

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Date: 13 October 2011

Name of Witness: Anthony James Lee

Address of Witness: [REDACTED] Beaconsfield Rd, Beaconsfield QLD

Occupation: Area Director

Division: Emergency Management Queensland
Department of Community Safety


Telephone: [REDACTED] (Mobile) [REDACTED]

I, Anthony James Lee, Area Director, Central Region/Mackay Area, Emergency Management Queensland, Department of Community Safety state:

1. I have been an Area Director for EMQ for approximately three years. I have been employed by EMQ for four and half years. In total I have been with the Department of Community Safety for over 10 years. Other positions I have held in EMQ and in the Department have included; Disaster Management Officer, Project Manager, HR Consultant and Project Officer.
2. I have extensive disaster management (DM) experience and have been involved in responding to various disasters throughout the State. I have been involved with SES ICC's, LDCC's, DDCC's and also Executive Officer at DDMG/DDCC level. I have been deployed to assist with Tropical Cyclones (Yasi, Anthony, Ului, Hamish), Oil Spills (Pacific Adventurer, Sheng Neng 1), Floods (Charleville, Emerald, Ingham, Mt Isa, Brisbane Floods - Newmarket, St George, Theodore), Equine Influenza (Warwick - Morgan Park), Pandemic Influenza (Warwick, Toowoomba and Mackay), Landslip (Hydeaway Bay).
3. Other operational experience, prior to my employment with the Department:
4. I was a Clearance Diver in the Royal Australian Navy. Within in this role I had significant combat/tactical and strategic operational (covert/clandestine) experience conducting diving operations and explosive ordnance disposal.
5. I have various DM qualifications through the Australian Emergency Management Institute and EMQ. I have a Bachelor of Emergency Management and I am currently

This is page 1 of a statement comprising 9 page/s. [REDACTED]


Witness ([REDACTED]): [REDACTED] UP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT



completing my Master of Emergency Management. See attachment for further details on DM qualifications. Please refer to my relevant disaster management qualifications now attached and marked "AJL 1".


1. Their role and position within Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ), including information about their direct supervisor and the person to whom they report in a disaster.
6. As previously stated, I am the Area Director for the Mackay Area. I provide management and support to five hundred (500) SES volunteers. This includes twenty three (23) SES Groups and three SES Units. I also provide DM support and advice to three (3) regional councils (Mackay, Whitsunday and Isaac), Mackay District Disaster Management Group (DDMG), State Agencies and Non-Government Organisations (NGO's).
7. During DM operations, internally in EMQ I report to the Central Region, Regional Director [REDACTED] who has now transferred to QAS and the current Acting Regional Director is [REDACTED]. Whilst working in disaster coordination centres I also report to the Incident Controller (SES ICC), Local Disaster Coordinator or Chair (LDMG/LDCC), XO (Executive Officer) or DDC (DDMG/DDCC).
2. The SES units within their region/including details (if known) of any paid SES members within their region.
8. Currently in the Mackay Area we have one paid Local Controller for the Mackay SES Unit, [REDACTED] is employed by Mackay Regional Council and subsequently his working conditions and pay are managed by Mackay Regional Council. Isaac Regional Council is currently in the process of appointing a paid SES Local Controller as well. In the Mackay Area there are three SES units:
 - Mackay Regional SES Unit
 - Whitsunday SES Unit
 - Isaac Area Unit
9. There are twenty three active SES groups under these units in total.
3. The adequacy of current SES volunteer numbers (including any issues with recruitment and retention of members), level of training and equipment and resources available to SES units within their area/region.
10. In the Mackay Area we have a transient working population i.e. shift workers in the mines and cane plantation workers who work about 6 months of the year during crop rotation i.e. harvesting and planting. However, we have sufficient members in the

This is page 2 of a statement of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] pages.

Witness [REDACTED]	 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT 68970 QUALIFIED	JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations: [REDACTED]
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Mackay Area. Attending SES training and activations in the Isaac area is an issue. We may have many active members but they cannot attend due to shift work. Since July 2010 in the Mackay Area we have recruited 125 new SES volunteers. Mackay (84), Isaac (29) and Whitsunday (12).

11. Recruitment is only an issue in the Isaac Regional Council area. The primary issue is most people are employed in the mines on shift rosters. This is exacerbated with fly in and fly out (FIFO) rosters as well. With recruitment of SES volunteers you still need to look at quality rather than quantity i.e. capacity and capability at the local level. What are the identified functions of the SES to assist the community in the event of a disaster? Recruitment needs to be based on the SES functions for the Group.
12. Funding from State is minimal to assist SES executives to manage their Groups administratively. Each SES Unit gets approximately \$3,000.00 per Unit and \$300 for each SES Group from EMQ for business administration purposes. A lot of my SES Groups also get extra grants/funding from the mines. SES Executives get an executive allowance every twelve months, Deputy Local Controllers, Local Controllers and Group Leaders. Councils also provide further funding from their own budgets to assist SES Groups. I believe all SES Executives must complete Leadership Training before they are appointed or on commencement of their appointment. There are many SES Executives that are appointed in executive roles who have no management or leadership background to assist them in managing a Group or Unit.
13. Equipment and resources are adequately provided to the SES within the budget constraints. The biggest issue for us is that there is ownership with State and ownership with Regional Councils. There should be one body that manages, commands and controls SES equipment and human resources. The equipment that is supplied is only for the SES functions identified for that group. The issuing of flood boats to areas that are prone to flooding is a good idea and it is an identified function of that Group. The issue arises when those members in the Group don't want to become flood operators. The issuing of equipment comes down to capacity versus capability.
14. Lack of internet access and computer competence of some members in SES Groups is an issue. If we could get a laptop into a shed that has internet access that would be preferable rather than using personal internet access. Members who are not familiar with a computer may need some sort of computer training. Not only to use a computer but access SES Portal and various other sites.
4. **The mechanisms for receiving requests for assistance and the process for, and their role in, managing requests for assistance, including the prioritisation and/or management of competing requests for assistance.**
15. Requests for Assistance (RFA's) are received by Shared Services Queensland (SSQ) via the 132 500 number. The calls are then transferred through the appropriate contact lists

