

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Prepared by: Legal Services Unit

Date: 29 November 2011

Name of Witness: Thomas Craig DAWSON

Address of Witness: 128 Margaret Street, Toowoomba, QLD 4350

Occupation: Assistant Commissioner

Position: Assistant Commissioner, South Western Region,
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Requirement to Provide Statement No. 1777432

I, Thomas Craig Dawson, Assistant Commissioner, South Western Region, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Department of Community Safety, state:

Background

Question 1. You previously provided a sworn statement to the Commission, dated 9 May 2011.

1. Agreed.

Question 2. The Commission received a response from Queensland Fire and Rescue Service ('QFRS') signed by Commissioner Lee Johnson, dated 13 September 2011 ('QFRS submission').

2. Agreed.

Question 3. You were the Assistant Commissioner, South-Western Region, on 10 January 2011.

3. Agreed.

This is page 1 of a statement comprising 15 page/s.

Witness (Thomas Craig Dawson):

**JP/Solicitor/Commissioner for
Deputy**

Question 4. The Commission has received the following information:

- a. On 10 January 2011, the permanent stations were staffed as follows:
- i. Kitchener street fire station (Toowoomba) had a full complement of six staff including two SWTs;
 - ii. Anzac avenue fire station (Toowoomba) had a full complement of four staff; and
 - iii. Warwick fire station had a full complement of four staff including one SWT;

4. Agreed.

- b. Due to the prevailing weather conditions, you gave a direction applicable to the period between 22 December 2010 and early February 2011 that any absence of leave as to be backfilled (through overtime) to ensure that there was always a full contingent of staff to respond;

5. Agreed.

6. On my return from annual leave on 20/12/2010 up to and including 24/12/2010, I attended a series of briefings and meetings where issues relating to the transition from the current bushfire season to the rapidly developing rain season within parts of South Western Region had been identified, and needed to be addressed. Present at these meetings were the Director Region Operations [REDACTED] (Urban Operations), Director Rural Operations Superintendent Wayne Waltisbuhl, Acting Inspector Toowoomba Command Wally Rye, and in the later meetings, Station Officer Stewart Lange, the Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator.

7. A critical point discussed was the historical evidence that indicated the sick leave for permanent staff for the month of December, and the early part of January, was always traditionally high — therefore, reducing the day-to-day crewing ability of all appliances within Toowoomba and Warwick stations. This, of course, would impact on the regional swift water rescue capability. (Attachment "TCD-1")

8. Therefore, I gave the direction to sustain full operational staffing numbers at all permanent stations until further notice. This would be achieved by calling back staff on overtime as required at the beginning of each shift, and would be supervised by the Command Inspector. Further to this, I supported the position to acquire additional swift water resources and suitable vehicles to be prepared, and to securely house such equipment ready for response or deployment. Also Mr. Lange, as part of his co-ordination role would insure access to qualified staff to crew such additional vehicles.

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9. This became the responsibility of [REDACTED] who was supported by Mr. Rye and Mr. Lange, to action these requirements as soon as possible. Such directions given during these meetings were clearly defined, acknowledged and understood by all parties. It has been my experience that it is not unusual for such directions to be given in operational situations within the fire service. Therefore, the directions were verbal and no formal notes were taken. Such directions become formalised in implementation at Command and station level, regarding staff call back procedures, time sheet entries, budget monitoring (overtime code, flood code, etc), staff leave documents. All activity was in accordance with my Departmental Human Resource and Financial delegation.

10. The successful outcomes achieved by the mentioned staff, and the permanent staff within Toowoomba and Warwick at this point in time, has been acknowledged and was operationally important to assist the region to shift its focus from a reducing bushfire season to the pending wet season.

- c. **A cache of swift water rescue equipment and three additional support vehicles had also been moved to the Kitchener Street fire station on 23 and 24 December 2010 to provide for additional regional swift water rescue capacity if required;**

11. I agree, as per Attachment 4 to the QFRS Submission.

- d. **On the evening of 9 January 2011, there was a flooding event in Grantham and staff were called back and responded to this incident. Those staff included Mr. Shane Rankin, Mr. Stewart Lange, Mr. Scott Frame and Mr. Steve Horvath;**

12. Agreed.

- c. **On completion of the Grantham flooding event the above staff were directed to go home and rest but to remain on standby in the event that they were required;**

13. Agreed.

- f. **The South-Western Region's incident report shows that on 10 January 2011:**

- i. **Mr. Rankin was dispatched to incidents at 3.26pm, 6.17pm and 11.04pm;**

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14. I agree. Records indicate that Mr. Rankin was dispatched to those incidents, in addition to other incidents as per Attachment 3 of the QFRS Submission.

ii. Mr. Lange was dispatched to incidents at 3.01pm, 3.45pm, 5.11pm, 6.30pm and 6.50pm;

15. I agree. Records indicate that Mr. Lange was dispatched to those incidents.

iii. Mr. Frame was dispatched to incidents at 3.26pm, 6.17pm and 11.04pm;

16. I agree that Mr. Frame was dispatched to incident at 3:26pm and 6:17pm, as well as some other incidents as per Attachment 3 of the QFRS Submission. Records do not indicate that Mr. Frame was dispatched to an incident at 11:04pm.

iv. There are no records of Mr. Horvath being dispatched to any incidents on 10 January 2011.

17. It is my understanding that due to flooding in the Lockyer Valley, Mr. Horvath was property bound, and was not able to respond on the 10 January 2011.

g. On the morning of 10 January 2011, a weather alert was broadcast for Dalby and you directed that this information be communicated to the Toowoomba fire stations;

18. I agree. On the morning of 10 January 2011, discussions were held within the Regional Coordination Centre ("ROCC"), with the senior officers who were on duty within the ROCC, and I directed that this information be disseminated to all effected areas and that the Toowoomba Fire Communications Centre and Senior Officer are advised.

19. An example of this communication can be found in Attachment 7 to the QFRS Submission.

20. The approach and practice by the staff within the ROCC has been to use FireComm to contact stations and to contact Command Inspectors, if required. Also the ROCC was conducting daily teleconferences, which involved all of the Inspectors — or, if needed, the ROCC would contact the Inspectors or Incident Control Centre directly as required. This approach is reflected in the Statewide Integrated Operational planning Process (SIOPP) Area Reference Manual. Refer to the documents included. (Attachment "TCD-2" Operations Management A2.1.)

h. Also on the morning of 10 January 2011, the station officer of Kitchener street fire station, Mr. William Dundas says he unsuccessfully attempted to call Inspector Wally Rye and so left voicemail messages and waited for a response;

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21. I have no personal knowledge of the phone calls that were claimed to be made by Mr. Dundas to Mr. Rye.

- i. QFRS's telephone records show that two calls were made from the mobile phone of fire vehicle 311A (where Mr. Dundas was a crew member) to Mr. Rye's mobile phone at about 11.50am;**

22. I have no reason to dispute the QFRS telephones records. However, I have no personal knowledge of these two calls.

- j. Mr. Rye was at a meeting in Toowoomba on the morning of 10 January 2011;**

23. To date I am still unaware of Mr. Rye's movements on the morning of the 10 January 2011.

- k. Mr. Rye does not recall having a telephone conversation with Mr. Dundas or Mr. Haddow on the morning of 10 January 2011;**

24. I have no personal knowledge as to these matters.

- l. Mr. Dundas says that at about 1.00pm, he attended to a life rescue in the Murphy's Creek area where a decision was made to separate the two attending rescue vehicles which resulted in each vehicle only having one Level 2 swift water technician on board. Mr. Dundas recalls then making a call to the Fire Communications Centre requesting for more Level 2 swift water technicians ('SWT'); and**

25. A search of the incident data for 10 January 2011 (Attachment 3 of the QFRS Submission) reveals that Mr. Dundas attended a rescue incident: QF6-11-002735 [South Eastern Region Incident] at Murphy's Creek at 13:31 hours. The only reference to a request for additional resources that I can find is on the Firecom tapes (Operator 1) at 13:46:52 where Mr. Dundas (on appliance 311A) advises Firecom that he cannot get through to the incident that he is en-route to due to flooding. At this time he also requested that appliance 317A (from Highfields) to respond to the incident and to advise South East Region.

- m. When it became apparent that a severe weather event was unfolding, the management team moved quickly to place all available resources in a position including recalling all available staff and placing Mr. Rye and Superintendent, Mr. Lindsey Hackett, in the Fire Communication Centre to assist in the operational response.**

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26. I agree. This is stated in the QFRS Submission. The staff within the ROCC moved quickly to stand up all available staff and resources. These actions were initiated within the ROCC once I became aware of the rapidly unfolding weather conditions.

Procedure for requesting more staff and/or appliances

Question 5. Please set out whether you disagree with any of the paragraphs 4(a) to (m) above and, if so, in what way?

27. I refer to paragraphs 4 – 26 of my statement above.

Question 6. Does a formal protocol exist outlining the procedure for station officers and/or other operational staff to request more staff and/or appliances?

a. **If yes, please outline the procedure and provide the Commission with a copy of the protocol; or**

b. **If no, please outline the procedure in place for South-Western Region for station officers and/or operational staff to request more staff and/or appliances.**

28. During an operational incident, if a station officer requires further resources or appliances, the Greater Alarm Response System ("GARS") response protocol applies. This protocol operates in conjunction with the QFRS Computer Aided Dispatch System (ESCAD). This protocol provides a mechanism for the officer in charge of an incident to call for additional resources, and these requests are facilitated through the FireComm. (Attachment "TCD-3")

29. If an officer has a request for additional resources in circumstances where they are not attending to an operational incident, the normal chain of command applies, and officers should raise any concerns/requests with the Command Inspector or the nominated on-call Senior at first instance. If those officers do not respond, the officer can contact the next level of senior officers, including Director of Regional Operations or the Assistant Commissioner if required. It should also be noted that the FireComm can facilitate the contact with a Senior officer should staff have difficulty in making contact through direct means (phones, paging and SMS).

Question 7. Is the procedure for requesting more staff and/or appliances different in an emergency situation? If yes, please provide details of the differences in procedure.

30. The procedures that apply in operational and non operational circumstances are those outlined in paragraphs 28 and 29 of my statement above.

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Question 8. Is the South-Western Region's procedure for station officers and/or operational staff to request more staff and/or appliances (whether documented as a formal protocol or not) identical to the procedure for the South-Eastern Region? If not, please provide details of the differences in procedure.

31. The GARS protocol is standard across all regions of the QFRS. Variations regarding regional staffing levels and fire appliance types are factored into the protocols as required. I am not aware of any additional local procedures that may (or may not) exist in the South-Eastern Region.

Question 9. Are station officers and/or operational staff provided with training and/or made aware of the procedure for requesting more staff and/or appliances?

a. **If yes, who provides the training/awareness? When is the training/awareness provided? Are there refresher training programs?**

b. **If no, why not?**

32. Yes.

33. The GARS program, awareness programs regarding ESCAD, and how Fire Communication Centres operate are subjects within operational staff core skill training programs.

34. Staff have received training in the Statewide Integrated Operational Planning Process (SIOPP) and Operations Management Systems (OMS) where Business Rules and Standing Orders are kept.

35. Access to all this information is through the Department's intranet website ('DCS portal').

36. In addition, some stations still prefer to have hard-copies of current regional standing orders and procedures readily available.

37. As an example, I have attached supportive training documents referring to GARS training, and an email from Inspector Paul Evans regarding SIOPP training within the region. (Attachments "TCD-4" and "TCD-5")

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Question 10. Please provide a copy of all communications made with the Fire Communications Centre on 10 January 2011.

38. Attached is compact disc containing a copy of all communications with FireComm on the 10/01/2011. (Attachment "TCD-6A") At my request, I had a transcript of the communications prepared by one of my staff members, from the FireComm recordings. Whilst it is not a professional transcription, and may not be complete or free from error, I found it of assistance. (Attachment "TCD-6B")
39. Also attached is a document that contains my mobile phone records for the 10/1/2011 which indicates my direct communications to FireComm on that day (Attachment "TCD-7").

QFRS Management Response on 10 January 2011

Question 11. When did it become apparent that a severe weather event was unfolding on 10 January 2011? If able, please provide details of the severe weather event and how this information became available.

40. I had been monitoring weather conditions throughout the flooding events, through staff at the ROCC. On the morning of 10 January 2011 we were monitoring weather reports and live radar (in particular the Marburg radar site).
41. At approximately 12:30 hours, I became concerned that the severe weather formation we had been watching had intensified and developed even further, and would pass over Toowoomba on its way to Dalby.

Question 12. What was your response to the severe weather warning?

42. I have reviewed the QFRS Submission at pages 7 and 8 and I agree that this is an accurate reflection of the actions that I took upon realising that a severe weather event was occurring. Below is a more detailed summary of my actions.
43. I organised a briefing to occur in the ROCC between DRO Hackett and DRO Waltisbuhl. During this briefing at 12:47 hours, the Fire Communication Centre contacted the ROCC and spoke to DRO Waltisbuhl. FireComm passed on information regarding local dam capacities which indicated that heavy rain was falling to the immediate north of Toowoomba. The briefing now discussed the potential impact of this information regarding Toowoomba and west to Oakey. It was my understanding that DRO Waltisbuhl also took the opportunity to provide notification to the Fire Communications Centre regarding the current position of the approaching weather formations. FireComm were reminded to keep a watch on the BOM radar web site.

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44. It was the collective opinions of all present at this briefing that Toowoomba would be impacted by this weather event, as well as areas west of Toowoomba.
45. Immediately following the briefing the following actions occurred.
46. At 12:56 hours I phoned and briefed Acting Inspector Wally Rye of the Toowoomba Command of the current position. I requested him to go to the Fire Communication Centre to brief FireComm and his Command, and assist with operational decisions and responses that may arise as a result of this weather event.
47. At 12:59 hour I phoned Inspector Warwick Command, Hemo De Vries, and advised him of the situation. I asked him to brief his command staff as required.
48. I then meet with DRO Hackett immediately after the briefing, and requested that he also proceed to the Fire Communication Centre also to oversee all operational decisions and FireComm operations.
49. Tactically, I used FireComm as a major incident point. The rationale for this is that all of the incident requests would come into FireComm, all incident responses would be conducted through FireComm (GARS and ESCAD), and all could be recorded. This, combined with having all stations fully crewed, additional staff level2 swift water qualified available for recall, fully resourced swift water rescue vehicles available, as well as the recall of any available off duty staff as well as having Toowoomba Command's surrounding stations manned (Auxiliaries in stations), were to be my strategies.
50. DRO Waltisbuhl had also been in contact with the QPS Officer Brett Shafferius, who was the District Disaster Coordinator for the Toowoomba DDMG, and also had contacted Superintendent Greg Reynolds who was the State Operations Co-ordination Centre officer in Kedron Park Brisbane, just prior to 13:00 hours. DRO Waltisbuhl advised all parties that, in our collective opinion, Toowoomba would be impacted as this weather event passed on its way to Dalby.
51. At about 12:48 hours, I informed the Manager Regional Communications (who was in the ROCC at the time); and at 12:50 hours I contacted the Fire Communication Centre to call in a third operator and further back up, if possible (Kellie Docherty arrived at approximately 13:30 hours, and Gavin Taylor commenced his night shift at approximately 16:00 hours).
52. At 12:55 hours Inspector Kelso from the ROCC contacted the Fire Communication Centre, to pass on a request from me to stand up and ready for response the Oakey and Pittsworth stations.
53. At 13:00 hours I attempted to engage in the daily 13:00 statewide teleconference. I attempted to communicate that we had concerns regarding the weather event that we were

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J [redacted]
D [redacted]

then experiencing. The rain was so intense I could not hear the teleconference. I needed to return to the ROCC to monitor the event and activity, which I did.

54. At approximately 13:15 hours DRO Waltisbuhl and I discuss that an additional 4x4 appliance and crew could be made up, using operational staff from the ROCC. This was established and later deployed by FireComm.
55. Other available day work Officers were also deployed by FireComm to support crews attending incidents within the Toowoomba CBD.
56. At 13:24 hours, listening to Fire Communications Centre radio messages, I noted that incidents resulting from the weather event had commenced
57. At 13:44 hours, Fire Communications Centre was requested to stand up all staff available at the Highfields station .
58. At 14:09 hours DRO Waltisbulh, ASTO Storrs and Rural Inspector Kelso are responded from the ROCC as a special crew to assist with operational management requirements within the Toowoomba CBD. This crew established a staging point at Ruthven St. and Chalk Drive in the immediate area where several incidents occurred.
59. At 14:08 hours I requested Fire Communication Centre to stand up the Millmerran station ready for response
60. By this time, Toowoomba and surrounding areas were well and truly being impacted.
61. My mobile phone records also indicate other phone calls, including those to the Assistant Commissioner - QPS Toowoomba, Assistant Commissioner - QAS Toowoomba, Mayor of Toowoomba, EMQ Director - Toowoomba, State Commander - QFRS Kedron Park Brisbane, State Air Operations - Brisbane,

Question 13. Did you or anyone else communicate to any station officers or operational staff in relation to the severe weather warnings?

- a. **If yes, who was informed? What was communicated? When was this information communicated?**
- b. **If no, why was this severe weather warning not communicated to station officers or operational staff?**

62. I refer to paragraphs 42 – 62 in my statement above.

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63. As the Assistant Commissioner, it is not generally my role to directly communicate matters such as this to the on-duty Station Officers. As indicated previously, there is a chain of command to be followed in both directions, up and down.

Question 14. If not already answered above in paragraph 12, was the following specific information communicated to station officers or operational staff:

- a. Evacuation of Oakey air base; and
- b. Observations of impending storm cell on Bureau of Meteorology website?
 - i. If yes, who was informed? What was communicated? When was this information communicated?
 - ii. If no, why was this information not communicated to station officers or operational staff?

