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Sent: Sunday, 16 January 2011 4:28 PM
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Cc: michael.lyons [REDACTED] Mike Foster; Elaina Smouha; peter.allen [REDACTED]
Subject: Cabinet in confidence - Ministerial brief outline
Attachments: Ministerial brief - contents outline.docx; Ministerial Briefing Note January 17 2011 Final Draft for distribution.doc; Jan 2011 Flood Event_Ver 1_draft for distribution.docx

Please see attached draft with attachment.

In relation to the draft contents outline sent yesterday, the following is a cross reference FYI.

The attached Ministerial Briefing Note addresses the questions contained in the Ministerial Information Request as follows:

- 1) Design of Dam – Storages/Spillway upgrade

Refer Section 1

- 2) "The Flood Event" – Q&A

- a. Chronology - High level time step of events and significant decision making/changes – more detailed time step information for Tuesday afternoon (i.e. what was the BOM forecast at the time, narrow peak etc.)

Refer Section 2.5

- b. How does Wivenhoe Dam work as a flood mitigator?

Refer Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 3.1

- c. What are the factors being balanced when making decisions about the amount of dam releases? To what extent does information from the Bureau of Meteorology/rain gauges influence decisions? How reliable is this information?

Refer Sections 3.1 and 3.2

- d. Statistics on how much did Wivenhoe Dam knock off the flood peak.

Refer Section 2.1

- e. What would have happened if Wivenhoe Dam had not been built and we only had Somerset Dam? What damage would have been caused compared to what has currently been experienced (damage statistics)?

Refer Sections 2.1 and 2.2

- f. If we have undertaken pre-emptive dam releases to bring Wivenhoe Dam's full supply level down to lower than what we had maintained (i.e. 60%), what would have been the river height for the period that this flood event occurred?

Refer Section 2.4

- g. If pre-emptive dam releases would not have made a difference, why? (i.e. why did we not release earlier?)

Refer Section 2.4

- h. Why was Wivenhoe Dam only allowed to rise up to 191% and not 230%?

Refer Section 2.2

- i. What is the fuse plug and why did it need to be maintained?

Date:

Exhibit Number:

5/2/1069

QFCI

Refer Section 2.3

- j. What damage or town isolation occurred during the Wivenhoe Dam releases that occurred since October 2010?

Refer Section 2.4

- k. Did Seqwater have time to reduce the dam level between the 5 events? If so, would it have made a difference to this flood event?

Refer Section 2.4

3) The Flood Mitigation Manual

Refer Section 3.1

- a. Describe the decision making framework - Four strategies

Refer Section 3.2

- b. How is the Manual designed to work?

Refer Section 3.2

- c. History of Flood Mitigation Manual updates and peer review – who was on the panels, studies that fed into previous versions of the Manual and who was involved in these studies?

Refer Section 3.1

- 4) Regulatory context - *Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008* (Information provider: Peter Allen - DERM)

Refer Section 4

Regards, Peter.

Peter Borrows
Chief Executive Officer
Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority *trading as Seqwater*



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From: Elaina Smouha [mailto: [REDACTED]]
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michael.lyons [REDACTED] Elaina Smouha
Subject: Cabinet in confidence - Ministerial brief outline

Dear All

3/02/2012

To assist, attached is a Ministerial brief outline as per our recent teleconference, for Monday's Emergency Cabinet meeting. It also records those who will be providing information for the Background and Flood Mitigation Manual report process.

As discussed, the brief needs to be provided to Minister Robertson tomorrow (Sunday, 16 January 2011).

Regards

Elaina

Elaina Smouha

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Ministerial brief outline

What is the objective?

- a) Ensuring public transparency
- b) To answer the State's questions on the performance of Wivenhoe Dam operations
- c) Preparation for a public inquiry
- d) Normal and logical course of conduct after the occurrence of a major flood event – Review requirement under the Flood Mitigation Manual

Background (focus on Brisbane River flooding issues)

- 1) Design of Dam – Storages/Spillway upgrade (*Information provider: Seqwater and Peter Allen - DERM*) [1/3 to ½ a page]
- 2) “The Flood Event” – Q&A (*Information provider: Seqwater*) [2 ½ pages]
 - a. Chronology - High level time step of events and significant decision making/changes – more detailed time step information for Tuesday afternoon (i.e. what was the BOM forecast at the time, narrow peak etc.)
 - b. How does Wivenhoe Dam work as a flood mitigator?
 - c. What are the factors being balanced when making decisions about the amount of dam releases? To what extent does information from the Bureau of Meteorology/rain gauges influence decisions? How reliable is this information?
 - d. Statistics on how much did Wivenhoe Dam knock off the flood peak.
 - e. What would have happened if Wivenhoe Dam had not been built and we only had Somerset Dam? What damage would have been caused compared to what has currently been experienced (damage statistics)?
 - f. If we have undertaken pre-emptive dam releases to bring Wivenhoe Dam's full supply level down to lower than what we had maintained (i.e. 60%), what would have been the river height for the period that this flood event occurred?
 - g. If pre-emptive dam releases would not have made a difference, why? (i.e. why did we not release earlier?)
 - h. Why was Wivenhoe Dam only allowed to rise up to 191% and not 230%?
 - i. What is the fuse plug and why did it need to be maintained?
 - j. What damage or town isolation occurred during the Wivenhoe Dam releases that occurred since October 2010?
 - k. Did Seqwater have time to reduce the dam level between the 5 events? If so, would it have made a difference to this flood event?

