

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Date: 14 October 2011

Name of Witness: Michael Shapland

Address of Witness: 61 Mary Street, Brisbane Queensland 4000

Occupation: Regional Director, Brisbane Region

Division: Emergency Management Queensland
Department of Community Safety

Telephone: (Work) [REDACTED] **(Mobile)** [REDACTED]

I, **Michael Peter Shapland**, Regional Director, Brisbane Region, Emergency Management Queensland, Department of Community Safety state that:

- I have been Regional Director for Brisbane Region since 31 January 2011;
- Before that, I held several positions in the (now) Department of Community Safety and Emergency Management Queensland. These included: Senior Project Officer for Counter-Terrorism (March 2004 – December 2004); Executive Manager, Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management Services (December 2004 – September 2005); Director, Disaster Operations / Director Disaster Management (September 2005 – November 2010); Director Policy and Performance (November - December 2010); and Acting Executive Director - Operations (January 2011);
- Before taking up a role with the department, I completed an MBA with Griffith University, and spent 25 years with the British Army. During this time, I attended the British Army's Command and Staff Course - a year long course aimed at the development of senior management. This has given me a good understanding of management, and of command and control issues; and
- I am an SES volunteer in Brisbane SES Unit.

This is page 1 of a statement comprising 12 page/s [REDACTED]

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland): [REDACTED]	JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations:
--	--

1. Their role and position within Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ), including information about their direct supervisor and the person to whom they report in a disaster.

- a. I am currently the Regional Director for Brisbane Region in EMQ, and I report to [REDACTED], Executive Director - Operations
- b. During the month of January 2011 – and during the Brisbane floods - I was acting as Executive Director – Operations for EMQ, and reporting to the Acting Assistant Director-General, EMQ – Warren Bridson.

2. The SES units with their region/including details (if known) of any paid SES members within their region.

- a. The SES units within Brisbane Region are:
- a. Brisbane City Council SES Unit
 - b. Moreton Bay SES Unit
 - c. Redland city Council SES Unit
- b. Brisbane City Council SES Unit has a paid full-time Local Controller, a paid full-time administrative staff member, a paid part-time training administrative staff member, and for most of the last 8 months has also had a paid trainee administrative staff member.
- c. Moreton Bay Regional Council pays an honorarium to its Local Controller, which enables this member to devote his work life to SES matters.
- d. Redland City Council has no paid SES members. However, the Local Controller and Deputy Local Controller both have unrelated jobs with the council.

3. The adequacy of current SES volunteer numbers (including any issues with recruitment and retention of members), level of training and equipment and resources available to SES units within their area/region.

- a. Current numbers for volunteers are considered adequate.

This is page 2 of a statement comprising 12 pages [REDACTED]

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):
[REDACTED]

**JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:**

b. As at 6 October 2011, figures are shown in the table below:

Council	Active members	Probationary members	Total Members
Brisbane City	627	3	630
Moreton Bay Regional	304	26	330
Redland City	222	1	223
Total	1153	30	1183

Table 1. Brisbane Region SES numbers - 6 October 2011

- c. My assessment of adequacy is based on functions agreed for the SES in Brisbane Region some three years ago, and the numbers required to be trained in those functions. While the appropriateness of the functions and the number of groups themselves are in the early stages of review, and there is an intent to expand SES numbers in all three local governments, the current figures are at **Brisbane Region Agreed Membership Requirements and Functions Matrix marked MPS1**. This shows an overall total target membership of 1215. The regional total of 1183 fully active or probationary members is 2.6% below target. But in addition are those not yet counted in the SES information management system. For example, Brisbane City Council has a further 150 volunteers that have just started one of the three annual induction training sessions.
- d. Training against the agreed functions is also adequate overall, although there are variations within individual units, and an individual SES member may be counted against more than one function. The one exception is flood boat operators, but this has already been highlighted by the Commission's Interim Report, and addressed in part by training. Further steps are also being taken on this issue.
- e. However, the operational requirements of functions are not the only benchmark for adequacy of training. The SES is a community-based organisation, where community expectations also play a part. As part of my normal role, I am still researching data to support verbal reports that reveal the SES community's expectations about training. These point to few problems with recruiting (there is still a waiting list of around 300 for Brisbane SES), but greater problems with retention.
- f. It is believed there are 3 break points in retention:
1. The first during the 3 months of probation, when some people decide SES is not for them;
 2. The second, most critical, about the 12 month point, when some leave through disillusionment with lack of operational tasking, or lack of training opportunities;
 3. The third, around 5 years, as circumstances change.