64. I was not aware of the evacuation of the Oakey air base on 10 January 2011, and I only later became aware that this had occurred. A post incident review of Fire Communications records (refer attachment "TCD-6A") reveals that a call was received into the Fire Communications Centre from Captain Rod Mason at 11:37 hours advising that the Oakey police had mentioned that Cooby Dam will overflow, and that 'Air base has been sent home, will flood about 12 hours, houses will go under'. This information was not brought to my attention at the time.

65. I again refer to paragraphs 42 – 62 in my statement above.

Question 15. If not already answered above in paragraph 11, who was responsible for recalling Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange and Mr. Frame? Why were they recalled? Did Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange or Mr. Frame initiate contact with you or any other person or authority and request that they be recalled? If so, please provide details.

66. I had no personal contact with Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange, and Mr. Frame at the time and had no knowledge as to the circumstances in which they were recalled to duty.

67. However, normal circumstances, either FireComm or the Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator can recall and activate Technical Rescue operators. Review of the FireComm records indicates that at 13:41:39 hours, FireComm telephoned the Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator (Firefighter David Crighton) to request Technical Rescue assistance. This would appear to be the process by which these officers were recalled to duty.

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68. I refer to paragraphs 14- 16 of my statement, in which I agree that records indicate that Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange and Mr. Frame were responded to incidents during the afternoon and evening of 10 January 2011.
69. I do not know if Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange or Mr. Frame initiated contact with or any other person or authority to request that they be recalled

Question 16. Was the recall of Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange and Mr. Frame communicated to the station officers or other operational staff?

- a. If yes, please provide details; or
- b. If no, why was the recall of staff not communicated to station officers or operational staff?

70. I do not know if Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange or Mr. Frame initiated contact with or any other person or authority to request that they be recalled.
71. I have no personal knowledge as to whether the recall of Mr. Rankin, Mr. Lange and Mr. Frame was communicated to the station officers or other operational staff.

Question 17. Did any other operational staff including SWTs contact you or any other person or authority and request that they be called in? If so, who were these people, what time did they make contact and what instructions were given to them?

72. No operational staff contacted me and requested that they be called in.
73. I have no personal knowledge of any operational staff contacting any other person or authority and requesting that they be called in

Question 18. Would you agree that your response to the severe weather warning was reactive? If you disagree, please provide details of why you disagree?

74. From 22 December 2010, I took proactive steps to ensure that the operational preparedness was in line with the weather conditions being experienced in the whole of the region at that time.
75. This approach had been developed based on previous weather events experienced within the region over the past 6 years.

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76. On the 10/1/2011, my actions and responses to the severe weather warning — and to the rapid change and increase into the most extreme weather conditions that I have personally ever experienced as a Fire Officer — were reasonable, proactive, responsible, and supportive of the outstanding efforts demonstrated by all my staff on that day.
77. I have provided more details of my actions in paragraphs 42 - 62 in my statement.

QFRS management's state of preparedness for the events of 10 January 2011

Question 19. Please provide a copy of your direction given regarding staff availability applicable for the period between 22 December 2010 and until early February 2011.

78. I refer to paragraphs 5 -10 of my statement. My direction was not a written direction.

Question 20. Irrespective of the above direction, was consideration given to the allocation of staff over and above the full complement of staff outlined in paragraph 4(a) above?

- a. **If no, why not? In what circumstances would QFRS allocate staff over and above the full complement?**
- b. **If yes, why was the decision made not to allocate staff over and above the full complement?**

79. The ROCC coordinated operational decisions required for all staffing and logistical requirements for the 2010/2011 weather event.
80. Staff over and above the normal roster were called on at various times throughout the weather events (commencing on approximately 20 December 2010).
81. All such staff came from within the QFRS (Brisbane Region, South Eastern Region, North Coast Region and in one case from the NSW Fire Service).
82. For example, between 6 January 2011 and 12 January 2011, there were 14 additional Level 2 swift water rescue staff deployed to the Dalby Incident Control Centre and utilised in the Dalby, Chinchilla and Condamine flooding events.
83. A further 7 Level 2 swift water rescue operators were deployed to the Roma Incident Control Centre for operational use in Surat, St George and Dirranbandi areas.
84. Also we had ten specially trained special operations staff deployed to St George between 6 January 2011 to 12 January 2011, to establish the flexible habitat in that location.

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85. This alone accounts for an additional 24 specialists in the South Western Region to assist with response and requirements.
86. On Sunday the 09/01/2011 the ROCC requested 2 more additional Level2 swift water rescue operators, so as to add to the 9 already available in Toowoomba to assist in fatigue management issues. These 2 extra operators arrived in the late afternoon of the 10/01/2011. After a short workload, these men were directed to rest as they would spearhead the strike team that was being assembled for immediate deployment to Oakey at first light on the 11/1/2011, ahead of the pending flood waters from the water in Toowoomba on the 10/1/2011 that was heading west. This strike team were deployed into Oakey and played a major role in the evacuations of the low areas as the flood waters arrived.
87. Additional qualified officers in the area of operational management from other regions were at the following locations from the 06/01 -12/01/2011:
- 4 at the Roma Incident Control Centre
2 at the Dalby Incident Control Centre
2 at the Toowoomba ROCC
88. From the 08/01 – 15/01/2011 there were 4 NSW Level2 swift water rescue operators being rotated between Dirranbandi, St George, Goondiwindi and Surat assisting and relieving as required.

c. Is there a formal criterion that QFRS use in deciding staff allocation over and above the full complement?

i. If yes, please provide a copy of this criterion; or

ii. If no, please provide details of the criterion used by QFRS (if any).

89. On the 10 January 2011 there was no formal criterion regarding weather events within South West Region. However, there is now a formal criterion which is captured in the draft Swift Water Incident Response plan for the city of Toowoomba which includes the severe warning process (pages 7,8,9). This document is attached and marked "TCD-8".
90. Incident Directives for the ROCC activation protocols and functional standards which indicate the role of the ROCC to maintain an overview of the regions response capability and resources utilised is attached and marked "TCD-9 and 10".

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I make this statement of my own free will believing its contents to be true and correct.

Justices Act 1886

I acknowledge by virtue of Section 110A(6C)(c)(i)(ii) of the Justices Act 1886 that:

- (1) This written statement by me dated today and contained in the pages numbered 1 to 15 is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and
- (2) I make it knowing that, if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating anything that I know is false.

..... Signature

Signed at Brisbane this 29th day of November 2011

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

"TCD-1"

ATTACHMENT 1

Toowoomba Sick Leave Taken
by Month, Jan 07-Dec 10

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
2007	261	258	190	350	429	463	455	449	424	416	319	412
2008	228	270	402	400	595	648	780	800	605	499	362	642
2009	345	338	474	436	355	371	591	612	315	417	462	434
2010	460	378	547	386	336	633	452	550	564	460	445	514
Average	324	311	403	393	429	529	570	633	477	448	397	501

Toowoomba Sick Leave Taken



'TCD-2" ATTACHMENT 2

Business Rule (How to Do It Guide)		
Operations Management A2.1	Monitor and Report Seasonal Conditions for Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) Bulletins	Urban/Rural

What I Need to Know

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) Rural Operations provides weekly information on grassland fuel conditions throughout Queensland to the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) in order to assist them to forecast fire danger. The BOM also receives reports directly from some observers via reply paid cards and other sources. Data provided by Area observers is also used in the in the preparation of the following services:

- **Season Tracker** – produced by the BOM each Friday incorporating fuel quantity and curing observations to provide pre fire season information that can assist in identifying high-risk areas so that appropriate risk modification strategies can be developed and resourced.
- **Fire Danger Rating Graphic (FDRG)** – provides a visual/graphical representation of potential fire conditions over coming days based on assessment of fuel quantity and grassland curing rates. Fuel quantity is assessed as sparse, moderate or abundant. The FDRG is one component considered by the Regional Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager, Rural Operations when setting the Wildfire Alert Level (WAL).




Fig 1 – Fire Condition Warning Chain

The BOM also provides updates on extreme weather conditions that affect the activities of the QFRS as well as fire risk.

The BOM provides fire weather forecasts to fire agencies and weather bulletins through the media and via their own website (refer Reference Material below).

It is always difficult integrating/incorporating weather condition information into operational planning. Information received from the BOM on perceived extreme weather conditions is relayed by the Regional Assistant Commissioners to the Area Directors and collectively operational decisions are made regarding action to be taken e.g. swift water team deployment, preferably pre the weather event.

How I do it

Urban Area Directors

- Monitor FDRG and Season Tracker reports.

- Distribute condition information to relevant personnel and stations.
- Liaise with Urban/Rural counterparts to ensure information is correct and stations/brigades are at the correct level of operational readiness, commensurate with the FDRG and WAL.
- An email report is received from Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations and reviewed by the Area Director to determine local area impact.
- Contact high-risk stations/brigades to advise of the risk level and to discuss support arrangements for the upcoming days.
- Send fax/email regarding condition information to all stations/brigades in the Area.
- Before distributing condition information, contact the Area Director, Rural Operations to confirm that the information and assessments are accurate and current.

Rural Area Directors

- Forward grassland curing data to the Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations every week.
- Identify a number of persons within the rural area (e.g. fire wardens, stock inspectors) who might be able to provide details for particular BOM sites each Wednesday. Alternative observers may be necessary to ensure that reliable observations can be obtained as required.
- Observers should assess the average fuel quantity and average state of curing of grassland fuels within a 20-kilometre radius of the selected meteorological stations, being careful to avoid road corridors etc. that might give a false indication of average conditions across the broader area. Currently, BOM bases its calculations on the following: 0-1.5t/ha = sparse, 1.5-4.5t/ha = moderate, >5t/ha = abundant.
- Provide tools (e.g. Curing Card) to assist in estimating the state of fuel curing information and guidance to those persons so that there is an understanding of the purpose and intent of these observations as well as the process of making and reporting an assessment.
- Rural Area Offices must collate this information each Wednesday and forward it by email or fax to the Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations.
- Ensure the Area Administration Officer has access to the information so the process does not fail when the Area Director is out of the office.
- Contact FireCom to get an update in relation to possible ignition sources (*Permits to Light Fire*).

Reference Material

- Grassland Fuel Curing Report
- Grassland Fire Danger Meter State of Curing Card
- BOM reply paid card
- BOM web site: www.bom.gov.au/weather/qld (Login into General Users; User is bomw0129; Password is sN88arIn; Scroll to Observations; Open Fire Weather Bulletin)
- www.longpaddock.qld.gov.au/RainfallAndPastureGrowth/Qld/index.html

Appendices

- N/A

Contact Person

- Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations, QFRS
Phone: [REDACTED]
- Regional Manager, Rural Operations, QFRS
- Area Administration Officer, Rural Operations, QFRS

"TCD-3"

QFRS Operational Guides		
Guide 1	Level 1 Incident Tactical Command	
Guide 2	Management of Level 2 & 3 Incidents	
Guide 3	Control and Coordination Centres	
Guide 4	Air Attack Guidelines	
Guide 5	Breathing Apparatus Safety Teams	
Guide 6	Pre-Incident Planning	
Guide 7	Incident Debriefing	
Guide 8	Exercise Management	
Guide 9	Greater Alarm Response System (v1.0)	✓

Operational Guides have been developed to provide staff with further information and clarification on operational systems and processes.

They are designed to "bridge" the information gap between training documentation and the QFRS Operations Doctrine.

Further Operational Guides will be developed as they are required.

For further information contact the State Operations Directorate (Ph: 3247 8868).

Key Points
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provides increased operational performance delivery.• Enhanced operational focus for the Incident Controller.• Provides two response systems for the entire state.• The core firefighting component for each alarm level (that is the number of pumpers or rural fire brigades) usually corresponds to double the alarm level number.• The Incident Controller may request the attendance of one additional pumper at an incident without activating the next level of alarm response.• One of the most important issues for an Incident Controller to consider when using GARS is the designation of staging areas.

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Enquiries should be addressed to The Commissioner QFRS, GPO Box 1426 Brisbane 4001

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QUEENSLAND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE Relevancy Matrix						
	Urban Fire		Rural Fire			
	Full-time	Part-time	Class 4 Brigade	Class 3 Brigade	Class 2 Brigade	Class 1 Brigade
Applicable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Not Applicable						
May Apply*						

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

Prepared by:

Contributors:

Authorised by:

Superintendent John Cowcill
Executive Manager, State Operations Directorate

Acknowledgement:

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service would like to acknowledge the New South Wales Fire Brigades and Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (Melbourne) in the development of this information.

FOREWORD

Progressive fire services across the world continue to review their operating standards and procedures with a view of improving operational response to the community.

The introduction of the QFRS Operations Doctrine has provided a solid foundation of operational procedures for QFRS personnel that attend an ever growing and diverse range of incidents.

Effective response to emergency incidents must include:

- a rapid dispatch of resources;
- an appropriate weight of attack for the type of emergency;
- notification of relevant offices and authorities;
- appropriate capabilities and equipment to safely resolve the emergency; and
- an appropriate level of incident management relevant to the type and size of the emergency and the resources committed.

One fundamental basis to effective response is to ensure that the organisation has appropriate mobilisation protocols that provide sufficient resources, both in terms of physical resources and a management structure that is appropriate with the scale, intensity and duration of the incident.

QFRS is now adopting a system of response resource mobilisation known as the Greater Alarm Response System or GARS.

GARS is a proven system of response that has worked for many years for fire services overseas and also interstate. GARS will bring a structured and coordinated mobilisation of resources that is designed to match an escalating incident with front line firefighting resources, specialist support and appropriate levels of incident management.

In recognition of the diversity of the state of Queensland, the QFRS GARS approach introduces two models to accommodate and be flexible to the needs of south east Queensland and regional Queensland.

It is extremely important that all QFRS personnel are familiar with the various alarm levels and the relevant protocols contained in this guide. GARS will enhance QFRS operational response and ensure that an appropriate level of physical and human resources are responded to an emergency incident. In doing so, there will be overall improvement in the safety for operational personnel, the effectiveness of operational response and in the delivery of service to the communities of Queensland.


Iain S MacKenzie AFSM
Deputy Commissioner


PURPOSE

This guide will provide assistance to QFRS personnel in understanding the introduction of the Greater Alarm Response System (GARS) across the state.

The guide will highlight how GARS works and its relationship with the QFRS Incident Management Levels and the Wildfire Alert System. The two QFRS GARS models (South East Queensland model and Regional Queensland model) will be explained as a local application of available resources.

The detail for the use of GARS is discussed including requesting specialist resources, calling additional resources enroute, calling-off despatched resources, the relationship with Fire Communications Centres and considerations for staging resources.

By using GARS, the Incident Controller (or QFRS Commander) will employ a sufficient weight of initial attack and any ongoing operations by resourcing appropriately at incidents. Furthermore, effective resourcing will maintain a suitable span of control that will ensure that as an incident increases in size (and the subsequent increase in numbers of front line firefighting resources); there must be a matching response of specialist support appliances and personnel as well as an appropriate incident management structure. This will increase the overall safety of all personnel and members of the community during the course of the response.



QFRS GARS Pocket Guide

The pocket guide has been developed to provide a quick reference for the different alarm levels for the South East Queensland and Regional models.

GREATER ALARM RESPONSE LEVELS

A significant part of GARS is the alarm response levels. The level of response is termed the Alarm Response Level and is designed to match the size of the incident. An alarm response level is broken into a number of components:

- Core firefighting component - i.e. the number of Pumpers or Rural Fire Brigades
- Specialist combat resources - i.e. Aerial and Rescues
- Specialist support resources - i.e. Hazmat units and Incident Control Vehicles
- Incident Management and Command Structure

As the size or complexity of the incident escalates there is a corresponding increase in the alarm level. This ensures that the infrastructure that is required to resolve an incident of a particular magnitude is responded as a predetermined response and not on an *ad hoc* basis.

Benefits of using GARS

The introduction and effective use of GARS will enhance the operational performance of QFRS and provides a number of benefits to the organisation's response including:

- The structured system can facilitate resources from one region to be sent to a neighbouring region for a large protracted incident. For example, a large incident in the South East Region that is designated at a certain alarm level may initiate early activation of specialist resources from Brisbane Region.
- GARS will cater for inter-regional needs using a model that uses state-wide resources, rather than a regional-centric perspective.
- The provision of an automatic response of an appropriately sized Incident Management Team (IMT) to support the Incident Controller.
- Supporting the concept of an appropriate sized "weight of attack" with specialised support vehicles and IMT.
- Readily adaptable into the Statewide Notification Incident Protocols as outlined in Standing Order (SO-Q-OM-4.3).
- Allowing the Incident Controller to simplify the requesting of all the appropriate support mechanisms and resources.
- Reduction in radio traffic and improved message reports from the incident ground. Currently radio traffic is now taken up with requests for ancillary services rather than a detailed description of the incident.

- Supporting the incorporation of specialised day work staff into the IMT structures, e.g., the system will support the response of day work staff from community safety that bring expertise to the incident in the form of specialised knowledge of fire systems and building safety systems.
- Potential to act as a trigger to initiate the Regional Fire Coordination Centre (RFCC) and the State Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC) and to consider re-scheduling all regional training and placing Community Safety and Regional Training staff on standby (but to continue functional roles). Currently there is no predetermined level that triggers the opening of such coordination centres.

GARS and Incident Management Levels

From the initial response of local resources, escalation of the incident may require a scaling up of the Incident Management System. This may be the result of the intensifying complexity, increased application of resources and a predicted protracted incident - or a combination of all factors.

At all stages of the escalation of the management structure, communications and control measures must maintain their effectiveness and have a seamless operational continuity for all personnel.