- 3) The Flood Mitigation Manual (*Information Provider: **Seqwater/DERM***) [½ to 1 page]
 - a. Describe the decision making framework - Four strategies
 - b. How is the Manual designed to work?
 - c. History of Flood Mitigation Manual updates and peer review – who was on the panels, studies that fed into previous versions of the Manual and who was involved in these studies?
 - d. **Attach** Minister Robertson’s request for advice on pre-emptive release and our response (*Information provider: **SEQ Water Grid Manager***)

- 4) Regulatory context - *Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008* (*Information provider: **Peter Allen - DERM***)
 - a. Flood Mitigation Manual approval
 - b. Formal reporting process under the Flood Mitigation Manual – **attach** report resulting from the February 1999 flood event
 - c. Decision making process under the Flood Mitigation Manual –
 - i. Who makes the flood release decisions under the Manual?
 - ii. who is informed/consulted?
 - iii. effect of the recent Flood Communication Protocol?

- 5) Brian Cooper Flood Mitigation Manual compliance review (*Responsible: **SEQ Water Grid Manager***)

Seqwater report

(*Information provider: **Seqwater, Peter Allen and Bob Reilly***)

Seqwater, in consultation with Peter Allen and Bob Reilly, to set out how Seqwater’s Flood Mitigation Manual Report to the Chief Executive on the effectiveness of the operational procedures will be undertaken.

- **Attach** table of contents of the 1999 Flood Mitigation Manual report
- Reflect Brian Cooper’s compliance review
- Peer review – establishment of an expert panel – who will be on it? Peter Allen and Bob Reilly may provide some input.
- Communication Protocol and incorporation into the Flood Mitigation Manual (revisit in the next fortnight?)

Timeframes on the development of the report – consider urgency due to anticipated further rainfall during this summer.

Ministerial Briefing Note

17 January 2010

Flood Event January 2011

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WIVENHOE DAM

2. WIVENHOE DAM FLOOD MITIGATION AND FLOOD OPERATIONS

- 2.1 What were the benefits provided by Wivenhoe Dam during the current event?
- 2.2 Why was Wivenhoe Dam only allowed to rise up to 191% and not 230%?
- 2.3 What is the role of the erodible fuse plug embankments?
- 2.4 Why weren't pre-emptive releases undertaken prior to the start of the flood event?
- 2.5 Is there a detailed record of the events associated with the current flood?

3. THE MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR FLOOD MITIGATION AT WIVENHOE DAM AND SOMERSET DAM

- 3.1 What is the Manual of Flood Mitigation and how was it developed?
- 3.2 What is contained in the Manual?

4. REGULATORY CONTEXT

5. COMPLIANCE WITH MANUAL

6. SEQWATER REPORT

1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WIVENHOE DAM

Wivenhoe Dam was completed in 1984 and has two main functions;

- A 1,165,000 ML storage providing an urban water supply for Brisbane;
- Flood mitigation in the Brisbane River by providing a dedicated flood storage volume of 1,450,000 ML (this flood storage was increased in 2005 to 1,966,000 ML with the dam at the point of failure).

In accordance with the Queensland Regulatory program for dam spillway upgrades, a further upgrade of Wivenhoe Dam is scheduled to occur prior to 2035.

Wivenhoe Dam is in excellent condition with four Comprehensive Dam Safety reviews undertaken in the last 14 years, the latest in 2010.

2 WIVENHOE DAM FLOOD MITIGATION AND FLOOD OPERATIONS

2.1 What were the benefits provided by Wivenhoe Dam during the current event?

The following graphs demonstrate the significant benefits of Wivenhoe Dam in mitigating the current flood event, with reductions in flood peak of up to 2.5 metres in the City area and up to 5.5 metres in the Moggill area further upstream.


This equates to significant reduction in the potential for loss of life as well as saving in damages in the order of up to \$1.6 billion based on current damage curves. Up to 13,000 more properties would have been impacted by the event without the Dam. (Source: Flood Damage Tables provided to Seqwater by the Brisbane City Council).

The time at which flood levels remained elevated above major levels has also been reduced by up to 3 days by the dam. This has significant benefits to impact on the population of the city, property damage and the recovery operation.


Depending on the nature of the event, the presence of Wivenhoe Dam could also potentially increase flood warning times to impacted areas. How these times may have been increased during the current event is presently difficult to quantify, but discussions will be held with BOM on this issue at a later date.