This is page 3 of a statement comprising 4 pages/s.	
Witness	JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations
	

for the area or SES Group. Each area has three contact numbers that SSQ can divert the number to. If an RFA comes through SSQ they take the call and they take the details and try and transfer to the relevant area. The three contacts for arguments sake could be the SES Duty Officer, Local Controller and Group Leader.

If the number cannot be diverted than a Kit Referral is completed by SSQ. SSQ will then send the Kit Referral vial email to the Regional Duty Officer email account. The EMQ Duty Officer for the region will be notified via a voice activated telephone message, advising them a Kit Referral is in the inbox. The Duty Officer will then access Kit Referral and action accordingly.

16. My Regional Councils (LDCC) request to get the 132 500 calls pertaining to their area to be diverted to their own call centre in the LDCC. The calls are then logged into Guardian where the SES Liaison Officer picks up the tasking then sends this to the SES ICC for completion. Prioritisation of RFA's is done in the SES ICC and completed tasks are then updated into Guardian.
5. **Their authority for, and role in, the tasking and deployment of SES members, including local controller tasking/deployment, both when a disaster is declared and at other times.**
17. As part of my role I oversee deployment and tasking of SES members in the Mackay Area. For SES deployments the EMQ Area Officer will contact all Local Controllers to send out an expression of interest (EOI) for members to volunteer themselves to go on deployments. The EOI will also stipulate what skills will be required for the deploying crew/s i.e. flood boat or chainsaw operators. In the conversation to Local Controllers the deployment would be for five days, one day travel, three days on the job and one day travel home. We would also seek permission from the respective Regional Councils as well.
18. Names are provided back to the Mackay Area Office to put on file in anticipation of a request from a LDMG/LDCC requiring further SES resources in a particularly area.
19. If deployments were required we would advise the Local Controller to provide names etc and head office (EMQ) with State assistance will organise transport, accommodation, deployment orders etc.
6. **Whether any SES members within their area/region were deployed to another area/region during the 2010/2011 floods and, if so, the process by which this occurred and their role in it.**
20. In the Mackay Area we had quite a few deployments of SES crews to assist with the floods. Some of my teams were also deployed on a couple of occasions. The process was conducted as above in question five.

This is page 4 of a statement comprising 9 page/s. [REDACTED]

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
REGISTRATION GENERAL (6/1/1)
Reg. No. 8970
QUALIFIED

21. Each crew deployed was tasked by the SES ICC in that particular area. Each team that deployed from the Mackay Area also had an EMQ Liaison Officer that travelled with them. Crews that deployed were needed to assist with flood boat operations, general clean up and structural mitigation.

7. Whether there are any SES units in their area with more than one Local Controller, and, where this is the case, a description of:

22. Whitsunday Regional SES has two Local Controllers, [REDACTED] in Proserpine and David Thicker in Bowen.

a) the history of this arrangement and how it works in practice (in view of the combined effect of sections 84A and 85 of the Disaster Management Act 2003);

This structure was in place prior W-o-G regional council amalgamations that occurred in March 2008. Currently having two Local Controllers is not an issue as they are working fine and Regional council can't see why they have to change it. Also it also aligns itself well with having a Local Controller in Bowen to provide assistance to other emergency services. For example; QFRS in the Bowen area is managed and tasked from Townsville. Bowen prior to the amalgamations reported to the EMQ Office in Townsville not Mackay.

b) how SES members are tasked and deployed in that unit;

Nothing changes with the deployment of SES members. EMQ Area Office will contact the respective Local Controller's and go through the same process as previously discussed.

c) the person ultimately responsible for that SES unit during a disaster;

The Local Controller will still be responsible for their troops in the event of a disaster or deployment.

d) how communications are coordinated among the various local controllers for SES unit during a disaster and the process of communicating with the local disaster coordinator;

Each Local Controller is a core member on the Whitsunday LDMG. They both report to the LDC to provide current SITREP's. This could be in person, radio, email or by phone, subject to the event and conditions. Both Local Controllers constantly remain in touch during operations and will provide assistance to one another when required.

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- e) **whether or not this arrangement is considered effective and/or whether or not it may be subject to review or amendment.**

Currently this arrangement works well and I have not heard other wise from either Local Controller. Regional Council is also happy with the current arrangements with having two Local Controllers.

