MacKenzie
Cc: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart
Subject: RE: dumb luck
Attachments:

Tom,

Regarding this issue I wish to refer you to a series of meetings and agreements with the Local Branch of the United Firefighters

In addressing our manning concerns you stated that before further staffing increases can occur you need to explore the current required our cooperation to allow for the best chance of success in making them a reliable resource. The local branch in good fa nearly two years ago!

The second part of the equation was that if it was not successful then you're part of the agreement was that you would correspc for a further Manned Fire fighting Appliance/Station.

Can you please inform this Branch if you now intend to keep your end of the agreement?.

In In light of all this, the local branch executive has been talking with the UFU State officials and requires answers on the followi

1. Is the safety of QFRS crews paramount?
2. Are the Toowoomba Aux's a viable 3rd Pump response crew?
3. With 14 Aux's on staff at Toowoomba and a response of only 4 to incidents where is the value for money for the Service
4. Why has the State Response standard to "Special Risks" of 3 Pumps on initial turnout been diluted to 2 pumps without cor
5. Is it acceptable that a Fire-fighter who fell 4m and was injured at a incident should have to re-enter to rescue his fellow fi
6. Is it acceptable that the BAST crew is made up of Aux's who took 20mins to arrive "Code 8"?
7. How can 2 Pumps in Toowoomba [population 150,000] be classified as acceptable risk management by QFRS?
8. Why was a Aux used as a casual fire-fighter? This is in breach of QFRS' own Standing Orders/Policy.
9. Why was a un-qualified Aux fire-fighter placed on 311J as the driver, and with an S/O tasked with responding to any other
10. Isn't point 9 a change of work practice and a breach of duty of care? Why hasn't there been consultation at a local level c
11. With the size and growing risks within Toowoomba [population 150000] why haven't operational staffing levels increased

John Burrows
 UFU Toowoomba Branch President
 On behalf of Remco Spreenbrink
 Branch Secretary

-----Original Message-----

From: Tom Dawson
Sent: Sun 9/20/2009 9:43 PM
To: Remco Speekenbrink; Iain MacKenzie
Cc: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart; John Burrows
Subject: RE: dumb luck

Remco

I will review your questions that you have raised and will provide my reply in due course. However the normal SHE report and V occur regarding this incident. The debrief will allow for not only operational tactics to be considered but also allow us to review the early hours of Saturday morning did not indicate any staff level issues or ESCAD problems . But as indicated I will review all of y

On your other issues regarding the current and future manning levels of Toowoomba I am glad continue our discussions at our i

Regards

Tom Dawson
AC-SWR

From: Remco Speekenbrink
Sent: Saturday, 19 September 2009 22:43
To: Tom Dawson
Cc: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart; John Burrows
Subject: dumb luck

Tom

Again we have escaped, only through pure dumb luck, with the serious deficiencies in our safe permanent staffing levels. As you there have been sufficient crew for bast teams for safety support for the primary response crews.

Tom, in my email about a month ago I raised our members concerns for their safety due to the unsafe permanent staffing levels do a safety audit through the State UFU OH&S rep on our crewing levels the rate payers and risks of Toowoomba.

But wait there's more, ESCAD also managed to go down during this incident. As discussed at our last meeting, Auxiliaries are not to crew specials, but again an Auxiliary was crewing a special with an officer Auxiliary FF was expected to drive if another incident was to occur in our area (with a crew of 2).

The Auxiliary was then told to take up the spot of the injured FF for the rest of the shift, 3hrs (casual labour) instead of calling t

In 1956 the Toowoomba fire station was built with 5 engine bays, in 1974 Anzac Ave was built with 2 engine bays. In 2009 Too high risk buildings have increased, heavy vehicle & dangerous goods has increased.

Toowoomba has not had an operational permanent staff increase since 1974, but staffing levels of non-operational administrativ

Remco Speekenbrink
Toowoomba Branch Secretary


Incident Management System (IMS)

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Escalation of an Incident


From the initial response of local resources, escalation of the incident may require a scaling up of the Incident Management System (IMS). This may be the result of the intensifying complexity, increased application of resources and a predicted protracted duration of the incident – or a combination of all factors.

At all stages of the escalation of the management structure, communications and control measures must maintain their effectiveness and have a seamless continuity for all personnel.

Level 1 Incident




Level 1 to Level 2 Transition




Incident Management System (IMS)

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Escalation of an Incident

Level 2 Incident



Level 3 Incident



"D-13"

	Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Operations Doctrine	Command and Control
	INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	Escalation of an Incident (Level One, Two & Three)
Version: 3.0 Valid from: 01/05/2010		IMS 2.3

1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline requirements for the escalation of an incident from Level One through to Level Three.

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to all fire officers and volunteers.

3. ESCALATION OF AN INCIDENT

3.1 General


- (a) From the initial response of local resources, escalation of the incident may require a scaling up of the Incident Management System. This may be the result of the intensifying complexity, increased application of resources and a predicted protracted incident - or a combination of all factors.
- (b) At all stages of the escalation of the management structure, communications and control measures must maintain their effectiveness and have a seamless operational continuity for all personnel.
- (c) During a classified Level 2 or Level 3 incident all regional resources (urban and rural) will come under the direct control of the regional Assistant Commissioner.

3.2 Level One Incident


- (a) At a Level One incident the Officer-in-charge takes control and informs the relevant Fire Communication Centre of the nominated Incident Control Point and provides the appropriate Situation Reports.
- (b) Where a higher ranked Officer arrives and assesses the incident to be within the scope of the existing level of control, the higher ranked Officer need only advise the Incident Controller of their arrival and that they will not be taking control. When this occurs, the higher ranked Officer may, at their discretion, be delegated another role, leave the scene or remain to observe.
- (c) If the assessment determines the existing level of control is not adequate for the incident, the higher ranked Officer, after appropriate briefing (SMEACS format) with the current Incident Controller, shall immediately assume the role of Incident Controller.
- (d) Immediately after the higher ranked Officer assumes control, the relevant Fire Communication Centre and personnel at the incident shall be notified of the new Incident Controller and the location of the Incident Control Point.

- (e) As an incident escalates and more sectors (geographical or functional) are required, the ability to appropriately manage the incident from a Level One Incident Control Point may not be possible.
- (f) The Incident Controller will request the establishment of an Incident Control Centre and will maintain control until advised of the establishment of the Incident Control Centre.
- (g) The Incident Control Centre maybe predetermined in regional response plans or may be suitably located near the incident (e.g. refinery, Emergency Operations Room).

LEVEL 1 INCIDENT



LEVEL 1 TO LEVEL 2 TRANSITION




- Sectorisation Occurs
- Incident escalates
- Requires more sectors - geographical or functional
- Request for an Incident Control Centre be established
- Maintain control until Incident Control Centre is established

3.3 Level Two Incident

- (a) An incident shall be reclassified as a Level Two (2) Incident by a Senior Urban Officer or Senior Rural Operations Officer.
- (b) Where the Senior Urban Officer or Senior Rural Operations Officer determines the incident should be reclassified, the Incident Controller must be consulted.
- (c) Once advised that the Incident Control Centre is established the Incident Controller will generally become the Operations Officer and continue to tactically command the incident from an Operations Point.
- (d) If it is operationally necessary to locate the Operations Officer in the Incident Control Centre then a single Division Commander can be appointed.
- (e) In many urban cases a dedicated 'control' vehicle may be substituted for an Incident Control Centre.
- (f) All relevant incident information including resource summary, personnel accountability, and incident option analysis is to be made available at the new Incident Control Point or the Incident Control Centre.
- (g) When an Incident Control Centre is established then a Staging Area should be established.
- (h) The transfer of control is communicated at the incident to all personnel and a Situation Report is sent to the relevant Fire Communication Centre, confirming new appointments of roles, new Incident Control Point or Incident Control Centre location, geographic area being managed and any update on the incident status.


LEVEL 2 INCIDENTS



- Control is transferred to Incident Control Centre (Incident Name Control)
- Firecom to Incident Control Centre (Identify boundaries)
- Incident Control Point becomes Operations Point
- Resourcing from Staging Area

3.4 Level Three Incident

- (a) An incident shall only be reclassified as a Level (3) three incident by the Assistant Commissioner. This is necessary, as the suspension of regional non-essential duties may need to be considered.
- (b) If there is a continuing escalation of the incident, i.e. the establishment of Divisions, preparation for the transfer from a Level Two Incident Control Point or Level Two Incident Control Centre to a Level Three Incident Control Centre, will begin.
- (c) A Division Point(s) will replace the Operation Point Division Commander(s) will be appointed and the Operations Officer previously working from an Operation Point will work within the Incident Control Centre.
- (d) The Incident Control Centre must be fully operational before transfer from the Level Two Incident Control Point occurs. If a Level Two Incident Control Centre is functioning the only change is in staffing.
- (e) The Incident Control Centre may be predetermined in regional response plans or may be identified for suitability in relation to the incident location.
- (f) The transfer of control is communicated at the incident to all personnel and a Situation Report is sent to the relevant Fire Communication Centre, confirming new appointments of roles, new Division Command Points location, geographic area being managed and any update on the incident status.
- (g) The Regional Operations Coordination Centre and the State Operations Coordination Centre will be established at the appropriate levels relevant to the requirements of the incident.




4. QFRS RELEVANCY

IMS 2.3	URBAN OPERATIONS		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	iZone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Not Applicable								
May Apply *								✓

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES

The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides



Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner





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Transcript: Wayne Waltisbuhl

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Act
BSZ401A-F	Plan Assessment Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ402A-F	Conduct Assessment Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ403A-F	Review Assessment Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ404A-F	Train Small Groups Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ405A-F	Plan and Promote a Training Program Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ406A-F	Plan a Series of Training Sessions Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ407A-F	Deliver Training Sessions Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
BSZ408A-F	Review Training Activity		Instructor-Led	18/02/2002	Successful	External		
C-HRBC010	<u>Code Of Conduct Awareness</u>	1.0	Web Based Training	02/02/2010	Successful			View Con
C-SPDC110	<u>Introduction to Privacy</u>		Web Based Training	30/11/2009	Successful			View Con
F-CSFC010	<u>QFRS Awareness for PREPARE,ACT,SURVIVE.</u>		Web Based Training	24/09/2010	Successful			View Con
F-FPEMC06	Senior First Aid Full		Instructor-Led	15/05/2005	Successful			
F-FPEMC06	Senior First Aid Full		Instructor-Led	07/11/2007	Successful			
F-FRURL065	Practical - Level 2 Fire Management		Instructor-Led	28/04/2003	Successful			
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction		Instructor-Led	19/05/2005	Successful			
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail		Instructor-Led	19/05/2005	Successful			
F-FUNIT405	Operations Mapping System		Instructor-Led	25/10/2005	Successful			
F-FUNIT407	AllIMS/IMS - Management		Instructor-Led	16/07/2007	Successful			
F-FUNIT493	Senior Officers Command & Control Residential		Instructor-Led	12/08/2005	Successful			
F-OPRC005	Electronic command and control		Instructor-Led	17/03/2010	Successful			
F-PUACOM001B-1	Communicate in the Workplace-assessment		Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful			
F-PUACOM004A-1	Manage Organisational Communication Strategies-assessment		Instructor-Led	16/01/2007	Successful			
F-PUACOM004B-1	Manage organisational communication strategies-activity		Instructor-Led	21/07/2009	Successful	Version change		
F-PUACOM007B-1	Liaise with other organisations-activity		Instructor-Led	20/11/2009	Successful	RPL		
F-PUACOM009A-1	Manage Media Requirements At Major Incidents-assessment		Instructor-Led	19/07/2005	Successful			

F-PUACOM010A-1	Promote The Organisation's Mission And Services-assessment	Instructor-Led	16/01/2007	Successful	
F-PUACOM010B-1	Promote the organisation's mission and services-activity	Instructor-Led	21/07/2009	Successful	Version change
F-PUACOM012-1	Liaise with media at a local level	Instructor-Led	20/11/2009	Successful	RPL
F-PUACOM012B-1	Liaise with media at a local level-activity		20/11/2009	Successful	RPL
F-PUAEME001A-1	Provide Emergency Care-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAEQU001A-1	Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR201A-1	Prevent Injury-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR202A-1	Respond to isolated/remote structure fire-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR203A-1	Respond to Urban Fire-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR204A-1	Respond to Wildfire-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR207A-1	Operate Breathing Apparatus - Open Circuit-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR208A-1	Participate in community safety activities-assessment	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful	
F-PUAFIR301B-1	Undertake community safety activities-activity	Instructor-Led	20/11/2009	Successful	RPL
F-PUAFIR504A-1	Assist With The Formulation And Implementation Of Plans And Policies-assessment	Instructor-Led	16/01/2007	Successful	
F-PUAFIR504B-1	Assist with formulation and implementation of plans and policies-activity	Instructor-Led	21/07/2009	Successful	Version change



Enrolments
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Curricula: Wayne Waltisbuhl