In addition, the strategy adopted to quickly close off releases once the peak in the dam had been reached and rain stopped falling certainly reduced the predicted flood peak by at least one metre in the lower Brisbane River area.

JANUARY 2011 BRISBANE FLOOD Assessment of Flood Levels at Brisbane City



JANUARY 2011 BRISBANE FLOOD Assessment of Flood Levels at Moggill



2.2 Why was Wivenhoe Dam only allowed to rise up to 191% and not 230%?

Wivenhoe Dam mitigates downstream flooding by storing incoming flood water during a rainfall event and releasing these waters at a reduced flow rate downstream to reduce flood impacts. The timing of the releases is also manipulated so that the aim is for outflows from the dams to impact on downstream areas only after the peak inflows from the downstream major tributaries have passed. However this aim cannot always be achieved in practice. This is because some large floods, such as the one currently being experienced, have the potential to overflow the dam's flood storage compartment. **Should this occur, the dam would fail and the resulting damage and loss of life would be at least 100 to 1000 times greater than that currently being experienced.**

Therefore the basis of all flood operation decision making is to ensure the dam never fails. This is the reason that the dam's flood storage compartment would never be intentionally fully filled as any additional inflows after this point would result in a dam failure. At any one time, there will always be uncertainty about what rain is going to occur. Hence, we cannot use all of the flood capacity as we would not be able to release sufficient water to cater for large inflows.

2.3 What is the role of the erodible fuse plug embankments?

Another factor that impacts on flood release decision making in large events are the levels at which the erodible fuse plugs are triggered. The fuse plugs act as a safety valve to rapidly increase dam outflows if the structural safety of the dam is in danger. Loss of one or more fuse plugs severely limits the ability of the dam to mitigate the effects of future flood events that may occur prior to the fuse plug or plugs being reinstated. Reinstatement of a fuse plug following an event would take a minimum of 4 to 6 months and would require an extended period of relatively dry weather.

2.4 Why weren't pre-emptive releases undertaken prior to the start of the flood event?

In the 25 days leading up to the current event, three flood events impacting on Wivenhoe Dam were experienced, with gate releases being made on all but five of those days. The total outflow from these events was around 700,000ML.

During these events, requests were received from Councils and residents impacted by bridge closures downstream of the dam to curtail releases as soon and as quickly as possible. Additionally the 2 January end date of the flood event prior to the current event meant that significant drain down of the dam prior to the onset of the current event that commenced on 6 January 2011, was not possible without major bridge inundation downstream of the dam and without exceeding minor flood levels in the lower Brisbane River.

Additionally, a flood event was also experienced in October 2010 that resulted in a release of 750,000ML from the dam. Accordingly drain down below the dam full supply level prior to the start of the first December event would not have been possible without significant bridge inundation and without exceeding minor flood levels (as defined by BOM and BCC) in the lower Brisbane River.

Regardless, significant drain down prior to the current event would have had little impact on the peak level in Wivenhoe Dam as shown in the table below. The reason for this is that this total event inflow volume of 2,600,000 ML is well in excess of the useable flood storage combined with the available water supply storages shown in the table.

The specific impact on the Lower Brisbane River of these reduced dam levels requires the use of a complex hydraulic model. The results of this modelling would still contain a degree of uncertainty as illustrated by the difficulties in estimating the final flood peak in Brisbane during the event. This is because the rapid closure of the gates after peak inflow was achieved resulted in significant water level reductions downstream and this is difficult to model accurately.

JANUARY 2011 FLOOD			
Starting Level		Peak Height	Capacity
%	m AHD	m AHD	%
100	67.0	74.97	191
95	66.5	74.93	191
90	65.8	74.88	190
75	64.0	74.63	187
50	60.0	74.11	180

It should be noted that the possible reductions shown above are based up a unique dual peaked flood hydrograph with a volume of about 2,600,000 ML which occurred during this event. A hydrograph with the same volume but a different distribution could result in a significantly lower reduction in peak water levels.

Flood operations at the dam are also highly dependent upon the flood inflow volume and a slight variation in the flood volume could significantly reduce the benefits associated with draining down the dam prior to a flood event.

2.5 Is there a detailed record of the events associated with the current flood?

A preliminary report has been prepared and is attached to this briefing.

3 THE MANUAL OF FLOOD MITIGATION AT WIVENHOE DAM AND SOMERSET DAM

3.1 What is the Manual of Flood Mitigation and how was it developed?

The Manual of Flood Mitigation for Wivenhoe and Somerset dams in its current form was developed in 1992 during an extensive hydrological study of the Brisbane and Pine Rivers catchments by DPI, Water Resources. The final reports were subject to extensive internal review by the Water Resources Group before being reviewed by an independent review panel comprising Professor Colin Apelt, Head of Department, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Queensland and Mr Eric Lesleighter, Principal Hydraulic Engineer and Chief Engineer Water Resources, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation. Subsequently, the Manual was extensively reviewed during the Brisbane Valley Flood Damages Minimisation Study in 2006, with the latest comprehensive review of the Manual undertaken in 2009. Both of these reviews have included expert review panels comprising key stakeholders, with the most recent review involving representatives from DERM, BOM, BCC and SunWater.