23. In the Mackay Area there is only one SES Local Controller per SES Unit.

8. **The nature of their contact and coordination with any Local Disaster Coordinator, Local Disaster Coordination Centre, Local Disaster Management Group, and other EMQ officers during the 2010/2011 floods.**

24. Each LDMG has an SES member who is a core member. Usually this person is the Local Controller that sits on the LDMG. The SES Liaison Officer in the LDCC is also usually the Local Controller that forwards all SES tasking to the respective SES ICC. The SES Liaison Officer would have constant contact with the Local Disaster Coordinator (LDC) to provide feedback on the current operations of the SES and situation awareness (SA) i.e. hot spots within the community.




25. Also an EMQ member is a core member on the LDMG that provides advice and support. Not only to the members in the Group but to provide further management and support to the SES as well if required. I'm on the LDMG as a core member. If there are HR management or equipment issues and it can't be fixed by the Local Controller they can come to me directly to provide assistance or fix the problem ASAP.

9. **Any instances, during the 2010/2011 floods, where EMQ's requirements or expectations of the SES differed from those of the Local Disaster Management Group or Local Disaster Coordinator, and how these issues were managed.**

26. No issues that have been tabled that I'm aware of.

10. **The Government (State and State/Commonwealth) funding programs accessed by SES units within their area in the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11, and their role in all aspects of the funding application process and administration of this funding.**

SES Local Government Subsidies

This is page 6 of a statement on Form 9 page/s.	
Witness	JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations:
	
	

27. Emergency Management Queensland provides each Local Government with an annual subsidy.
28. The purpose of this subsidy is to assist in defraying the costs incurred by the Local Government in running local SES Units/Groups as part of their disaster management program for the community.
29. The criteria used to determine the amount payable for the subsidy funding is as follows:
 - a- A base amount of \$3,000 (GST exclusive) is paid to each Local Government SES Unit operating within the Local Government area;
 - b- Local Governments receive an extra \$100 (GST exclusive) for each additional active SES Group;
 - c- Local Governments with a population in excess of 45,000 who have only one group attached to an SES Unit, receive an additional \$500 (GST exclusive) as compensation for the operation of a single, large unit; and
 - d- Local Governments that have active Emergency Services (ES) Cadet Groups within their areas of responsibility receive an additional \$300 (GST exclusive) for each active ES Cadet Group.
30. The Annual Local Government subsidies process commences in July and is generally paid in the first week of December.
 - a: The total budget available is \$480,000 (excluding GST).
 - b: The total amount of grants approved by the Minister for the Local Governments in 2009-2010 was \$530,750 (including GST).
 - c: The total amount of grants approved by the Minister for the Local Governments in 2010-2011 was \$528,385 (including GST).
 - d: Some SES Groups also receive funding from other avenues that we may be unaware of i.e. donations from other organisations and in particular mining companies in this area.
31. I now attach, marked "AJL 2", an SES Recurrent Local Government print out. The money is given to SES Unit/s (\$3000) and SES Group/s (\$100) to assist the SES with business administration processes i.e. postage, network access, printers, faxes, stationery supplies and so on. This is not a lot of money, many Regional Councils actually provide extra funding out of their own budget to provide further help and assistance to their respective Unit and Groups.
32. I also attach the SES Recurrent VEA marked "AJL 3". This shows the Volunteer Executive Allowance given to all SES Executives i.e. Local Controller, Deputy Local Controller and Group Leader. As per SES Operations Doctrine, BMF, 1.0 Volunteer Executive Allowance for Mackay 2009/2010.
33. Any funding programs or initiatives that come on scope are forwarded to all Local Controllers and Local Disaster Coordinators and they make application where necessary.

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Local Controllers are also asked to forward to their respective SES Groups. If they require any assistance with the application process they can contact the Mackay EMQ Area Office:

a: Each Unit and Groups receive an allowance each year from EMQ includes the following to assist the SES units with business administration.

- SES Unit: \$3000
- SES Group: \$100

b: Each Executive (Local Controller, Deputy Local Controller and Group Leaders) receives an allowance each year and this amount increases slightly each year, this year;

- Local Controller: \$403.65
- Deputy Local Controller: \$306.00
- Group Leader: \$306.00

11. Whether or not issues have been raised with them directly by SES members about the level of funding provided by the State Government, including any suggestions by SES members about how the funding arrangement could be improved.

34. SES has advised me there is lack a funding for SES training. Each year we seem to be doing more with less. There needs to be more money to be able to do more SES executive and training workshops in the region i.e. training workshops for SES Instructors should be done at least twice a year. Further money should also be available to provide leadership training for all executives.

12. The results of any assessment or debrief within their area relating to the performance of the SES units during the 2010/2011 floods.


35. A debrief was conducted with all three LDMG's and DDMG. Only minor issues from an SES perspective were raised and have been fixed. I also had a verbal debrief with my Local Controllers who had crews that deployed during the floods to see how things went. Please refer to the attachment marked "AJL 4".