Curricula	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
F-PUA20701 Certificate II in Public Safety (Firefighting Operations)	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		Print Export
F-PUAFIR207A Operate breathing apparatus open circuit	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		
F-PUALAW001A Protect and Preserve Incident Scene	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		
F-PUALAW004A Represent the Organisation in a Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Setting	Acquired	Saba Config	21/07/2005		
F-PUATEA001A Work in a Team	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	27/06/2003		
F-PUACOM010B Promote the organisation's mission and services	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	21/07/2009		
F-PUAOPE008B Coordinate resources within a multi agency emergency response	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	21/07/2009		
BSZ408A Review Training	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002		
F-PUACOM010A Promote the Organisation's Mission and Services	Acquired	Saba Config	16/01/2007		
F-PUACOM007B Liaise with other organisations	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	20/11/2009		
BSZ40198 Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002		
F-PUA60501 Advanced Diploma of Public Safety (Firefighting Management)	In progress (0%)	Saba Config			X
F-PUACOM001B Communicate in the Workplace	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		
F-PUAFIR602A Manage the Implementation of Community Service Strategies	Acquired	Saba Config	16/01/2007		
F-PUAOPE006A Control Multi-Agency Emergency Situations	Acquired	Saba Config	07/02/2007		
F-PUATEA003A Lead, Manage and Develop Teams	Acquired	Saba Config	01/12/2006		
F-QFCFFG1B Apply First Response Firefighting Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		
F-PUAOPE005B Manage a multi-team response	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	20/11/2009		
F-PUALAW001B Protect and preserve incident scene	Acquired	F-JR-VFA	08/09/2009		
F-PUAOPE006B Control multi-agency emergency situations	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	21/07/2009		
F-PUACOM004B Manage organisational communication strategies	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	21/07/2009		
F-PUAEQU001A Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	27/06/2003		
F-PUAFIR202A Respond to Isolated/Remote Structure Fire	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003		
F-PUAFIR204A Respond to Wildfire	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	27/06/2003		
F-PUALAW003A Give Evidence in a Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Setting	Acquired	Saba Config	21/07/2005		

<u>F-PUATEA004A Work Effectively in a Public Safety Organisation</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003
<u>F-PUACOM012B Liaise with media at a local level</u>	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	20/11/2009
<u>F-PUAOPE007B Command agency personnel within a multi-agency emergency response</u>	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	20/11/2009
<u>F-PUAFIR208B Participate in community safety activities</u>	Acquired	F-JR-VFA	08/09/2009
<u>F-PUAMAN001B Manage the organisation's public safety responsibilities</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	21/07/2009
<u>BSZ401A Plan Assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002
<u>BSZ405A Plan and Promote a Training Program</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002
<u>F-21588VIC Course in Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	16/07/2007
<u>F-PUAEME001A Provide Emergency Care</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003
<u>F-PUAFIR201A Prevent Injury</u>	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	27/06/2003
<u>F-PUAFIR203A Respond to Urban Fire</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	27/06/2003
<u>F-PUAFIR301B Undertake community safety activities</u>	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	20/11/2009
<u>BSZ403A Review Assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002
<u>BSZ406A Plan a Series of Training Sessions</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002
<u>BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	18/02/2002

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Actio
BSZ40198AA00	Assessment and Workplace Training Common Critical Score Item		Instructor-Led	16/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA01	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Pre Course Workbook		Instructor-Led	12/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA02	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Ice Breaker Presentation		Instructor-Led	13/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA03	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Training Session		Instructor-Led	15/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA04	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Practical Assessment		Instructor-Led	15/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA05	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Theory Assessment		Instructor-Led	16/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA06	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training- Workplace Assessment		Instructor-Led	15/04/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA07	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training - Workplace Planning and Promoting		Instructor-Led	15/04/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA08	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training - Unpacking the Package - A Process		Instructor-Led	13/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA09	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training - Identify the Competency Level		Instructor-Led	13/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA10	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training - Assessment Development Learning Activities		Instructor-Led	15/01/2004	Successful			
BSZ40198AA11	Certificate IV Assessment and Workplace Training - Training Development Learning Activities		Instructor-Led	14/01/2004	Successful			
C-SPDC110	Introduction to Privacy		Web Based Training	10/11/2009	Successful			View Conte
F-CSFC010	QFRS Awareness for PREPARE,ACT,SURVIVE.		Web Based Training	02/09/2010	Successful			View Conte
F-FRURL120	Information Session Initial Rural Training		Instructor-Led	24/11/2001	Successful			
F-FUNIT142	Media Training		Web Based Training	11/01/2010	Successful			View Conte
F-FUNIT142	Media Training		Web Based Training	26/10/2009	Successful			View Conte

F-FUNIT143	<u>Witness Training</u>	Web Based Training	11/01/2010	<u>Successful</u>	View Conte
F-FUNIT149	Wildfire - Instructor - Delivery to Urban Firefighters	Instructor-Led	04/07/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT216	i Zone - Introduction to Structural Protection	Instructor-Led	10/09/2009	Successful	
F-FUNIT216	i Zone - Introduction to Structural Protection	Instructor-Led	05/08/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT219	Road Accident Rescue Awareness	Instructor-Led	24/09/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT220	Assist at Rendering Hazardous Materials Safe	Instructor-Led	10/11/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT269	Fire Warden - Permit to Light	Instructor-Led	01/03/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT272	On-line Campus Orientation	Instructor-Led	22/03/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT282	Incident Control Radio Communication - Introduction	Instructor-Led	14/05/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT285	Powers & Responsibilities of Fire Officers	Instructor-Led	14/05/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction	Instructor-Led	01/06/2006	Successful	
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction	Instructor-Led	29/06/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT300	Radio Procedures - 2005	Instructor-Led	14/05/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail	Instructor-Led	01/06/2006	Successful	
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail	Instructor-Led	15/05/2005	Successful	
F-FUNIT314	Air Attack Guidelines for Fireline Personnel	Instructor-Led	04/05/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT327	Incident Controller Level I - Crew Leader Wildfire	Instructor-Led	16/07/2006	Successful	
F-FUNIT341	AIIMS/IMS - Intermediate	Instructor-Led	02/05/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT342	AIIMS/IMS - Awareness	Instructor-Led	04/05/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT392	AIIMS/IMS Operations Officer	Instructor-Led	11/09/2009	Successful	
F-FUNIT405	Operations Mapping System	Instructor-Led	05/09/2007	Successful	
F-FUNIT407	AIIMS/IMS - Management	Instructor-Led	02/05/2008	Successful	
F-FUNIT415	AIIMS/IMS Sector Commander	Instructor-Led	29/10/2006	Successful	



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Curricula: Paul Storrs

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Curriculum	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
BSZ405A Plan and Promote a Training Program	Acquired	Saba Config	15/04/2004		
F-HLTFA201A Provide Basic Emergency Life Support	Acquired	Saba Config	11/03/2007		
F-HLTFA301B Apply First Aid	Acquired	Saba Config	11/03/2007		
F-PUAFIR202A Respond to Isolated/Remote Structure Fire	Acquired	Saba Config	24/09/2005		
F-PUATEA002A Work Autonomously	Acquired	Saba Config	16/07/2006		
TAA40104 Certificate IV in Training and Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
TAAASS404A Participate in assessment validation	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
F-PUAFIR303B Suppress wildfire	Acquired	F-JR-VCL	08/09/2009		
F-PUACOM001C Communicate in the workplace	Acquired	F-JR-VFA	08/09/2009		
F-PUAOPE004B Conduct briefings/debriefings	In progress (0%)	F-JR-VBO			X
F-PUA50501. Diploma of Public Safety (Firefighting Management)	In progress (0%)	Caroline Fowke			X
BSZ403A Review Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/04/2004		
F-PUAEME002B Manage Injuries at Emergency Incident	Acquired	Saba Config	11/03/2007		
F-PUAFIR303A Suppress Wildfire	Acquired	Saba Config	16/07/2006		
F-PUAOPE002A Operate Communications Systems and Equipment	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1- Prog, F-JR-FM1-Prog	15/04/2004		
TAAASS402A Assess Competence	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
TAADEL301A Provide training through instruction and demonstration of work skills	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
TAADEL401A Plan and organise group-based Delivery	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
F-PUAOPE001B Supervise response	In progress (0%)	F-JR-VBO			X
F-PUAFIR301B Undertake community safety activities	Assigned	F-JR-VBO			X
F-PUA20701 Certificate II in Public Safety (Firefighting Operations)	Acquired	Saba Config	24/06/2008		
F-PUA0HS001A Follow Defined Occupational Health and Safety Policies and Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	15/04/2004		
TAADEL402A Facilitate group-based learning	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
TAAENV401A Work effectively in vocational education and training	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007		
F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Prog, F-JR-FM1- Prog, F-JR-FM1- Prog, F-JR-FM1-Prog, F-JR-FM1-Prog	15/04/2004		

<u>F-PUATEA002B Work autonomously</u>	Acquired	F-JR-VCL	08/09/2009
<u>F-VCL300 Volunteer Crew Leader Program</u>	Acquired	F-JR-VCL	08/09/2009
<u>BSZ40198 Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	15/04/2004
<u>BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	16/01/2004
<u>F-PUAEME001A Provide Emergency Care</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	11/03/2007
<u>F-PUATEA001A Work in a Team</u>	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog, F-JR-FM1-Prog	15/04/2004
<u>TAADES401A Use training packages to meet client needs</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007
<u>F-PUACOM001B Communicate in the Workplace</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	10/09/2007
<u>F-QFCFFG1B Apply First Response Firefighting Procedures</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	14/10/2005
<u>F-VBP227 Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIMS)</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	02/05/2008
<u>TAAASS401A Plan and organise assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007
<u>TAAASS403A Develop Assessment Tools</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007
<u>TAADES402A Design and Develop Learning Programs</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007
<u>TAAENV402A Foster and promote an inclusive learning culture</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007
<u>TAAENV403A Ensure a Healthy and Safe Learning Environment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	25/06/2007

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"D-15"

John Burrows

From: John Burrows **Sent:** Fri 24/07/2009 8:44 AM
To: Tom Dawson
Cc:
Subject: Just a couple of observations out of the Vic Black Saturday Fires
Attachments:

Tom,
Just a couple of observations out of the Vic Black Saturday Fires and a couple of sobering comments that I have found:-

" Conformity to rules was the enemy of judgment, commonsense and moral responsibility"

"There was a failure by media to distinguish between the fire-fighter on the frontline, who were rightly lauded, and the competence of those who were controlling the fight".

However in conversation with some QFRS managers there is a belief that this would not happen in Queensland, whats your thoughts, and have we prepared ourselves to ensure this doesnt happen?

John Burrows
Station Officer
Queensland Fire and Rescue
Mobile [REDACTED]

"D-16A"

Learning History

Thomas Dawson

Person No: 000905

Includes Profiles:

000905 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Certifications	Status	Completed	Expiry Date
FNA480 Senior First Aid	Overdue		
FNA480 Senior First Aid	Expired	8/01/2008	08/01/2011
FNA481 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation	Overdue		
FNA481 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation	Expired	8/01/2008	08/01/2009
FNA482 Advanced Resuscitation Techniques	Expired	9/03/2004	09/03/2005
ZSKR200 Senior Officers Core Skills Block 2	Overdue		
ZSKR300 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 3	Overdue		
ZSKR400 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 4	Overdue		

Curricula	Status	Completed
1.25 High Angle Rescue 1	Acquired	4/06/1999
4.04 Incident Control System - Agency Specific	Acquired	12/11/1999
FMI005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	2/09/1998
HLTCPR201A Perform CPR	Acquired	8/01/2008
HLTFA201A Provide Basic Emergency Life Support	Acquired	8/01/2008
HLTFA301B Apply First Aid	Acquired	8/01/2008
PUASAR001A Participate in a Rescue Operation	Acquired	29/04/2004
QFST01 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING	Acquired	28/02/1997
QFST02 Training Preparation	Acquired	28/02/1997
QFST03 Instruction Techniques	Acquired	28/02/1997
QFST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR	Acquired	28/02/1997
QFSWTR Certificate IV In Workplace Training	Acquired	28/02/1997

Courses	Status	Completed
1.25-1 High Angle Rescue 1 course	Successful	4/06/1999
4.04-1 Incident Control System - Agency Specific course	Successful	12/11/1999
CSYC010 Operations Management System Essentials	Successful	24/06/2010
FMI_UNIT1 Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT10 Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT11 Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT2 Provide Leadership in the Workplace	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT3 Establish and Manage Effective Workplace Relationships	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT4 Participate In, Lead and Facilitate Work Team	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT5 Manage Operations To Achieve Planned Outcomes	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT6 Manage Workplace Information	Successful	2/09/1998

Learning History

Thomas Dawson

Person No: 000905

Includes Profiles:
000905 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Courses	Status	Completed
FMI_UNIT7 Manage Quality Customer Service	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT8 Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment	Successful	2/09/1998
FMI_UNIT9 Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes	Successful	2/09/1998
FPEMC03 Advanced Resuscitation	Successful	1/04/2000
FPEMC03R Advanced Resuscitation Recertification	Successful	9/03/2004
FPEMC06R Senior First Aid Recertification	Successful	9/03/2004
FPEMC09R Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Recertification	Successful	9/03/2004
FUNIT124 Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) - Category 1	Successful	6/11/2003
FUNIT228 BA Refresher	Successful	4/06/2009
FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Successful	20/02/2008
FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Successful	19/02/2009
FUNIT493 Senior Officers Command & Control Residential	Successful	11/03/2005
FUNIT529 Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early	In Progress	
FUNIT551 Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness	Successful	6/03/2008
HLTFA301B-1 Apply First Aid - activity	Successful	8/01/2008
PERC015 Diversity in the workplace	In Progress	
PERC020 Solving people problems	In Progress	
PERC025 Leading teams	In Progress	
PUASAR001A-1 Participate in a Rescue Operation-assessment	Successful	29/04/2004
QFST01-1 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING course	Successful	28/02/1997
QFST02-1 Training Preparation course	Successful	28/02/1997
QFST03-1 Instruction Techniques course	Successful	28/02/1997
QFST04-1 ROLE OF THE MENTOR course	Successful	28/02/1997
SHLC015 Alcohol and other drugs awareness for Supervisors	Successful	20/09/2010
SPDC110 Introduction to Privacy	Successful	19/01/2010
ZSKC100 IC500AS Guide for First Senior Officer at an Incident	In Progress	
ZSKC101 IC501AS Hierarchy of Command and Control	In Progress	
ZSKC102 IC502AS Role of Divisional Commander	In Progress	
ZSKC103 IC503AS Snr Officers Core Skills GARS	In Progress	
ZSKC104 IC504AS Duties of the Incident Controller	In Progress	
ZSKC105 IC505AS Duties of the Planning Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC106 IC506AS Role of the Operations Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC107 IC507AS Role of the Logistics Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC108 MS501AS Command, Leadership and Management Core Skills	In Progress	