This is page 3 of a statement comprising 12 pages

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

- g. Training issues most affect the second group. In their first year, volunteers can expect to attend a range of basic core-skills courses that are a pre-requisite for others. Currently these absorb much of the available SES instructor resources, and limit the capacity for those courses that are more resource-intensive, capability-enhancing and motivating for volunteers. The cycle can repeat itself, as more new volunteers join, requiring repetition of the core courses. There are a range of strategies currently being discussed that can address this – a recruit training ‘depot’ to reach a certain standard, functional groups where certain skills are concentrated, very large courses that concentrate instructors to best effect. But as a volunteer organisation, the SES is clannish, working in community groups with their own strong culture, and there is a limit to the extent that ideas can be imposed without volunteer backlash.
- h. Equipment and physical resources for training are not an issue. The Region contains councils that are committed to the SES, and their support, together with equipment provided through EMQ, results in adequate resources.
- 4. The mechanisms for receiving requests for assistance and the process for, and their role in, managing requests for assistance, including the prioritisation and/or management of competing requests for assistance.**
- a. Ordinarily, requests for assistance (RFAs) for flood and storm related issues are passed through the 132 500 number. Newly established procedures enable these to be passed directly from Queensland Government call-takers at Smart Services Queensland (SSQ) to the ‘Request for Assistance Online’ (RFA Online) system. These requests are then monitored through RFA Online at the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC). Notification of an RFA is given to the SES units through their Duty Officer system for the SES Group concerned.
- b. An exception to this is the Brisbane SES Unit. In Brisbane, calls to 132 500 from landlines and mobile phones where the caller’s suburb is identified by voice recognition software are routed to the Brisbane City Council call centre, and from there passed direct to the SES Unit. Calls to 132 500 from mobile phones within the Brisbane city area where the caller’s suburb is *not* identified by voice recognition software are still routed to the SSQ Call Centre, then SDCC, who email the Brisbane SES Unit direct. Over-flow arrangements exist that will route all calls to SSQ when the Brisbane City Council call centre is unable to handle the volume.
- c. I and my staff play no role in the management or prioritisation of ordinary requests. Requests for assistance, other than for flood and storm issues, such as a request from the Queensland Police Service for support to a land search, may be referred direct to SES Units or to the Regional Duty Officer. Management of the occasional competing request for assistance, may be referred to the Regional Duty Officer by Local Controllers, but these tend to be related to the interpretation of policy, rather than for operational decisions.

This is page 4 of a statement comprising 12 pages

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

- d. Under the current legislation, and particularly as set out in the draft *EMQ Roles and Responsibilities in Support of Disaster Management Arrangements* guideline (EMQ Roles Guide), I and my staff have a role in 'managing, supporting and coordinating SES activities'. We, therefore, may provide advice to a Local Controller on how a particular issue may be managed, and may seek to influence them on actions to take, but this does not extend to command or control over a Local Controller or the operational management of RFAs.
- 5. Their authority for, and role in, the tasking and deployment of SES members, including local controller tasking/deployment, both when a disaster is declared and at other times.**
- a. The declaration of a disaster has, to date, been peripheral to my and my staff's role in tasking and deployment of SES members, as no special powers have been used in relation to such deployments.
- b. My authority for, and role in, the tasking and deployment of SES members stems from the draft EMQ Roles Guide. This includes the "responsibility to coordinate, support and manage the provision of SES resources across boundaries in consultation with respective local governments".
- c. In practice, this means speaking to SES units and Local Governments within my region and ensuring that arrangements are in place to allow support between units of different local governments. While some of these arrangements might be local through neighbouring groups, I would expect to be consulted before any local cross-boundary deployments took place. The tasking of the SES units, once in place, is a matter for SES Local Controllers and Group Leaders.
- d. During large deployments to other areas of the State, I receive requests from other regions through the SES State Operations Centre, coordinate the call for volunteers to meet requirements, plan and communicate the logistics of the deployment through a deployment instruction form, ensure the equipping of the deploying taskforce, ensure an liaison officer from EMQ (normally one of my staff members) deploys in advance of, or with, the deploying taskforce, ensure that the taskforce return is managed, and that a debrief takes place after deployment.
- e. I have not directly experienced deployments into Brisbane Region, but my responsibilities are to ensure that the reception and logistics arrangements are sufficient and that such deploying taskforces are tasked effectively. The tasking is the responsibility of the SES Local Controller. In large scale events, such a task may be beyond the capacity of a local controller and their support structure, and my responsibility in such circumstances is to ensure that they are supported in their role, with