The Manual of Flood Mitigation is prepared by Seqwater as the owner of the dam and approved and gazetted by the Chief Executive of DERM in accordance with the Water Supply Act 2008. The manual defines flood objectives procedures; roles and responsibilities; and staffing and operational requirements for flood events impacting on Wivenhoe and Somerset dams.

3.2 What is contained in the Manual?

The primary objectives of the procedures contained in the Manual are, in order of importance:

- Ensure the structural safety of the dams;
- Provide optimum protection of urbanised areas from inundation;
- Minimise disruption to rural life in the valleys of the Brisbane and Stanley Rivers primarily, this involves minimising inundation of the seven bridges below the dam upstream of Moggill);
- Retain the storage at Full Supply Level at the conclusion of the Flood Event.

- Minimise impacts to riparian flora and fauna during the drain down phase of the Flood Event.

During an event, the operation of the dam transitions between the following four operating strategies depending of the circumstances at the time. These procedures associated with these strategies are explained in detail in the Manual.

- **Strategy W1** – Primary consideration is given to Minimising Disruption to Downstream Rural Life.
- **Strategy W2** – Transition Phase moving from Minimising Disruption to Protecting Downstream Urban Areas.
- **Strategy W3** – Primary consideration is to Protect of Urban Areas from Inundation.
- **Strategy W4** – Primary consideration is to protecting the structural safety of the Dam.

In addition to these strategies, historical records show that there is a significant probability of two or more flood producing storms occurring in the Brisbane River system within a short time of each other. Accordingly for each flood event, the aim is always to empty stored floodwaters within seven days after the flood peak has passed through the dams.

4 REGULATORY CONTEXT (Provided by Peter Allen and unedited)

These are contained in the Flood Mitigation Manual (manual) approved under sections 370 to 374 of the *Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008*. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of DERM (or his delegate) approves the manual, and the approval is notified in the Queensland Government Gazette. Approval can be for a period of up to five years, after which the approval needs to be renewed. There are no decision-making criteria specified in the Act for the CEO to take into account when approving the manual.

The manual for the dams requires, amongst other matters:

1. Flood operations to be conducted in accordance with manual's provisions. (There is an approval process specified in the manual, if Seqwater considers a different flood release strategy is desirable to deal with a particular flood event. This was not used in the January 2011 flood event)
2. Flood operations to be under the control of CEO-approved engineers (who are highly qualified and experienced)
3. Annual reporting on the preparedness and status of the flood control system for flood operations, and the training of the personnel who manage the flood events.
4. Reporting on the flood operations during flood events.
5. Reviews after flood events such as the January 2011 event. For this flood event, the Queensland Government engaged Mr Brian Cooper, an independent consulting engineer, to review compliance with the manual. Mr Cooper concluded (**Attachment??**): "...The strategies in the Flood Mitigation Manual have been followed, allowing for the discretion given to make variations in order to maximise flood mitigation effects. The actions taken and decisions made during the Flood Event appear to have been prudent and appropriate in the context of the available knowledge available to these responsible for flood operations and the way events unfolded..." (**p.3 of the final report or other appropriate reference??**)

The manual is separate from a draft communication protocol (Insert name) between the Local, State and Commonwealth government agencies that are affected by the dams' flood operations. This protocol is not binding on the parties to it is not subject to regulatory approval/review.

Some DERM staff, because of their specialist skills, work in the Flood Operations Centre that Seqwater activates to manage such events. None of them are involved in any of the regulatory decisions concerning the dams or are members of the work unit (Office of the Water Supply Regulator) which undertakes the CEO's regulatory functions.

5 COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANUAL

(To be provided)

6 SEQWATER REPORT

It is recommended that the process and content for reports required for this event be:

- In the short term, utilise this report attached to this briefing note as the basis for communications and discussion.
- Prepare any Interim Reports as agreed to provide information and input as required.
- Seqwater prepare a Comprehensive Report as per the existing regulatory requirements of the Act and the gazetted manual and any requirements of the Dam Safety Regulator. This would be done within 6 weeks of the closure of the current event as per the manual. This timeframe is subject to any new mobilisation of the Flood Operations Centre. The Table of Contents would include:
 - Introduction
 - Flood Event Summary
 - Mobilisation and Staffing
 - Event Rainfall
 - Inflow and Release Details
 - Data Collection System Performance
 - Data Analysis Performance
 - Communication
 - Flood Management Strategies and Manual Compliance
 - Improvements in data collection systems, practices and processes.
 - improvements by interacting agencies
 - Review of factors impacting on the protection of urban areas
 - Recommendations & Conclusions
- The report would then be reviewed by the Dam Safety Regulator in conjunction with any peer review they require. The review should cover:
 - Were the provisions of the manual complied with?
 - What improvements to either facilities e.g. stream gauges, or work practices, are desirable to improve Seqwater's ability to predict inflows into the dams.
 - Are improvements to either Seqwater's facilities or work practices desirable to improve Seqwater's ability to manage events? For example, investigations to raise the dam to improve its flood storage capacity, If so, what are they and their implications