Learning History

Thomas Dawson

Person No: 000905

Includes Profiles:
000905 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Courses	Status	Completed
ZSKC200 01 HM610AS Introduction to chemical fires	In Progress	
ZSKC201 02 HM611AS Introduction to chemical fires and managing safety	In Progress	
ZSKC202 03 HM612AS Applying the measurements	In Progress	
ZSKC203 04 HM613AS Risk assessment and planning	In Progress	
ZSKC204 05 HM614AS Chemical detection capability	In Progress	
ZSKC205 HM500AS Managing a decontamination area	In Progress	
ZSKC206 HM615AS Health Surveillance	In Progress	
ZSKC207 HM616AS Recovery Arrangements for Major Hazmat Incident	In Progress	
ZSKC208 HM617AS Guidelines for Transport Emergency Response Plan	In Progress	
ZSKC209 HM502AS Clandestine drug lab incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC210 HM503AS Actions at white powder incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC211 HM506AS Corrosive Material Incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC212 HM507AS Radioactive materials incidents	In Progress	



"D-16B"

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Action:
C-SPDC110	Introduction to Privacy		Web Based Training	23/11/2009	Successful			View Conten
F-1.25-1	High Angle Rescue 1 course		Instructor-Led	18/02/2001	Successful			
F-2.17C-1	Confined Space Rescue course		Instructor-Led	14/03/2003	Successful			
F-BSXFM509A-1	Implement and Monitor Continuous Improvement to Systems And Processes-assessment		Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful			
F-BSXFM510A-1	Facilitate & Capitalise On Change & Innovation-assessment		Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful			
F-CSFC010	QFRS Awareness for PREPARE,ACT,SURVIVE.		Web Based Training	01/09/2010	Successful			View Conten
F-CSYC010	Operations Management System Essentials		Instructor-Led	24/06/2010	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT1	Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT10	Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT11	Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT2	Provide Leadership in the Workplace		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT3	Establish and Manage Effective Workplace Relationships		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT4	Participate In, Lead and Facilitate Work Team		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT5	Manage Operations To Achieve Planned Outcomes		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT6	Manage Workplace Information		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT7	Manage Quality Customer Service		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT8	Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FMI_UNIT9	Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful			
F-FPEMC03	Advanced Resuscitation		Instructor-Led	26/02/2004	Successful			
F-FPEMC03	Advanced Resuscitation		Instructor-Led	10/07/2003	Successful			
F-FPEMC03R	Advanced Resuscitation Recertification		Instructor-Led	12/02/2007	Successful			
F-FPEMC03R	Advanced Resuscitation Recertification		Instructor-Led	26/02/2004	Successful			
F-FPEMC06	Senior First Aid Full		Instructor-Led	20/03/2003	Successful			
F-FPEMC06R	Senior First Aid Recertification		Instructor-Led	09/02/2007	Successful			

F-FPEMC09R	Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Recertification	Instructor-Led	09/02/2007	Successful
F-FUNIT005	Electrical De-energising - Low Voltage Extraction	Instructor-Led	17/03/2002	Successful
F-FUNIT085	Undertake Road Accident Rescue - Instructor	Instructor-Led	31/07/2004	Successful
F-FUNIT137	Compartment Fire Behaviour Training (CFBT)	Instructor-Led	10/12/2010	Successful
F-FUNIT140	Drug Lab Hazards Awareness	Instructor-Led	10/12/2010	Successful
F-FUNIT150	Flash Hood Fitting Instruction	Instructor-Led	07/12/2010	Successful
F-FUNIT155	Driver Fatigue Management	Instructor-Led	12/09/2003	Successful
F-FUNIT224	Heat Strain - Working in Heat Awareness	Instructor-Led	19/08/2002	Successful
F-FUNIT227	Vector Tactical Facilitator	Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful
F-FUNIT228	BA Refresher	Instructor-Led	07/12/2010	Successful
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction	Instructor-Led	11/11/2005	Successful
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail	Instructor-Led	11/11/2005	Successful
F-FUNIT314	Air Attack Guidelines for Fireline Personnel	Instructor-Led	10/11/2005	Successful
F-FUNIT344	Incident Planning - Previously 5.02 -AFAC	Instructor-Led	04/07/2003	Successful
F-FUNIT345	Senior Officers Leadership and Management Residential	Instructor-Led	24/08/2007	Successful
F-FUNIT390	Vector Strategic Facilitator	Instructor-Led	30/06/2005	Successful

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits
C-SPDC110	Introduction to Privacy		Web Based Training	23/11/2009	Successful		
F-1.25-1	High Angle Rescue 1 course		Instructor-Led	18/02/2001	Successful		
F-2.17C-1	Confined Space Rescue course		Instructor-Led	14/03/2003	Successful		
F-BSXFM509A-1	Implement and Monitor Continuous Improvement to Systems And Processes-assessment		Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful		
F-BSXFM510A-1	Facilitate & Capitalise On Change & Innovation-assessment		Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful		
F-CSFC010	QFRS Awareness for PREPARE.ACT.SURVIVE.		Web Based Training	01/09/2010	Successful		
F-CSYC010	Operations Management System Essentials		Instructor-Led	24/06/2010	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT1	Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT10	Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT11	Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT2	Provide Leadership in the Workplace		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT3	Establish and Manage Effective Workplace Relationships		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT4	Participate In, Lead and Facilitate Work Team		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT5	Manage Operations To Achieve Planned Outcomes		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT6	Manage Workplace Information		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT7	Manage Quality Customer Service		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT8	Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FMI_UNIT9	Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes		Instructor-Led	16/05/2001	Successful		
F-FPEMC03	Advanced Resuscitation		Instructor-Led	26/02/2004	Successful		
F-FPEMC03	Advanced Resuscitation		Instructor-Led	10/07/2003	Successful		
F-FPEMC03R	Advanced Resuscitation Recertification		Instructor-Led	12/02/2007	Successful		
F-FPEMC03R	Advanced Resuscitation Recertification		Instructor-Led	26/02/2004	Successful		
F-FPEMC06	Senior First Aid Full		Instructor-Led	20/03/2003	Successful		
F-FPEMC06R	Senior First Aid Recertification		Instructor-Led	09/02/2007	Successful		
F-FPEMC09R	Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Recertification		Instructor-Led	09/02/2007	Successful		
F-FUNIT005	Electrical De-energising - Low Voltage Extraction		Instructor-Led	17/03/2002	Successful		
F-FUNIT085	Undertake Road Accident Rescue - Instructor		Instructor-Led	31/07/2004	Successful		
F-FUNIT137	Compartment Fire Behaviour Training (CFBT)		Instructor-Led	10/12/2010	Successful		
F-FUNIT140	Drug Lab Hazards Awareness		Instructor-Led	10/12/2010	Successful		
F-FUNIT150	Flash Hood Fitting Instruction		Instructor-Led	07/12/2010	Successful		
F-FUNIT155	Driver Fatigue Management		Instructor-Led	12/09/2003	Successful		
F-FUNIT224	Heat Strain - Working in Heat Awareness		Instructor-Led	19/08/2002	Successful		
F-FUNIT227	Vector Tactical Facilitator		Instructor-Led	27/06/2003	Successful		
F-FUNIT228	BA Refresher		Instructor-Led	07/12/2010	Successful		
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction		Instructor-Led	11/11/2005	Successful		
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail		Instructor-Led	11/11/2005	Successful		
F-FUNIT314	Air Attack Guidelines for Fireline Personnel		Instructor-Led	10/11/2005	Successful		
F-FUNIT344	Incident Planning - Previously 5.02 -AFAC		Instructor-Led	04/07/2003	Successful		
F-FUNIT345	Senior Officers Leadership and Management Residential		Instructor-Led	24/08/2007	Successful		
F-FUNIT390	Vector Strategic Facilitator		Instructor-Led	30/06/2005	Successful		
F-FUNIT391	AIIMS/IMS Planning Officer		Instructor-Led	31/10/2007	Successful		
F-FUNIT393	AIIMS/IMS Logistics Officer		Instructor-Led	11/04/2008	Successful		
F-FUNIT396	Tactical Incident Management - Area Director		Instructor-Led	10/12/2010	Successful		
F-FUNIT407	AIIMS/IMS - Management		Instructor-Led	26/02/2007	Successful		
F-FUNIT414	AIIMS/IMS Incident Controller (Advanced Incident Management Skills)		Instructor-Led	30/06/2006	Successful		

F-FUNIT415	AIIMS/IMS Sector Commander	Instructor-Led	20/12/2007	Successful
F-FUNIT460	AIIMS/IMS - Planning Officer - Instructor	Instructor-Led	12/05/2006	Successful
F-FUNIT461	AIIMS/IMS - Operations Officer - Instructor	Instructor-Led	21/07/2006	Successful
F-FUNIT463	AIIMS/IMS - Incident Controller - Instructor	Instructor-Led	30/06/2006	Successful
F-FUNIT489	Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Instructor-Led	14/05/2009	Successful
F-FUNIT499	AIIMS/IMS - Intermediate - Instructor	Instructor-Led	26/04/2007	Successful
F-FUNIT528	AIIMS/IMS - Management - Instructor	Instructor-Led	26/04/2007	Successful
F-FUNIT529	Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful
F-FUNIT550	Inspectors Leadership & Management Program	Instructor-Led	20/06/2008	Successful
F-FUNIT551	Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness	Instructor-Led	13/02/2008	Successful
F-OPRC030	Electronic Command and Control (Senior Officers)	Instructor-Led	29/09/2010	Successful
F-PERC015	Diversity in the workplace	Web Based Training	18/01/2010	Successful
F-PERC020	Solving people problems	Web Based Training	19/08/2010	Successful
F-PERC025	Leading teams	Web Based Training	19/08/2010	Successful
F-PUACOM004A-1	Manage Organisational Communication Strategies-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUACOM010A-1	Promote The Organisation's Mission And Services-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAFIR204A-1	Respond to Wildfire-assessment	Instructor-Led	06/12/2006	Successful
F-PUAFIR303A-1	Suppress Wildfire course	Instructor-Led	26/08/2008	Successful RPL
F-PUAFIR504A-1	Assist With The Formulation And Implementation Of Plans And Policies-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAFIR507A-1	Inspect Building Fire Safety Systems-assessment	Instructor-Led	04/05/2005	Successful
F-PUAFIR601A-1	Develop And Administer Agency Policy, Procedures & Practices-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAMAN001A-1	Manage The Organisation's Public Safety Responsibilities-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAMAN003A-1	Manage Human Resources-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAMAN005A-1	Manage Projects-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAMAN007A-1	Manage Financial Resources-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAOPE006A-1	Control Multi-Agency Emergency Situations-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAOPE008A-1	Coordinate Resources Within A Multi-Agency Emergency Response-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUAPRS20529A-1	Managing Marketing Requirements-assessment	Instructor-Led	28/10/2006	Successful
F-PUASAR001A-1	Participate in a Rescue Operation-assessment	Instructor-Led	01/05/2009	Successful
F-QFST01-1	INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING course	Instructor-Led	13/02/2001	Successful
F-QFST02-1	Training Preparation course	Instructor-Led	13/02/2001	Successful
F-QFST03-1	Instruction Techniques course	Instructor-Led	13/02/2001	Successful
F-QFST04-1	ROLE OF THE MENTOR course	Instructor-Led	13/02/2001	Successful
F-X_FPHRC16	Human Resources Courses: Introduction to E.E.O.	Instructor-Led	25/06/2001	Successful
F-ZSKC100	IC500AS Guide for First Senior Officer at an Incident	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC101	IC501AS Hierarchy of Command and Control	Web Based Training	23/11/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC102	IC502AS Role of Divisional Commander	Web Based Training	07/12/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC103	IC503AS Snr Officers Core Skills GARS	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC104	IC504AS Duties of the Incident Controller	Web Based Training	07/12/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC105	IC505AS Duties of the Planning Officer	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful
F-ZSKC106	IC506AS Role of the Operations Officer	Web Based Training	07/12/2009	Successful

F-ZSKC107	IC507AS Role of the Logistics Officer	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful	
F-ZSKC108	MS501AS Command, Leadership and Management Core Skills	Web Based Training	09/12/2009	Successful	
F-ZSKC200	01 HM610AS Introduction to chemical fires	Web Based Training	18/01/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC201	02 HM611AS Introduction to chemical fires and managing safety	Web Based Training	20/01/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC202	03 HM612AS Applying the measurements	Web Based Training	20/01/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC203	04 HM613AS Risk assessment and planning	Web Based Training	20/01/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC204	05 HM614AS Chemical detection capability	Web Based Training	20/01/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC205	HM500AS Managing a decontamination area	Web Based Training	08/06/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC206	HM615AS Health Surveillance	Web Based Training	20/07/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC207	HM616AS Recovery Arrangements for Major Hazmat Incident	Web Based Training	20/07/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC208	HM617AS Guidelines for Transport Emergency Response Plan	Web Based Training	20/07/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC209	HM502AS Clandestine drug lab incidents	Web Based Training	28/06/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC210	HM503AS Actions at white powder incidents	Web Based Training	28/06/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC211	HM506AS Corrosive Material Incidents	Web Based Training	28/06/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC212	HM507AS Radioactive materials incidents	Web Based Training	20/07/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC500	Senior Officer Positive Pressure Ventilation	Web Based Training	20/10/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC501	Senior Officer Public Safety Preservation Act	Web Based Training	21/09/2010	Successful	
F-ZSKC600	Disaster Management Act - Legislative Changes	Web Based Training	11/02/2011	Successful	
F-ZSKC602	Relationship between the ICC, ROCC and SOCC	Web Based Training	11/02/2011	Successful	
F-ZSKC604	Cobra Cold Cut System (CCS) Awareness	Web Based Training	11/02/2011	Successful	
TA 104	Certificate IV in Training and Assessment (External)	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAASS301A-1	Contribute to Assessment - Activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAASS401A-1	Plan and organise assessment-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAASS402A-1	Assess competence-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAASS403A-1	Develop assessment tools-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADEL401A-1	Plan and organise group-based delivery-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADEL402A-1	Facilitate group-based learning-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADEL403A-1	Facilitate individual learning-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADEL404A-1	Facilitate work-based learning-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADEL405A-1	Facilitate Distance-based Learning-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADES401A-1	Use training packages to meet client needs-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TADES402A-1	Design and develop learning programs-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAENV401A-1	Work effectively in vocational education & training-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAENV402A-1	Foster and promote an inclusive learning culture-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
TAAENV403A-1	Ensure a healthy and safe learning environment-activity	Instructor-Led	14/12/2006	Successful	External
	Incident Command System		03/08/2006	Successful	