This is page 5 of a statement comprising 12 page/s

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

advice, resources, and planning and decision support - in effect everything short of taking command. Under the current legislation and guidelines I believe we do not have responsibility for their command, but we do have the responsibility never to let the SES fail - either individually or collectively. I have communicated that message both upwards and downwards, and my staff understand it.

6. Whether any SES members within their area/region were deployed to another area/region during the 2010/2011 floods and, if so, the process by which this occurred and their role in it.
- a. SES members from Brisbane region were deployed to other regions during the 2010/2011 floods. The table below shows the details.

Dates	Location	SES Volunteers	Notes
28 Dec 2010 - 1 Jan 2011	Dalby	2	Flood boat operators
29 Dec 2010 - 2 Jan 2011	Dalby	2	Flood boat operators
2 -6 Jan 2011	Emerald	19	Flood cleanup
16-19 Jan 2011	Fernvale	23	Flood cleanup
22 Jan 2011 - 20 Mar 2011	Grantham	150+	Numerous taskforces support to search.

Table 2. Brisbane region cross-boundary deployments - 2010/2011 Floods

- b. Following the deployments above and the impact of TC Yasi, Brisbane Region SES filled a further 257 places in seven taskforces deploying to Cairns and Townsville between 4 February and 2 March 2011. Eight EMQ regional staff deployed as liaison officers, or in other roles, to support the cleanup.
- c. I was not in the role of Regional Director, Brisbane Region during the deployments shown in Table 2. However, the process and that for the subsequent deployments in support of Tropical Cyclone Yasi operations is the same as that set out in paragraph 5.d.
7. Whether there are any SES units in their area with more than one Local Controller, and, where this is the case, a description of:
- a) the history of this arrangement and how it works in practice (in view of the combined effect of sections 84A and 85 of the Disaster Management Act 2003);
- b) how SES members are tasked and deployed in that unit;

This is page 6 of a statement comprising 12 page/s.

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

- c) the person ultimately responsible for that SES unit during a disaster;
- d) how communications are coordinated among the various local controllers for SES unit during a disaster and the process of communicating with the local disaster coordinator;
- e) whether or not this arrangement is considered effective and/or whether or not it may be subject to review or amendment.

a. There are no SES Units in the region which have more than one Local Controller.

8. The nature of their contact and coordination with any Local Disaster Coordinator, Local Disaster Coordination Centre, Local Disaster Management Group, and other EMQ officers during the 2010/2011 floods.

a. As I was based in the State Disaster Coordination Centre at Kedron during the 2010/2011 floods, my contact with locally-based individuals and groups was minimal. As Acting Executive Director - Operations, I did deploy to Somerset Regional Council for one day for fact-finding, and to ensure resources were in place to support the Local Disaster Management Group.

b. As Acting Executive Director – Operations, I also held daily teleconferences with EMQ Regional Directors to establish the state of SES operations and future requirements. This teleconference monitored SES deployments, and information from it formed the basis for SES future deployment planning.

9. Any instances, during the 2010/2011 floods, where EMQ's requirements or expectations of the SES differed from those of the Local Disaster Management Group or Local Disaster Coordinator, and how these issues were managed.

a. As I was based in the State Disaster Coordination Centre at Kedron during the 2010/2011 floods, I cannot comment on instances in Brisbane Region during the floods.

b. Outside of the context of the 2010/2011 floods, I am aware that, on occasion, the expectations of EMQ about deploying SES resources have not been shared by all local governments, some of which wished to retain resources in case they were needed locally. This is an issue that is best addressed outside the turbulence of disaster operations. It is the subject of negotiation with local governments, and is included in a Memorandum of Agreement on the SES.