The QFRS Operations Doctrine, Incident Management System details the levels of incident management, their definitions and the manner in which they escalate.

However, there is no direct correlation between alarm levels and incident management levels. A first alarm level may be used for a number of level one incidents, this does not mean a third alarm is an appropriate response for a level three incident.

GARS and Wildfire Alert Levels

Wildfire Alert Levels are based on the Fire Danger Ratings (FDR) aligned to the Macarthur Forest Fire Danger Meter Mark 5 and Grassland Meter MK 4. The range from Low to *Extreme* FDR's is the primary basis for developing and determining a Wildfire Alert Level which is a pre-emptive response to wildfire management in the Region.

As with incident levels, the Wildfire Alert Levels are not directly connected to GARS. With the example of Wildfire Alert Level One is normal business within a Region and is not relevant to a First Alarm (nor relevant to a Level One incident).


GARS MODELS FOR QFRS

The basis of the GARS model is for the Incident Controller to request a certain alarm level that will respond a predetermined mix of core firefighting resources, specialist support resources and command officers.

Because the system is dependant upon the available resources in the region, the decision was made to develop two models to reflect the increased number of resources (both human and operational) available in the south east corner of the state.

The South East Corner model will be applied to the Brisbane and South East Region, whilst the Regional Model will apply to the remainder of the State.

Whilst the number of core firefighting resources will be the same for each alarm level, the South East Corner model will have a slightly greater amount of support resources and command officers for some alarm levels.



GARS Tables

South East Queensland Model

GARS South East Queensland Model Greater Alarm Response System (GARS)						
Incident Type	1 st Alarm	2 nd Alarm	3 rd Alarm	4 th Alarm	5 th Alarm	6 th Alarm or Higher
Structure Fire	First Alarm Response is as per Regional Mobilisation Protocols	4 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Command Officer	6 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Aerial 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Scientific Officer 2 x Command Officers	8 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Rescue 1 x Aerial 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Scientific Officer 3 x Command Officers	10 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Rescue 2 x Aerial 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Scientific Officer 4 x Command Officers	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm
Non-Structure Fire (e.g. wildfire, vehicle)	4 x Pumps or 4 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Command Officer	5 x Pumps or 6 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle 2 x Command Officers	8 x Pumps or 8 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 3 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief State Air Desk Notified	10 x Pumps or 10 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 4 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief State Air Desk Notified	2 x Additional Pumps or Brigades per alarm	
Rescue	3 x Pumps + 1 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Command Officer	4 x Pumps + 2 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle 2 x Command Officers	6 x Pumps + 2 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle 3 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief	8 x Pumps + 2 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 4 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm	
Hazmat	3 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Scientific Officer 1 x Command Officer	5 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Scientific Officer 1 x Decon Unit 2 x Command Officers	6 x Pumps + 2 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Decon Unit 1 x Scientific Officer 3 x Command Officers	8 x Pumps + 2 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 1 x Decon Unit 2 x Scientific Officers 4 x Command Officers	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm	

Regional Queensland Model

QFRS Regional Queensland Model (South-West Region, Central Region, North Coast Region, Northern Region and Far Northern Region)						
Incident Type	1 st Alarm	2 nd Alarm	3 rd Alarm	4 th Alarm	5 th Alarm	6 th Alarm or Higher
Structure Fire	First Alarm Response is as per Regional Mobilisation Protocols	4 x Pumps 1 x Command Officer	6 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Scientific Officer 1 x Command Officer	8 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Aerial 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Scientific Officer 2 x Command Officers	10 x Pumps 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Aerial 1 x Scientific Officer 3 x Command Officers	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm
Non-Structure Fire (e.g. wildfire, vehicle)		4 x Pumps or 4 x RFB 1 x Command Officer	6 x Pumps or 6 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Command Officer	8 x Pumps 8 RFB 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 2 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Notified	10 x Pumps or 10 x RFB 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 3 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief State Air Desk - Notified	2 x Additional Pumps or Brigades per alarm
Rescue		3 x Pumps + 1 x Rescue 1 x Command Officer	5 x Pumps + 1 x Rescue 1 x Command Officer	7 x Pumps + 1 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle 2 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief	8 x Pumps + 2 x Rescue 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 3 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm
Hazmat		3 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Scientific Officer 1 x Command Officer	5 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Scientific Officer 1 x Command Officer	7 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle 1 x Scientific Officer 2 x Command Officers	9 x Pumps + 1 x BA Hazmat 1 x Control Vehicle (or ICC) 2 x Scientific Officer 3 x Command Officers RFCC - Watching Brief SOCC - Watching Brief	2 x Additional Pumps per alarm







GARS Tables Explanatory Notes





The following notes have been prepared to assist in explaining the information contained within the tables and the application of the alarm levels:

1. The First Alarm for any incident will be based on the regional mobilisation protocols.
2. The number of command staff has been calculated as a guide to the number required to safely and effectively manage an incident.
3. For wildfire / bushfire incidents, temporary changes to a First Alarm response will change depending on the current regional "Wildfire Alert Level" and reflect the Regional Wildfire Plan.
4. Where possible, the command personnel should be in addition to the first responding crews.
5. Command officers generally relate to "Senior Officers" where possible. Where this is not possible, the number of designated command officers may be made up by appropriately trained staff.
6. "Rescue" is a generic term for an emergency tender, command rescue (CR) or specialist rescue resource.
7. "BA/Hazmat Vehicle" refers to the Regional BA Hazmat resource. The capability of this resource may differ from region to region.
8. The initial "appliance" response to non-structure fire incidents can be either urban pumpers, Rural Fire Brigades (RFB) or a combination of both. RFB's are used as opposed to appliances as there are various numbers of resources available for different brigades.
9. Depending on the regional resources available, a "Control Vehicle" should be a specialist vehicle with some associated communication equipment for the management of the incident. In some circumstances, the command vehicle may be a Senior Officer's Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) with suitable equipment.
10. GARS is a mobilisation process for the initial and subsequent request for resources in relatively short time frame and is not applicable during campaign and long duration incidents.

It is acknowledged that in some rural and remote areas there will be a gradual uptake of the system and that full implementation across all areas of the state may take some time.

Model Resourcing Comparison for Structure Fire Response

Structure Fire	Regional Queensland Model	South East Queensland Model
1 st Alarm	First Alarm Response is as per Regional Mobilisation Protocols.	
2 nd Alarm		
3 rd Alarm		
4 th Alarm		

Structure Fire	Regional Queensland Model	South East Queensland Model
5 th Alarm		
6 th Alarm or Higher Two additional pumpers per successive alarm		

USING GARS

The core firefighting component for each alarm level (that is the number of pumpers or rural fire brigades) usually corresponds to double the alarm level number.



EXAMPLE: A non-structure fire second alarm responds four pumpers or four rural fire brigades or a combination of both; similarly a structure fire fourth alarm responds eight pumpers and so on.

If for any reason the Incident Controller is unsure of the exact details of the response breakdown, they should request the alarm level on the basis of the number of core firefighting components required to combat the incident. This way, the Incident Controller can be confident that an appropriate number of specialist support vehicles as well as an appropriate sized incident management structure will also be responded.

In addition to the details of the alarm levels, it is important to be aware of these governing protocols that will apply to the new system of responding resources to an incident.

Special Calling Resources

If necessary the Incident Controller may request resources that are not part of the standard alarm - this is known as Special Calling.

Special Calling - One Additional Pumper

The Incident Controller may request the attendance of one additional pumper at an incident without activating the next level of alarm response.



EXAMPLE: The Incident Controller at a third alarm factory fire, where there are sufficient firefighting resources in attendance to control the situation, may simply require the attendance of an additional pumper to assist relay pumping. The Incident Controller can simply Special Call the additional pumper, rather than activating the next complete level of response and transmit a fourth alarm.

It should be noted that Special Calling a single pumper should only occur once during an incident. This is to avoid resource levels climbing incrementally without a corresponding increase in incident management and support resources.

Special Calling - Specialist Resources

In some situations the standard alarm may not provide all of the Specialist Resources required. In such cases the required Specialist Resources should be included as part of the assistance message.

Calling Off Unnecessary Appliances

Alarm levels are based on generic incident types of structure fire, non-structure fire, rescue and hazmat.

There may be some circumstances whereby the Incident Controller may not require the exact type and number of support appliances detailed for the particular alarm level requested. When this occurs, the Incident Controller may transmit as part of the assistance message that a specific resource in the alarm response is not required.

Calling For Assistance En-Route

As per normal QFRS procedures, Officers can still call for assistance en-route should conditions indicate the response needs to be upgraded.



EXAMPLE: An Officer observing large volumes of smoke visible en-route to a factory fire might transmit a message for a higher alarm to be responded than has already been assigned by Firecom.

A request for the response of additional alarms does not have to follow in numerical sequence.



EXAMPLE: The Incident Controller may decide to escalate the response level from the initial first alarm response straight to a fifth alarm or a second alarm direct to a fourth alarm.

Alarm levels may be escalated to what ever level the Incident Controller believes is appropriate to adequately bring the situation under control regardless of the incidents current alarm level.

Firecom Escalating Alarm Levels

Personnel from the Fire Communications Centre may escalate the level of alarm response before an assistance message is received if information suggests the incident will not be handled with the first alarm.

This may occur when the Fire Communication Centre receives a large number of triple '000' calls from the community concerning an incident. The information from these calls must be consistent and indicate to the communication personnel that the incident requires an escalation of the alarm level.

Staging Areas

One of the most important issues for an Incident Controller to consider when using GARS is the designation of staging areas.

Incident Controllers should be aware that some of the additional appliances that arrive on scene in response to higher alarms levels may not necessarily be deployed at the incident immediately. In some instances these appliances may not be deployed at all due to the incident being brought under control without the need for further assistance.

Incident Controllers must establish a staging area as soon as possible for the holding of incoming appliances to prevent unnecessary congestion at the incident, which could hinder operations and compromise safety.

A staging area is set up for incidents of extended duration and size or where congestion could occur. This is an area designated for backup, supplies, personnel, equipment etc, to be stored and kept on standby in case of need. This can also be a location that is used to position vehicles that may be required for incidents such as high-rise incidents that have no facilities but allows the incident control zone to be kept clear of non-required vehicles but allow crews to move into the incident control zone for operations.

Staging Area Officer - appointed by the Operations Officer, approved by the Incident Controller and will be identified by the appropriate tabard. The Staging Area Officer is responsible for managing all resources within a staging area for a specific incident or event. To maintain the effective application of resources at an incident, the Operations Officer will have resources (personnel and/or equipment) staged at a central location managed by a Staging Area Officer.

Generally, once the Incident Controller has requested the staging of appliances, the Officer on the first attending appliance at the staging area will undertake these duties.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1. Why are we implementing a system that was developed overseas?

Whilst these types of predetermined levels of response had their origins in overseas fire services, GARS models are now being used by most Australian Fire Services including:

- Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB),
- New South Wales Fire Brigade (NSWFB),
- Western Australia (FESA),
- Tasmania,
- ACT and
- South Australia (SAMFS).

In fact, the system is not new in Australia with MFB using this type of system for in excess of 20 years.

2. What is wrong with the current system of requesting resources e.g. make pumps four etc.

Whilst this system has served QFRS well, this new system will reduce the responsibilities and pressure on the Incident Controller.

By simply nominating the alarm level, the IC can be confident that not only will they receive the appropriate number of core firefighting resources, but also the appropriate mix of support and specialist resources to assist bringing the incident under control.

In addition, these additional resources will be responded in the first instance, rather than an incremental build up of resources.

3. There is a lot of information contained in the relative matrix. How am I expected to remember all of this when I am deciding on an alarm level?

There are pocket guides and dash stickers available to refer to, but your decision should be made primarily on the number of core firefighting resources (pumps or rural fire brigades) required.

Remember that the alarm level responds double that corresponding number of resources. For example, a 2nd alarm responds four pumpers, 3rd alarm responds six pumpers etc.

If you require one extra appliance rather than responding the next alarm, you can "special call" one additional appliance or one additional rural fire brigade.

4. How does the Wild Fire Alert Level affect GARS?

The regional Wild Fire Alert Level is not related to GARS. If there is a very high fire danger rating for a particular day, the region may increase the level of 1st Alarm response or the initial response, but this does not affect the GARS matrix or its use.

5. I work in an auxiliary station in a regional centre and I have never attended a fire where I can get 8 or 10 pumps so where do I stand?

If you have never had a job at your location where you have required this amount of pumps then you probably won't have any need in the future as well.

Remember that the vast majority of incidents that QFRS attend (no matter where you are in the state) do not progress past a first, second or third alarm.

However, be aware that if you do attend a very significant event at your location (e.g. train derailment) then it is likely that you may have to request a higher alarm level; bearing in mind that you will have to wait a much longer period of time than if you were working in a larger town.

6. Why are there two GARS models

Because GARS responds a predetermined mix of resources to an incident, it is very much dependant upon the available resources in the region.

Due to the fact that there is a greater amount of resources (both human and operational) there will be two models; a South East Queensland Model (Brisbane and South East Region) and a regional model for the rest of the State.

7. What if a Telescopic Aerial Pumper (TAP) is responded as a pumper within an initial alarm response and then I require the attendance of an aerial appliance?

The Incident Controller has a couple of options to consider:

1. Special call an aerial appliance to respond; or
2. Special call an additional pumper to "release" the TAP for re-deployment to meet this requirement.

Note: for response purposes any resource that has a multi-function capability will be treated within the meaning of its initial response, i.e., a TAP responded as a pumper will be considered a pumper irrespective of what function it is actually performing.

"TCD-4"

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Parameters:

Courses: F-FUNIT651 Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness

Organisation: QFRS South Western Region

Sort Order: U Person Status:

From Date: 1/01/2000 To Date: 24/11/2011

Note: Totals show distinct persons only. Multiple records for a person are only counted once.

QFRS South Western Region

[Redacted]	Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	22/03/2010	Unknown
	Total Persons			1

Public Service

[Redacted]	QFRS South Western Region	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	PA05
	Public Service Total Persons			1

QFRS Communications Officer

[Redacted]	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FC014
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	17/04/2008	FC014
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FC012A
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	14/10/2008	FC013
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FC014
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	06/03/2008	FCM3
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	20/04/2008	FC014
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	24/06/2009	FC011
	South Western Region - Firecom(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	17/04/2008	FC014

QFRS Communications Officer Total Persons

QFRS Firefighter Auxiliary

[Redacted]	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX001
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX002
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX002
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2010	FX004
	Allora Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	31/03/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	31/03/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	17/03/2009	FX002
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	31/03/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	29/04/2009	FX004
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	31/03/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX002
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	31/03/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	08/04/2008	FX003
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	3/04/2008	FX004
	Anzac Avenue Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	08/07/2008	FX004
	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT651	08/07/2008	FX003
	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT651	08/07/2008	FX003
	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FX003
	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT651	16/02/2010	FX004
	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FX002

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Station	Course	Unit	Date	Grade
[REDACTED]	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	8/07/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Augathella Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	8/07/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Bollon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT551	17/07/2010	FX004
[REDACTED]	Bollon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT551	9/04/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Bollon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT551	9/04/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	18/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	18/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	18/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	18/04/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/04/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	24/03/2010	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cecil Plains Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	24/03/2010	FX004
[REDACTED]	Charleville Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	2/07/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Charleville Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	2/07/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Charleville Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	2/07/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Charleville Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	2/07/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Charleville Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	2/07/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	6/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	6/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	6/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	6/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	6/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Chinchilla Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	5/08/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	28/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Clifton Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	9/02/2009	FX003
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	1/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	1/04/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	1/04/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	1/04/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	16/10/2010	FX004
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	9/02/2009	FX002
[REDACTED]	Crows Nest Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT551	22/03/2010	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX001
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX002
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX003
[REDACTED]	Cunnamulla Station(QFRS XF3 CHAR)	F-FUNIT551	18/03/2008	FX004
[REDACTED]	Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT551	25/10/2008	FX003

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Station	Unit	Completion Date	Unit
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	10/04/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	25/09/2010	FX004
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	3/04/2008	FX002
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	10/04/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	22/03/2010	FX004
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	10/04/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	5/04/2008	FX002
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	6/05/2009	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	25/10/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	26/09/2010	FX004
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	10/04/2008	FX002
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	10/04/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	17/03/2011	FX004
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	26/10/2008	FX003
Dalby Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	5/04/2008	FX001
Dirranbandi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	8/04/2008	FX002
Dirranbandi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	22/06/2010	FX004
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	26/03/2008	FX002
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	26/03/2008	FX003
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	7/03/2010	FX004
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	25/03/2008	FX001
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	25/08/2011	FX004
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	26/03/2008	FX002
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	25/08/2011	FX004
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	7/03/2010	FX004
Goombungee Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	22/09/2009	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	13/05/2008	FX002
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	13/06/2008	FX002
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX002
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX001
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Goondwindi Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/03/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX004
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX001
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX004
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX002
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/11/2008	FX004
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX002
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	16/10/2010	FX004
Highfields Station(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	21/04/2008	FX003
Inglewood Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	19/03/2008	FX003
Inglewood Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	19/03/2008	FX001
Inglewood Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	19/03/2008	FX003
Inglewood Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	19/03/2008	FX002
Inglewood Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	19/03/2008	FX002
Injune Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	16/06/2008	FX004
Injune Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	16/06/2008	FX002
Injune Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	25/08/2008	FX003