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Curricula: Edward Lacko

Curricula	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
TAADES401A Use training packages to meet client needs	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		Print Export
TAAENV402A Foster and promote an inclusive learning culture	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		
F-PUAFIR303A Suppress Wildfire	Acquired	Hannah Rogers	26/08/2008		
BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	16/03/2002		
F-21588VIC Course in Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
F-PUACOM004A Manage Organisational Communication Strategies	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-PUAFIR201A Prevent Injury	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-PUAMAN007A Manage Financial Resources	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-VBP227 Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
TAAASS402A Assess Competence	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		
BSZ402A Conduct Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	16/03/2002		
BSZ403A Review Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	16/03/2002		
BSZ405A Plan and Promote a Training Program	Acquired	Saba Config	16/03/2002		
F-BSXFM1510A Facilitate and capitalise on change and innovation	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-PUAEQU001A Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-QEST02 Training Preparation	Acquired	Saba Config	13/02/2001		
TAAENV403A Ensure a Healthy and Safe Learning Environment	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		
F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Prog	06/12/2006		
BSZ406A Plan a Series of Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	16/03/2002		
F-PUACOM010A Promote the Organisation's Mission and Services	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-PUAFIR601A Develop and Administer Agency Policy, Procedures and Practices	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-PUAMAN001A Manage the Organisation's Public Safety Responsibilities	Acquired	Saba Config	28/10/2006		
F-QFSA02 Assessment Characteristics	Acquired	Saba Config	28/07/1998		
F-QFSA04 Recording and Review of Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	28/07/1998		
F-QEST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR	Acquired	Saba Config	13/02/2001		
TAA40104 Certificate IV in Training and Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		
TAADEL402A Facilitate group-based learning	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		
TAADEL405A Facilitate Distance-based Learning	Acquired	Saba Config	14/12/2006		

F-PUASAR001A Participate in a Rescue Acquired
Operation

Anne West

01/05/2009

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Curricula: Lawrence Bill

Curricula	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
F-AIPM601 Graduate Certificate in Applied Management	Acquired	Saba Config	03/10/2003		
F-AIPM601S3 Strategic Planning and Performance Management	Acquired	Saba Config	03/10/2003		
F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Assigned	F-JR-FM1-Prog			X
F-FMI005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	Saba Config	23/03/1999		
F-FNA451 AIIMS/IMS Awareness Commissioners Requirements	In progress (0%)	F-AIIMS Awareness			X
F-AIPM601S1 Foundations of Strategic Management	Acquired	Saba Config	03/10/2003		
F-AIPM601S2 Contemporary Issues in Public Safety	Acquired	Saba Config	03/10/2003		
F-AIPM601S4 Leadership and Organisational Change	Acquired	Saba Config	03/10/2003		

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Transcript: Lawrence Bill

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Actions
C-SPDC110	Introduction to Privacy		Web Based Training	27/11/2009	Successful			View Content
F-FPEMC06R	Senior First Aid Recertification		Instructor-Led	07/11/2007	Successful	External		
F-FUNIT295	Operations Doctrine - Introduction		Instructor-Led	03/03/2005	Successful			
F-FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail		Instructor-Led	09/03/2005	Successful			
F-FUNIT493	Senior Officers Command & Control Residential		Instructor-Led	02/03/2007	Successful			
F-FUNIT494	Senior Officers Command & Control Program		Instructor-Led	08/02/2008	Successful			
F-FUNIT511	BFS Maintenance inspection refresher training		Instructor-Led	14/05/2009	Successful			
F-SHLC015	Alcohol and other drugs awareness for Supervisors		Web Based Training	08/09/2010	Successful			View Content





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Curricula: Paul Evans

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Curriculum	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
F-AIPM601 Graduate Certificate in Applied Management	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-AIPM601S4 Leadership and Organisational Change	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-DESRAR Road Accident Rescue	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/1998		
F-ESELAW Fire Scene Examination - Law	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000		
F-QFRESE Diploma of Fire Scene Examination	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000		
F-QFSA02 Assessment Characteristics	Acquired	Saba Config	25/05/1999		
F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Prog	15/09/2010		
F-PUAWER003B Manage and monitor workplace emergency procedures, equipment and other resources	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		
F-PUAWER008B Confine small workplace emergencies	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		
F-PUATEA001B Work in a team	Acquired	F-JR-VFM-Units	15/09/2010		
F-PUAOPE002B Operate communications systems and equipment	Acquired	F-JR-VFM-Units	15/09/2010		
BSZ404A Train Small Groups	Acquired	Saba Config	21/12/2004		
F-PUAPOL004A Gather, Collate and Record Information	Acquired	Saba Config	24/05/2002		
F-QFSWPA Short Course in Workplace Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	25/05/1999		
F-PUAWER001B Identify, prevent and report potential workplace emergency situations	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		
F-PUAWER006B Lead an emergency control organisation	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		
F-VFM100 Volunteer Firefighter Minimum Skills	Acquired	F-JR-VFM-Prog	15/09/2010		

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Transcript: Paul Evans

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Actions
F-ZSKC604	Cobra Cold Cut System (CCS) Awareness		Web Based Training	21/02/2011	Successful			View Content





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Curricula: Steven McInerney

Curricula	Curriculum	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
	F-RARINC RAR INCIDENT MANAGEMENT	Acquired	Saba Config	02/07/1998		Print Export Pr Ce Cl En Tr Fo M
	F-RARORG RAR ORGANISATION	Acquired	Saba Config	02/07/1998		
	BSZ403A Review Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	F-4.04 Incident Control System - Agency Specific	Acquired	Saba Config	25/02/1999		
	F-QFST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
	F-RPL04 Demonstrate Communication Skills Required By RPL Assessors	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Assigned	F-JR-FM1- Prog			
	BSZ404A Train Small Groups	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	BSZ406A Plan a Series of Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	BSZ408A Review Training	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	F-FM1005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	Saba Config	07/12/2000		
	F-QFSA01 Introduction to Workplace Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/07/1997		
	F-QFST03 Instruction Techniques	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
	F-QFSWTR Certificate IV In Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
	F-RPL01 Explain the History, Principles and Purpose of the Recognition of Prior Learning	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	F-RPL03 Explain the RPL Assessment Methods in Relation to Queensland Fire Service Policy	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	F-RPL05 Identify the Need for Appropriate Turnaround Time Within the Total RPL Process	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	F-RPL06 Record RPL Assessment Including Review Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	BSZ401A Plan Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	F-1.25 High Angle Rescue 1	Acquired	Saba Config	03/03/2000		
	F-QFSRPL Recognition of Prior Learning Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	F-QFSWPA Short Course in Workplace Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/07/1997		
	F-RARRES RAR RESCUE TECHNIQUES	Acquired	Saba Config	02/07/1998		
	BSZ402A Conduct Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	BSZ405A Plan and Promote a Training Program	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		
	F-QFSA04 Recording and Review of Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	15/07/1997		
	F-QFST01 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
	F-QFST02 Training Preparation	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
	F-RPL02 Demonstrate and Explain a Generally Accepted Diagram Model for RPL Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	15/05/1997		
	BSZ40198 Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	06/07/2000		

<u>F-DESRAR Road Accident Rescue</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	02/07/1998
<u>F-QFSA03 Planning and Initiation of Assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	15/07/1997
<u>F-RARVEH RAR ROAD VEHICLE CONSTRUCTION</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	02/07/1998
<u>F-QFSA02 Assessment Characteristics</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	15/07/1997



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Transcript: Steven McInerney

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Completion Date before

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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Actions
BSZ50198	Diploma of Training and Assessment Systems (External)		Instructor-Led	10/05/2001	Successful			
C- HRBC010	<u>Code Of Conduct Awareness</u>	1.0	Web Based Training	01/03/2010	Successful			View Content
C- SPDC110	<u>Introduction to Privacy</u>		Web Based Training	23/11/2009	Successful			View Content
F-AFAC 5.03	Logistics Management		Instructor-Led	21/11/2003	Successful	External		
F- CSFC010	<u>QERS Awareness for PREPARE.ACT.SURVIVE.</u>		Web Based Training	02/09/2010	Successful			View Content
F- FUNIT311	Operations Doctrine - Detail		Instructor-Led	09/03/2005	Successful			
F- FUNIT393	AIIMS/IMS Logistics Officer		Instructor-Led	30/06/2006	Successful			
F- FUNIT405	Operations Mapping System		Instructor-Led	09/11/2005	Successful			
F- FUNIT462	AIIMS/IMS - Logistics Officer - Instructor		Instructor-Led	30/06/2006	Successful			
F- FUNIT489	Leadership Within a CLM Structure		Instructor-Led	20/02/2008	Successful			
F- FUNIT531	Operations Management Assessor		Instructor-Led	03/04/2007	Successful			
F- FUNIT551	Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness		Instructor-Led	28/02/2008	Successful			
F- OPRC030	Electronic Command and Control (Senior Officers)		Instructor-Led	29/09/2010	Successful			
F- SHLC015	<u>Alcohol and other drugs awareness for Supervisors</u>		Web Based Training	08/09/2010	Successful			View Content



"D-16F"

Curricula: Walter Rye

Curricula

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
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Curriculum	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
F-FSEFS Fire Scene Examination - Applied Science	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000		
F-PUAHS001B Follow Defined Occupational Health and Safety Policies and Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-PUAPOL004A Gather, Collate and Record Information	Acquired	Saba Config	24/05/2002		
F-PUAFIR201B Prevent injury	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Units	21/07/2009		
F-PUAFIR204B Respond to wildfire	Assigned	F-JR-FM1-Units			
F-PUATEA001B Work in a team	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Units	21/07/2009		
F-PUAQPE002B Operate communications systems and equipment	Acquired	F-JR-FM1-Units	21/07/2009		
BSZ402A Conduct Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ408A Review Training	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-FSEFUN Fire Scene Examination - Fundamentals	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000		
F-PUAWER005B Operate as part of an emergency control organisation	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		
BSZ403A Review Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-FSEFSM Fire Scene Examination - Scene Management	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000		
F-PUATEA001A Work in a Team	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-QFSWPA Short Course in Workplace Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	28/06/1995		
F-QFSWTR Certificate IV in Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	08/10/1997		
F-RPL06 Record RPL Assessment Including Review Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	16/10/1996		
BSZ40198 Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-FMI005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	Saba Config	23/03/1999		
F-PUAEQU001A Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-PUAFIR201A Prevent Injury	Acquired	Saba Config, F-JR-FM1-Prog	10/10/2005		
F-QFSA01 Introduction to Workplace Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	28/06/1995		
F-QFSRPL Recognition of Prior Learning Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	16/10/1996		
F-RPL02 Demonstrate and Explain a Generally Accepted Diagram Model for RPL Procedures	Acquired	Saba Config	16/10/1996		
F-RPL05 Identify the Need for Appropriate Turnaround Time Within the Total RPL Process	Acquired	Saba Config	16/10/1996		
F-PUAWER006B Lead an emergency control organisation	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009		

<u>F-PUAWER008B Confine small workplace emergencies</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009
<u>BSZ401A Plan Assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001
<u>F-21588VIC Course in Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	21/09/2007
<u>F-FSESPA Fire Scene Examination - Special Aspects</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	17/01/2000
<u>F-QFSA03 Planning and Initiation of Assessment</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	28/06/1995
<u>F-QFSA04 Recording and Review of Procedures</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	28/06/1995
<u>F-FNA460 Fire Safety Adviser</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009
<u>F-PUAWER001B Identify, prevent and report potential workplace emergency situations</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009
<u>F-PUAWER003B Manage and monitor workplace emergency procedures, equipment and other resources</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009
<u>F-PUAWER007B Manage an emergency control organisation</u>	Acquired	Caroline Fowke	03/12/2009
<u>F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)</u>	In progress (0%)	F-JR-FM1-Prog	
<u>BSZ406A Plan a Series of Training Sessions</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001
<u>F-PUAPOLO26A Conduct Interviews</u>	Acquired	Saba Config	24/05/2002

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Curricula: Bruce Smith

Curricula	Status(% complete)	Assigned by	Acquired On	Target Date	Actions
BSZ402A Conduct Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ403A Review Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-21588VIC Course in Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
F-QFST03 Instruction Techniques	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
F-FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Assigned	F-JR-FM1-Prog			X
F-FNA451 AIIMS/IMS Awareness Commissioners Requirements	Acquired	F-AIIMS Awareness	30/03/2005		
BSZ40198 Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ406A Plan a Series of Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-AIPM601 Graduate Certificate in Applied Management	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-PUAOPE008A Coordinate Resources within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
F-PUAOPE006A Control Multi-Agency Emergency Situations	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
F-QFST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
BSZ408A Review Training	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-4.04 Incident Control System - Agency Specific	Acquired	Saba Config	25/02/1999		
F-FMI005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	Saba Config	23/03/1999		
F-QFST01 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
BSZ401A Plan Assessment	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-AIPM601S2 Contemporary Issues in Public Safety	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-QFSWTR Certificate IV In Workplace Training	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
F-YBP227 Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	Saba Config	26/02/2007		
F-QFST02 Training Preparation	Acquired	Saba Config	03/02/1997		
BSZ404A Train Small Groups	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ405A Plan and Promote a Training Program	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
BSZ407A Deliver Training Sessions	Acquired	Saba Config	15/02/2001		
F-AIPM601S1 Foundations of Strategic Management	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-AIPM601S3 Strategic Planning and Performance Management	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		
F-AIPM601S4 Leadership and Organisational Change	Acquired	Saba Config	26/10/2001		