- Are changes to the facilities or work practices of other organisations desirable to improve Seqwater's abilities to manage these events? If so, what are they and their implications? (For example, would it be worth funding Brisbane River crossing upgrades so that floodwater could be released faster, while not adversely affecting access to properties--or maybe alternative strategies e.g. resupply operations could be put in place to achieve similar outcomes?)
 - Given the manual's order of priorities i.e. protection of the dam etc, are any changes in the flood release strategies for either dam desirable? If so, what are they, and their implications
- Based on this review, a review of the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam would occur utilising an expert panel of review including representatives of DERM, Seqwater, BoM, affected Local Governments and other stakeholders as necessary.



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WATER FOR LIFE

**JANUARY 2011 FLOOD
EVENT**

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1 INTRODUCTION

Wivenhoe Dam was constructed by the Queensland Government between 1977 and 1984. The dam is a 56 m AHD high and 2.3 kilometre long earth and rock embankment separated into two parts by a concrete gravity spillway. The spillway is controlled by 5 radial gates, each 12.0 metres wide by 16.0 m AHD high. Two saddle dam embankments are located on the left side of the reservoir.

The dam spillway capacity was upgraded in 2005. This was done primarily through the construction of a 164 metre wide secondary spillway through the right abutment of the existing dam. This spillway contains three erodible earth fill fuse plug embankments that are initiated at different dam levels in excess of EL 75.6.

The dam has two main functions by providing:

- A 1,165,000 ML storage at full supply level (FSL EL 67.0) providing an urban water supply for Brisbane and surrounding areas;
- Flood mitigation in the Brisbane River by providing a dedicated flood storage volume of 1,450,000 ML up to EL77 (this flood level was increased as part the 2005 upgrade to allow a water level of EL80m and a temporary flood storage volume of 1,966,000 ML with all fuse plugs initiated and the dam at the point of failure).

The dam has an EXTREME hazard classification under ANCOLD guidelines because of the significant development downstream in the Brisbane and Ipswich metropolitan areas, with the population at risk in the event of a dam failure numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

In accordance with the Queensland Regulatory program for dam spillway upgrades, a further upgrade of Wivenhoe Dam is scheduled to occur prior to 2035 to enable the dam to safely pass the Probable Maximum Flood. This work will involve the reconstruction of Saddle Dam 2 as a fuse plug spillway.

Wivenhoe Dam is in excellent condition. Comprehensive Dam Safety reviews undertaken in accordance with ANCOLD guidelines have been undertaken in 1997 (Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd), 2003 (Wivenhoe Alliance), 2006 (NSW Department of Commerce), 2009 (GHD) and September 2010 (Seqwater). The reports concluded that the design of the dam is in accordance with modern day standards and that there are no significant outstanding design or construction issues that require investigation.

2 WIVENHOE DAM FLOOD MITIGATION AND FLOOD OPERATIONS

2.1 Flood Mitigation

The Brisbane River catchment covers an area of approximately 14,000 square kilometres of which about half is below Wivenhoe Dam. Maximum overall flood mitigation effect is achieved by operating Wivenhoe Dam in conjunction with Somerset Dam. Although Somerset and Wivenhoe Dam reduce flooding in Brisbane City, major flooding can still occur. The Lockyer-Laidley Valley drains into the Brisbane River through Lockyer Creek that enters the Brisbane River just downstream of Wivenhoe Dam near Lowood. Another major tributary, the Bremer River, flows into the Brisbane River at Moggill. Wivenhoe Dam has no control over inflows into the Brisbane River from both these major tributaries.

Wivenhoe Dam mitigates downstream flooding by storing incoming flood water during a rainfall event and releasing these waters at a reduced flow rate downstream to minimise flood impacts. The timing of the releases is also manipulated so that the aim is for outflows from the dams to impact on downstream areas only after the peak inflows from the downstream major tributaries have passed. However, this aim cannot always be achieved in practice. This is because some large floods, such as the one currently being experienced, have the potential to overflow the dam's flood storage compartment. **Should this occur, the dam would fail and the resulting damage and loss of life would be at least 100 to 1000 times greater than that currently being experienced.**

Therefore the basis of all flood operation decision making is to ensure the dam never fails. This is the reason that the dam's flood storage compartment would never be intentionally fully filled as additional inflows after this point would result in a dam failure. Similarly, there will be uncertainty on future rainfall that could occur which could not be releases if there was insufficient flood storage which could not be stored or released.

Another factor that impacts on flood release decision making in large events are the levels at which the erodible fuse plugs are triggered. Loss of one or more fuse plugs severely limits the ability of the dam to mitigate the effects of future flood events that may occur prior to the fuse plug or plugs being reinstated. Reinstatement of a fuse plug following an event would take a minimum of 4 to 6 months and would require an extended period of relatively dry weather.