10. The Government (State and State/Commonwealth) funding programs accessed by SES units within their area in the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11, and their role in all aspects of the funding application process and administration of this funding.

This is page 7 of a statement comprising 12 pages

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

**JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:**

a. State Government Direct Funding.

2009/2010

State Government funding contributed \$463,783.04 in the form of Person Protective Equipment for SES. During the same financial year, State Government funding contributed \$82,920.20 in the form of a flood boat and trailer and a rescue trailer.

2010/2011

State Government funding contributed \$845,745.37 in the form of Personal Protective Equipment for SES. During the same financial year, State Government funding contributed \$29,380.14 in the form of three trailers.

b. State and State/Commonwealth funding. There are the 4 State and State/Commonwealth funding programs under which the SES can apply for funding. They are the Natural Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP), Jupiters Casino Community Benefit Fund (JCCBF), Gambling Community Benefit Fund (GCBF) and SES Non-Recurrent Subsidy Program. If a project applied for under NDRP is eligible for more appropriate funding from other sources, then they will be directed to apply under that program.

c. NDRP. To date, there have not been any applications from SES units within the Brisbane Region for NDRP funding.

d. JCCBF.

2010-11

Brisbane SES, North East Group - Purchase Motor Vehicle – unsuccessful.
Brisbane SES, Western Group - Purchase Bus – unsuccessful.

e. GCBF.

2010-11

Brisbane SES, North East Group - Purchase Trailer, portable generators and portable lighting. Total approved funding: \$14,381.82

f. SES Non-Recurrent Subsidy Program

2009-10

Brisbane SES - funding for Motor Vehicle Accessories. Total approved funding: \$2,474.50.

This is page 8 of a statement comprising 12 page/s

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

2010-11

No applications were submitted under this round of funding.

- g. SES support groups and social clubs may also apply for funding under the JCCBF and GCBF. In previous years, SES support groups were not required to apply for sponsorship through the Department of Community Safety as long as they were incorporated. Therefore, in 2009-10 and 2010-11 SES units may have benefitted from equipment purchased by these groups under these funds.
- h. The application process for these funding programmes is run centrally from EMQ head office. My role is to ensure that notice of such funding rounds is passed to SES units and to encourage applications that support the work of the SES. Funding is administered directly between the Local Controller or Group Leader and EMQ's Grants and Subsidies team. I am copied correspondence between the Assistant Director-General for EMQ and the recipient of the grant.

11. Whether or not issues have been raised with them directly by SES members about the level of funding provided by the State Government, including any suggestions by SES members about how the funding arrangement could be improved.

- a. No specific issues have been raised with me by SES members about the level of funding provided by State Government, nor have any alternative suggestions about how funding arrangements could be improved been raised.
- b. The option for a council to raise a specific SES levy has come up in more general discussion.
- c. Most suggestions by members have concentrated on how equipment might be made better or changed.

12. The results of any assessment or debrief within their area relating to the performance of the SES units during the 2010/2011 floods.

- a. On 3 March 2011, a Regional SES Executive Debrief was held, which covered collectively SES operations in support of the Queensland Floods and deployments to TC Yasi. The **Debrief Lessons Identified are marked MPS2**. The paragraphs below are based on my covering email, which circulated the lessons to other Regional Directors and EMQ SES support staff.
- b. My most significant learning is about SES taskforce composition and structure. The comments attached suggest that we can set these up better and staff them appropriately to

This is page 9 of a statement comprising 12 page/s.

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:

deliver a single package to an area that should be capable of operation autonomously. The major points are:

1. More detail at the start on the task and team requirements
 2. A selected SES Task Force Leader
 3. About 20 working members PLUS
 - i. An integral SES Incident Management Team (IMT)
 - ii. A dedicated safety officer
 - iii. 1-2 integrated Peer Supporters, working for the EMQ liaison officer as welfare support initially.
 4. As self sufficient as possible
 5. Accommodated - rough if necessary - but close to the affected populations as logistics allow.
 6. Remaining as a composite task force; not broken down.
 7. With an advance party (TF leader, half the IMT and possibly the liaison officer) going up the day before to sort out tasking.
- c. The EMQ liaison officer should stay on task and not be drawn into IMTs.
- d. This will need greater coordination by the despatching region with Kedron, and an understanding from the requesting region of capability of the taskforce. But it should result in a more efficient working unit.
- e. Peer support got a mixed reception. Looking forward, the feeling was they should be managed as part of the SES taskforce; forming up with them before departure and staying with them during ops and rest. 1-2 per task force the preferred number. Aligning peer support to the EMQ liaison officer was discussed; neutral figures doing welfare support jobs that give them the opportunity to get amongst SES vols for a different reason. Peer supporters proved useful to talk to the community as well. And they need their own welfare vehicle.
- f. Expectations in the minds of the community that SES carry out menial tasks should be changed. A media campaign emphasising that the SES is an 'Emergency Service' would help. The community needs to understand more that some elements of tasks will need follow-up once the initial issue is dealt with -- disposing of all elements of cut trees, for example.
- g. The local (or sector) tasking of SES flood boats by QPS was at variance from normal doctrine; however it worked well. 000 was called to get help from flood boats. QPS tasked both SLSQ and SES assets locally. The tasking of flood boats through 132 500 and RFAs Online worked less well -- probably due to the emergency nature of the calls and the more immediate tasking through 000 by QPS.

This is page 10 of a statement comprising 12 page/ [REDACTED]

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):
[REDACTED]

**JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:**

- h. Inoculations; interstate SES arrived with vaccinations. There was much discussion over whether SES deploying in Queensland should have the same – either as a matter of course or in disasters. A voucher system for a GP might be an option over the long term. QHealth advice of 'no need' was explained.
- i. Accommodation can be flexible. Volunteers would be happy to “rough it” nearer the site if that is a practical logistical arrangement. A last day in a hotel would be preferable in these circumstances and worked well in those instances where it was used.
- j. Travel uniforms - like other states - are an aspiration.

13. Any other observations on the structure, funding and command and control arrangement of the SES generally and/or in relation to the 2010/2011 floods, including possible areas for improvement, and any improvements made, or proposed to be made, in any of these aspects following the 2010/2011 floods.

- a. Command and Control. The current arrangements set out in paragraphs 4.c. and d., and 5.e., can be unsatisfactory for the command and control of larger, higher profile, and therefore higher risk SES operations. My direct experience of the Gap Storms in Brisbane in November 2008 was that the capacity of the SES to direct large-scale operations was limited, and the lack of clarity over what should happen in such circumstances led to confusion, inefficiency and much angst between people who were all trying to help the affected community. Brisbane City SES have instigated many improvements since that time. I understand also that resources are already allocated to improve leadership of SES executives, and this will, no doubt, help. However, my sense is that the fundamental issue has not changed. As volunteers continue to join and leave, there is no guarantee of knowledge continuity and understanding, and much will continue to rely on the leaders on the day.
- b. Training. Training of volunteers is key to SES success. There is much that is good with the current system: the training framework and doctrine; training pathways to qualification; quality and availability of publications; and the Registered Training Organisation that ensures qualifications for SES volunteers. Work is ongoing to refine this system and its application still further. But the onus is still on SES volunteer instructors to deliver many of these courses, and the development of sufficient instructors in experience and capability across a range of disciplines takes time. The accountability requirements of a Registered Training Organisation and the delegation of this to volunteers requires more time from existing instructors. The result is an uphill struggle to find enough volunteer instructors to run the number of courses required to match SES expectations – and to motivate newer volunteers to stay. Brisbane Region has 4 permanent training staff and a dedicated administrative officer to support SES training. Even in a geographically small area, such as this, the task of the 5 permanent training staff to process, document, monitor, and sometimes deliver, training to 17 SES groups and over 1100 volunteers on evenings and weekends, is significant. As identified in

This is page 11 of a statement comprising 12 page/s

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):

**JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Declarations:**

paragraph 3. g. strategies that capitalize on economies of scale are being formulated to address this. Challenge assessments, that take advantage of existing skills in new volunteers without their need to complete courses, are also being more widely used. But SES 'clannishness' is an inevitable factor when a community volunteers to help itself, and there is much attachment to keeping training local.