Enrolments
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Formal Education

Transcript: Bruce Smith

Completion Date after

01/01/2001



Completion Date before

01/04/2011



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Course Id	Course Title	Ver	Delivery Type	Completed	Result	Grade	Credits	Actions
C- HRBC010	<u>Code Of Conduct Awareness</u>	1.0	Web Based Training	26/08/2010	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
C- HRBC010	<u>Code Of Conduct Awareness</u>	1.0	Web Based Training	02/02/2010	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
C- HRBC010	<u>Code Of Conduct Awareness</u>	1.0	Web Based Training	21/07/2010	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
C- SPDC110	<u>Introduction to Privacy</u>		Web Based Training	27/11/2009	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
F- CSFC010	<u>QFRS Awareness for PREPARE.ACT.SURVIVE.</u>		Web Based Training	26/08/2010	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
F- FPEMC06R	<u>Senior First Aid Recertification</u>		Instructor-Led	07/11/2007	<u>Successful</u>	External		
F- FUNIT216	<u>1 Zone - Introduction to Structural Protection</u>		Instructor-Led	08/09/2004	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT295	<u>Operations Doctrine - Introduction</u>		Instructor-Led	30/03/2005	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT311	<u>Operations Doctrine - Detail</u>		Instructor-Led	30/03/2005	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT407	<u>AIIMS/IMS - Management</u>		Instructor-Led	26/02/2007	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT489	<u>Leadership Within a CLM Structure</u>		Instructor-Led	20/02/2008	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT492	<u>Introduction to Radio Communications</u>		Instructor-Led	08/09/2009	<u>Successful</u>			
F- FUNIT529	<u>Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early</u>		Web Based Training	12/08/2010	<u>Successful</u>			View Content
F- FUNIT551	<u>Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness</u>		Instructor-Led	06/03/2008	<u>Successful</u>			
F- OPRC030	<u>Electronic Command and Control (Senior Officers)</u>		Instructor-Led	29/09/2010	<u>Successful</u>			

Learning History

"D-16H"

Lindsay Hackett

Person No: 001163

Includes Profiles:

001163 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Certifications	Status	Completed	Expiry Date
FNA480 Senior First Aid	Overdue		
FNA480 Senior First Aid	Expired	19/09/2006	19/09/2009
FNA481 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation	Overdue		
FNA481 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation	Expired	19/09/2006	19/09/2007
FNA482 Advanced Resuscitation Techniques	Expired	10/03/2004	10/03/2005
ZSKR200 Senior Officers Core Skills Block 2	Assigned		
ZSKR300 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 3	Assigned		
ZSKR400 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 4	Assigned		
ZSKR500 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 5 Urban	Assigned		
ZSKR700 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 7 Urban	Assigned		

Curricula	Status	Completed
21588VIC Course in Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	26/02/2007
4.04 Incident Control System - Agency Specific	Acquired	25/02/1999
AIPM601 Graduate Certificate in Applied Management	Acquired	1/04/1999
AIPM601S1 Foundations of Strategic Management	Acquired	1/04/1999
AIPM601S2 Contemporary Issues in Public Safety	Acquired	1/04/1999
AIPM601S3 Strategic Planning and Performance Management	Acquired	1/04/1999
AIPM601S4 Leadership and Organisational Change	Acquired	1/04/1999
FMI005 Diploma of Frontline Management	Acquired	23/03/1999
FNA003 Electrical De-energising	Acquired	1/06/1994
FNA011 Introduction to Incident Control Systems - 16hrs	Acquired	5/02/1999
FNA036 Incident Control Systems - Awareness Program - 4 Hours	Acquired	5/02/1999
FNA039 Building Fire Safety - Level III	Acquired	13/09/1996
FNA089 JEST - Chemical Biological Radiation Workshop - 8 Hour	Acquired	22/07/2001
FNA450 Fire Management 1 (FM1)	Acquired	29/01/2008
FNA451 AIIMS/IMS Awareness Commissioners Requirements	Acquired	26/02/2007
HLTCPR201A Perform CPR	Assigned	
HLTFA201A Provide Basic Emergency Life Support	Assigned	
HLTFA301B Apply First Aid	Assigned	
PUAEQU001A Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment	Acquired	29/01/2008
PUAFIR201A Prevent Injury	Acquired	29/01/2008
PUAFIR204A Respond to Wildfire	Acquired	19/04/2007
PUAOHS001B Follow Defined Occupational Health and Safety Policies and Procedures	Acquired	29/01/2008

Learning History

Lindsay Hackett

Person No: 001163

Includes Profiles:
001163 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Curricula	Status	Completed
PUAOPE002A Operate Communications Systems and Equipment	Acquired	29/01/2008
PUAOPE003A Navigate in Urban and Rural Environments	Acquired	14/03/2008
PUAOPE005A Manage A Multi-Team Response	Acquired	14/09/2005
PUAOPE006A Control Multi-Agency Emergency Situations	Acquired	26/02/2007
PUAOPE007A Command Agency Personnel Within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response	Acquired	14/09/2005
PUAOPE008A Coordinate Resources within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response	Acquired	26/02/2007
PUAPOL004A Gather, Collate and Record Information	Acquired	19/02/2002
PUAPOL008A Administer Legislation to Ensure Compliance	Acquired	19/02/2002
PUAPOL026A Conduct Interviews	Acquired	19/02/2002
PUASAR001A Participate in a Rescue Operation	Acquired	29/04/2004
PUATEA001A Work in a Team	Acquired	29/01/2008
QFST01 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING	Acquired	24/12/1997
QFST02 Training Preparation	Acquired	24/12/1997
QFST03 Instruction Techniques	Acquired	24/12/1997
QFST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR	Acquired	24/12/1997
QFSWTR Certificate IV In Workplace Training	Acquired	24/12/1997
VBP227 Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS)	Acquired	26/02/2007

Courses	Status	Completed
4.04-1 Incident Control System - Agency Specific course	Successful	25/02/1999
BFSC005 Building fire safety regulations 2008	Successful	19/05/2009
FMI_UNIT1 Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT10 Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT11 Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT2 Provide Leadership in the Workplace	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT3 Establish and Manage Effective Workplace Relationships	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT4 Participate In, Lead and Facilitate Work Team	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT5 Manage Operations To Achieve Planned Outcomes	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT6 Manage Workplace Information	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT7 Manage Quality Customer Service	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT8 Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment	Successful	23/03/1999
FMI_UNIT9 Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes	Successful	23/03/1999
FPEMC03R Advanced Resuscitation Recertification	Successful	10/03/2004

Learning History

Lindsay Hackett

Person No: 001163

Includes Profiles:

001163 26 QFRS

Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Courses	Status	Completed
FPEMC06R Senior First Aid Recertification	Successful	10/03/2004
FPEMC06R Senior First Aid Recertification	Successful	19/09/2006
FPEMC09R Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Recertification	Successful	10/03/2004
FUNIT005 Electrical De-energising - Low Voltage Extraction	Successful	1/06/1994
FUNIT050 Incident Control Systems Introduction - 16 hrs	Successful	5/02/1999
FUNIT109 Incident Command Systems - Introductory - 4 hours	Successful	5/02/1999
FUNIT110 Vector Tactical Scenario	Successful	26/03/2008
FUNIT122 Building Fire Safety - Level 3	Successful	13/09/1996
FUNIT122 Building Fire Safety - Level 3	Successful	24/03/2009
FUNIT209 JEST - Chemical Biological Radiation - 8 Hour	Successful	22/07/2001
FUNIT216 I Zone - Introduction to Structural Protection	Successful	19/04/2007
FUNIT228 BA Refresher	Successful	23/11/2006
FUNIT295 Operations Doctrine - Introduction	Successful	15/08/2005
FUNIT295 Operations Doctrine - Introduction	Successful	12/09/2005
FUNIT311 Operations Doctrine - Detail	Successful	12/09/2005
FUNIT311 Operations Doctrine - Detail	Successful	14/09/2005
FUNIT314 Air Attack Guidelines for Fireline Personnel	Successful	24/07/2006
FUNIT367 Vector UK HIMO 1A	Successful	26/03/2008
FUNIT407 AIIIMS/IMS - Management	Successful	26/02/2007
FUNIT415 AIIIMS/IMS Sector Commander	Successful	6/02/2008
FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Successful	21/02/2007
FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Successful	5/09/2008
FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure	Successful	14/05/2009
FUNIT492 Introduction to Radio Communications	Successful	13/03/2007
FUNIT493 Senior Officers Command & Control Residential	Successful	12/08/2005
FUNIT529 Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early	Successful	24/09/2010
FUNIT551 Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness	Successful	1/04/2008
OPRC005 Electronic command and control	Successful	10/11/2009
OPRC030 Electronic Command and Control (Senior Officers)	Successful	29/09/2010
PERC015 Diversity in the workplace	In Progress	
PERC020 Solving people problems	In Progress	
PERC025 Leading teams	In Progress	
PERC030 Command, Leadership and Management - Level 2	Successful	5/09/2008
PUAFIR204A-1 Respond to Wildfire-assessment	Successful	19/04/2007
PUAOPE003A-1 Navigate in Urban and Rural Environments-assessment	Successful	14/03/2008

Learning History

Lindsay Hackett

Person No: 001163

Includes Profiles:

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Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Courses	Status	Completed
PUAPOL004A-1 Gather, Collate and Record Information course	Successful	19/02/2002
PUAPOL008A-1 Administer Legislation to Ensure Compliance course	Successful	19/02/2002
PUAPOL026A-1 Conduct Interviews course	Successful	19/02/2002
PUASAR001A-1 Participate in a Rescue Operation-assessment	Successful	29/04/2004
QFST01-1 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING course	Successful	24/12/1997
QFST02-1 Training Preparation course	Successful	24/12/1997
QFST03-1 Instruction Techniques course	Successful	24/12/1997
QFST04-1 ROLE OF THE MENTOR course	Successful	24/12/1997
SHLC015 Alcohol and other drugs awareness for Supervisors	Successful	24/09/2010
SPDC110 Introduction to Privacy	Successful	23/11/2009
X_FPAER04 Aerial Supervisor: 40 hour Aerial Induction Course	Successful	10/11/1995
X_FPBF01 Building Fire Safety Level 1: 40 hour Course	Successful	20/11/1995
X_FPBF02 Building Fire Safety Level 2: 80 hour Course	Successful	22/04/1996
X_FPDRV01 Defensive Driving Level 1: 8 hour Program Qld Transport	Successful	21/01/1990
X_FPDRV02 Defensive Driving Level 2: 16 hour Course	Successful	30/04/1991
X_FPDRV03 Defensive Driving Level 3A: 4 hour Course	Successful	3/12/1992
X_FPHRC30 Human Resources Courses: Anti Discrimination Training	Successful	26/04/1995
X_FPMAP04 Risk Map Monitor: Risk Mapping	Successful	2/06/1995
X_FPOTR01 Officer Training S/O: Station Officer FPO2-PP1 Theory	Successful	9/10/1989
X_FPOTR02 Officer Training S/O: Station Officer FPO2-PP1 Practical	Successful	14/10/1990
X_FPOTR04 Officer Training S/O: Station Officer FPO2-PP2 Practical	Successful	14/09/1995
X_FPRES01 RAR Level 1 Operator: 40 Hour Course	Successful	11/11/1994
X_FPWPT01 Workplace Training Level 1 Informing Others: 2 Day Course	Successful	8/09/1993
X_FPWPT02 Workplace Training Level 1 Instructing Others: 2 Day Course	Successful	28/03/1990
ZSKC100 IC500AS Guide for First Senior Officer at an Incident	In Progress	
ZSKC101 IC501AS Hierarchy of Command and Control	In Progress	
ZSKC102 IC502AS Role of Divisional Commander	In Progress	
ZSKC103 IC503AS Snr Officers Core Skills GARS	In Progress	
ZSKC104 IC504AS Duties of the Incident Controller	In Progress	
ZSKC105 IC505AS Duties of the Planning Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC106 IC506AS Role of the Operations Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC107 IC507AS Role of the Logistics Officer	In Progress	
ZSKC108 MS501AS Command, Leadership and Management Core Skills	In Progress	
ZSKC200 01 HM610AS Introduction to chemical fires	In Progress	
ZSKC201 02 HM611AS Introduction to chemical fires and managing safety	In Progress	

Learning History

Lindsay Hackett

Person No: 001163

Includes Profiles:
001163 26 QFRS


Region: QFRS South Western Region

Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

Courses	Status	Completed
ZSKC202 03 HM612AS Applying the measurements	In Progress	
ZSKC203 04 HM613AS Risk assessment and planning	In Progress	
ZSKC204 05 HM614AS Chemical detection capability	In Progress	
ZSKC205 HM500AS Managing a decontamination area	In Progress	
ZSKC206 HM615AS Health Surveillance	In Progress	
ZSKC207 HM616AS Recovery Arrangements for Major Hazmat Incident	In Progress	
ZSKC208 HM617AS Guidelines for Transport Emergency Response Plan	In Progress	
ZSKC209 HM502AS Clandestine drug lab incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC210 HM503AS Actions at white powder incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC211 HM506AS Corrosive Material Incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC212 HM507AS Radioactive materials incidents	In Progress	
ZSKC500 Senior Officer Positive Pressure Ventilation	In Progress	
ZSKC501 Senior Officer Public Safety Preservation Act	In Progress	
ZSKC600 Disaster Management Act - Legislative Changes	In Progress	
ZSKC602 Relationship between the ICC, ROCC and SOCC	In Progress	
ZSKC604 Cobra Cold Cut System (CCS) Awareness	In Progress	



"D-17"



The Department of Emergency Services Workplace Health and Safety Policy

Our commitment

To provide all our staff, volunteers and contractors, a workplace that is free from harm and encourages a culture that has safety as an absolute priority.