13. Any other observations on the structure, funding and command and control arrangement of the SES generally and/or in relation to the 2010/2011 floods, including possible areas for improvement, and any improvements made, or proposed to be made, in any of these aspects following the 2010/2011 floods.

36. RFA and Guardian software packages need to be sorted out ASAP i.e build RFA into the back end of Guardian so any tasks that are logged into Guardian pertaining to the SES, then filter into RFA. Guardian is preferable. My Councils won't use RFA as

This is page 8 of a statement comprising 9 page/s.

Witness (



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they already have Guardian. Guardian is a multi agency tasking system and RFA is only for SES.

37. One organisation or statutory body needs to have command and control over the SES. The collaboration between EMQ and Regional Council just confuses the situation I believe the current MOA between EMQ and Council will not work. We have gone out to consultation with the regional Councils and there needs to be more consideration about who does what for the SES. The SES is not really controlled by any organisation. One organisation needs command and control over the SES.

38. If requested by the LDMG, all 132 500 calls during a disaster should be diverted into the respective LDCC call centre, if they have the capability to do so.

39. Resource analysis of SES volunteers in the field should be done at the local level, conducted by the LDMG. This cannot be done at a district or state level when they have a lack of SA or what is going on locally. Forward deploying troops into an area when they have not been requested only provides further management issues for the LDMG to deal with i.e accommodation, food, water, SES troops sitting on their hands because there are too many people assisting and so on.

Justices Act 1886

I acknowledge by virtue of Section 110A(6)(c)(ii) of the Justices Act 1886 that:

- (1) This written statement by me dated 13/10/2011 and contained in the pages numbered 1 to 9 is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and
- (2) I make it knowing that, if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating anything that I know is false.

..... Signature


Signed at 16.15..... this 13 day of OCT...2011

MACKAY

This is page 9 of a statement comprising 9 page/s.

Witness (Name):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations:



"ASL 1"
Relevant Qualifications – Anthony Lee
Statement of Witness (COI)

Master of Emergency Management – Current
(Dissertation: Research and Analysis of Recovery Plans for Regional Councils in Queensland)
Charles Sturt University

Bachelor of Emergency Management
Charles Sturt University

Diploma of Business Management
Martin College

Associate Diploma of Clearance Diving
Royal Australian Navy

Certificate IV Training and Assessment – TAE40110
Australasian Regional Training Services

Exercise Management – Design and manage activities which exercise elements of emergency management
Australian Emergency Management Institute

Coordinate Resources within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response
Australian Emergency Management Institute

Manage Media Requirements at a Major Incident
Australian Emergency Management Institute

Manage Recovery Functions and Services
Australian Emergency Management Institute

Senior Disaster Management Officer Course
Emergency Management Queensland

Fireline Leadership Course
Mission-Centred Solutions, Inc. (Franktown, Colorado USA)

Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) course
Queensland Fire Rescue Service

Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements (QDMA), Introduction to Emergency Risk Management, Evacuation, Resupply, Local Disaster Coordinator, Warnings and Alert Systems.
Emergency Management Queensland

Introduction to Fuel Oil Spills
Maritime Safety Queensland

"ASL 2"

FY	Local Government
MACKAY	
2009-10	Central Highlands Regional Council / Peak Downs Unit
2009-10	Isaac Regional Council / Belyando Shire
2009-10	Isaac Regional Council / Nebo Shire
2009-10	Isaac Regional Council / Broadsound Shire
2009-10	Mackay Regional Council / Mackay City
2009-10	Mackay Regional Council / Mirani Shire
2009-10	Mackay Regional Council / Sarina Shire
2009-10	Whitsunday Regional Council / Whitsunday Shire
TOTALS	

" ASL 2 "

Principal SES Group	Total Subsidy SES Component Incl GST	Total Subsidy Active _Cadet_Groups_Incl GST
Capella	\$3,300.00	\$0.00
Clermont	\$3,410.00	\$0.00
Nebo	\$3,410.00	\$0.00
St Lawrence	\$3,740.00	\$0.00
Mackay	\$3,520.00	\$0.00
Mirani	\$3,410.00	\$330.00
Sarina	\$3,740.00	\$0.00
Proserpine	\$3,520.00	\$0.00
	\$28,050.00	\$330.00

"ASL 2"

Grand_Total_Subsidy_SES Component_&_Active_Gadet Group_Incl_GST
\$3,300.00
\$3,410.00
\$3,410.00
\$3,740.00
\$3,520.00
\$3,740.00
\$3,740.00
\$3,520.00
\$28,380.00

"ASL 3"