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/04/2008	FX003
		F-FUNIT651	20/08/2008	FX003
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	2/07/2008	FX004
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT661	18/08/2008	FX002
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	18/08/2008	FX004
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	18/08/2008	FX002
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	18/08/2008	FX004
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	12/08/2008	FX004
	Roma Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	18/08/2008	FX003
	St George Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	8/04/2008	FX002
	St George Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	7/05/2008	FX004
	St George Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	8/04/2008	FX002
	St George Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT661	8/04/2008	FX001
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX001
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX004
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX003
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX003
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX004
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	6/05/2008	FX002
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX004
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	20/08/2008	FX004
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	8/05/2008	FX002
	Stanthorpe Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FX002
	Sural Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	23/04/2008	FX001
	Sural Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	7/07/2010	FX004
	Tara Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT661	28/10/2008	FX003
	Tara Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	28/10/2008	FX001
	Tara Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	28/10/2008	FX002
		F-FUNIT651	5/04/2008	FX002
	Tara Station(QFRS XF3 DALB)	F-FUNIT651	28/07/2011	FX004
	Teroom Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX001
	Teroom Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX004
	Teroom Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX004
	Teroom Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX002
	Texas Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	3/04/2008	FX001
	Texas Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	12/11/2008	FX002
		F-FUNIT651	3/04/2008	FX002
	Texas Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT661	3/04/2008	FX003
	Texas Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	12/11/2008	FX003
	Wallangarra Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT661	18/03/2008	FX001
	Wallumbilla Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	17/08/2008	FX002
	Wallumbilla Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	17/08/2008	FX001
	Wallumbilla Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT661	17/08/2008	FX004
	Wallumbilla Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	17/07/2010	FX004
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT661	28/10/2008	FX002
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX001
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	28/10/2008	FX002
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT661	8/07/2008	FX003
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX003
	Wandoan Station(QFRS XF3 ROMA)	F-FUNIT651	8/07/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX002
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	13/03/2008	FX002
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX004
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX001

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Unit	Course	Registration No	Completion Date	Pass Mark
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	20/04/2008	FX002
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Warwick Station(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FX003
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	15/04/2008	FX001
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	15/04/2008	FX002
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	16/04/2008	FX003
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	9/10/2010	FX004
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	15/04/2008	FX003
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	15/04/2008	FX003
	Yeterbon Station(QFRS XF3 GOON)	F-FUNIT651	9/10/2010	FX004

QFRS Firefighter Auxiliary Total Persons 256

QFRS Firefighter Full-time

	Charloville Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	2/04/2008	FINS
	Dalby Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FINS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	13/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	9/11/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	17/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	3/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/02/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	12/12/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	14/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Unit No.	Unit Title	Unit No.	Completion Date	Grade
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	7/06/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	9/04/2008	FFQ
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FFO
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	12/03/2008	FPTEMP
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	2/11/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	27/02/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	1/04/2008	FFO
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	FFS
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	27/02/2008	FF1
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	4/04/2008	FFL
	Firefighters - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	FFS
	Goondiwindi Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	14/02/2008	SOF3
	Goondiwindi Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	FINS
	QFRS South Western Region	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FSSP2
	QFRS South Western Region	F-FUNIT651	1/04/2008	FCHIEF
	QFRS South Western Region	F-FUNIT651	20/02/2008	SOF3
	South Western Region Community Safety(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	FF9
	South Western Region Community Safety(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	27/02/2008	SOF3
	South Western Region Community Safety(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	FINS
	South Western Region Community Safety(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FBA02
	South Western Regional Training(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	SOF3
	South Western Regional Training(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	SOF3
	South Western Regional Training(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	SOF1
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	15/02/2008	SOF1
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	16/02/2008	SOF1
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	3/03/2008	SOF1
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	SOF2
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	SOF3
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	15/02/2008	SOF1
	Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOOW)	F-FUNIT651	10/03/2008	SOF1

Learners with Courses Completed Successfully

24-Nov-11

Name	Enrolment	Course Title	Unit Code	Completion Date	Grade
		Station Officers - Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3 TOQW)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	SOF1
		Station Officers - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	SOF3
		Station Officers - Warwick Area(QFRS XF3 WARW)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	SOF1
		Stn Western Reg - Strategic Development(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	28/02/2008	SOF2
		Stn Western Reg - Strategic Development(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT551	6/03/2008	SOF1
		Stn Western Reg - Strategic Development(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	6/03/2008	SOF3
		Stn Western Reg - Strategic Development(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT551	13/02/2008	FINS
		Stn Western Reg - Strategic Development(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT551	6/03/2008	FSUP
		Toowoomba Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT651	11/03/2008	FINS
		Warwick Area(QFRS XF3)	F-FUNIT551	16/02/2008	FINS

QFRS Firefighter Full-time Total Persons 68
 QFRS South Western Region Total Persons 330
 Grand Total Persons: 398

"TED-5"

Tom Dawson

From: [REDACTED] (QFRS Toowoomba)
Sent: Thursday, 24 November 2011 13:43
To: Tom Dawson
Subject: FW: GARS
Attachments: SabaReportViewer[1].pdf
Assistant Commissioner

GARS

FUNIT551 - Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness training package (attached).
Obtained from PDU.

SIOPP -

- Introduced by Gordon Bell and the Madonna Day project team
- 2 days training provided to permanent staff
- Regional Champions - Ron Cook and Wally Rye
- Each permanent shift undertook a review of their area of responsibility and SO Burrows has completed a review of all sections of SIOPP as required for his advantage
- SIOPP does not have a subject code for recording competency of subject.

Thank you
Paul Evans

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, 24 November 2011 13:28
To: [REDACTED] (QFRS Toowoomba)
Subject: GARS

Hi [REDACTED]
the attached report shows those who have completed this training. If you want me to run a report on those who have not completed the training, I can do that too.

Cheers

ATTACHMENT 3A FIRECOM

South West Region, QFRS - Information retrieved from voice logger tapes for January 10th 2011
COMMENTS

TIME	Logger ref.	Comments Officer	FROM	COMMENTS
08:30:19	OP2	Gina	Paul S - ROCC	req incident number for job at Bowenvilla from last night
08:31:20	OP2	Gina	Insp Evans	[REDACTED]
8:32:09				[REDACTED]
8:36:52	OP2	Gina		[REDACTED]
8:36:16	OP1	Matt H	311K	regarding deployments and that so - yes well I just wanted to give you the heads up ,not aproblem - right , can you do me a favour, can you give me station 45 SE phone number - ipowich - can 45 Ip SE station SE
8:38:10	OP1	Matt H	Wally Rye (planning Officer)	call to Wally Rye - planning officer message bank
8:38:58	OP1	Matt H	David Oighton (FF Swift water)	[REDACTED]
8:44:37	OP2	Gina		Rocky control this is Callum - Hi Callum this is Gina calling from Firecom in Toowoomba - how is it going - we you know , its going great , we have got power lines down in Park Road in Crows Nest - Park Road Crows Nest - yes - ok - too easy - if you could give me a ETA when you have one - return phone number - 46367204 , right , too easy - bye - bye
8:44:36	OP1	Matt		hello Gina - Gday mate its Matt from FireCom we've got power lines down across the road at 21 Park Road Crows Nest
8:45:29	OP2	Gina	Crows Nest Str	Firecom this is Gina - Hi Gina Station 16 (Crows Nest) - we've got power lines down outside 21 Park Road - power lines down - yep - Park Road Crows Nest - No worries at all - thanks - bye

WTCB-6B11

8:45:23 OP1 Matt H S Lange (swift water tech) QFRS Matt - Matt, Stewy how are you - hey mate how are you doing - not too bad - its Stew Lange - just letting you know Dave Brighton is the contact for this day shift for swift water as I am standing down for today - reasing - ok too easy mate - ops I was up till 4 o'clock this morning - on yeah fair enough - do you have um - or the agency spoken to Oakey - good - I was just going to - I am compiling a list of all the most closures to send to the ROC and also to yours and Oakey's work emails - thank ya - so you can have a look in probably about an hour and half - righto I'll be asleep - I'm giving Oakey the job now so for today - too easy - talk to you later mate - see you - bye

8:47:15 OP2 Gina Oakey media QFRS this is Gina - hi this is Ken Rogers from the Champion hero- just won't be a moment - sorry - Matt get it - where were you from I'm sorry - the Oakey Champion newspaper - yes - on Friday afternoon there was a gas leak in a house in Doherty street - ok on Friday 7th - yes - just give me a moment - and I will bring it up - gas in Oakey yes - yes, the guys from Oakey attended but there were also a truck from Toowoomba I was just wondering is that any special sort of unit - no it was just another appliance from Toowoomba because we only have the one appliance in Oakey so it is just backed up by the second appliance from Toowoomba for manpower and that sort of thing - oh - good on you - o - thank you very much - bye - bye

8:51:15 OP2 Gina Supt Smith
8:51:43 OP1 Matt 316A (crows nest) felt directions to Faringrove Road - not related to weather event incidents.
316A - Firecom SW 316A - Code 2 Firecom have Ergon been advised over - 316A code 2, affirmative Ergon have been advised, unknown eta at this time, stand by 0851

8:56:13 OP2 Gina 316A (Crows Nest appliance)
8:56:13 OP1 Matt Ergon Control Firecom 316A - Firecom sw 316A - we've got Park Road shut off on Northern end waiting for Ergon to fix up power lines - over -

9:02:11 OP2 Gina Rocky control this is Callum - hi Callum its Matt from Firecom in Toowoomba, do you have an eta for your brakes in Crows Nest - um no not at the moment, on wait hang on, it is approximately one hour - one hour - yes - ok - too easy - I'll let them know, cheers mate - see you - Firecom SW 316A - firecom - 316A be advised eta on Ergon approximately one hour - 60 minutes over - roger Firecom - 0057

9:20:23 OP2 Gina 311K Western Downs Regional Council's Luke's - FF Luke's this is Gina from QFRS how are you - good thank you - now just before Christmas I ring you guys and I got Justice Lord and she emailed me a media release - on food conditions and road closures and that sort of thing - I was just wondering if I could get an updated version of that which I know will only take you guys a few seconds - ok I am in Justice's office at the moment - if you don't mind holding I will find it on my computer - ok thank you - the only one that I've received.

9:20:44 OP2 Gina So Haddow 311K 311K Mobile from west Timba to station 11

9:21:38 OP2 Gina QFRS this is Gina - Gina Mack from 311K we are still K30 to jobs because of the siren, the guys have taken it out to the electrochem to have a look then back to To ROC, Vicki, net jury duty - not event related

9:32:54 OP2 Gina FF Glen Englart QFRS this is Gina - g'day Gina this is Glen ?? - how are you going - good Gina, Gina or - do you now if Hemmo Davies is at area office today or is he flooded in at Goombarra - hang on won't be a moment - Firecom SW 311K - 311K resumed to sta 11 - 311K returned to Sta 11 0933 - um I've had no communication that he is flooded in elsewhere - alright can you give me his office number down at Warwick and also his afterhours number if you wouldn't mind yeh - I think his after hours number is a heap of 66 followed by a 211 - I have him on speed dial so mate all that I know - I think I've got his home number - so he got his mobile number - is he this home number is a lot of 66 and his mobile is 0477373431 yep that's his home number do the one with a lot of 66 his work number is - Inspector - 46675165 - thanks Gina I'll give those a try - you haven't heard of any crises down at Goombarra - no, we are more worried about Dalby at the moment, Dalby is going under - Dalby is going under? - Dalby is going under umm - hang on -

9:39:47 OP2 Gina Firecom SW 324A - we are currently doing a run of the main street of Kilmaley helping people lift stuff up out of flood zone - over - 324A you are in the main street helping people lift stuff up so it is not affected D935, ummm Dalby is going under Myles Creek is probably going to get to 3.5, the rain we have just had is heading out Dalby way an expansion 5-SE is apparently short for swift water so we could also be being responded down there as well - o, ok - have they bought any extra follows in for Toowoomba do you know? - no, not yet - gee is the ROC up and running? - the ROC is running I think Paul, Paul Evans, I ring before and got a Wayne, the only Wayne I know is Wayne Walkshut but I don't know if its him

9:45:26 OP1 Matt Fire & Rescue Kitchener St Station
9:46:00 OP1 Matt Firecall TO yeh - so there are people at the ROC, but that's just behind you anyway - yes we don't venture down there, ROCs are not on our menu - then you have to socialise with people - WE are a bit antisocial up here - So that's all that we have at the moment Dalby is sending up a little command centre each side of the creek s they are all sorted - Alright Gina, I am mainly after Hemmo so I'll try and contact him, thanks for that bye - bye

9:47:09 OP1 Matt QAS Corang QFRS this is Gina - G'day Gina this is Andrew from tech support at Hamilton - how are you going - good tanks, look we have had the ambox up there complain about their site at Bald Hill not working and just wondering how your U60 channel is going because that is at the same site - starts the million dollar question isn't it - it is, it services Crows Nest - we have had no problems we have had a couple of incidents this morning at Crows Nest and have had no problems with radio, as a little bit scratchy a few times but no problems - the problem is its a solar 300 on their site if you haven't had enough sun everything could die draining a bit, the ambox might have taken out well before the rains - yes well we haven't had any problems they are sitting out there at the moment - yes, in the rain - yes well we have had power lines down so they are waiting for Ergon and they are taking an hour to get there - Well that would not affect our radio site anyway, thanks Gina - bye - bye

9:47:33 OP2 Gina 316A (Crows Nest) Fire & Rescue Kitchener St Station - yes Stewy Mack, is Mark there - yes mate he's gone - (I am just turning out 11 by phone) you mate - Mark, Firecall doing it my phone because we've got nothing from QAS yet they are taking the call, 2 veh RTC unknown entrapped 16315 New England Highway - stand by - New England Highway Clifton its near the Clifton turn off we are responding Clifton AUX also I will send further details through on the radio - can I get through that way - you should be able to - we will go code 30 - ok cheers mate - see you

9:48:38 OP1 Matt 000 caller hi Mac its Des - Firecom SW 311K - Firecom SW 311K - 311K we are responding code 30 - roger 311K responding code 30 to New England Highway be advised further information - 2 vehicles believed to be a truck & one together reported as an entrapment unknown at this time if truck is rigid body or prime mover over - message understood - roger Firecom will attempt to contact caller to provide further information 0948

9:48:59 OP2 Gina Station 22 (Clifton) Firecom SW 316A - Firecom sw 316A - we have Ergon on scene - 316A Ergon on scene 0947, - SW 311K - 311K responding RTC New England Highway Clifton

9:48:59 OP2 Gina Station 22 (Clifton) hello - yes g'day is this Neil Fisher - yes - its Mac from Fire & Rescue how are you - good thanks - I notice that you reported a 2 vehicle crash at Clifton - yes - mate I've got it from the ambulance service who obviously took the call there - I was wanting some information for our own purposes - yes - do you know if the truck, is that a semi trailer or rigid - no rigid body milk truck - milk truck, ok, and you can't see any fuel spill or anything like that on the ground? - no no - and is anyone trapped in the vehicles - no - the body is in the ute out the site got bad chest pain - she's got chest pain ok no worries - yes yes the air bag went off - the air bag went off, are they off the road are they - yeh yeh - ok and its just a single person in the ute, just the lady - yes - ok - about in her twenties - no worries, now the milk truck is that refrigerated - yes - no worries - thats all I need to know - I've got it at the Clifton turn off New England highway does that sound right - yes - yes that's right - right now there's trucks coming from both directions as well as ambulance and police - righto - they'll be there shortly - ok if anything changes just give us a call back on 000 either fire or ambulance - y

9:48:59 OP2 Gina Station 22 (Clifton) Stn 22 manned - Station 22 turn out with Stn 23, 311K to 2 vehicle RTC truck & ute on New England Highway at Clifton turn off that is 16316 New England Highway at the Clifton turn off - acknowledge

9:50:12 OP2 Gina Station 23(Alora) Station 23 manned - Station 23 turn out with Sqn 22, 311K to 2 vehicle RTC truck versus ute on the New England Highway at Clifton turnoff (that is 16316 New England Highway at the Clifton turnoff - acknowledge - Station 23 acknowledge - Roger Sta 23 acknowledge 0950

9:50:50 OP1 Matt 311K Firecom SW 311K - 311K go ahead - 311K be advise 2 vehicle RTC is a pig body refrigerated milk truck and it use with single occupant off the road, over - roger sta 1
Firecom message understood - roger 0951

9:51:53 OP1 Matt 322A(Alora) 323A to Firecom SW - Firecom SW 3232A - turning out to Clifton turn off with a crew of 1 & 3 Lt Koener in charge over - 323A turning out crew of 1 & 3 OIC Koener 0953

9:52:56 OP2 Gina 322A Firecom SW this is 322A - Firecom SW 322A - have OAS, OPS been advised over - roger that 322A call came from OAS, will advise OPS - OFPS this is Gina - Gina its Sully, how are you - not too bad, hey uh, you got a call to Clifton turn off? - yep - yes ok, I was just coming through there thats all - OK not a problem yes we got Clifton on the way and Alora - there's no emergency services on scene but it doesn't look like there's anyone hurt. - Ok cool thanks for that - bye - bye

9:54:37 OP1 Matt Clifton Courier Old Fire & Rescue Man - yes hello Matt its Linda Matkova calling from the Clifton Courier how are you going - good how are you - good thanks, Matt we've just had our fire truck head out of town, we are wondering whats happening - yes they are going to a truck and use together on the Clifton turn off for the New England Highway, at this stage there is no one there so if you want to wait say an hour and call back we will give you some more details - so a truck and it use have collided - yes thats right, its a rigid body not a prime mover - so a rigid - yes a rigid not a prime mover - ok then thank you - cheers, bye

9:55:42 OP1 Matt Insp DeVries (Warwick) hello Hemmo here - yes gday Hemmo its Matt from Firecom how are you - yes hello Matt I heard you got a 2 vehicle accident Alora Clifton turn off - yes, oh well consider yourself notified - I heard the pages that's all - yeh yeh also, do you know what the road closure situation is down in your area - no but I m at the Clifton District meeting at the moment and it will know more after that - cool coz I am just doing an update for their ROC and our major concern is that most of our swift water guys are out at Darby and out of town Toowoomba and we are likely to get off from Brisbane and Ipswich on the Warrego Highway later on today - you know that Michael Coombe is on today - yep - I will send you an email with it all if I can get it, as long as I can get it on computer I can send it on - too easy - even if you can call it through mate, but main concern or Lindseys main concern is Toowoomba will be the only swift water people from Gatton to Darby and up to Manago and a lot of the guys are either out of town or on fatigue so we are just trying to keep an eye on things - well you know Mick Coombe is here and everyone is a level one in Warwick - yes my concern is if the Warwick bridge goes under we won't have your backup - yes but its 2 1/2 metres at the moment but they will know roughly when its going to go over - ok the thing is its raining in Orlambo and Kilmory it going so pretty quick - yes they are out at the moment doing a bit of a help out what they - yes they are, I told them anything they can do to help the community is good - too easy - good - well if you can let us know anything you find out - - righto Matt - bye

9:56:26 OP2 Gina Crows Nest 41 you are proceeding to Crows Nest police station at 0956

9:57:32 OP1 Matt 316A (crows nest) Firecom SW 316A - 316A - 316A, can you advise if OAS completion OPS is on scene - that is correct OPS is on scene - roger 0959

9:58:27 OP2 Gina 322A Firecom SW this is 322A - Firecom SW 322A - Code 2, it appears the driver of the utility is out of the vehicle over - 322A code 2 k appears the driver of the utility is out of the vehicle 0958

9:59:25 OP2 Gina 316A (Crows Nest) Firecom SW 316A - Firecom SW 316A - we are leavin gthe scene in the hands of Ergon, we are code 4.