2.2 Flood Operations

A real time flood monitoring and forecasting system has been established in the Wivenhoe and Somerset Dam catchments. This system employs radio telemetry to collect, transmit and receive rainfall and stream flow information. The system consists of around 230 field stations that automatically record rainfall and/or river heights at selected locations in the dam catchments. Most of these field stations are owned by Seqwater with the remainder belonging to other agencies.

The rainfall and river height data is transmitted to Seqwater's Flood Operations Centre in real time. Once received in the Flood Operations Centre, the data is processed using a Real Time Flood Model (RTFM) to estimate likely dam inflows and evaluate a range of possible inflow scenarios based on forecast and recorded rainfall in the dam catchments. The RTFM is a suite of hydrologic computer programs that utilise the real time data to assist in the operation of the dams during flood events.

Seqwater engineers use the RTFM for flood monitoring and forecasting during flood events to operate the dams in accordance with a Manual of Flood Mitigation (the origin of and objectives and procedures contained in the Manual of Flood Mitigation are explained in the following section of this document). Releases of water from the dams are optimised to minimise the impacts of flooding in accordance with the objectives and procedures contained in a Manual of Flood Mitigation.

The RTFM and data collection network performed well During the January 2011 event, with no failures experienced that compromised the ability of Seqwater to operate the dam.

3 MANUAL OF FLOOD MITIGATION FOR WIVENHOE AND SOMERSET DAMS

The Manual of Flood Mitigation for Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams, in its current form, was developed in 1992 during an extensive hydrological study of the Brisbane and Pine Rivers catchments by DPI, Water Resources. The final reports were subject to extensive internal review by the Water Resources Group before being reviewed by an independent review panel comprising Professor Colin Apelt, Head of Department, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Queensland and Mr Eric Lesleighter, Principal Hydraulic Engineer and Chief Engineer Water Resources, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation.

Subsequently, the Manual was extensively reviewed during the Brisbane Valley Flood Damages Minimisation Study in 2006, with the latest comprehensive review of the Manual undertaken in 2009. Both of these reviews have included expert review panels comprising key stakeholders, with the most recent review involving representatives from DERM, BOM, BCC and SunWater.

The Manual of Flood Mitigation is prepared by Seqwater as the owner of the dam and approved and gazetted by the Chief Executive of DERM in accordance with the Water Supply Act 2008. The manual defines flood objectives procedures; roles and responsibilities; and staffing and operational requirements for flood events impacting on Wivenhoe and Somerset dams.

The primary objectives of the procedures contained in the flood manual are, in order of importance:

- Ensure the structural safety of the dams;
- Provide optimum protection of urbanised areas from inundation;
- Minimise disruption to rural life in the valleys of the Brisbane and Stanley Rivers primarily, this involves minimising inundation of the seven bridges below the dam upstream of Moggill);
- Retain the storage at Full Supply Level at the conclusion of the Flood Event.
- Minimise impacts to riparian flora and fauna during the drain down phase of the Flood Event.

During an event, the operation of the dam transitions between the following four operating strategies depending of the circumstances at the time. These procedures associated with these strategies are explained in detail in the Manual.

- **Strategy W1** – Primary consideration is given to Minimising Disruption to Downstream Rural Life. Under this strategy, the predicted water level is below 68.50 m AHD and the maximum release is 1,900m³/s.
- **Strategy W2** – Transition Phase moving from Minimising Disruption to Protecting Downstream Urban Areas. Under this strategy, the water level is predicted to be between 68.5 and 74.0 m AHD and the maximum release is less than 3,500m³/s.
- **Strategy W3** – Primary consideration is to Protect of Urban Areas from Inundation. Under this strategy, the water level is predicted to be between 68.5 and 74.0 m AHD but the maximum release is less than 4,000m³/s.
- **Strategy W4** – Primary consideration is to protecting the structural safety of the Dam. Under this strategy, the water level is predicted to exceed 74.0 m AHD and there is no limit to the maximum release. Consideration is given to managing flood releases to avoid fuse plug initiation if at all possible as this would compromise flood mitigation capacity in the short to medium term.

In addition to these strategies, historical records show that there is a significant probability of two or more flood producing storms occurring in the Brisbane River system within a short time of each other. Accordingly for each flood event, the aim is always to empty stored floodwaters within seven days after the flood peak has passed through the dams.

4 JANUARY 2011 FLOOD EVENT

4.1 Background

In the 25 days leading up to the current event, three flood events impacting on Wivenhoe Dam were experienced, with gate releases being made on all but five of those days. The total outflow from these events was around 700,000ML. The details of these events are as follows:

EVENT	EVENT START DATE	EVENT END DATE	VOLUME RELEASED (ML)
1	13/12/2010	16/12/2010	70,000
2	17/12/2010	24/12/2010	150,000
3	26/12/2010	02/01/2010	470,000

During these events, requests were received from Councils and residents impacted by bridge closures downstream of the dam to curtail releases as soon and as quickly as possible.