We believe:

- o Safety is a core value
- o Leadership is the key driver of a ZEROharm culture
- o Safety is everyone's responsibility
- o Workplace safety standards are absolute
- o Working safely is a condition of employment for everyone
- o Everyone's involvement in health and safety is essential
- o Safety training and preparedness is critical

We act on our beliefs by:

- o Communicating and consulting with stakeholders
- o Clearly stating safety roles and responsibilities
- o Continually improving of safety systems and practices
- o Complying with WHS Act, 1995 and other legislation
- o Rigorously identifying hazards and controlling risks
- o Establishing Key Performance Indicators
- o Providing early and effective rehabilitation

We internally monitor our performance through:

- o Robust internal audits against legislative requirements and AS 4801
- o Objective reporting against Key Performance Indicators in the WHS Strategy
- o Reviewing and reporting WHS performance
- o Line managers conducting safety evaluation checks

We verify our performance by:

- o External third party audits for continued accreditation to AS4801
- o Achievement of the Key Performance Indicators in the WHS Strategy

our target is **ZERO harm**



Jim Mc Gowan
Director-General




Lee Johnson AFSM MIFIREE
Commissioner
Queensland Fire
and Rescue Service




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
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ZEROharm

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Version: 1.0
Valid From: 29-08-2007
Valid To: 29-08-2009
Contact: [Workplace Health and Safety / Human Resources](#)

ZEROharm

The health and safety of all employees, volunteers and contractors is a DES core value. The recently developed DES Workplace Health and Safety Strategy 2007-2010 establishes the department's intention to vigorously pursue and integrate a best practice management approach to WH&S for employees, contractors and volunteers which systematically eliminates or mitigates workplace hazards and risks and has "ZEROharm- all injuries are preventable" as its ultimate goal.

The WH&S Strategy establishes the department's intention to vigorously pursue and integrate a best practice management approach to WH&S for staff, contractors and volunteers which systematically eliminates or reduces workplace hazards and risks.

The alignment is demonstrated by the four strategic objectives documented in [DES Workplace Health and Safety Strategy 2007-2010](#). The objectives are:

- › To eliminate workplace hazards and injuries;
- › To build WH&S leadership and workplace capability;
- › To drive a ZEROharm WH&S performance culture across DES and;
- › To establish effective WH&S governance.

For further information on ZEROharm refer to the WH&S Management Policies and Procedures.


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Associated Topics

[WHS Management System Policy Statement](#)

[Back to Top](#)

For Information contact: [Workplace Health and Safety / Human Resources](#)
Last Updated: 23-12-2008 14:39:06



1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the activation protocols for a Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC).

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to fire officers involved in the activation and operation of the ROCC.

3. GENERAL

- (a) The ROCC is essential to maintain a strategic overview of the emergency response capability and resources utilised and available across the Region and also the availability of resources from intrastate and interstate deployments.
- (b) When the ROCC is activated to assist with intrastate and interstate deployments, it will ensure that appropriate mobilisation, accountability, well-being maintenance and demobilisation of all resources is efficient and effective.
- (c) When required, the QFRS will provide a QFRS Liaison Officer to any other agency involved in managing the incident and specifically the District Disaster Management Group (if activated).
- (d) The functional standards for a ROCC are detailed in Incident Management System 2.7.2.

4. DIRECTIVE

4.1 Activation

- (a) The activation of the ROCC and the level of activation will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner after an assessment of the incident or emergent situation. For wildfire incidents, the Assistant Commissioner will consult with the Regional Manager Rural Operations in determining the level of activation and taking into consideration the Wildfire Alert Level for identified areas.
- (b) When the Assistant Commissioner activates the ROCC it is their responsibility to appoint an appropriately qualified officer as the Regional Coordinator as required. Note: for minor incidents and activations, the ROCC Manager may be appropriate to perform this role (refer Incident Management System 2.7.2).
- (c) Upon activation of the ROCC, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will notify the State Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC) and the regional Fire Communications Centre of the activation.

4.2 Stages of Activation

- (a) The activation levels of the ROCC include the following:
- Watching brief
 - Alert
 - Standby
 - Activation
- (b) **Watching Brief** - involves monitoring the warnings about a potential incident that may require activation of all or part of the ROCC. During the *watching brief* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) monitors the developing situation/s during normal business hours and under normal operating conditions, and regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events. The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC during the *watching brief*.
- (c) **Alert** - involves ensuring the ROCC is ready to be activated. During *alert* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
- Check, prepare and verify the ROCC can be activated, e.g., check phone lines, faxes, and emails.
 - Continues to monitor the developing situation/s during, either on site or off site.
 - Regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events.
 - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC.
- (d) **Standby** - involves the preparation of the ROCC to enable full activation within one (1) hour. During *standby* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
- Monitor the developing situation/s during all hours.
 - Identify staff who can attend the ROCC within one (1) hour.
 - Regularly inform the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations unfolding events.
 - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is required to be in the ROCC during all hours.
- (e) **Activation** - involves expanding the functional roles and staffing of the ROCC to meet the current and projected situation.

4.3 Stand Down (Partial and Full)

- (a) The full or partial stand down of the ROCC will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner on advice from the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) considering the size and scale of the operations.
- (b) Stand down of the ROCC may be staged by functional area at the discretion of the ROCC Coordinator (or ROCC Manager).
- (c) Debriefing of the ROCC operational activities will follow the full stand down of the ROCC.

4.4 Relationship with Incident Control Centres and SOCC

- (a) The ROCC is responsible for effective and efficient management of information from all Incident Control Centres and Incident Control Points across the region.
- (b) The ROCC does not make decisions that are directly involved with operations at an incident however the ROCC may:
 - make decisions concerning resource availability which may affect operations at an incident; and
 - monitor ICC activities and provide guidance and assistance to the ICC in meeting operational standards.
- (c) The ROCC is responsible for communicating relevant incident information to the SOCC by following the reporting protocols and timing requirements (e.g. summary of all Incident Control Centres/Point to the SOCC, etc).
- (d) A ROCC will generally not communicate with another ROCC, however it is the responsibility of the SOCC to coordinate support and information between ROCCs as necessary.

4.5 Reporting Requirements

- (a) The first report from the ROCC to the SOCC must be generated within the first two hours using the Regional Incident Summary (INCFORM 16). An Incident Action Plan or a Situation Report (INCFORM 15) received by the ROCC may also be attached.
- (b) After the first report, ongoing Regional Incident Summary Reports are required to the SOCC:
 - Every four hours; or
 - More frequently if a major change has occurred or a notifiable event such as significant injuries, fatalities, service vehicle accidents, significant structural loss, and/or stock loss.
- (c) The Regional Incident Summary Report need to indicate if the region requires additional resources, for example 4 to 48 hours in advance.


5. QFRS RELEVANCY

INCDIR 7.2	URBAN		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	iZone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓					
Not Applicable				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
May Apply*								

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES

The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides



Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
 Commissioner





Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

State Operations Directorate

Operational Guide

Incident Debriefing



Guide 7

V1.0

QFRS Operational Guides		
Guide 1	Level 1 Incident Tactical Command	
Guide 2	Management of Level 2 & 3 Incidents	
Guide 3	Control and Coordination Centres	
Guide 4	Air Attack Guidelines	
Guide 5	Breathing Apparatus Safety Teams	
Guide 6	Pre-Incident Planning	
Guide 7	Incident Debriefing (v1.0)	✓
Guide 8	Exercise Management	
Guide 9	Greater Alarm Response System	

Operational Guides have been developed to provide staff with further information and clarification on operational systems and processes.

They are designed to "bridge" the information gap between training documentation and the QFRS Operations Doctrine.

Further Operational Guides will be developed as they are required.

For further information contact the State Operations Directorate [REDACTED]

Key Points

- Incident Debriefing involves:
 - debriefing,
 - reporting, and
 - analysing collected information to identify any lesson to be learned and shared.
- 'Lessons Learned' can be applied from the local level to the entire organisation.

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QUEENSLAND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE						
Relevancy Matrix						
	Urban Fire		Rural Fire			
	Full-time	Part-time	Class 4 Brigade	Class 3 Brigade	Class 2 Brigade	Class 1 Brigade
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Not Applicable						
May Apply*						

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

Prepared by: Bruce Budge
Contributors: Kevin Walsh, John Harrison

Authorised by: John Cawcutt
 Executive Manager State Operations Directorate

FOREWORD

Every incident together with its relevant response has the potential to improve QFRS operations and assist in ensuring the safety of all Queenslanders. We can learn from the collective experiences of Queensland firefighters so that the best approach for emergency response is identified. This learning will also provide, in the environment of continuous improvement, a safer workplace and work practices for all personnel.

For nearly all operational personnel there have been moments of reflection in where we ask ourselves after attending incidents "Could I have done better?" This simple question is the first step to the process of continuous improvement for the entire organisation. If there is the recognition that there may have been a better way of doing what we do, then it must be captured and made available across the organisation.

No review of operational performance is the forum to lay blame or to criticise individuals; rather it is to review the organisation's performance to enable actions to be taken to improve deficiencies and to recognise areas of strength. The process must be exploratory so that the reason and thought process behind actions taken can be extracted. The debriefing officer should probe and ascertain exactly why individuals and groups pursued a particular course of action.

It must be recognised that when an incident response is effective and innovation for a "better way" has occurred that it must be captured and shared across the organisation for the benefit of all.

From this point, a total package of information is developed for application across aspects of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service - from training to operational response and on to community safety and education. This information will be made available externally (in response to requests or specific need) for other agencies or groups in a state, national or international sphere.

This Operational Guide has been developed to provide all QFRS staff with a reliable and consistent method for debriefing of incident response and training. Debriefing and incident analysis will continue to be a valuable tool for the QFRS and other emergency services for refining and improving their operational response procedures and incident management systems.



Iain S MacKenzie AFSM
Deputy Commissioner

PURPOSE

The QFRS has embraced a knowledge management philosophy to ensure that firefighters and support personnel across the state are encouraged to share information and pass on the legacy of their experiences.

A 'Centre for Lessons Learned' process is being developed to capture both negative and positive experiences of personnel at emergency situations. This process begins with personnel being aware of their immediate environment, their actions and the resultant outcomes. This situational awareness is crucial when recalling the "cause and effect" scenario that will be used in the operational debrief.

This guide has been developed to give personnel a greater understanding of the process of knowledge management and learning from operational response.

For incident analysis to be effective, various tools for review such as forms and report formats are to be completed appropriately as per the suggested examples provided in this guide.

Future developments include a lessons learned package for specific incidents, inclusion of "lessons learned" into firefighter competency maintenance training and a web-based, experience capturing database for QFRS personnel.

This guide involves other knowledge management approaches from within the organisation to improve understanding, learning and service delivery.


ESTABLISHING KNOWLEDGE

Incident analysis enables the firefighters involved in an incident to identify information about what happened, why it happened, what went well, what needs improvement and what lessons can be learned and shared from the experience.

The process begins before the first firefighter arrives at the incident. It starts with having knowledge about what are the incidents most likely to occur within a firefighter's area of responsibility.

It involves persons involved in pre-incident activities as well as those directly involved in operational response. It also involves any persons that can facilitate the process and those with expert knowledge relevant to the type of incident.

QFRS Incident Analysis System



WHY DEBRIEF AN INCIDENT

An Incident Debrief is an overall assessment of the effectiveness of any incident planning and the operational response and recovery. The review encompasses debriefing, incident investigation and cause determination, environmental, community and organisational incident impact, near-miss reporting and inter-agency collaborations where applicable.

The review material and findings will (where relevant) be used for any enhancement of firefighter safety, equipment, operational response, and community service and may include any of the following:

- safety issues (near misses, reporting of injuries)
- human impacts (stress, fatigue and attitude)
- communications (mobilisation, incident ground, between various centres and external)
- command (roles and responsibilities)
- objectives
- tactics and strategies
- coordination of QFRS and external agencies response and actions
- performance and use of equipment
- procedural adherence issues
- pre-incident planning
- organizational issues (cultural problems)
- influences of the environment
- technical performance and tactics used
- innovations
- lessons learned
- chronological report of events

Debriefs are conducted to ensure consistency in the process of gathering information and then presenting it for review to identify any potential improvement in service delivery. Consistency in debriefs can be achieved through the use of the SMEACS format - as in briefings.

As identified in the Operations Doctrine, there are numerous types of incidents requiring varying levels of response and varying levels of escalation.

This is reflected in the manner in which the debrief is conducted - ranging from an informal debrief to a formal debrief and investigation. The first consideration is the location and the timeframe in which the debrief is conducted.

WHERE TO DEBRIEF

The options available to the Officer-in-Charge include:

- Informally on-site with crews and other agencies involved in the response;
- Informally at the home station with available crews and other agencies; or
- Formally at a time and a location in which all personnel involved and specific personnel who can offer additional input can attend without interruption (consider alternate response strategies).

Each situation has its strengths and weaknesses in achieving a successful improvement from any identified lesson in relation to the response to the incident.

Debriefing during the course of a long duration incident such as a campaign wildfire would be best managed by an informal on-site debrief at a suitable time such as crew changeovers. The information captured is compared against the broader incident objectives within the incident action plan for that operational period.

This has an immediate impact as it will be used to review the incident action plan for all subsequent operational periods.