10:00:24 OP2 Gina 322A 322A stop for call, 311K over - Firecom 311K copied last code 40 - 311K you are now code 40 at 10:00

10:05:57 OP1 Matt Crows Nest 41 Firecom SW Crows Nest 41 over - Firecom SW Crows Nest 41 - mobile to Crows Nest Police Station - Leaving Crows Nest Fire Station 10:05

10:17:53 OP2 Gina 323A Firecom SW 322A - Firecom SW 322A - code 4 on this incident over - 323A you are code 4 at 10:18

10:18:55 OP1 Matt 324A Firecom SW this is 324A over - Firecom SW 324A - returned to station over - returned to station 10:19

10:20:11 OP2 Gina 324A Firecom SW, last appliance calling - Firecom SW this is pump 322A over - Firecom SW 322A - Vehicle has been recovered from the scene we will be very shortly code 4 over - 322A vehicle has been recovered from the scene you will shortly be code 4

10:26:06 OP2 Gina 323A Firecom SW this is 323A - Firecom SW 323A - we are in town and now we are going to replenish with water - 323A you are in town area and replenishing with water at 10:26

10:28:30 OP2 Gina Crows Nest Crows Nest 41 you are back at station at 10:28

10:33:29 OP2 Gina 323A Firecom SW 323A - Firecom SW 323A -

10:34:02 OP2 Gina OO Harris OFRS this Gina - Gina, Jimmy how are you - good mate how are you - good, are you busy - oh, no got a moment - can I ask a favour - can you open up the roster, after Wednesday, I think I am working Wednesday Thursday, - possibly, today is in order, you are working Wednesday and Thursday night - yes, what about over the following weekend - there is nothing, you are not on for the roster for the rest of that week, - oh good, perfect, thank Gina - you want to be unavailable at any point? - yes well I am meant to be moving house tomorrow but because of the rain we are not doing it so we are thinking of the next weekend, so the next weekend - the 22nd - yes Friday Saturday - as in 4 days time - ok with 15th - yes - ok - slight you have a good day - yes I will - make sure you send me some-where today otherwise I will be very unhappy, - you will go knock a power line down and we will send you somewhere - ok got to go.

10:35:48 OP1 Matt Station 13 Firecom South West Station 13 - Firecom South West Station 13 turnout to a private smoke alarm at 4 McHugh Road Southbrook no sign of smoke or fire, Station 13 turnout to private smoke alarm at 4 McHugh Road Southbrook no sign of smoke or fire, Station 13 South West 313A - Firecom South West 313A

10:36:12 OP1 Matt 313A(Pittsworth) Firecom SW 321A - Firecom SW 321A - 321A back at station - 322A you are back at station at 10:36 - Gamma (OAS) Dec - you are not required - not required? - no - ok good

10:38:06 OP2 Gina 321A (Warwick) OFRS Matt - yes Matt its Station 13 from Pittsworth just let you know that I missed the call by the stations manned - so the stations manned - yes - ok

10:38:08 OP1 Matt 313A(Pittsworth) Firecom SW 313A - Firecom SW 313A - code 1 - 313A code 1 at 10:45

10:45:41 OP2 Gina 313A(Pittsworth) 313A, stop for call, appears to be malfunction, chinking roof cavity at 10:48

10:48:39 OP2 Gina 313A(Pittsworth) no you are right - - Sorry just reading through the job - no seriously take your time

10:52:08 OP1 Matt ? you are not waiting for me are you - no I am just reading the job, - take your time - I am not across this one - you there - yes - we responded with 2 vehicles, sorry three vehicles - Gatton Creek - were they out, like dry on the - roof cavity is clear, leaving in the hands of occupants - 313A roof cavity is clear, leaving in the hands of occupants to organise an electrician 1056 - or yes sorry what was your question - I didn't hear you say so I was asking if the person was out of the car, they weren't in the water, they had got out the road? - they had already removed themselves from the vehicle before we arrived and were subsequently transported by ambulance but you will have to talk to them for the details on that.

10:54:23 OP1 Matt ?

10:54:09 OP2 Gina OPS Comms QFRS Gina speaking - hi Gina its Jan from Police comms how are you - I am good thank you how are you - we had a lady ring up about a fire alarm or distress alarm at Oakley number 5 Cass Ct - OK - our crew - we haven't been able to reach them at the moment and so just as a precaution we thought we would send you - its an elderly lady that lives at that residence - OK, and what was the address again - 5 Cass Ct - just not coming up and its Cass - no S for Sam - that would be why its not coming up - wow - scilly computer took me to Mermaid Beach - thats not going to help us is it - no - so you guys are responding - I've had the informant walk around the house - knocking on the windows - she cant smell anything - it does sound like a smoke alarm - the blinds are pulled, I've asked her to go towards a bathroom or kitchen but has had no response so we just thought that as a precaution we would ask you to go - ok not a problem so this has come not from the lady -

10:59:01 OP1 Matt Station 14 (Oakley) no across the road - do you have a number in case we need to get back to her - yes 0407938808 - ok not a problem , thanks we will get the guys going - ok thanks bye-bye

11:01:39 OP2 Gina 314A (Oakley) Fire & Rescue Matt - gday Matt its Chris from Oakley mail - hey mate are you at station - yes I am - we've got a private smoke alarm sounding - yes - at 5 Cass Street - sorry Cass Court - yep - at Oakley, no sign of smoke or fire - no worries - very good, cheers, thank you -

11:01:39 OP1 Matt Kilmsey Firecom SW 314A - Firecom SW 314A - 314A turning out crew of 4 Captain Mason OIC - 314A turning out crew of 4 OIC Mason, for your information call came from OPS - advised alarm sounding - unable to determine if fire or distress alarm this an elderly resident - all noted - 1102

11:04:17 OP2 Gina 314A (Oakley) Hello - yep g day Bruce its Matt from Firecom how are you - good thanks mate how are you - yep good thanks buddy how is the flood situation going down there - just sitting on a hot mate, I am just about to take a look at the matter - ok - its raining - its not raining - its been about 400 miles in the last half hour or so, its still going up - do you know any road closures mate - no I don't at this stage mate, I haven't heard of any - I don't know if the police could tell you or not - Ok I might give them a bell - that might be your best shot - ok mate, thanks mate - bye

11:05:01 OP1 Matt Wallangarra Captain Firecom SW 314A - Firecom SW 314A - Code 2 alarm sounding - 314A Code 2 alarm sounding - 1104

11:07:38 OP1 Matt 314A (Oakley) Hello - gday Jenny Matt from Firecom how are you - well - yes, I was just ringing up to find out if there are any road closures out your way - um no I have just come through Accommodation Creek and you can't even see the water - I think the road is closed, someone said that that is on the NSW side - yes - there would be little need a cut, I am actually heading to Brisbane now, I just talked to Herma - I have got friends to pick up from the airport, so I am hoping I will get back tonight - yes now far have you got - oh I am only - not even Stanthorpe yet - oh - its wet but as I said Accommodation Creek what I went over I went fairly slowly and you can't even see the water so we have a good couple of meters at least - do you know if Kilmsey is on the same river system as you - I talked to Herma this morning and he said that Kilmsey is going to be cut off very shortly - yes I am asking - no I don't think so - they have had 400 mil in the last half hour - ok I gotta go - as far as I know we have only got the - from the mountains here - ok gday go - bye

11:09:52 OP1 Matt AC Dawson Firecom SW assistance calling say again - Firecom South West this Applethorpe S1 over - Applethorpe S1 go ahead - Applethorpe S1 turning out to Glen road for assistance with pumps and or whatever you over - Roger Applethorpe S1 can you say again the name of road over - Glen Ewen Road the Summit - Applethorpe S1 turning out to Glen Ewen Rd The Summit for flood assist - 1107

11:17:32 OP2 Matt Firecom South West 314A - Firecom South West 314A - Firecom have talked with neighbours not sure if anybody is at home in this residence we are currently forcing entry through a rear window alarm still sounding quite unable to ascertain if there is any fire inside

11:18:22 OP2 Gina Applethorpe 51 Gday fire & rescue Matt - Gday Matt Tom Dawson down at the RDOC how are you - OK sir how are you - very good can I get you to fax to me a the RDOC all the details information regarding the Gartham boxes incidents last night - sir I can send you the firecode if that what you are after - thats it - I want all the times responded all those sorts of things - certainly, there is a secondary one at Woodcot slightly later - or earlier as the night - I'll take both of those - yes please - certainly, no worries - right thanks Matt you got that - yes definitely - good on you I am on the move - bye - cheers

11:24:21 OP2 Gina 311A (Tmbs) Hello, sorry speaking - yep gday Matt from Firecom how are you mate - good mate and yourself - mate not too bad, hey do you know if there is any road closures down your way at all - at this stage mate I am not aware of any - ok - but that's because I haven't been informed - on ok - I imagine there would have to be a few over - yes I am really only concerned with the major - major highways - New England is open thats the only one I am worried about - you have one across to Yelarbon don't you or Tross - across to Tross - mate, if I had to take an educated guess I would say that that one would have to be over - yep - because there area couple of low crossings there - yep yep - on the granite belt for a - its going to go over its going to go over at Bistandean Accommodation Creek - I was talking to Jenny just before and she said that was open - ok that covers that one and we may have a couple of little ones to clean up around Besside from Warwick -

11:27:05 OP2 Gina personal call ok that covers that one - as a general rule of thumb, because we are on top of the hill here it flows away in a couple of hours - if you hear of anything please let me know -

11:27:05 OP3 Matt Insp DeVries (Warwick) do you want me to make contact here in town and let you know - that's all right mate don't go chasing anything - if it happens it happens if you do hear anything just let us know - no easy - well I've still got here at the windy wharf I work we have got customers coming in travelling from the north so I guess its still open a bit - well we've got Herma and the Warwick crew in a meeting with Southern Downs Council discussing road closures an shit so I am sure they will inform us of anything major - well that was going to be my next question - see they looking for a cut to go out and assist at jobs cos im sitting at work here and I can't really do anything while its raining so im a free agent if they want me to go anywhere - ill be speaking to Herma about midday when he finishes his meeting and I will certainly let him know - are you available for a task force or something - yep I am limited I can do Fire with this rain -

11:28:22 OP2 Gina Applethorpe 51 I think it is mainly - they are sending Toowoomba and Warwick out because they have Swilt Water level 1 and I don't think you wouldn't down at Stanthorpe would you - also we don't get flood in like you guys all crop - ill speak to him anyway if they need manpower and stuff, theres task forces at Derranbandi Dalby and St George at the moment and Chinchilla, its certainly let him know - we do have a pretty serious fatigue issue with the guys at the moment - yes well mate let him know if he needs me to not if not an issue for me - too easy ill let him know and get him to call you - yep - too easy, ill talk to you later - bye

11:29:49 OP1 Matt WU2 Firecom SW this Applethorpe S1 - Firecom SW Applethorpe S1 - Applethorpe S11 has arrived at a house on Glen Newton Rd, Checking out to see if they need assistance with pipes or pumps over

11:33:49 OP1 Matt WU2 Firecom SW 311A - Firecom SW 311A - Comms 311A mobile on building inspections over - 311A you are mobile on building inspections - 1124

11:36:26 OP1 Matt Insp DeVries (Warwick) - alright yes - it looks like Kilmsey the bridge will go over there so you will have the north and the south cut off - so the Warwick crew will have to look after the north side of Kilmsey - Bruce Lewis is going to take the truck to the south side - ok - the other thing is the condition of the roads - you will have to get on to main roads for them - theres Warwick Allora road and those other ones - yep - you'll work it out and if they can't get through they will know - they will go another way - we try to get up to date information but it changes continually - exactly - mate the hard part keeps up with it - yep too easy - give you with it mate - too easy - bye

11:37:41 OP2 Gina personal call 314A you are unable to find reason for alarm - suspect that batteries in alarm - you have replaced batteries - 1132

11:37:41 OP1 Matt WU2 Firecom South West WU2 - Firecom SW WU2 - WU2 back on station - WU2 back on station - 1132

11:37:41 OP2 Gina personal call Firecom south west 314Alpha - Firecom SW 314A, code 5 - 314A code 5 - 1136

11:37:24 OP1 Matt Capt Mason (Oakley) QFR Matt - Matt Rodney how are you mate - its mate now you doing - no too bad , they just thought that I would let you know . we just heard from the Oakley police out on that job - yes - they are apparently letting water go out of Cooty, no w I know that the army base has let everyone go home and they anticipate that water to be down in about 12 hours - ok - now if that happens we are already near at the 5 meter mark if we get more water through we have houses that will go under here ; if that happens it may not be too sure I am going to try and go round in a minute you will know the on the radio we are going to get a bit of fuel and in of the police and see if we have got any more info on it - too easy mate I if you do hear anything more just let us know - I will mate - and I will contact the ROC and let them know - so that is the creek that runs parallel to the Warrego -

11:48:45 OP1 Matt CS Hackett Matt Lindsey Hackett how are you - gday sir how are you - they the actual cut with the Cooty Dam being released , have we been talking to the Oakley Captain and letting him know what's happening - he was the one who informed us sir - on - we had a job and he met up with the Oakley police who told him - O Ok - that was his impression that he got from the copper , he's going to double check and get back to us - so if he can pass that information back to you for where we might have to respond something from this side obviously you know if they are going to cut out there , as long as you guys are over it mate fine - he's call back and confirm and we will let you know as well , we have checked the Starwax website and Cooty is at 124% - yeh yeh - its actual 1162 if the combined dam levels - good well hopefully they will get rid of some of those water restrictions then - the one that's short is Cressbrook cos precipitation is over 100 too - yeh, how can it be over 100% -

11:48:36 OP2 Gina
11:52:37 OP2 Gina 321B
11:53:28 OP1 Matt 31A
11:57:23 OP1 Matt 311K

12:02:20 OP1 Matt Scept Lewis (Kilamey)

12:12:02 OP2 Gina Ingo Fehner (goodwind)

12:12:04 OP1 Matt Applethorpe 51
12:17:35 OP2 Gina Capt Lewis (Kilamey)
12:25:15 OP2 Gina 321B (Warwick)
12:26:32 OP2 Gina Brett (Tara)

portable 311K - Firecom SW portable 311K - crew of 311K away from vehicle available on portable radio over -
Firecom SW 321B - Firecom SW 321B - 321B mobile town area - 321B - mobile town area - 1152
Firecom 311A over - Firecom South West 311A - Firecom 311A returns to station 11 over - 311A returned to station 1155
Firecom South West 311K - Firecom South West 311K - Comms 311K business complete mobile to station 11 - 311K business complete mobile to station 11 1157

O the S. Rescue Matt - Matt Bruce Lewis Kilamey here - gday mate how are you - good thanks , Matt the bridge here is holding steady at about 4.5 we have still got a good meter before it goes over the bridge , still open through the town here - are you expecting more or - well it could do depends , we had a bit of a lift in the weather here at the moment but if it comes it will come - I can tell you mate we are looking at the BOM website and it is going to be us in the next hour or so a major storm - tracks at Kilamey - that will go from Toowoomba all the way down , you will probably catch the fringe of that will still be reasonably bad - yes - any way I'll keep in touch or just give us a ring on the mobile anyway and I'll keep you - no worries mate you let Hemmo know - yes I have , I haven't let him know the height but I had a good yarn to Hemmo this morning and told him what I was going to do so if it looks like going over the bridge I will be taking the appliance to the south side of Kilamey - no fair enough mate - and hopefully Warwick can get to the side if it goes to that .