Title	1st_Name	Surname	Area	SES_Group
MACKAY				
Mr		MACKAY	Airlie Beach	Airlie Beach
Mr		MACKAY	Airlie Beach	Airlie Beach
Mr		MACKAY	Armstrongs Beach	Armstrongs Beach
Mrs		MACKAY	Bowen	Bowen
Mr		MACKAY	Bowen	Bowen
Mr		MACKAY	Calen	Calen
Mr		MACKAY	Campwin Beach	Campwin Beach
Ms		MACKAY	Carmila	Carmila
Mr		MACKAY	Carmila	Carmila
Mr		MACKAY	Dysart	Dysart
Mr		MACKAY	Glenden	Glenden
Mr		MACKAY	Gloucester	Gloucester
Mr		MACKAY	Greenhill	Greenhill
Mr		MACKAY	Mackay	Mackay
Mr		MACKAY	Midge Point	Midge Point
Mr		MACKAY	Mirani	Mirani
Mr		MACKAY	Mirani	Mirani
Mrs		MACKAY	Mirani Cadets	Mirani Cadets
Mr		MACKAY	Moranbah	Moranbah
Mr		MACKAY	Moranbah	Moranbah
Mrs		MACKAY	Moranbah	Moranbah
Mr		MACKAY	Nebo	Nebo
Mr		MACKAY	Nebo	Nebo
Mr		MACKAY	Nebo	Nebo
Mr		MACKAY	Proserpine	Proserpine
Mr		MACKAY	Proserpine	Proserpine
Mrs		MACKAY	Proserpine	Proserpine
Mr		MACKAY	Sarina	Sarina
Mrs		MACKAY		
Mr		MACKAY		
TOTALS				

"ASL 3"

Total_Claim_Amount_Of_SES_S ubaldy	Total_Claim_Amount_Of_Cadet Allowance	Grand_Total_Claim_Amount
\$189.20	\$0.00	\$189.20
\$71.00	\$0.00	\$71.00
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$189.20	\$0.00	\$189.20
\$373.15	\$0.00	\$373.15
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$373.15	\$0.00	\$373.15
\$118.30	\$0.00	\$118.30
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$342.05	\$0.00	\$342.05
\$47.30	\$0.00	\$47.30
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$0.00	\$283.60	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$373.15	\$0.00	\$373.15
\$236.40	\$0.00	\$236.40
\$236.40	\$0.00	\$236.40
\$373.15	\$0.00	\$373.15
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$189.20	\$0.00	\$189.20
\$373.15	\$0.00	\$373.15
\$189.20	\$0.00	\$189.20
\$283.60	\$0.00	\$283.60
\$7,360.80	\$283.60	\$7,644.40

Mackay DDMG
Debrief of Disaster Operations
Cyclones Anthony & Yasi – February 2011

"ASL 4"

		these meetings	organisations present facilitates effective planning and agreement on actions, instilling confidence in the processes employed.	
ABC RADIO	7	Preparation	Planning and cyclone education and preparedness information went on air as per normal	Continued work done on this throughout the season helps the community
	8	Having to evacuate our building	Knowing our staff were safe was comforting Information was going out on the radio. We had people on the ground in Mackay feeding into the broadcast.	The contact numbers of the studio where the program was originating from was sent to the DDMG distribution list well before the event. DDMG people are aware of my telephone numbers
	9	Follow up after cyclone	Able to follow up and get out any information that was needed.	
	10	Having a line at the police station	This allowed us to have someone at the station who could report into the program and in the news. This was used for our national current affairs program the following day.	
EMQ	11	NO ISSUES		
QFRS	12	The Mackay group seems to function very well.	Continue with the same professionalism	
	13	Meetings were timely and structured		
	14			
Executive Officer		Communication between LDCC and the DDCC	Positive working relationship established with local governments	
Mackay Regional Council		Communication between District and Local went smoothly given the State was firing in the curly ones.	Communication was open and honest.	
		DDMG Meetings – The ability to be left alone	We not need micro-management.	

**Mackay DDMG
Debrief of Disaster Operations
Cyclones Anthony & Yasi – February 2011**

"ASL 4"

		to do our work without constant meetings given our involvement level was good.		
		Joint media conference with the mayor and DDC worked well.	Achieved one united message from the Region.	
		Aged Care Providers some had effective evacuation plans whereas some did not.	Hold workshops to work together to improve everyone's plans.	
		Caravan Parks generally heeded the advice of Council to relocate residents whilst some parks reported refusals to leave, most had fairly good clearance rates.	Work to improve communication with the vulnerable sectors of the community.	

Mackay DDMG
Debrief of Disaster Operations
Cyclones Anthony & Yasi – February 2011

"AJL 4"

Things we can improve on next time.

Agency	No	Item	Comments / Solution	Comments / Action By / Date
ST		<p>STATE INTERFERENCE</p> <p>Premier's Department – rang caravan parks Monday night advising evacuate residents – Local Govt not aware of this until start calling Tuesday confirming that caravan parks have evacuation underway from Emergency alert.</p> <p>This is a Local Government function not State.</p> <p>Then loading up caravan parks after we had evacuated them – wanting caravan parks to accept travellers from up north to stay in Mackay Tuesday and Wednesday night and we are still in the warning zone.</p>	<p>State needs to recognise where they sit in the triangle and what functions Local Govt under Qld disaster Management arrangements OR at least tell us they want to do this then we are not wasting our resources doing the same job.</p>	
		<p>State interfering with DDMG/DDCC and LDMG/LDCC operations. i.e. State requesting Evacuation information (Location, Who manages them? Capacity etc) from the DDMG.</p> <p>Why does State want this information? This information is the responsibility of the respective Regional Councils (LDMG). State is strategic not tactical.</p>	<p>Regional Councils (LDMG) have the local expertise and knowledge to make the best informed decisions within their community.</p> <p>State must trust Councils capability to make decisions on behalf of their community. LDMG's will provide info about Evacuation Centres through the normal information management process i.e. SITREPS to the DDCC and then SDCC.</p> <p>Workshop to be conducted between Regional Staff members, not from Brisbane or South East (EMQ, QPS, Council Members etc)</p>	