On-site

On-site debriefs are conducted informally with the immediate crew members involved in the incident. These are typically for incidents of a short duration where local resources were used. On-site debriefs can be done at the conclusion of the response, after a significant event during an incident or at the demobilisation of personnel during an incident - at a time that does not compromise operational activities. On-site debriefs are best suited for a tactical, task or personal evaluation of operations.

Most information will come from personal observations and experiences. The Officer-in-Charge may use *Incident Debriefing Worksheet (INCWS 11)* or a simple 'mud map' to examine the incident particulars.

Consideration must be shown when conducting on-site debriefs in that respect must be shown to members of the public or persons involved who may be nearby.

At Station

These debriefs are conducted at station after the incident where the format can still be informal. Where possible, such debriefs should involve all attending crews and members of other involved agencies. Some of the techniques suggested in this guide could be used to ensure that relevant information that can be passed on is captured.

It is expected that this will be the most common format. It may require the Officer-in-Charge or Incident Controller to complete an Operations Doctrine *INCFORM 09* which will be passed on to the immediate supervisor.

The debriefing officer can use a whiteboard or data projector to present information to personnel. The information being displayed may be a building or street layout or a map of the area involved together with a written sequential explanation of the incidents events or tactical benchmarks.

A Specific Location

For a formal debrief, there is time available to gather information, complete the Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident*, collect information from other agencies (if possible request personnel from other agencies to attend and present information) and reports from other areas such as Community Safety and the Fire Investigation and Research Unit.

This debrief may not require the presence of all operational response crews as the focus is more on the strategic considerations. Operational crews and their Officer-in-Charge may submit *INCFORM 09* relevant to their involvement to the Debrief Officer.

The debrief will be best facilitated by a venue where information technology such as computers and data projectors are used to present the information to the attendees.

The quality of an Incident Debrief depends on the willingness of participants to be open; this is unlikely to happen if they fear they are going to be unfairly assessed or blamed.

DEBRIEF TYPE

Debriefing occurs at different stages of an incident and may require a special approach to how the debriefing process is managed and its objective. The type of debrief will be influenced by the complexity, duration and the impact of the incident on the organisation and the community.

Hot / Shift

A hot / shift debrief can be conducted with personnel at the conclusion of a shift or work period or during a shift immediately after a significant event or a near miss situation. This information from this type of debrief may be used to improve or adjust the Incident Action Plan, providing an opportunity to review work undertaken throughout the shift, to identify any issues. The result can then be addressed and reported to the appropriate supervisors and personnel participating in the subsequent shift.

Post-Incident (Formalised)

A post-incident debrief is conducted after the incident with the purpose of assessing the conduct or results of an operation. At a Level 1 incident, this debrief will usually occur immediately after the incident. In Level 2 and 3 incidents, the debrief may be conducted some weeks or months after the event. A post-incident debrief may be conducted at the crew, agency or inter-agency level.

Tour / Campaign

A tour or campaign debrief is conducted when crews have operated at a location away from their home base (e.g. region, interstate and overseas). The purpose is to determine if there were any issues associated with mobilisation and logistical arrangements regarding the tour (e.g. transportation) and to capture information and learn organisationally from the experience.

Agency-specific

An agency-specific debrief is conducted at an organisational level after a major event or at the end of a fire season or event. This type of debrief provides an opportunity for an organisation to identify any emerging trends and can be part of an ongoing organisational improvement process. A campaign debrief can also involve an interagency or community component if required.

Inter-agency

Individual agencies do not respond alone to the majority of incidents; debriefs provide opportunities to improve joint operations. These debriefs normally occur at the higher or strategic levels of most interagency operations but can occur at any of the three incident levels relevant to the involvement of the agencies. Care must be taken to respect the intent and responsibilities of other agencies, organisations and individual persons that were involved. They are excellent forums to learn more from other agencies and to develop relationships across the agencies involved.

Critical Incident Stress

Critical incident stress debriefs (CISD) are conducted by personnel with specialist training and expertise in this particular type of debrief.

This Operational Guide **does not** provide you with the expertise to undertake a CISD. The QFRS Operations Doctrine details the criteria for responding FireCare in the aftermath of a critical incident (QFRS Operations Doctrine *INCDIR 13.1 FireCare Activation*) and further information can be obtained from FireCare.

FACILITATING DEBRIEFS

The value of using independent facilitators is the provision of a comprehensive process and one that is conducted in an open and honest forum.

The following facilitators are appropriate for the different incident levels as listed below:

- **Level 1 incident:** the Incident Controller should be the facilitator.
- **Level 2 incident:** the facilitator may be a Senior Officer from a different area or region.
- **Level 3 incident:** the facilitator may be appointed by the Assistant Commissioner or above.

For level 2 and level 3 incident, the appointed facilitators should be persons not closely involved in the incident; they can remain objective and neutral but must have a detailed knowledge of operational procedures, guidelines and the organisation as a whole.

During a review into the QFRS response to major incidents, research was conducted into various debriefs and reports. These debriefs and reports from various agencies and sections varied greatly in their structure, detail and depth of discussion.

Other issues identified included:

- questions raised over how "critically reflective" some people were as facilitators of debriefs: and
- the accuracy of information contained in reports generated from the debrief back to their respective areas to be addressed.

Whilst it is an improbable proposition to suggest that every debrief should be conducted by an independent person, some organisations are now appointing facilitators for major and significant incidents. The main functions of the independent facilitator are to:

- help the team to learn by creating an environment leading to answers, insight and the consideration of contentious issues;
- ensure every person present has the opportunity to contribute; and
- assist in creating the right environment, ensuring there is a "no blame" mentality present.

Any debrief should be carried out in a manner that can be described as being "critically reflective" yet not critical.

PRESENTING DEBRIEF INFORMATION

When presenting debrief information at a station, a standard approach should be adopted to ensure consistency across the organisation. The presentation of information should follow these guidelines in order to analyse the incident, actions of personnel and the degree in which objectives were achieved:

1. information on pre-incident planning;
2. notification and response details;
3. chronological details of events within the incident;
4. details of approach, initial actions, information gathering and the development of the Incident Action Plan (IAP);
5. the decision-making process used and the tactical information involved;
6. layout of incident (hand-drawn map, site layout, building plans, topographical map);
7. comments and observations from other agencies (when available); and
8. post-incident recovery details.

The debrief techniques in this guide will assist the debriefing officer to get the most out of the experiences, both negative and positive, of the personnel involved.

The format below is a suggested layout that can be adjusted to suit each individual incident. The layout is to be used after an incident as a prompt to assist in the presentation of consistent information.

DEBRIEFING WORKSHEET				Post Incident Analysis Report Required				
Incident				INFORM 09 <input type="checkbox"/>		IMS 2.10 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Location				Completed by:				
S A F E T Y	R	P	A	Incident Action Plan		Incident Times		Significant events
	E	A	C	Situation		Time of call		
	C	T	T	Mission		Acknowledged		
	E	T	T	Execution		Arrival		
	O	T	T	Administration		Stop		
	V	T	T	Command/Comms		Under control		
	S	T	T	Safety		Code 4		
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM				QFRS RESOURCES				
Incident Controller				CALLSIGN	CREW	ONSITE	OFF-CALL	
BA Entry Officer								
Safety Advisor								
OPS Officer								
Plan Officer								
Logs Officer								
AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE				ON-SITE				
QAS								
QPS								
Elect.								
LESSONS LEARNED		ACTION REQUIRED		RESPONSIBLE PERSON				

This work sheet can be accessed through the Desportal - QFRS Knowledge - Operations Doctrine - Incident Worksheets - *INCWS 11 Incident Debriefing*.

Debriefing worksheets may be used in conjunction with the incident worksheets (e.g. High-rise, Wildfire) to assist in presenting the Incident Debrief. This worksheet can be printed in a large poster size or alternatively used electronically with a data projector.

INFORMATION SOURCES

A range of documents can be used to present information. Their use can ensure a comprehensive operational debrief leading to an overall improvement in QFRS service delivery.

1. INCFORM 09
2. IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident
3. Aust. Incident Recording System (AIRS) Report
4. First Attending Officer's Report
5. Near-miss Reports
6. Workplace Health and Safety Report
7. Coroners Report
8. Media Articles (Print, Photos and Audio-Visual)
9. Community Safety Report
10. Equipment Fault and Performance Reports
11. Fire Investigation Reports
12. Wordback transcripts
13. Entries into official notebooks
14. Incident Action Plans
15. All unit logs
16. Community Safety Reports
17. All relevant maps
18. Information from external sources (other state, national or international agencies or organisations)

Information is gathered from these sources and compared against current QFRS Doctrine, operational plans, practices, policies and procedures to ensure personnel operate in the safest, most effective and efficient emergency service possible.

CONDUCTING A DEBRIEF

When debriefs are to be conducted, the intent of the debrief, the objectives of the facilitator and rules of behaviour for the group must be communicated to the personnel involved.

The considerable information presented by the facilitator, should flesh out larger amounts of information, experience, opinions and lessons drawn out from the group. It is this process that validates the effectiveness of the response, identifying meaningful recommendations and lessons learned.

While the following process is a guide only, it can be adapted to suit the specific requirements of the situation:

1. Set a time, date and location for the debrief relevant to the incident and the type of debrief required.
2. Identify the persons required to attend relevant to the incident type and sufficient time for specific persons to schedule attendance.
3. Prepare the debrief location relevant to type of debrief, incident, personnel and facilities required such as whiteboards, data projects and personal requirements such as travel time to the location, catering, toilets or accommodation if needed.
4. Greet personnel and record their attendance in the minutes of the meeting if this applicable for the type of debrief. In opening the debrief, take the opportunity to state the rules of behaviour for the group.
5. Use maps, Incident Forms and building plans to describe incident actions and developments, ensuring that all personnel can see and hear the information being presented. As information is presented, check with personnel that it is valid information.
6. Depending on the situation, the debrief may involve
 - open discussion as the information is presented
 - invitation to the group to randomly give information or opinions
 - structured order of responses for specific personnel/roles
 - open discussion after the information is presented.
7. By involving all personnel encourage an environment of succinct, calm and respectful dialogue that promotes a sense of value. A calm and respectful facilitator will encourage calm and respectful group participation.
8. Use the debrief techniques suggested in this guide to capture information, ensuring that it is recorded for further analysis and validation in the QFRS reporting process.
9. When required, follow-up on critical issues with feedback to the individual or group involved.
10. At the end of the debrief, summarise the process and openly thank everybody for their attendance and involvement.

DEBRIEFING TECHNIQUES

Certain techniques can help a facilitator to ensure the effective capture of information from personnel.

Listed below in italics are some suggested communication strategies that the person conducting the debrief can use to facilitate the process.

Setting the Atmosphere

"This is a critique not criticism. It's an open, honest and professional discussion. It is about helping others faced with similar situations in the future."

Restating a Point

This is used to summarise a point, made by a participant that may have not been clear to everyone. *"So you're saying you think the backburn should have started higher up the ridge, and that would have prevented....."*

Handling the Upward Delegation of Blame

Participants will often blame the "system" for being broken, and that causes failures at their level. *"OK, I agree, but that's out of our hands. We still have to live with the fact that this issue places us in increased risk. So what can we work on at our level to improve?"*

Bringing Out the Opinion of the "Quiet Ones"

Some people just don't process through discussion, but they usually are listening closely and when asked have good insights. Wait until a little later in the debrief and then ask them by name open-ended questions. *"Well Ken, you were up on the road. What was your perspective on this?"*

Interrupting a Dominant Member of the Group

Some people just naturally like to talk. There is also a tendency for a leader to give all the answers. Interrupt them tactfully with a comment like: *"I'm concerned we're going too deep into this issue without getting any additional input. Let's hear from...."*

Pursuing an Issue to its Root Cause

The Japanese have a saying, 'Always ask "why" five times'. It's a good technique to make sure that you're really getting to the root cause of an issue. *"So...the torches weren't ready because they didn't get fuelled. And we've heard they didn't have fuel because the fuel cans were on the other rig. What caused that to happen?"*

Using “Negative Polling” to Ask Questions

This is an effective way to get quick agreement/consensus. It is faster than making sure everyone agrees. *“Is anyone opposed to moving on to question #3 now?”* or *“Does anyone disagree that that was the plan, yet this is what really happened?”*

Avoiding Win/Lose Decisions

Look for a win-win situation with the group. *“Does it have to be one way or the other? Could we agree to both?”*

Building Up or Eliminating Ideas

This technique merges complementary pieces from different ideas or highlights agreement on pieces of an idea when the total idea is not agreed upon. *“So is there anything you could add to that suggestion to make it work for you?”* or *“What could we delete from the idea to make it work better?”*

Asking Open-Ended Questions

This allows for a variety of possible responses while inviting involvement and participation. *“Why do you think that happened?”* or *“What could we do differently next time?”*

Backcasting

Relate events to subsequent results using hindsight in supportive manner to highlight alternative courses of action.

When the Group is in Denial

One or more people think (let's use “communications”) went fine and are not discussing the issues. In this order:

- Act somewhat surprised. *“Really? Interesting. Are there any other thoughts on how communications went today?”*
- Spur discussion with one of your own observations: *“OK, I saw a couple messages that didn't get passed to the crews holding the road. What was the plan there?”*
- Press a bit firmer: *“OK, what I'm hearing is that you would do this exactly the same way again?”*

Emotion and Memory

The emotional aspect of an experience is a key point if you want to discuss human performance factors, and it is important for effective adult learning. Most people will not “technically” remember a specific situation that they were confused about. The event is then remembered within the context of that emotion.

Terms like: "frustrated", "confused", "unsure", "apprehensive", and "pissed off" can indicate the emotional manifestation of a command breakdown. As time goes by, the emotional aspect of the event fades and the event itself can be lost or reduced to its technical aspect only.