Additionally the 2 January end date of the flood event prior to the current event meant that significant drain down of the dam prior to the onset of the current event that commenced on 6 January 2011, was not possible without major bridge inundation downstream of the dam and without exceeding minor flood levels in the lower Brisbane River.

Additionally, a flood event was also experienced in October 2010 that resulted in a release of 750,000ML from the dam. Accordingly drain down below the dam full supply level prior to the start of the first December event would not have been possible without significant bridge inundation and without exceeding minor flood levels (as defined by BOM and BCC) in the lower Brisbane River.

Regardless, significant drain down prior to the current event would have had little impact on the peak level in Wivenhoe Dam as shown in the table below. The reason for this is that this total event inflow volume of 2,600,000 ML is well in excess of the useable flood storage combined with the available water supply storages shown in the table.

The specific impact on the Lower Brisbane River of these reduced dam levels requires the use of a complex hydraulic model. The results of this modelling would still contain a degree of uncertainty as illustrated by the difficulties in estimating the final flood peak in Brisbane during the event. This

is because the rapid closure of the gates after peak inflow was achieved resulted in significant water level reductions downstream and this is difficult to model accurately.

JANUARY 2011 FLOOD			
Starting Level		Peak Height	Capacity
%	m AHD	m AHD	%
100	67.0	74.97	191
95	66.5	74.93	191
90	65.8	74.88	190
75	64.0	74.63	187
50	60.0	74.11	180

It should be noted that the possible reductions shown above are based up a unique dual peaked flood hydrograph with a volume of about 2,600,000 ML which occurred during this event. A hydrograph with the same volume but a different distribution could result in a significantly lower reduction in peak water levels.

Flood operations at the dam are also highly dependent upon the flood inflow volume and a slight variation in the flood volume could significantly reduce the benefits associated with draining down the dam prior to a flood event.

4.2 Event Decision Making

The following table contains a summary of the key decisions points associated with the current event. As at 16 January 2011, the event remains in progress.

DATE AND TIME	FLOOD EVENT MILESTONE
07:00 06/01/2011 (Thursday)	Rainfall is experienced in the dam catchments that will result in flood releases, however Wivenhoe releases are delayed for 24 hours to allow Lockyer Creek flood flows to pass downstream and prevent the isolation of the community dependent of Burtons Bridge. The forecast is for 150mm over the next 24 hours.
15:00 07/01/2011 (Friday)	Wivenhoe releases commence, with operational strategy W1 in use. Rainfall for the next four days is estimated to be between 140mm and 300mm, with a forecast for rain easing on Tuesday 11 January 2011. All bridges downstream of the dam with the exception of Fernvale Bridge and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge are expected to be inundated for a number of days.

<p>06:00 09/01/2011 (Sunday)</p>	<p>Moderate to heavy rain periods forecast until Tuesday, but both Wivenhoe and Somerset dam levels were falling slowly, with Somerset at 1.27 m AHD above FSL and Wivenhoe 1.58 m AHD above FSL.</p>
<p>15:30 09/01/2011 (Sunday)</p>	<p>Following significant rain during the day a meeting of Duty Engineers is held. The QPF issued at 16:00 indicates 50mm to 80mm over the next 24 hours. Based on this forecast, it is anticipated that dam levels can be held to a maximum of 3.50 m AHD above FSL in Somerset and 5.5 m AHD above FSL in Wivenhoe. However, by 19:00 it was apparent that both Fernvale Bridge and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge would be inundated by the combined dam releases and Lockyer Creek flows and that the operational strategy had progressed to W2.</p>
<p>06:30 10/01/2011 (Monday)</p>	<p>Rainfall continued during the night and based on rainfall on the ground it was apparent the operational strategy had progressed to W3.</p>
<p>06:30 10/01/2011 (Monday)</p>	<p>Rainfall continued during the day but based on rainfall on the ground, operational strategy W3 remained in use. However it was apparent that any further heavy rain would result in progression of the operational strategy to W4.</p>
<p>08:00 11/01/2011 (Tuesday)</p>	<p>Rainfall continued during the night with isolated heavy falls in the Wivenhoe Dam catchment area and based on rainfall on the ground it was apparent the operational strategy would soon progress to W4 with Wivenhoe Dam exceeding 8.00 m AHD above FSL. The objective now was to limit outflows and subsequent flood damage to urban areas, while ensuring the structural safety of the dam.</p>
<p>11:00 11/01/2011 (Tuesday)</p>	<p>Rapid inflows were experienced in Wivenhoe Dam, with the dam rising almost a metre in eight hours. Releases were increased until the dam level stabilised in accordance with Strategy W4. Computer models were not reflecting actual dam inflows due to intense point rainfalls in the immediate catchment around the dam. Falls are estimated to be similar to those experienced at both Toowoomba and Upper Lockyer the previous day and are falling outside and between existing rain gauges.</p>
<p>21:00 11/01/2011 (Tuesday)</p>	<p>Wivenhoe Dam peaked. Peak release of 7450 cumecs with a level of 0.7 metres below fuse plug trigger.</p>