- c. Equipment. Current approaches to equipment capitalise on the partnership between State and Local governments for the SES. A Memorandum of Agreement between Local government and State government will shortly detail much of these arrangements. In Brisbane region, the shared arrangements result in a complicated equipment environment. Equipment is supplied through a variety of funding sources, and its support, from registration fees to operational funding, to repairs, maintenance and replacement is addressed through a variety of arrangements.

I make this statement of my own free will, believing its contents to be true and correct.

Justices Act 1886	
I acknowledge by virtue of Section 110A(6)(c)(ii) of the Justices Act 1886 that:	
(1) This written statement by me dated 14/10/2011 and contained in the pages numbered 1 to 12 is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and	
(2) I make it knowing that, if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating anything that I know is false.	
.....	Signature
Signed at <u>KEORON</u>	this <u>14th</u> day of October 2011




This is page 12 of a statement comprising 12 page/s.

Witness (Michael Peter Shapland):	JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for Declarations
-----------------------------------	---

11 MPS 1 11

MPS1 - Brisbane Region Agreed Membership Requirements and Functions Matrix

AGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION NUMBERS	AGENCY SUPPORT						Incident Management						SPECIALIST RESCUE						COMMUNITY EDUCATION						
	Air Observer		Welfare Team		Evacuation Centre Team		Comms Operator		Incident Management		Rescue Operator		Urban Search and Rescue Cat		Community Education Officer		Sub Function Agreed Numbers		Sub Function Training Gap		Sub Function Agreed Numbers		Sub Function Training Gap		
	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	Sub Function Number Trained	Sub Function Training Gap	
30	6	9	3	0	0	0	0	24	142	118	12	0	31	31	0	0	0	20	20	0	0	0	0	68	
16	4	6	2	0	0	0	1	12	79	67	6	0	29	29	0	0	0	12	12	0	0	0	0	36	
6	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	6	27	21	4	0	4	4	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	16	
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	10	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	16	
8	2	7	5	0	0	0	0	6	51	45	4	0	9	9	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	16	
20	4	8	4	0	0	0	0	16	84	68	8	0	20	20	0	0	0	16	16	0	0	0	0	44	
30	6	12	6	0	0	0	1	24	151	127	10	0	30	30	0	0	0	20	20	0	0	0	0	60	
10	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	8	58	50	4	0	8	8	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	20	
22	6	7	1	0	0	0	0	16	102	86	8	0	18	18	0	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	0	44	
6	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	5	12	6	12	0	9	9	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	12	
8	2	7	5	2	0	2	2	2	46	44	8	8	13	5	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	60	
8	2	5	3	2	0	2	2	2	18	16	8	8	5	3	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	40	
8	2	3	1	2	0	2	2	2	53	51	8	8	8	0	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	40	
8	2	5	3	2	0	2	2	2	15	13	8	8	6	2	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	40	
8	2	5	3	2	0	2	2	2	32	30	8	8	12	4	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	40	
8	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	10	8	8	8	6	2	16	8	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	40	
12	66	5	61	0	0	0	1	12	64	52	12	12	24	12	18	0	0	18	6	12	6	0	0	111	
4	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	4	8	4	3	3	6	3	6	0	0	6	2	4	2	0	0	36	
220	110	90	20	12	0	12	5	7	4	970	816	135	63	238	175	228	43	0	43	72	106	34	70	24	759



MPS2 - Debrief Lessons Identified

"MPS 2"

Brisbane Region SES Executive Debrief - Queensland Floods and TC Yasi - 3 March 2011

Theme	Detail	Comments
Mounting	Selection for deployment	Greater work on explaining what was happening with external deployments and the reason why deployments had taken place, and publicising what QLD had deployed.
	Warning	SES Portal as the best way of publicising the results. More prompt media releases covering SES deployments. More detail should be included at the start on what team requirements are. This will aid preparedness. Task forces should include IMT members as a matter of course.
	Briefing/Information	2 days notice; esp on Fri afternoons are not workable for employers. SES Portal should be used to support media information on deployments. General approval of the QPS use of Facebook.
	Equipment	Neck ties successful. Deployment bags were not so. Not enough uniform to cope with the dirt and travel. The importance of self sufficiency in the kit taken was emphasised. Wellingtons were particularly good. The issue of ration packs prompted the need for a KFS issue and the need for hot water on site. (Thermos's as a unit item of kit?)
	Travel	Single flights preferred. Travel uniforms - like other states - are an aspiration. The deployment T-shirt was much appreciated.
	Paperwork	Deployment orders need more careful checking before release.