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			and SDMG members. It would be an opportunity for Regional Staff involved with LDMG's, and DDMG's who have extensive regional DM Operational experience, to discuss DM topics/issues with SDMG members.	
		SDMG Teleconferences – cases of LDMG's not being invited onto SDMG teleconferences. LDMG's have the right to information as we are supposed to be managing the event as per the Qld Disaster Management Arrangements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALL SDMG teleconferences need to have an invitation to LDMG. 	
		SDMG Consultation - was non-existent during many of the decision making process. SDMG tried to manage the event disregarding local knowledge, localised weather conditions or the structure under the DM Act and the Qld Disaster Management Arrangements. Tried to micro-manage the event. Coordination is not a word in the present vocabulary of SDMG more a Command and Control .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultation needs to be recognised as extremely important and a necessary tool as per the DM Act. • Need to understand the Qld Disaster Management Arrangements. 	
		Bottom up approach to disaster management	Events being managed from Brisbane	Follow the existing arrangements and principles
		EVACUATIONS CENTRES		
Whitsunday LDMG		Evac Centre (Certified)	No building within the Council Boundaries will meet the Guidelines for Evacuation Centres. Media from State advised persons	Matter to be raised at District Disaster Group Meeting for discussion at State Debrief. Chairman to have discussions

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			to Evacuate to Evacuation Centres.	at Government level to determine solution to issue.
			No consultation by State with District and Local on Process and Procedure to activate local Refuge Centres prior to, during and following an event.	State be requested to at least consult with District and Local Groups prior to making such decisions at that level.
			State media releases continue to advise the public to go to Evacuation Centres.	Any media releases about Local matters are to be made by Local Group
		REFUGE CENTRES		
		Procedure for activation of Refuge Centre	<p>1.Public Expectation for Evac Centre regardless of Event.</p> <p>2.Change description from Evac Centre to Refuge Centre.</p> <p>3.The procedure for opening of Refuge Centres for Storm Surge to be defined.</p> <p>*In the event of a cyclone where there is no storm surge expected, the WDMG recommends that people follow normal cyclone preparation procedures as detailed in the Emergency Action Guide.</p> <p>*Refuge Centres will not be opened staffed and manned prior to and during the impact of an event as normal procedure.</p> <p>*There is an expectation that accommodation providers and tour operators will implement their own risk management and business</p>	<p>Amend SOP and OP to include amended procedures.</p> <p>Provide media outlets with amended procedures to advise public of outcome of meeting decision</p>

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			<p>continuity strategies and manage their guests and customers safety and welfare during and following an event</p> <p>*In the event of a major storm surge, the WDMG will assess the situation, determine the areas in need of evacuation and choose the most suitable building from our current register of refuge centres.</p> <p>*Queensland Police Service will direct only those persons in the path of the storm surge to the designated building. However, the WDMG cannot guarantee that the designated building will withstand the forces of cyclonic winds</p> <p>4. Buildings on the Register of Refuge Centres be checked to determine those clear of Storm Surge Inundation levels</p>	
		<p>AGED CARE</p>		<p>Buildings on the Register to be graded to Surge levels</p>
		<p>Aged Care it is obvious that some providers do not have adequate or any plans to evacuate residents other than "get Council to do it".</p> <p>Plans need to include all parties involved i.e. if the provider wants the ambulance to transport patients then a MOU needs to be established with them – it is no good having a plan the specifies a resource that does not exist or does not have the capability to meet the plan.</p>	<p>Workshop needs to be held with all aged care providers to assist them in creating adequate plans.</p> <p>Needs to have the Commonwealth Regulatory Body that issues licences and funding – state the plans must be agreed to by Local Govt and MOU's required for external resources.</p>	

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		<p>Aged care facility closure</p>	<p>It can not be left to the last minute to determine where aged care residents go if the facility has to be evacuated.</p> <p>Contingency plans for the potential evacuation of these centres should be made prior to the next wet season.</p>	<p>Plans developed by aged care facilities and presented to LDMG's by next wet season</p> <p>(Queensland Hlth should be requested to comment on plans)</p> <p>Plans should not include any expectation that the local hospital will be able to accommodated evacuated residents</p>
EMERGENCY ALERTS/MEDIA ISSUES				
		<p>Emergency Alerts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notice to react (supposed to be 45 minutes) to short for council to place additional resources to deal with call volumes or website hits. • Calls being received 2330hrs at night – causing panic. • Dependent on provider a number of persons did not receive advice. (i.e. providers connected to computers, some business lines, address other than here depending on where they brought the phone, mailing address) • Little knowledge in the public domain about what to do or that by simply staying on the line the message will be repeated. • Some calls being placed by 1815hrs messages were suppose to start at 1900hrs before SDMG teleconference 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define target area to worst affected first - then fringe areas. What's the point in Mackay getting warnings at 1815hrs when Townsville area was more in the initial path. • Consider toned down message for fringe areas i.e. PREPARE to evacuate. • Consider preference of daytime broadcast when applicable. • Allow time to have media broadcasting "Action to Take" before the alert is issued. • Major public education campaign required. • Do not jump the gun with 	