<p>22:00 11/01/2011 (Tuesday)</p>	<p>Wivenhoe Dam releases were closed off as quickly as possible over the next 11 hours, while ensuring water levels in the dam did not rise further and initiate a fuse plug embankment.</p>
<p>08:00 12/01/2011 (Wednesday)</p>	<p>Minimum possible release level reached, with inflows matching outflows. Further reductions in release rate would likely cause the dam level to rise.</p>
<p>21:00 13/01/2011 (Thursday)</p>	<p>The 7 day dam drain down is commenced as Lockyer Creek and Bremer River peaks pass the Lower Brisbane area. Maximum release target is the limit of damaging floods in Brisbane being 3500 cumecs.</p>
<p>09:00 17/01/2011 (Monday)</p>	<p>Drain down continues, with released expected to cease on Wednesday 19 January 2011 unless further rainfall is experienced.</p>


4.3 Flood Mitigation Benefits of Wivenhoe Dam

The following graphs demonstrate the significant benefits of Wivenhoe Dam in mitigating the current flood event, with reductions in flood peak of up to 2.5 metres in the City area and up to 5.5 metres in the Moggill area further upstream.


This equates to significant reduction in the potential for loss of life as well as saving in damages in the order of up to \$1.6 billion based on current damage curves. Up to 13,000 more properties would have been impacted by the event without the Dam.

The time at which flood levels remained elevated above major levels has also been reduced by up to 3 days by the dam. This has significant benefits to impact on the population of the city, property damage and the recovery operation.

**JANUARY 2011 BRISBANE FLOOD
Assessment of Flood Levels at Brisbane City**



**JANUARY 2011 BRISBANE FLOOD
Assessment of Flood Levels at Moggill**



The strategy adopted to quickly close off releases once the peak in the dam had been reached and rain stopped falling certainly reduced the predicted flood peak by at least one metre in the lower Brisbane River area. This notion is supported by BOM.

5 EVENT REVIEW

Under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam that are approved and gazetted by the Department of Environment and Resource Management, there is a regulatory requirement that a report must be prepared as per the below wording:

“Seqwater must prepare a report after each Flood Event. The report must contain details of the procedures used, the reasons therefore and other pertinent information. Seqwater must forward the report to the Chief Executive within six weeks of the completion of the Flood Event.”

Such a report was prepared for the flood events of February and March 2010 and copies are available. A copy of the Table of Contents of that report is included as Appendix 1. For this event, the report would be a comprehensive summary of all procedures, actions, outcomes and processes during the event.

It is recommended that the process and content for reports required for this event be:

- In the short term, utilise this report attached to this briefing note as the basis for communications and discussion.
- Prepare any Interim Reports as agreed to provide information and input as required.
- Seqwater prepare a Comprehensive Report as per the existing regulatory requirements of the Act and the gazetted manual and any requirements of the Dam Safety Regulator. This would be done within 6 weeks of the closure of the current event as per the manual. This timeframe is subject to any new mobilisation of the Flood Operations Centre. The Table of Contents would include:
 - Introduction
 - Flood Event Summary
 - Mobilisation and Staffing
 - Event Rainfall
 - Inflow and Release Details
 - Data Collection System Performance
 - Data Analysis Performance
 - Communication
 - Flood Management Strategies and Manual Compliance

- Improvements in data collection systems, practices and processes.
 - improvements by interacting agencies
 - Review of factors impacting on the protection of urban areas
 - Recommendations & Conclusions
- The report would then be reviewed by the Dam Safety Regulator in conjunction with any peer review they require. The review should cover:
 - Were the provisions of the manual complied with?
 - What improvements to either facilities e.g. stream gauges, or work practices, are desirable to improve Seqwater's ability to predict inflows into the dams.
 - Are improvements to either Seqwater's facilities or work practices desirable to improve Seqwater's ability to manage events? For example, investigations to raise the dam to improve its flood storage capacity, If so, what are they and their implications.
 - Are changes to the facilities or work practices of other organisations desirable to improve Seqwater's abilities to manage these events? If so, what are they and their implications? (For example, would it be worth funding Brisbane River crossing upgrades so that floodwater could be released faster, while not adversely affecting access to properties--or maybe alternative strategies e.g. resupply operations could be put in place to achieve similar outcomes?)
 - Given the manual's order of priorities i.e. protection of the dam etc, are any changes in the flood release strategies for either dam desirable? If so, what are they, and their implications
 - Based on this review, a review of the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam would occur utilising an expert panel of review including representatives of DERM, Seqwater, BoM, affected Local Governments and other stakeholders as necessary.

Appendix A

FINAL REPORT – FLOOD EVENTS AT WIVENHOE, SOMERSET AND NORTH PINE DAMS FOR FEBRUARY AND MARCH 2010

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