but we can come back if we can but we can't - would you know the main bridge over Warwick near the Soccer Club do you have to go over that to get to Kilamey - the Mason Bridge - I don't know the name - the real big one over the Condamine - yes - yes let me ask for a minute , yes - so they would have to cross that to get to Kilamey - yeh - because that one is looking at going under as well - I reckon Warwick is going to really cop it to be honest with you because this water is staying at a constant level for a long time , usually for us an down fairly quickly this been not just staying up , we are in for quite a bit - would say - what about the Starthorpe to you - no I couldn't tell you anything about Starthorpe - but can they get through is there a road that goes from Starthorpe to Kilamey - yes there is a back road - isn't pretty shabby - yes its gravel a fair bit of it , no look I couldn't tell you for sure , Matt they might be able to get through but I couldn't tell you for sure - Ok Mate well let us know - yes if it's for sure it is going close to the bridge - an if you want to update Hemmo as well because we will probably want to put something in action now - night - ops like I said if that Warwick bridge gets cut they won't be able to get to you - an d they might have to start looking at Starthorpe or maybe even one of the SE ones down Cunningham Gap - yes - it might have to be one of them because Clifton and Allora are copping it as well - yes well - usually bring a spare vehicle out there and put on the north side of town , but its Inst George apparently - yes it would be - we are sort of stashed there - I don't know who else would get to us to be honest with you but anyway I'll ring him and let him know how things are going good Matt - cheers Bruce - talk to you tomorrow , bye - - - - -

Firecom SW this is Gina - Hi Gina its Jeff Fehner again - yes - 1054 is now in Malmesbury Station - ok - and will be 344A - ok - so we have got 1096 as 341A - yeh - and do you know what , sorry - the number is - 490 yes we have got 490 as 210 - well its actually the charlie pump - ok , I'll make that the charlie then - well it should always be the charlie it responses , its not actually a spare - yeh ok cool - and 908 is now on its way to Brisbane - I've got 809 - thats close enough - ok cool fantastic , thank you for that - cheers - bye

Firecom SW this is Applethorpe 51 over - Firecom SW Applethorpe 51 - Applethorpe 51 code 5 - Applethorpe 51 code 5 1212
OFS this is Gina - Gina its Bruce Lewis Kilamey Station here - good thank you how are you - er , I'm good thanks , Gina the road between Kilamey & Warwick is closed - OK - yeh - ok not a problem its let them know - night - not a problem , thanks for calling bye - bye
Firecom SW 321B - Firecom SW 341B - Comms 321B back in station over - 321B back at station 12:25
OFRS this is Gina - hi Gina its Brett from Tara Fire Brigade here - how are you g-day - not too bad , just a bit of a road update in case you haven't caught up - sure - um , our local police has just come back from Dalby and its now shut because the water is going over Lourens Bridge - and so that's between - Dalby & Tara - yep - just out of Dalby there , Lourens Bridge - yep - its about a foot over it now and rising fast since he went down - yep - so um - yes well they are expecting to go under today , well they should be under by now usually - yeh, yeh, so I just thought you could easily ring up and ask whats happening so I just thought I'd get in first this time , Tara
Chinchilla road is closed , theres a metre of water over the bridge there - yes - on the Condamine River , we can still get through from Goondi at the present moment , and Condamine they said ,

Condamine township will probably be out about now from the bridge again - ok , Condamine township , isolated , from you ? - well they said the bridge should be out , probably an hour and half ago , so should be nearly out about now I'd say , but don't confirm about that one - yes - need find out where they turn appliances to & from , so Dalby's out , Chinchilla's out , Mearns with caution - yep - Goondi sort of open at the present moment - just a moment - Firecom SW 344A - 344A mob town area for fuel - 344A returning town area - well thats about it to the present moment - thanks - bye -

12:28:45 CP2 Gina Capt Mason Oakley Station
 Gina - Rodney how are you - good thank you - how are you - just a bit more info in regards Cooby Dam - yes, what did you and our - Sgt Cook from Oakley has been in touch with some-one, yep they dont plan to open the gates. - ok - as running about half meter over the spill way at the moment, its stopped about half meter so it was originally about a meter, we are starting to drop a bit here but it that water is still to some we will probably see it at about 6 o'clock tonight or something like that, at the stage they are not planning to open the gates up at all. - OK cool I was just looking at the Toowoomba Regional Web site and at the stage Cooby is at about 12.0% - yep - yep ok - cool - so at this stage the water is still flowing over, there is a big storm, well a bit of a storm, about to hit Toowoomba so that will, hit you guys as well probably. - yes this night and if there is any run off from the Toowoomba side that will back out creek up to wall - so when you were saying this morning that there is a chance that you might get isolated, is that going to happen. - still dont know - still dont know - yep - its all going to depend on how much rain we have - yep - ok cool, not a problem, thats fine, just keep us up-dated with what you know and - yep - thanks for that Rodney - OK Gina - see you - bye

12:30:20 CP2 Gina 314A
 12:34:32 CP2 Gina to TRC
 There is some 5250 mega litres on its way to Oakley. - that's a ridiculous amount of water and there is not a dam thing we can do to stop it, so, look out Oakley, here it comes. - OK that ridiculous - thank you - OK that may have some bearing on what other people have to do to deal with the flooding. - Yes, no - we are just trying to get prepared, because if it does all come down into Oakley than it must cut Oakley township over - look out Esk - yep? so is your prediction is there a chance that Crestbrook, coz its only at 92% isn't it, 94 - 94 - thats at 9am this morning - right - do you know what it was at 9am yesterday morning? - no - 82% - wow, thats ridiculous - it came up 32.2% overnight - wow, so don't go to Esk - look out Esk - right, no no that's not in my area - OK thanks very much for that Mark - OK, have fun, bye

12:34:00 CP1 Mark Firecom North Coast
 personal call to North Coast

12:44:42 CP1 Mark 14 to Mason
 Hi Hello Rodney speaking - M Yeah mate Matt from Firecom - R Yeah mate - M Well we were just speaking to the council regarding this Cooby Dam thing and TRC and they're actually saying there's no actual gate - said no gates that open to Cooby Dam it just naturally overflows and then goes - R That's what I thought - M Yeah and they've estimated 5 and a half thousand megalitres has overflowed and is heading your way - R Is heading our way - M Yep - R Right but we haven't got that yet - M No no it as you said before the peak around 10 pm tonight - R Oh right so that's correct - Matt Yep - R Right too easy - M So um I've...the ROCC knows about everything and I believe they're sort of looking at putting a plan in place in terms of where to put the truck and all that sort of stuff - R Right - M Its just that you're out off in between between you and Dobby - R Yep - M is cut off and I understand the reason is actually on the eastern side of the creek - R We are yeah - M So I think, don't quote me on that, but I think the plan is to move the truck to the western side and then we back up with a Toowoomba truck to the eastern side - R mmm - M So...because we know that um its cut at Jondaryan the Warrego's cut at Jondaryan and Jandowae can't get through either - R Well where do they think its going to cut in Oakley? M - They estimate its going to cut in Oakley? M - They estimate basically in the town in half - R Yeah, out of - M At the creek - R Yeah but if it doesn't go over the bypass we can access the other side of town via the bypass - M The bypass is...um...which part is that? - R The Oakley bypass - M On the actual Warrego bypass - R Yeah - M Oh okay - R The bridge there is higher than the outcrop in town - M Oh okay right - R mmm - M So alright. How much will it take to cut that bridge? - R Oh fuck I've never seen it, we've never had a flood since it's been there mate - M An okay right - R Its take a bit of water but if they're talking that much water then yeah, it could be a fair bit. M Yeah a warn from Crestbrook went from 82 to 94% in the last 24 hours - R Apparently Perseverance is overflowing - M Sorry? - R Perseverance is overflowing into Crestbrook - M Yep and obviously Crestbrook um Cooby is overflowing and we're just looking at the website now and there's a massive damn coil heading our way - R Yeah right - M Yeah so its all bad news - R Yeah alright right they'll let us know I'm sure - M Yeah but if anything else changes keep us in the loop - R yeah will do buddy: thanks - M Righto mate talk to you later - R scaya mate bye

12:47:56 CP2 Gina Wayne W (ROCC)
 Toowoomba ROC, Wayne speaking - Hi Wayne its Gina from Firecom how are you - good - just an update on the water out at Oakley - yes - with Cooby Dam, I've rang the Council and there's actually any gates on Cooby, they can't stop it they can't slow it if they get over 100% what ever goes over that 100% is going to flow over at whatever rate - yes thats what we thought so thanks for backing that up for us - so its at 124% now - which means that its well over the top & spilling everywhere - well he also said that at 9am yesterday it was at Crestbrook was at 82% its currently at 94% this morning at 94% - and Perseverance is already over - its at 107 - so 94% and Crestbrook, well that will be 100 by now for sure - you know that without any of this rain - that was at 9am this morning so anything over that is going to flow down in to Esk - correct, thats down the bottom - that's not our problem but I think that we should probably be aware - talk to the SE ROC and let them know as I think they may want to consider that at this stage - yes because of your pot - if looking at the BOM

12:48:44 OP1 Matt H DeVries
M Queensland Fire and Rescue Matt - H Must how you going its Hermito again. Just to annoy you, I've got to put in an outage on my sat phone - M Oh okay sure - H It's been giving me the shits for a week and I thought I better do something about it since its Monday. M Yeah okay one sec... (interrupted)

12:51:42 OP2 Gino CO Harris
James speaking- hey James its Gino... since you are not moving house are you actually available - not really - no - no sorry - no that's ok - are you going to be available tomorrow (because there's a chance that Jodie wont be able to come in - to come in because Jodie's flooded in today - hang on - can I ring you back this afternoon - I'm at work at the moment - yes thats ok no no its not that anyone's asked about tomorrow - its just that Tom D has asked for someone for now and I thought that I would see you up for tomorrow in case Jodie can't come in - I will email you when I get home right thanks Gino - Bye

12:53:49 OP2 Matt CO Connor
D Hello - M Dear Matt how are you - D Yeah good Matt how are you? M Yeah good hey you want to come into work? - D well I'm working at the moment what time when after two thirty to see how you're going or what do you want to do? - M yeah okay - D Yeah I'm working with some people here - M yeah no worries - D So then I can give you a ring we'll probably just get one of the full timers in - D All right no worries I'll give you a ring to see how you're going anyway. I'll send you a text message and let you know. D Okay thanks Matt - M All right cheers - D Bye

12:55:56 OP1 Matt Kato
M Queensland Fire and Rescue Matt - N Matt Neil Kelso from the ROCC how you going? M Good mate now you going? - N Good mate from AC Dunroon - M Yeah mate - N Herd like to activate or stand up Oakley and Pittsworth auxiliary - H Okay - N Uhh in case people get trapped at home we want to bring them into the station - M right - N Okay so I can say what, how are you guys do it, its basically the auxiliary crews are to man the station - M right and how long is that for do you know? - N Ah probably until the current expires the Tom how long - AC Ah 4 hours - N 4 hours at least - M okay no worries - N All right so Oakley and Pittsworth we'll activate them, I'll call the captain and find out exactly who they want - N yeah and just in case they get trapped in their own homes and can't make it to the station - M yep - N you right with that? - M Yep too easy. You just happy with single crew at each station? - N Single?? crew at each station you - M too easy Neil - N good on ya mate - M Thanks mate - N Thanks mate - M Bye

12:57:59 OP1 Matt Oakley Mason R Here Rodney speaking - M Yeah Pod Matt from Firecom - R Yeah mate - M Matta Tom's just called us - R Yep - M And he wants a crew to standby at station at Oakley - R Right can you just get the pages off them mate? - M I can mate do you just want me to put on the pager just single crew required? Will they no who it is or - R No they won't - M just fire in best dressed? - R Just send it and I'll sort it out when they get here. - M Okay no worries mate - R Or I can ring around actually cause I've got...they're crazy just leaving so I can ring them up myself - M okay if you want to do that mate let us know - R And I'll let you know as soon as I'm crewed. - M He basically just wants one crew to standby in case people can't get to station - R Yep yep - M all right mate - R Yep yep - M talk to you later - R right bye

12:59:10 OP2 Matt Moira Radel personal call

13:02:56 OP2 Gina personal call - re rental reference

13:14:14 OP2 Matt Ian Burden M - Giddy Ian how are you mate - I yeah good mate how are you - M yeah good it's a bit damp up here hoy - I Hey I just ring I was talking to some guys at Stanthorpe and the Carnarvon Bridge is just about to go over - M Okay yep - I Now we've got some lines on each side of town there and I just think that maybe you can get the pager off and get a truck on the other side of that bridge - M yeah okay so are both trucks on the north side are they? - I yeah yeah. If you get Tommy Durn or someone cause he's got a pretty big shed so at his place maybe they could put the truck up at his house or something like that - M Tommy Durn, alright - I yeah or even at the hospital or the ambulance station. That should be right on that side of the creek than - M okay-doke no worries mate. Does Herping know about this? - I no I haven't asked to him yet but we're just going back to the station now and I'll let you know what's happening if you like - M so you're in Warwick you're on shift today aren't you? - I Yeah I'm on shift today yep so I'll be in a couple of minutes - M All right, so if you want to let him know I'll let the ROCC know.

Do you just want me to set off the pagers and ask for a crew or - I yeah just set off the pagers and when they get there just let them know what's going on and get a few of them to get their gear and put on Charlie and take Charlie across the river. - M I'd just put on there require crew made up of southside Stanthorpe firefighters - I yep - M to man Charlie and move it to south side of town. - I yep that'd be good - M okay - I okay good on you mate - M too easy mate - I thank you bye

13:16:47 OP2 Gina Permit to Burn Carrooked - M/Merman - not relevant or related to weather event

13:20:35 OP2 Gina crew of 5 over, roger that station 14 manned with a crew of 5 at 13:20. (Oakley) Ok Fire & Rescue this is Gina - Gina Capt Huggins Pittsworth - just one moment please . won't be a moment. crew of 5. Ok no problem. so you guys are ready to standby at station you got a crew more - yep - fantastic - what are we standing by for - for all the rain that is currently falling out of my sky - so how many have we got at 13 or 14? - no we are 13 - 13 cool, how many people sorry - well there's 4 so far, more coming in - the AC has just asked, well however long the pagers, there's one big storm cell coming in there's just so much water every where - that all right I just want to know so I can answer the 50 questions I am going to get and you have just answered them - thank you - thank you - bye

13:24:44 OP2 Gina Aux FF Stanthorpe 1 000 ref incident QFS-11-002733 2 QFS Comms QFS-11-002735 3 000 SE QFS-11-00235 QFRS this is Gina - hi this is Tony Zammit from Stanthorpe, you guys been talking to Ian Burden has getting you to send a truck to the south side of Stanthorpe - that is correct - just letting you know I am on the north side I won't be turning out to that one if you get any turnout just make sure you put which side for me to roll - has the truck gone - I don't know I am not at the station I have been talking to Ian and told him the bridge is about to go over - yep yep - so that's why he organised to get a truck over the other side - just if we get call make sure you put it on the north side so I know I need to roll - yep not a problem - ok mate thanks - bye -
1 000 caller from 15 Morril Street Highfields - water flooding into house - has handicapped daughter - req assistance. - advised will get SES to help. 2 OPS Comms - Req where Swift water crew whereabouts - has person with disability in flood situation. 134 Post Office Rd Ravensbourne 3 000 emergency Upper Murphys Creek Rd drove through the water MCFD and Thomas Rd - car - white commodore elderly lady in car. water is getting higher - water coming into the car. SES call centre - cannot respond to incident in Highfields. Darren fm M/Merman - req change to pager message

13:24:48 OP2 Mat Chris Winney
 M Queensland Fire and Rescue Matt - C Matt to Chris Winney from Stanthorpe how you going mate - M gidley mate how you doing? - C Good. You need Charlie attend do you? - M We do mate. We were just speaking to Ian Bamford whose on shift in Warwick um what he needs basically is Charlie moved to the southside apparently there's the Cameron bridge - C Cameron bridge it about to out - M yeah he wants Charlie moved to the south side um - C Okay mate - M and apparently there's just hanging on... you speaking to Stanthorpe? Your not? Okay um ... yeah apparently one of the guys owns a shed on some high ground on the south side of town - C Yep

C Okay mate - M and apparently there's just hanging on you speaking to Stanthorpe? Your not? Okay um ... yeah apparently one of the guys owns a shed on some high ground on the south side of town - C Yep - M You know who that's? - C It could either be probably Tom Dunn I'd say would be who you were referring to. Tom Dunn yes - M What he wants basically if you pick a crew of four who live on the south side - C Yep I know of 3 - M Okay - C Yep - M Um or at least people who have access to it - C Yep - M Check their gear on the truck and put the truck at somewhere where it will safe on the southside - C all right mate - M and if we do a turnout we'll just say turnout north or south - C okay mate I'll give Paul?? a ring up and see what firefighters I can scratch for this side - M okay okay mate - C Thanks mate bye - M Cheers mate - C I'll give you a call back bye

13:26:58 OP1 Matt EMO:
 13:28:00 EMO 02: to Jay - M Yeah gidley mate Matt from Firecom in Toowoomba - J Gidley - M Mate we just had a 000 from a resident in Highfields whose got water backing up over the road and into her garage - J okay mate - M she has a handicapped daughter - J okay - M and would like some assistance I believe with evacuation either sandbagging of her residence - J okay mate yes - M are you able to assist with that? - J ah yeah mate our SES crews are flat chat at the moment but leave me with it give me the details we'll email it through and I can pass it on - M if you can just hold the line for one sec Jay I'll 7777 and just ask the call taker - J good on ya - M you there mate? - J yes - M it is evacuation its not life threatening at this stage

J yep so I'll pass that through to the SES - M how soon do you reckon you'd be able to respond - J Mate ah I'm not sure at this stage, I'll get in contact with the local controller and pass on its urgency - M okay - J Mate ah hopefully not too long at all if he can put sandbagging jobs on hold and get a crew out there - M ah well if you can ring us back and let us know if you want us to respond - J okay mate no worries - M Because we'll probably have a ten minute ETA - J sure mate no worries right and if you can give me a contact number mate - M Yep, 6638 - J 4638 - M 7204 - J 7204 I'll call the controller now and call you back - M Thanks mate bye - J Thanks mate bye - Queensland Fire and Rescue Matt

13:28:00 OP1 Matt Jack Kimberfeldt
 [REDACTED]

13:33:40 OP1 Matt Mark
 13:34:06 OP1 Matt SE Firecom
 13:35:15 OP2 Gina Str 42
 13:35:15 OP1 Matt Str 11
 13:35:42 OP1 Matt Str 11

[REDACTED]

13:36:51 OP1 Wally Fye
 13:37:02 OP2 Gina ref inc QF3-17-002738
 13:38:51 OP1 Matt Police:
 13:39:12 OP1 Matt
 13:39:52 OP2 Gina QFS-11-002742

adv crews resping to Murphy's Creek swift water rescue - and alarm at St Andrews OPS Comms - have 4 persons on roof at McCormack Street, Spring Bluff.
 000 - Hoberton Street - person has driven through water and is stuck - fast flowing water - just one car. Water coming up very quickly. Chris Winney from Stanthorpe confirming fr 13:36:51 people on roof at Murphy's creek, 10 McCormack personal call
 000-Wilson - Hoberton St - water coming through the house - wife disabled can't get her out. OPS - Swift water crew 2002? - no gone down the hill 000 - Hoberton St person on roof of car - water rising car about to float away. 000 car in Hoberton St in water. Kalia - Flow AC Dawson, stand by Highfields to station, single crew, owners advised water through house and poses evacuation in Highfields.