MPS2 - Debrief Lessons Identified

'MPS2''

<p>Operations/Mission Achievement</p>	<p>Command and Control</p>	<p>TF should have an integral SES IMT identified. Map issue was insufficient. RACQ maps are better than nothing. GPS Navmans an option?</p>
<p>Team Organisation</p>		<p>TF should stay as a composite task force; not broken down. 22 vols was <u>just</u> enough for a useful TF. An advance party to travel up and sort out tasking the day before would work very well. The EMQ Liaison officer should stay on task and not be drawn into IMTs (see above)</p>
<p>Planning</p>		<p>Local Food resupply drops raised the issue of feedback. The outcomes of tasks passed up to the SDCC for action were not always communicated back down to the originating groups and LG.</p>
<p>Tasking</p>		<p>The local (or sector) tasking of SES flood boats by QPS was at variance from normal doctrine; however it worked well. 000 was called to get help from flood boats. QPS tasked both SLSQ and SES assets locally. RFA's for flood boat tasks worked less well. Three way communications between SLSQ, SES and QPS and a common channel for QPS, QFRS, SES and SLSQ would improve arrangements and assist coordination over tasking. A meeting to examine options is needed</p> <p>An alleged insurance industry policy that claimants should call the SES in the first instance caused concern. SES felt that this was prejudicing their ability to priorities tasks appropriately.</p> <p>Expectations in the minds of the community that SES carry out menial tasks should be changed. A media campaign emphasising the SES is an 'Emergency Service would help, and that some elements of tasks would need to be followed up by the owner or other means (- clearing away all elements of cut trees for example)</p>
<p>Skills required/used</p>		<p>SSQ do not have sufficient understanding of the skills SES have. This led to tasks with skill requirements outside SES functions.</p>
<p>Reporting</p>		<p>No issues.</p>



MPS2 - Debrief Lessons Identified

1 MPS 2 "

	Safety	<p>Inoculations; interstate SES arrived with vaccinations. There was much discussion over whether SES deploying in Queensland should have the same – either as a matter of course or in disasters. A voucher system might be an option over the long term. QHealth advice of 'no need' was explained. TFs should have a dedicated safety officer from SES. Breaches of safety should be dealt with.</p>
<p>Operational Logistics/Welfare</p>	Accommodation	<p>Accommodation can be flexible. Volunteers would be happy to "rough it" nearer the site if that is a practical arrangement. A last day in a hotel would be preferable in these circumstances and worked well in those instances where it was used. TF should stay on task location if possible and have accommodations on site. Builds relationships with local inhabitants.</p>
	Communications	<p>The differences in communications N and S were not understood. Repeater channels in FNQ were not the same as in SEQ; therefore the radios taken did not work.</p>
	Transport	<p>Initial allocation of vehicles - chainsaw team to a 2WD sedan – was not appropriate. Greater sharing of resources in the field with OGDs would help. A careful pre-deployment skills audit of driving licences is needed, as occasionally drivers for busses or large commercial vehicles is needed. Prop-guards where fitted on flood boats proved very useful.</p>
	Meals	<p>No issues</p>
	Laundry	<p>No Issues</p>
	Health	<p>See safety.</p>



MPS2 - Debrief Lessons Identified

"MPS2"

	Peer Support	<p>A mixed reaction. Some debriefs were good; others said too much presence. NB "not there to drum up business". A softer, less push-approach needed in some cases.</p> <p>Greater options to align to EMQ liaison officer; peer support as a neutral figure doing welfare support jobs that gives them the opportunity to get amongst SES vols for a different reason. Peer supporters proved useful to talk to the community as well. They should be managed as part of the SES taskforce; forming up before departure and staying with them during ops and rest. 1-2 per task force the preferred number. Need their own welfare vehicle.</p> <p>Consolidated return transport by air where possible</p>
Recovery	Transport	
	Debriefing	Exec debriefing supported. Not debriefing each TF once arrived in Brisbane.
	Equipment refurbishment	Nil
Other		<p>Dreamword. Much appreciated</p> <p>Certificates for Employers should be given to those who support SES Supporters website as an idea</p>