Finally, do one of two things. If the issue is minor, let it pass. If the issue is important, then you may have to make the point blank observation yourself: "OK. *You're saying communications went fine. I saw two specific instances where we had a near-miss and that information did not get to either Mike or Susan. You're telling me that is not a problem? What would have happened if we didn't get that Helitack drop?*"

Techniques prepared by: Mark Smith/Mission-Centered Solutions
and Mike DeGrosky/ The Guidance Group, December 2003

REMEMBER, WHEN IN A DEBRIEF.

"Decisions made in real time are never perfect so don't second guess an operation from an armchair."

The Bourne Ultimatum 2007

REPORTING

For reporting of minor and major incidents a standard process is to be followed:

Minor Incident

At a minor incident the Incident Controller:

1. conducts debrief on-site or at station using QFRS Debriefing Format;
2. includes observations, an assessment of the Incident Action Plan and feedback from personnel including other agencies (if available);
3. completes *INCFORM 09* as per Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident*;
4. submits the *INCFORM 09* to Area Office, then to the Regional Office and on to the State Operations Directorate; and
5. review the current Local Action Plan (or develop a new Local Action Plan if required);

Major Incident

At a major incident the Incident Controller:

1. debriefs (Hot, Shift or Tour) are conducted at shift changeovers and when personnel are demobilised (Strike Teams, Inter-region and Inter-state);
2. includes observations, an assessment of the Incident Action Plan and feedback from personnel including other agencies;
3. requests frontline supervisors (Strike-team and Task-force Leaders, Sector or Division Commanders) to complete and submit *INCFORM 09*;
4. review the current Local Action Plan (or develop a new Local Action Plan if required);
5. complete, dependant on the incident size, complexity, duration, operation performance and impact on the community, an Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report*; and
6. submits the *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report* to the regional office which then passes the report onto the State Operations Directorate.

The facilitator for the formal debrief should be a Senior Officer neutral to the incident. Senior Officers from a neighbouring area or region should conduct Level 2 incidents whilst facilitators for level 3 incidents should be appointed by the Assistant Commissioner or above, (Post-incident or Campaign) for the total incident response at a station or a specific location

Information from the debrief and finalised reports is made available to the relevant research and improvement areas of the QFRS

WRITTEN REPORTS

Within the QFRS Operations Doctrine are three processes for writing reports detailing information that may be used to improve operational performance.

1. Operations Doctrine Feedback Form (General Section of the Operations Doctrine)
2. Post-Incident Analysis INCFORM 09
3. Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident*

Operations Doctrine Feedback Form

The form is used to give comment on existing documents within the Operations Doctrine based on the experiences, research or opinion of the person submitting the form.

Post-Incident Analysis Incident Form 09*

The minor incident Operational Analysis will occur at every incident:

- where there has been an incident-related fatality or serious injury;
- where an incident results in substantial property loss;
- where there are unusual circumstances that may provide learnings for others;
or
- as request by an Inspector or higher ranked Officer.

The Post-incident Analysis Report (*INCFORM 09*) is the template used for the Minor Incident Report, which is to be forwarded to the relevant Senior Officer, who will then forward a copy to the State Operations Directorate via *QFRS Knowledge* for review.

PURPOSE:

This form is used at incidents to capture information relevant to any operational review for the particular type of incident. It can be used if required by Division or Sector Commanders to support the Operational Analysis Report (IMS 2.10) for Level Two -Three incidents.

PREPARATION:

The report is completed by the Incident Controller for Level One Incidents after the completion of the incident response. If requested by the Incident Controller, this form would be completed by Unit Leaders, Division or Sector Commanders on the completion of their duties for that operational period.

MANAGEMENT:

The report is submitted to the Senior Officer responsible for the location in which the incident occurred. If completed by Division or Sector Commanders at request of the Incident Controller it is to be included in the Operational Analysis Report (IMS 2.10) for Level Two -Three Incidents. The form will be sent from the Senior Officer's office to the State Operations Directorate via *QFRS Knowledge* for review.

*QFRS Operational Guide Two

Provided below is a completed *Incident Form 09* as an example to assist with the process of collecting information.

 POST-INCIDENT ANALYSIS MINOR REPORT					
INCFORM 09	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Wildfire</td> <td style="width: 40%;">AIRS REPORT No.: 503778</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PREPARED BY: Terry Hunn</td> <td>DATE: 03/11/05</td> </tr> </table>	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Wildfire	AIRS REPORT No.: 503778	PREPARED BY: Terry Hunn	DATE: 03/11/05
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Wildfire	AIRS REPORT No.: 503778				
PREPARED BY: Terry Hunn	DATE: 03/11/05				
Call Details <small>Attach Firecom Word Back and AIRS Report.</small>	Multiple triple 0 calls from residents in the Sandy Creek area.				
Previous Incident History <small>Attach or refer to previous Post-Incident Analysis Reports.</small>	Fire in same area in 2004 with similar resourcing				
Pre-Incident Planning <small>e.g., details of exercises, inspections; attach LAP (if available).</small>	Izone LAP				
Size-up / Risk Assessment <small>Describe initial observations and information gathered on-site</small>	Fire burning in inaccessible areas but predict wind change will bring front close to properties				
Incident Action Plan <small>Describe IAP; and attach (if available)</small>	IAP attached for first operational period indicating water bombing for inaccessible areas with fire breaks and back burning to support this action				
Strategies and Tactics <small>e.g., operational mode, weight of initial attack, water supply, scene security, internal attack, exposure protection, line placement, salvage, ventilation</small>	Two helicopters working northern flank (greatest risk to properties on this flank) and four rural brigades supported by council earthmovers to establish fire breaks and conduct back burn				
Was the incident unique in any way?	no				
Lessons Identified	LAP needed to be updated to indicate new subdivision				
Innovations with procedures, resources and equipment used?	Two portable water dams used to increase attack rate.				
Supply any information to support INCFORM 09	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEBRIEF MATERIAL (e.g. INCWS 11 summary) <input type="checkbox"/> MEDIA (e.g. digital, video) <input type="checkbox"/> Other information				
FORWARD TO AREA DIRECTOR					
NAME: Terry Hunn DATE: 09/11/05	COMMENTS (Area Director):				
EMAIL TO [REDACTED]					

IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report

1. A major incident Operational Analysis will occur:
 - at Level 2 incidents where there is significant impact
 - at every Level 3 Incident, or
 - as required by the Assistant Commissioner.
2. Incident Management Team members and individual commanders can submit a *INCFORM 09* for activities carried out during their shift period in their area of responsibility; this can be used as information in the major incident report
3. The Operational Analysis and data collection process should endeavor to address each subject heading and sub points listed, but should not be restricted to the items listed.
4. The report is to be structured in accordance with the sections detailed in the Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident* and covered under the main headings listed below.
 - Summary
 - Scope
 - Incident Description
 - Pre-Incident Planning
 - Response
 - Recovery and Rehabilitation
 - Coordination
 - Other Issues
 - Recommendation / Action Plans
 - Signature / Approval

QFRS Commissioner's Request

To facilitate the process of improving performance in delivering service to the community of Queensland, the QFRS will seek to learn from its experiences. The task of completing post incident reports lies with Incident Controller; however, if an incident occurs and a report is not submitted, the Commissioner of the QFRS will request the relevant Region or Business Unit to provide information for incident analysis. In accordance with Operations Doctrine *IMS 2.10 Post-Incident Analysis*, a request can be made and will be forwarded to the specified Assistant Commissioner as per the following template.

Request for Post Incident Analysis Report

Assistant Commissioner
 Region
 (Address)
 (Date)

Dear *****,

The completion of a *'Post Incident Analysis Report'* is a key strategy in the "lessons learned" process for improving QFRS operational performance. Post incident reports provide important information for the review of command and control arrangements, training, legislation, safety issues and operational procedures.

Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 details the incidents where a report should be submitted to the State Operations Directorate. These incidents include:

- Where there has been a fatality or serious injury;
- Substantial property loss;
- Unusual circumstances that may provide learnings for others; and
- On request of the Inspector or Superintendent

An incident has occurred in your region that may provide important learnings that can be shared with all QFRS operational personnel.

Details	
Region/District	
Location	
Date	
Type of Incident	
Firecall Number	

Can you please arrange for the Incident Controller for the above incident to complete a Post Incident Analysis Report (INCFORM 09) and submit it to QFRS Knowledge Management; [REDACTED] at their earliest convenience.

Regards

LEE A JOHNSON AFSM MIFireE
 Commissioner

REPORT IMPLEMENTATION

The Operational Analysis (Major or Minor) will generally be undertaken by the Incident Controller or by person/s as designated by the Assistant Commissioner. On completion, it will be forwarded through the chain of command to QFRS State Operations Directorate via *QFRS Knowledge* for review.

The QFRS State Operations Directorate will determine whether the matter relates only to the region and can be addressed regionally or is a State matter. If determined that it is a State matter, it will be referred to the appropriate department for inclusion or adjustment to:

- QFRS training material
- Operations Doctrine and other QFRS documentation
- Fleet, equipment and other resources
- Community Education and Safety

If the issue has a multi-agency impact, then it may be referred to the Deputy Commissioner or relevant regional planning and coordination team to conduct a review and implement recommendations for improvement as necessary.

If the experience of a single firefighter at one incident can be used to improve the safety of all firefighters then this experience must be recorded and passed on to where those changes can be made for the benefit of all.

LESSONS LEARNED

Firefighters respond to a wide range of operations and while there are broad commonalities that exist, every incident presents many variables. These variables cannot be addressed by set procedures and must be approached initially on a generic level. By understanding the generic approach, firefighters can combine existing knowledge with the incident specific information to resolve the incident.

This combination leads to an innovative approach resulting in a positive lesson learned for the organisation. Where the activities at any level (strategic, tactical or task focused) highlight a critical error in the incident response, a negative aspect which can be corrected by the organisation is thereby revealed.

Lessons learned, both positive and negative, are the result of experiences. They can be of value to the organisation only if personnel are empowered to present them in an honest and factual account of the incident.

Any experience which is recounted in an environment where there is fear of punitive actions, personnel bias or unsubstantiated claims will not assist in the process of continuous improvement.

To identify the lessons from an incident, firefighters must first maintain situational awareness during the incident and then actively participate in the debriefing process. By doing this, observations are packaged together with pre-incident planning, information from the incident and interaction from external agencies and other involved persons.

Near- Miss

All incidents that occur within the DES or through DES sponsored activities where work-related fatality, injury, illness, dangerous occurrence, near miss, environmental incident, or property damage has resulted are to be reported.

A near-miss is an event observed during the incident; it involves an action or a series of preceding actions that were identified as having the potential to cause injury or death.

Near-miss reporting is to be undertaken in accordance with *DES Incident Reporting & Investigation Policy (OH/C15.0)* and should be included in debrief material to source the actions that lead to the near-miss. It can highlight the effect on operations if the event identified as a near-miss were to be actualised.

An operational near-miss can result in objectives being compromised such as when hose lines are placed ineffectively allowing fire spread or an incomplete backburn with the potential to allow the spread of a bushfire.

Innovation

Firefighters are practical people who are quick to realise when there is an easier and more effective way of achieving a task. These improvements must be captured, evaluated and introduced into the organisation's response profile.

VALIDATION

Four simple questions can be used to identify whether lessons can be learnt from the response:

1. What was supposed to happen?
2. What actually happened?
3. Why were there differences?
4. What did we learn?

From these questions, especially if there are considerable differences between what was supposed to happen and what actually happened, the lessons learned can be highlighted.

It is then that the organisation can consider its response options in possible improvements using the following categories:

Sustain

The response measures that the organisation has in place and have been validated by the recent experience are suitable for any future response. This directly links to relevant documents incorporating all policy, procedure and training material to support issue management (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Review

The response measures were inadequate or challenged in their ability to manage and effectively resolve the incident but only require nominal improvement, learning from the recent experience. This directly links to relevant documents with feedback from analysis to improve documentation during annual review process (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Develop

Personnel encountered a situation where organisational capacity was non-existent and the response was by an ad-hoc approach with the organisation learning to prevent a reoccurrence of not being prepared. Specific gap in knowledge identified and analysis of issue conducted to develop policy, procedure, training material and the implementation of the information across QFRS (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Pass On

Information and response indicate that the issue is not the responsibility of this organisation but documentation has to be completed to inform other DES Divisions and/or other Government Department of identified impact.

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

From this information and research on best operational practice, the QFRS will ensure increased safety for all personnel and continuous improvement in service delivery.

Effective learning draws upon the principle that the less time that elapses between discussing a lesson and applying it at work, the more effective the application and the overall improvement.

The **State Operations Directorate** maintains information within the **Operations Doctrine** and **Field Incident Guide** within the established annual review process. When information is identified as being vital for safety and operational effectiveness, **Safety Bulletins** and **Standing Orders** provide the temporary communications until the information is captured in the next review process.

In the practical environment of emergency response we must experience the lesson before teaching it to others so that the benefit to all is built on the cost of few.

Safety Bulletins

A Safety Bulletin is used to communicate critical/urgent information swiftly and to alert QFRS personnel to operational safety hazards, near misses, and innovations generated from the fireground and is outside the annual document review period.

In a generic sense, Safety Bulletins communicate the actions required to eliminate or manage the risk - then improve performance delivery by identifying a better practice and sharing the knowledge.

They may be revoked only by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or moved to an appropriate permanent location during annual review such as the Operations Doctrine.

Safety Bulletins can be initiated by Region, Area, or Headquarter Business Unit, after the Assistant Commissioner's approval, and then forwarded to the State Operations Directorate for issue.

Standing Orders

Standing Orders are a multi-purpose document used to communicate only critical/urgent information, new/changed policy, instruction or information relevant to QFRS operational and/or business functions;

Standing Orders enable the Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner to communicate to the relevant personnel, information that is not currently covered within policy, doctrine, business rules, templates etc. Standing Orders are used outside the annual review period or as a reminder of information needed to control a specific situation.