13:41:39 OP1 Matt Crighton
 hello - Criley Matt - yeh - I've got 3 swift water rescues just dropped in - fair dinkum - got two at Murphy's Creek, they can probably do one and then the other - yeh - and then I've got one other at Hoberton Street, Newcom - oh, righto, who have you got, the two guys at Murphy's Creek, is there two in the on spot there are there? - there's a car in water and there are people on the roof of their house - righto Murphy's Creek - yeh we got Kilo Alpha, Helidon & Ipswich going to the car first - yep - and once they do that I am going to do the house - you happy with that - yes, so the one in the car, that's the first one that came through? yes - so the ones on the house, they're out of the water - hold on Criley hold on
 Firecom 311A turning out life rescue - Murphy's creek road cross reference Ogdon St best access New England Highway can you notify senior on call - roger 311A senior already notified 1340 - so they are coming out - yep good, they will go to the house after that - 311Y turning out life rescue 1341

got 311Y going to that as well which I imagine is the 2 swift water guys on shift - good well they should have hopefully got it out I - sorry wasn't talking to you mate, which you was that - will they be able to get to these jobs to start with that's the issue - main issue yes, look are you happy with that I've really got to go. I'll get on to a third crew for you now Matt, yeh Holberton till get them to go to ?? and get them. to get in touch with you. - I've got to go - Firecom this is WT12 - who is senior on call - WT12 senior on call is MBO Goodman available at the ROC - affirmative - 1342

13:42:25 OP1 Matt OAS
 13:43:24 OP1 Matt 311A
 car in water in Holberton St - OAS unable to proceed, have patient on board, req Downes & Lockyer map reference - to St Comms - cancel SE Swift water response -not req for Murphys Creek 312A - diverting to help at to try to get in St Andrews - 312A - contact St Andrews check status of alarm - water flooding - north - 311A major flooding Rutland & Nth OAS - re Holberton Rd Car - 000 Roschale Rd Caberzati - houses flooded - water gushing through houses is Kelli in - on my way to Firecom - Stn 17 standby at station advised we are really busy - will call back

13:44:10 OP2 Gina
 13:46:15 OP1 Matt MRC
 13:46:08 OP2 Gina QFRS Meds
 13:46:52 OP1 Matt W Rye
 Wally we have got the swift water rescue I told you about in Murphys Creek Road which is a car in water, we've sent everything to K 11A, Y, K plus W from Ipswich & another Y and all that sort of shit, there is a separate one with people on the roof of a house in McCormack Drive in Murphys Creek as well, now they are trying to send - 311A Firecom SW - just hold on Wally - interrupted - sorry S - I'll come over (Wally) - Ok check plans - Firecom 311A, we can not proceed to this incident - we have - major flooding over New England Highway cross of Griffith Street can you respond 317A and advise SE of this incident over - Roger 311A unable to proceed - major flooding over New England Highway reponding 317A 1346. Firecom Matt - yes Matt Dave here (Capt Highfields station) what have we got mate - yeh mate - very sorry - swift water rescues down Murphys creek road & Thomas Road - Just heard Lima is blocked as well so we will be on our own? - no backing up with Holberton and Ipswich - Ok mate - so Murphys Creek road and Thomas Road - thats right - on our way - thank you - bye -

Firecom SW 317A - Firecom SW 317A - 317A turning out crew 1 & 4 Capt Lethbridge to Murphys Creek car Murphys Creek rd & Thomas Road - 317A turning out crew 4 - who have you got - I want to speak to her - put her on hold yeh getting 000 - Vicki (RSS) mags whats happening? - W just wondering have you turned out 317A yet - yeh no whats happening is 311A & Y can't get through - o - they can't get through to the other one? we have 2 at Murphys Creek - OK - we've got Murphys Creek road & Omas Drive and then 10 McCormack Drive Murphys Creek - Yes I understand that - on OK - I've spoken to my swift water techs and I explained it of you before, we don't have enough guys to do both so we are going to do the car first at Murphys Creek and Thomas and then McCormack - OK - So I've sent - I have just dispatched 317A to Murphys Creek Road & Thomas - on have you - ours are still on the other job for some reason - OK - OK thank you - bye - Firecom SW 325C stand by

13:47:05 OP2 Gina
 13:50:14 OP1 Matt
 000 Holberton Rd - person in waist deep water can't see him now - not sure if he reached dry land or not.
 311A 311K 311Y turnout to 10 life threatening water rescue Holberton St, 312A what is location - duck Tor & Bridge still attempting to turn around, attempting to gain access to St Andrews - 311Y major flooding bottom of range water over 4 lanes of highway - req QFRS while attempting to get to Holberton Smith & 2 Aus avail to respond from 12 (Wensley
 Firecom SW WUS - Firecom SW WUD - WUS proceeding to stan 11 swift water rescue over - WUS proceeding stan 11 swift water rescue 1407.
 From AC Dawson stand up Millerran & logchwood at station
 req approval to respond - approved W Rye
 crew standing by at station
 Burrows & McCarron self mobilized (vehicles floating in Kitchener rd)
 req helicopter - persons unreachable due to height and speed of water

1355 OP1 Matt WT12
 1407 OP1 Matt WUS (S Lange)
 1405 OP2 Gina Kelso
 1408 OP2 Kelli Burrows
 1409 OP4 Kelli Millerran
 1417 OP1 Matt 311K
 1426 OP1 Matt James St Control

TIME Logger ref Comms Officer FROM
 South West Region, QFRS - Information retrieved from voice logger tapes for January 10th 2011
 COMMENTS

1443 OP4 Kelli Dept main roads
 1446 OP4 Kelli FF Frame
 1449 OP2 Gina AC Dawson
 1501 OP2 Gina Bradlow
 1508 OP4 Kelli WTI
 1511 OP4 Kelli Stanthorpe
 1517 OP4 Kelli Ziemerle
 1520 OP1
 Warrego - range - closed in both directions
 responding to station - unable to get through water - working in area of Chalk Street, keeping kids out of the water. Avail to assist on north side
 2 helicopters have been dispatched. Arrived at sta 30 mins - one for obs & one for rescue ops
 so we need staff - Rye advised report to stan 12
 Matt Kendall, Rankine & Marshall (from Stn 17) avail - to respond
 Dam has burst - most roads flooded - except main highway
 avail to respond - Rye advised go to station
 Gavin Taylor - self responded to Firecom

National Direct


"TCB-7"

Seq	Date	Time	Origin	Number dialled	Rate	Min/sec	\$.
193	08 Jan	01:32pm	Gatton	[REDACTED]	ET	3:03	0.49
194	08 Jan	01:38pm	Grantham	[REDACTED]	ET	1:18	0.20
195	08 Jan	04:54pm	Gatton	[REDACTED]		0:36	0.20
196	08 Jan	04:56pm	Grantham	[REDACTED]		18:53	6.04
197	09 Jan	11:00am	Grantham	[REDACTED]	T	8:39	1.08
198	10 Jan	08:21am	Grantham	[REDACTED]	T-WANNE WALTSOHL	3:57	0.63
199	10 Jan	08:30am	Gatton	[REDACTED]	T DRO SER	4:43	0.78
200	10 Jan	10:57am	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- EX. ASSISTANT	7:15	0.10
201	10 Jan	11:09am	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Firecom	0:37	0.20
202	10 Jan	12:32pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Employee Rel.	0:30	0.16
203	10 Jan	12:50pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Firecom	1:09	0.36
204	10 Jan	12:58pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	T-AREA 1 COMMANDER	1:54	0.31
205	10 Jan	12:59pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	T-AREA 2 COMMANDER	1:50	0.29
206	10 Jan	01:53pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Firecom	0:48	0.26
207	10 Jan	01:54pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	?	0:20	0.05
208	10 Jan	01:56pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- DRO	1:28	0.24
209	10 Jan	02:02pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Bob Bundy	3:49	0.61
210	10 Jan	02:08pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]		0:20	0.05
211	10 Jan	02:17pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- AREA 1 COMMANDER	1:35	0.25
212	10 Jan	02:25pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Ian Mitchell	2:33	0.41
213	10 Jan	02:29pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- AREA 2 COMMANDER	0:23	0.08
214	10 Jan	02:31pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- AREA 1 COMMANDER	0:15	0.04
215	10 Jan	02:32pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- DRO	0:48	0.13
216	10 Jan	02:40pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- DRO	0:30	0.08
217	10 Jan	02:44pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Ian Mitchell	1:09	0.18
218	10 Jan	02:47pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Bob Bundy	0:05	0.02
219	10 Jan	02:49pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Firecom	0:29	0.15
220	10 Jan	02:51pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	0:30	0.08
221	10 Jan	02:55pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- DRO	0:44	0.12
222	10 Jan	02:58pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	A.C. Police	0:54	0.14
223	10 Jan	03:08pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	COMM. MANAGER	1:52	0.10
224	10 Jan	03:09pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Bob Bundy	1:02	0.33
225	10 Jan	03:11pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Ian Mitchell	4:08	0.67
226	10 Jan	03:17pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	1:12	0.19
227	10 Jan	03:19pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Ian Mitchell	0:24	0.08
228	10 Jan	03:21pm	MessageBank	[REDACTED]	A.C. Rural	1:47	0.29
229	10 Jan	03:35pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	0:51	0.13
230	10 Jan	03:39pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	EA	1:47	0.10
231	10 Jan	03:48pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Patricia Taylor Hill	1:12	0.19
232	10 Jan	04:00pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	2:28	0.40
233	10 Jan	04:04pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	A.C. Rural	2:44	0.44
234	10 Jan	04:23pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	DRO	0:19	0.05
235	10 Jan	04:29pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	DAISY HILL FAMILY	1:40	0.53
236	10 Jan	04:35pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Jan 12	0:03	0.02
237	10 Jan	04:35pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	DRO	2:48	0.44
238	10 Jan	04:39pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	Kevin Tomboyn	2:07	0.34
239	10 Jan	04:42pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	1:54	0.31
240	10 Jan	04:58pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	AREA 1 COMMANDER	1:24	0.22
241	10 Jan	05:00pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	- DRO	2:20	0.37
242	10 Jan	05:04pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	A.C. Rural	1:47	0.29
243	10 Jan	05:07pm	Harristown	[REDACTED]	DRO	0:57	0.15
244	10 Jan	06:42pm	Toowoomba S	[REDACTED]	DRO	1:07	0.10
245	10 Jan	06:48pm	Toowoomba S	[REDACTED]	AREA 3 COMMANDER DAVEY	1:34	0.25
246	10 Jan	06:49pm	Toow'ba Sth	[REDACTED]	COMM. MANAGER	0:45	0.10
247	10 Jan	06:54pm	Toowoomba	[REDACTED]	AREA 3 COMMANDER	1:35	0.26
248	10 Jan	06:58pm	Toowoomba	[REDACTED]	A.C. Rural	2:08	0.34
249	10 Jan	07:03pm	Toowoomba	[REDACTED]	IRECOM	1:05	0.34

National Direct

Seq	Date	Time	Origin	Number dialled	Rate	Min/Sec	\$
250	10 Jan	07:09pm	Toowoomba		-DRO	1:47	0.29
251	10 Jan	07:12pm	Mt Lofty		-DRO	0:44	0.12
252	10 Jan	07:14pm	Mt Lofty		AREA 3 COMMANDER	2:51	0.45
253	10 Jan	07:26pm	Toow'ba CBD		MRT	0:50	0.14
254	10 Jan	09:48pm	Harristown		Storer Service	2:42	0.43
255	10 Jan	10:44pm	Harristown		Pen Mitchell	8:59	1.43
256	11 Jan	05:33am	Harristown			2:17	0.37
257	11 Jan	08:00am	Harristown			1:48	0.29
258	11 Jan	08:28am	Harristown			0:45	0.12
259	11 Jan	09:02am	Harristown			0:45	0.12
260	11 Jan	10:39am	Harristown			2:46	0.10
261	11 Jan	11:14am	Harristown			4:04	0.65
262	11 Jan	11:31am	Harristown			0:21	0.05
263	11 Jan	11:33am	Harristown			2:03	0.33
264	11 Jan	11:39am	Harristown			0:21	0.06
266	11 Jan	11:53am	Harristown			0:57	0.15
266	11 Jan	12:12pm	Harristown			0:23	0.06
267	11 Jan	08:20pm	Harristown			0:36	0.10
268	11 Jan	08:31pm	Harristown			1:26	0.45
269	11 Jan	08:06pm	Harristown			0:03	0.02
270	11 Jan	09:06pm	Harristown			0:52	0.27
271	11 Jan	09:10pm	Harristown			3:11	1.02
272	11 Jan	09:16pm	Harristown			3:45	0.60
273	11 Jan	09:23pm	Harristown			5:36	1.79
274	12 Jan	05:37am	Harristown			0:54	0.15
275	12 Jan	09:26am	Harristown			3:02	0.46
276	12 Jan	10:16am	Harristown			5:45	1.84
277	12 Jan	11:32am	MessageBank			1:32	0.25
278	12 Jan	11:51am	Galton			8:06	2.59
279	12 Jan	12:08pm	Galton			1:16	0.10
280	12 Jan	12:30pm	Galton			0:21	0.10
281	12 Jan	01:00pm	Galton			5:16	1.69
282	12 Jan	01:28pm	Mt Lofty			2:56	0.47
283	12 Jan	01:49pm	Mt Lofty			0:22	0.10
284	12 Jan	01:52pm	Mt Lofty			0:15	0.10
285	12 Jan	01:56pm	Mt Lofty			0:07	0.03
286	12 Jan	01:57pm	Mt Lofty			2:23	0.10
287	12 Jan	02:19pm	Mt Lofty			0:26	0.10
288	12 Jan	04:36pm	Harristown			2:16	0.10
289	12 Jan	04:52pm	Harristown			0:29	0.10
290	12 Jan	05:09pm	Toowoomba			0:17	0.10
291	12 Jan	05:39pm	Toow'ba Sih			0:49	0.13
292	12 Jan	06:17pm	Harristown			11:46	1.89
293	12 Jan	08:37pm	Harristown			1:06	0.35
294	13 Jan	07:04am	Harristown			3:48	0.81
295	13 Jan	07:09am	Harristown			0:48	0.12
296	13 Jan	08:01am	Toow'ba Sih			1:44	0.10
297	13 Jan	09:18am	Toow'ba Sih			1:45	0.10
298	13 Jan	09:37am	Mt Lofty			0:15	0.04
299	13 Jan	09:40am	Wilsonton			1:30	0.26
300	13 Jan	10:30am	Harristown			1:08	0.36
301	13 Jan	10:59am	Harristown			0:35	0.10
302	13 Jan	12:39pm	Mt Lofty			0:33	0.08
303	13 Jan	01:05pm	Highfields			0:15	0.04
304	13 Jan	01:42pm	Toowoomba			1:22	0.22
305	13 Jan	01:50pm	Toowoomba			0:36	0.10
306	13 Jan	02:04pm	Toowoomba			0:40	0.10

"TCD-8"



**SOUTH WESTERN REGION
SWIFTWATER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
FOR THE CITY OF
TOOWOOMBA**



- 1: **Aim & Objectives**
- 2: **Environment & Exposures**
- 3: **Mapping**
- 4: **Response & Safety**
- 5: **Management of Flood Incident**
- 6: **Tactical Considerations**
- 7: **Community Management – Public Relations & Information**
- 8: **Agency Contact details**
- 9: **Appendices:**
 1. **INC Directive** **24.1.5**
 2. **IAG** **3.4**
 3. **IAG** **3.5**
 4. **LAPs**

1: Aim and Objectives

The aim of this plan is to manage any swift water rescue response to the Toowoomba Command by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Swift-water Rescue Technicians, and other personnel. The objective of this plan is to provide a strategic level framework for the QFRS South Western Region to successfully plan, and manage any future swift water events within the Toowoomba Command. Additional Plans will be developed in the near future to achieve the same outcomes across all other Commands within South Western Region.

In addition, this plan will ensure the following;

- Ensure that QFRS make safe, communities within the Toowoomba and surrounding areas from potential future flood events.
- Rescue persons in flood waters as required.
- Support combatant agencies during, and after flood events as required.
- Operational Support to swift water response by effective Command, Control and Coordination.