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		<p>had finished.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Message poorly worded needed to include PREPARE and LISTEN TO LOCAL RADIO as part of the advice rather than sinking call centres and websites. First warning was issued 50 to 65 hours before BoM expected crossing. • Message was 10-12 hours to early as no accurate storm surge figures available to 11.23pm Monday night. The difference in heights from 1800hrs and 2323hrs was a significant drop in surge 4m+2m to 2.5m including 1.2m wave set up for Mackay. • Message areas to broad for the same message – fringe areas message needs to be toned down otherwise people will ignore next time. • Caused panic and fear - a lot of criticism from the public was received. <p>The message:- 'Tropical Cyclone Yasi is due to hit the Queensland coast on Wednesday night. Those in low lying areas should be concerned about storm surge and should relocate on Tuesday. Check further details with your local council.'</p>	<p>issuing alerts. i.e. in this case the SDMG teleconference said it would start at 1900hrs yet we had phone calls by 1815hrs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wording needs to be correct. 	
Executive Officer		Emergency Alert	No advice provided to LDCC and DDCC on content and timing of message	Consultation with LDMG and DDMG on issues
Qld Health	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automatic dial up Monday night 31/01/11 	<p>Generic issues stated in the SMS</p> <p>The auto-dialling warning message is non-discriminatory and dials all</p>	Re-programming of the auto-dialling system to include

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			<p>numbers in a range. For businesses with large no.'s of direct dial numbers that may mean many calls.</p> <p>So many extensions were called at the Mackay Base Hospital that night that we were forced to call in a second switch operator to cope with the extra work as unanswered extensions transferred to the main switch.</p> <p>This was bad enough at night when there are reduced demands on the switch operator, however if this had occurred during the day this could have cost lives if the switch was jammed with such calls and medical emergency calls could not be made</p>	<p>certain known number ranges – unknown who does this, but should be done ASAP</p>
		SMS Text Message Storm Surge Advice Mon 31st Jan pm	<p>The decision by State to issue Storm Surge Advice by SMS from Sarina to Cooktown at 9.00pm Monday to relocate on Tuesday and contact Council was not appropriate. No Consultation with Council. No pre advice to Group. No substance to message.</p>	<p>The Chair raise this matter at District Group level so as the issue can be discussed at the State Debrief with a view to having future messaging discussed with and agreed to by District and Local Groups prior to such advices being broadcast.</p>
		Media Broadcast Tuesday 1st 9.00am advising all persons in the Brown Zone between Sarina and Cairns to Evacuate.	<p>The broadcast at 9.00am on Tuesday 1st of advice to all persons in the Brown Zone (4.0m) from Sarina to Cairns to evacuate on Tuesday prior to impact on</p>	<p>The Chair raise this matter at the District Group level so as this issue can be discussed at State Debrief with a view to having such advice discussed</p>

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			Wednesday was not appropriate and consideration of such advise was not discussed with District or Local Groups for input prior to issue of statement. Such specific advice on Surge Levels and location was not considered appropriate at this point in the track of the event. Such advice resulted in a raised level of concern by the public causing unnecessary actions and reactions.	with and agreed to by District and Local Groups The providers of such advice to the State Group should provide such information only when justification of the advice can be made
ABC RADIO	3	Having a more secure building	A new building is coming	May 2012
	4	Relocation	If we have to relocate is the set up we have good enough. Do we need to look at another location	Will talk to our technicians regarding getting more equipment. The only problem other stations also want the same. Is council a better option for us given there may be more space.
		Premiers Department issuing a blanket EA across the QLD East Coast. No consultation with Local Governments (LDMG). The EA contradicted the current DM measures LDMG's had implemented within their respected communities.	If a blanket EA that is going to be across regions, promulgated by State or the Premiers Department, Regional Councils (LDMG/LDCC) must be consulted. They could then have a say if they want their community to be included. An EA that contradicts the information being fed from the LDMG via the Mayor to the community (media) creates unnecessary confusion that the LDMG/LDCC does not need at the	DDMG/DCC – brief SDMG.

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			time.	
		<p>Local ABC Radio shut down.</p> <p>A number of complaints have been received by Council that people listening to ABC were not getting local information.</p>	<p>Mayor has written to ABC Management expressing disappointment at the lack of service provided in this instance.</p> <p>MRC continues to strengthen partnerships with commercial radio.</p> <p>Commercial radio has also signed a MOU with EMQ in May 2010</p>	
		CALL CENTRES		
		<p>132500 calls not coming thru to LDCC when activated.</p> <p>This is a continual problem along with inadequate information being given by this centre.</p>	<p>Previously raised with EMQ during Floods 2008/TC Hamish/ TC Ului.</p> <p>EMQ at State level fail to acknowledge as problem.</p>	
		132500 Call Centre.	<p>The Coordination Centre experienced difficulties in having all callers from our Region to the 132500 number re diverted to the WDMG dedicated Disaster Call Line. The procedure implemented by EMQ to Smart Centre to divert all calls failed.</p> <p>Calls made to the 132500 were received in our Centre up to 9 hours after being logged in the Centre in Brisbane and in at least one case 20 hours from lodgement.</p> <p>An attempt by a Council Staff member to log a request for</p>	<p>During each event EMQ request Smart Centre to divert all request for assistance calls to our Dedicated line. This request was not implemented at Smart Centre. Delays in response occur. District and EMQ to discuss at State Debrief and secure a procedure whereby calls can be diverted without fail to Councils Call Centre.</p> <p>Request to be made at State Debrief for staff within the</p>

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			assistance, as an attempt to identify issues in the system, highlighted lack of trained operators in the Call Centre with little knowledge in requirements.	Smart Centre Call Centre to be given appropriate training in their role as telephone operators
		PREPARATION		
		Schools closure	Can significantly affect staffing, especially when closed for so long – there was confusion as the original closure was announced as being for 3 days – consideration should have been given to closing on a day to day basis, depending on damage etc	Awareness of impact of closure and good communication
		Op Plan Activation of Group	The Activation of the Group was considered to be late in response to advice for TC Anthony and not as per Stages of Op Plan	For future Events the Group to be Activated as per the Stages of the Op Plan for Activation of the Group
		Op Plan for Coord Centre	The manning of the Coord Centre in particular close down to standby during night was questioned during event. The operation was determined by discussion with Chair and DC.	The activation and timing of activation of Centre is a decision for Chair and Group and takes into account event situation, staff safety and welfare, agency response limitations and other operational issues
		Preparation by Client Departments	Where sufficient warning is provided, clients should undertake action to mitigate possible damage to asset. Such action may involve requesting assistance from QBuild e.g. to	Clear instructions should be prepared for such events and to what extent preparation / mitigation is expected and not left to the last moment for someone to make a call.

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			remove shade sails prior to anticipated impact. Such actions involves minimal costs and has the potential to save considerable costs in the replacement of very expensive equipment following damage.	
		STORM SURGE		
		Storm Tide Warning Advice by BoM.	The format of the information issued by BoM as Official Storm Tide Warning is of a technical nature and confusing to some operators required to determine actions on the advice. Example: Estimated peak surge: 0.3m. Open coast storm tide (which includes 2.0m wave setup) 3.1m above AHD from 9.00am which is 1.1m above HAT. Consideration be given to providing less technical advice in official warnings	The Chair raise this issue for discussion with BoM.to Provide only advice such as: Expected Height above HAT, Time of effect, Duration of Effect.
		BOM information – local radio report Tuesday morning that no storm surge problem. Yet the 5.36am advice was:- MACKAY: Estimated peak surge: 1.0 metres Open coast storm tide [including 1.2m wave setup] 5.0 metres above AHD around 11am on Thursday which is 1.5 metres above	Know the Disaster Management protocols and say less. Lack of communication or prior broadcasts between Brisbane and Mackay causes confusion.	

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		the Highest Astronomical Tide [HAT]. There seems to be differing opinions between local and Brisbane forecasters on ABC radio.		
		Storm surge zones inadequate considering event. MRC only have a surge level of 2.5m due to the first zone being 3.47m to 3.5m AHD.	Need an additional 2m of zones, however DO NOT CHANGE the first six zones. Need for the BoM to officially acknowledge the HAT moved from 3.47 to 3.64 AHD – last storm tide book was 2008.	
		Storm tide levels confusion created using the word "above" AHD e.g. 5.0m above AHD is actual 5.0m AHD the word "above" should only be use as a prefix to HAT MACKAY: Estimated peak surge: 1.0 metres Open coast storm tide [including 1.2m wave setup] 5.0 metres above AHD around 11am on Thursday which is 1.5 metres above the Highest Astronomical Tide [HAT].	<i>BoM and DERM need to remove the word above prefixing AHD</i>	
		OTHER ISSUES		
		Stick with the facts of the event to reduce complacency in the future	General discussion to resolve	
		Limit/clarify as appropriate sensationalistic comments within the group		
		Clarify key points before everyone leaves the room		

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		Jump on inaccurate media reports early		
		Feed up the line the problems associated with all the above using the SMS alert as an example		
		I think the public became terrorised by the media and much of it was clearly inaccurate		
		<i>Bus Travel for Cyclone Anthony still occurred. This was better for TC Yasi.</i> <i>MRC believes that this will be a continual problem given that bus companies are asking travellers to sign waivers of duty of care.</i> <i>Given that TC Yasi was cat 5 if another TC is only a Cat 3 we believe that the bus companies will continue to travel endangering travellers and emergency services</i>	Need to have an SOP developed that as soon as a TC Warning is issued that bus companies are advised to cease travelling thru dangerous winds/conditions to cover ourselves from Coroner's Court	
		Red Cross Volunteers driving to Townsville in sedans thru TC Anthony placing volunteers at risk. By sending Mackay volunteers to Townsville with TC Yasi fast approaching we would be extremely short staff if evacuation centres in Mackay were needed	Taken up ARC Brisbane management – they have acknowledged the risk and are reviewing procedures to include 100km wind scenario in travel arrangements	