2: Environment & Exposures

Toowoomba City is located on the escarpment, and is situated on the Western side of the Great Dividing Range approximately 700 metres above sea level. Given the terrain, the vast majority of the city drains to the west with the far eastern areas draining to the east over the escarpment. There are a number of ridges and valleys within the City which divide it into six distinct catchments. During the recent floods of January 2011, four of these catchments, East Creek, West Creek, Black Gully and Gowrie Creek were severely impacted by rapid floodwaters (Collins 2011). Refer Appendix 4

Creek Catchments

East Creek

- East Creek catchment area = 14,1km²
- Extends from the southern extents of the city north to the CBD and westwards from the Great Dividing Range to Middle Ridge.
- Steep side slopes with very high consequent flow velocities.
- Meets West Creek in the northern part of CBD and forms start of Gowrie Creek.
- 100% residentially and commercially developed
- 37% of area impervious (i.e. roads, roofs and other hard structures)
- Predominately owned by Council.

West Creek

- West Creek catchment area = 16.4km²
- Extends from the southern extents of the city north to the CBD and westwards from Middle Ridge to West Ridge.
- Flood mitigation ponds – Watch for multiple overflows
- Moderate steep slopes with very high consequent water velocities.
- 100% residentially and commercially developed
- 37% of area impervious (i.e. roads, roofs and other hard structures)
- Predominately owned by Council.

Black Gully

- Black Gully catchment area = 6.4km²
- Extends westwards from Gowrie Creek confluence at North Street to Toowoomba Airport.
- Moderate steep slopes with high consequent flow velocities
- 100% residentially and commercially developed in Eastern parts near Gowrie Creek.
- 32% of area impervious
- Owned by Council.

Gowrie Creek

- Gowrie Creek catchment area = 18.9km²
- East Creek and West Creek converge to the north (Ruthven & Chalk Drive) of the CBD and the catchment area of Gowrie Creek extends from this confluence northwards to the Wetalla Water Reclaiming facility.
- Steep side slopes with very high consequent flow velocities.
- 100% residentially and commercially developed
- 32% of area impervious
- Owned by private ownership.
- Gowrie Creek is crossed at 12 locations along its length with some structures only having moderate hydraulic capacity. Water inundation over some bridges is likely.
- Heavy tree growth – High Risk Rescues

Collins (2011) has identified the following types of flooding that can arise within Toowoomba from a number of differing sources. These being;

- When the natural capacity of the creek system is exceeded.
- When the capacity of the urban drainage infrastructure is exceeded.
- Intense rainfall over parts of the catchment which are impervious and/or saturated.

These can occur in isolation, or in combination. The nature of a flood is dependant on catchment characteristics, rainfall intensity and duration. A combination of these characteristics will result in a rapidly responding, highly damaging flood event. A Swift-water Rescue Response must be prepared prior to such events.

High Risk areas and Exposures

James & East Creek

- High frequency of motor inundation & High Risk Rescue

Long Street over East Creek @ Lake Annad

- High volume of water flow & high risk of vehicle inundation. High Risk Rescue.

Ruthven Street on East Creek

- Significant water flows downstream that will build in volume at Gowrie Creek Junction. CBD Properties will be affected. Queens Park and Chalk Drive will be severely affected.

James Street on West Creek

- Significant water flows downstream that will build in volume at Gowrie Creek Junction. CBD Properties will be affected particularly Herrles, Margaret, Dent Streets.

James Street on East Creek

- Significant water flows will build rapidly in volume and inundate James street intersection at Gowrie Creek Junction. Significant flooding of Properties.


Note: At the Junction of East Creek, West Creek, and Gowrie Creek during the floods of Jan 10th.2011, the greatest flooding width was 700m around the junction of the creeks. (ICA Hydrology Panel 2011)

3: Mapping

ICC Planning Officer (If appointed) should utilise TOM ,OpsMaps and importantly, LAP's to gain mapping information for crews on responding to Swift-water incidents. Senior Officers should utilise laptop computers with wireless capability to assist Command and Control of Incident. Frequent Situation Reports to Firecom will also assist in gathering intelligence on current flooding heights and locations. Crews **MUST** provide this type of intelligence back to Firecom

All departments and agencies must communicate if a weather event is imminent

Mapping of the Toowoomba – Gowrie Creek, Black Gull, East and West Creek system



Staging area locations

- City East Sector: - Queens Park car park, Lindsay Street
- Central Sector: - Kitchener St Station rear
- City West Sector: - Anzac Ave Station

Inter-sector Access routes, (minimal waterflow)

Central to City East sector:

- South on Ruthven St, east on Spring St then north along Rowbotham St

Central to City West sector:

- South on Ruthven St, west along Nelson St then north into West street.


4: Severe Weather Alert Level

SEVERE WEATHER ALERT LEVELS ACTIVATION TABLE

Severe Weather Alert Level

The Severe Weather Alert Level (SWAL) allows Regions to apply local knowledge to local conditions and to review resources in determining the appropriate SWAL and subsequent activation.

The decision process for determining the Severe Weather Alert Level (SWAL) is a combination of:



The Director of Regional Operations (DRO) will consult with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) before deciding on the Severe Weather Alert Level for a particular location within the Region or for the whole Region.

Severe Weather Alert Level Activation Table and Regional Chart

The Severe Weather Alert Level Regional Chart (over page) details the actions to be taken correlating to the Severe Wildfire Alert Level Activation table below as a guide;

Severe Weather Alert Level Activation Table for South West Region							
SEVERE WEATHER ACTIVATION ACTIVITIES - #							
ALERT LEVEL	Staff and Agencies	Weight of Initial Attack*	Region Reporting**	Resources Prepared	ICG	ROC	BOC
4	Notify and activate relevant staff and agencies	Recall All Swiftwater Rescue Personnel	AC/DRO liaise with DC	SW Rescue Teams/appliances and crews as per plan	Activated	Activated	Alert
3	Duty Officer to notify relevant staff and agencies	Recall All Swiftwater Rescue Personnel	AC/DRO liaise with DC	SW Rescue Teams/appliances and crews as per plan	Activated	Activated	Watching brief
2	Duty Officer to notify relevant staff & Agencies	2x additional SWR Personnel to duty	Duty Officer liaise with A/C & DRO	SW Rescue Teams/appliances and crews as per plan	Alert	Alert/Stand By	Watching brief
1	NORMAL BUSINESS = On Shift Swiftwater Rescue Personnel						

*Weight of initial attack: Regions should consider additional appliances based on the risk and available resources
 # These are the minimum activity requirements, Regions may increase these activity categories (columns) based on local conditions (but may not increase or decrease the Alert Levels 1 to 4)

CHARACTERISTICS OF SEVERE WEATHER ALERT LEVELS

LEVEL 1

Level 1 is normal operational business and conditions are such that it does not require any additional planning to cope with weather conditions.

LEVEL 2

Level 2 is when there is a moderate weather event predicted that may have an impact on regional operations. This should still include normal response protocols with a heightened awareness of weather predictions and the checking of equipment and resources in the region to ensure operational preparedness. Level 2 will require an increase to initial response and may also require additional resources to be brought up for duty.

LEVEL 3

Level 3 is when there is a predicted moderate to high weather event. This may be an isolated moderate to high impact event or it may be an event that is following a long period of rain resulting in the swollen creeks and waterways. All additional SWR resourcing will be needed to bring up for duty to manage the potential risk and it may also trigger a request for additional resources from other regions.

LEVEL 4

Level 4 is when there is a predicted extreme weather event (cyclone) or when there is a predicted high impact weather event following a long period of rain resulting in saturated ground and higher than normal levels in creeks, rivers and waterways. All additional SWR resourcing will be needed to bring up for duty to manage the potential risk and it may also trigger a request for additional resources from other regions.

NOTE

- 1) Predictable seasonal weather conditions and adverse weather events can be prepared for; however, close monitoring of daily weather patterns by all operational staff is essential in maintaining optimum operational preparedness and response.
- 2) All Firecom and operational staff are to be informed of any change in SWAL.
- 3) The decision to elevate or decrease the SWAL will be a judgement call by the Director of Regional Operations informed by previous events and rainfall, current local conditions, resources, and local knowledge.

5: Response & Safety

Flooding of a significant magnitude similar to the Jan 2011 floods will impact severely of the Toowoomba Community. Importantly, serious consideration must be given to QFRS response capability if similar flooding was to occur during night time operations.

ICC

At a SWAL 3 level, consider the activation of the Toowoomba Command ICC at the Toowoomba Command office, Philip St.


ROC

ROC Activation will occur immediately on BOM/EMQ warning of an impending significant weather event.

Swift-water Rescue response teams will be activated by Firecom. This request will be made by the Toowoomba Area Commander, Chief Superintendent or, Assistant Commissioner. The Technical Rescue Coordinator will also be notified to activate additional Swift-water Rescue teams for response.

Technical Rescue Coordinator will coordinate Swift-water Rescue Teams and equipment for QFRS Commander Deployment.

Initial response



On report of severe weather event with significant flooding

- 1: Immediate 2nd Alarm response by Firecom (*Consider upgrade to 3rd Alarm by Senior Officer and ensure that the operational response for Toowoomba is coordinated by a Senior Officer.*)
- 2: Group page of Senior Officers in Toowoomba area.
- 3: Technical Rescue (Swift-water) personnel response by Firecom
- 4: Consider request for additional Swift-water Technician and equipment response (Cannon Hill, Brisbane)
- 5: Consider additional response & support from Brisbane to reduce South West Regional response depletion.
- 6: Consider Sectorisation of Toowoomba, deploying additional Senior Officers to strategic locations where floodwaters are impacting to manage events within sector.
- 7: Consideration as to number of Level 1 Swiftwater personnel required.

NOTE: Response should consider route of QFRS appliances and support agencies depending on flood waters. Intelligence reports (Sitreps) to Firecom are vital for road closures and potential rescues. Utilise LAP's


NOTE: Toowoomba Police must be notified and of floodwater road closures and requests for attendance to reduce community driving through floodwaters.

Early warnings to notify the community will be achieved through the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ)

5: Management of Flood Incident

A catastrophic flood incident will be difficult to manage unless a coordinated effort between agencies is achieved. Queensland Police is the agency responsible for a flood event by legislative authority. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is a support agency only however, are the combatant agency for all swift water rescues.

The potential for community evacuation/relocation is very high and must be considered. Significant support from QPS, QAS, EMQ, SES and Toowoomba Regional Council will be required. The instigation of the Public Safety Preservation Act (PSPA) by QPS must be considered early.



- 1: Establishment a Control Point utilising Control Vehicle ASAP (If an ICC is utilised, refer to INCDIR 7.3 - ICC Activation Protocols **(NEW)**)
- 2: Activate the South West Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC) to provide Logistical Support. This will alleviate logistical workload from Firecom South West. Refer to INCDIR 7.2 - ROCC Activation Protocols **(NEW)**
- 3: All Senior Officers responded are to ensure they respond with TAC 'C' packs and laptop computers for operational support as per INCDIR 17.2 - Command and Control Kits.
- 4: A Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) liaison officer is appointed from QFRS to support external agency operations.
- 5: QFRS Senior Officer to act as Liaison Officer between QPS/QFRS operations within the QPS Major Incident Room (MIR) if activated.

Once Command has been established, the QFRS Fire Commander must;

- Establish rescue incident objectives.
- Determines appropriate strategy/strategies with Swift-water L2 Technician support (Operations)
- Develop the Incident Action Plan (IAP). Refer (IAG 3.5) **Swift-water Rescues**
- Obtain and assign appropriate resources.
- Assign specific objectives to tactical sectors.
- Predict outcomes for the incident.
- Continually size-up the incident and revise plans.
- Manage and liaise with other agencies involved.

QFRS Fire Commander Responsibilities

Due to the potential danger of these types of incidents, it is imperative that the first arriving appliance assumes Command of the Swift Water Incident as part of a major flood.

After assuming Command the Fire Commander must secure the Immediate area and assure that no civilians enter the water. Well intentioned, untrained civilians can quickly become victims. The Fire Commander (FC) must identify the problem and make a decision whether to operate in the rescue or recovery mode. If operating in the rescue mode, the FC with L2 Swift water Technician (Operations) should consider all of the potential hazards to rescuers and victims. The FC should consider the risk/benefit factor. A risk/benefit factor is a subjective decision that weighs the benefits of what is to gain versus what can be lost if the worst happens. If the benefit is high, and the risk to rescuers is low, FC should move forward with the action plan. If the risk is high to rescuers and the benefit is low, FC should discuss with the SWR team and develop an action plan to make recovery.

If the FC is operating in the rescue mode, a quick assessment of the hazards associated with the water must be made (i.e., speed, temperature, hydraulics, debris, and possible contamination). If the victim can be seen, FC should determine if the victim is in immediate life-threatening danger or is relatively safe and secure for the moment. If the victim is in immediate life-threatening danger, rescue must be quick.

6: Tactical Considerations

As per IAG 3.6 – Swift Water Rescue (Operations Doctrine) the following table provides a list of hazards and issues associated with swift water rescues that may influence tactical priorities:

Firefighter Safety and Operational Issues

- Personnel not trained or equipped to perform rescues safely.
- Structural firefighting gear being worn during rescue.
- Rescuer being secured by tying rope around waist as safety line.
- Debris being swept into rescue area.
- Risk of personnel being swept down stream and becoming a victim during rescue activities.
- Temperature of water - low temperature will restrict exposure time.
- Initiate IAP rapidly due to time restraints.
- Losing sight and position of casualty.
- Electrical hazards (e.g. powerlines being down in storm conditions).
- Double the water speed (e.g. quadruple the force exerted).
- Potential infections from water.
- SES flood boat crews operation.
- Unguarded propellers used on flood rescue boats.
- Rescuers being drowned by panicked casualty climbing on top of them.
- Low light conditions reducing visibility due to night time rescues and storms.
- Weather conditions (e.g. storm activity increasing or tidal effects).
- Immediate medical treatment required for casualty and possibly rescuer.
- Critical Incident stress affecting rescue personnel.
- Riverbanks becoming unstable and collapsing.

Community Safety and Environmental Concerns

- Confusion, panic and curiosity of members of the public trying to gain access and assist rescue.
- Additional rescue due to members of the public attempting rescues.
- Health and safety of non-QFRS support agencies involved in the incident.

7: Community Management – Public Relations & Information.

Queensland Police with the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) will assist in Community Management including the evacuation and relocation of residents

This is a vital consideration to the management of this incident.

Given the complexities and rapid escalation duration a significant storm/flood weather event, the management of effected communities will be required by agencies outside of QFRS operations. Communication to the public via the media is an important function. This will be done by Queensland Police Service.

The QFRS Media Unit may play a vital role in linking QFRS Intelligence with QPS media to highlight the activities of the QFRS throughout the community and to provide flood water warnings.

Importantly, QFRS may play an active part in assisting in the relocation of effected communities. This would be achieved by the utilisation of swift-water rescue team assistance, physically relocating flood affected residents via flood boats and inflatable work platforms.

A coordinated effort between QPS operations and QFRS Command is vital. Swift-water Rescue Teams must NOT act in a stand alone capacity to conduct such operations.

The QFRS Media Unit is located at the Emergency Services Complex, Kedron. Contact phone numbers are as follows:

- Manager: [REDACTED]
- Senior Me [REDACTED]
- Media Off [REDACTED]

Directive

As per Incident Directive 21.1, the QFRS Media Unit must be advised as soon as possible of any significant incidents.

24 hour on-call QFRS Media Officer - Pager No [REDACTED]

Direct phone (24 hrs) [REDACTED]

Firecom will contact and/or page the on-call Media Officer provide information as to QFRS response activities

8: Support Agency contact details

- **QPS, QAS, EMQ & Toowoomba Regional Council.**

Support agencies contact details will be provided through Firecom or the Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC when established). This will ensure agency and command protocols are not by-passed.

References

Collins, N. (2011), Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. Technical Report on the Toowoomba Floods of 10 January 2011. Local Government Association of Queensland, p.2.

Insurance Council of Australia, (ICA) 2011. The Nature of Causes of Flooding in Toowoomba 10th January 2011.

Appendix 1

Queensland Fire & Rescue Service Incident Action Guide 3.5 Swift Water Rescues

1. PURPOSE

(a) To provide information and guidance for swiftwater rescues.

1. APPLICATION

(a) Applies to fire officers who may respond to incidents involving swiftwater rescue.

1. PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING

(a) Fire officers are to receive appropriate training and maintain their competency before undertaking any swiftwater rescues. QFRS has three levels of training, swiftwater awareness, Level 1 Technician (dry rescue only) and Level 2 Technician (dry and wet rescue). Only Level 2 trained personnel are to enter the water. Refer also to Incident Directive 24.1.5.

(b) The Officer-in-charge should ensure that planning occurs for local response to a swiftwater rescue. This may be achieved by identifying potential rescue sites previous rescue sites and then identifying site risks and local procedures. Where sites have been identified, undertake familiarisation activities, including training and simulated exercises, to identify equipment required, natural anchors, access and site specific hazards. Plan access to potential sites taking into account road and bridge closures from flooding.

(c) Anticipate potential rescues by monitoring weather situations such as prolonged heavy rain, impending storm activities or flooding. Liaise with local State Emergency Service (SES) groups and Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) to promote interoperability for rescue operations. Ascertain what resources are available to assist within the area.

(d) When regional resources are unable to meet response demands due to the scale, intensity and duration of operations, assistance from other regions and/or the Special Operations Unit may be requested. Support for additional Level 2 swiftwater rescue technicians and resources (beyond regional capability) can be arranged by contacting the State Operations Coordination Centre and coordinated with the Special Operations Unit Duty Officer (refer Incident Directive 25.1). This may occur prior to a response to a swiftwater rescue incident, or to standby at areas identified as having a risk of a swiftwater rescue occurring.

(e) Fire officers must be aware of the importance these activities can have on familiarisation (e.g. hazard recognition and reinforcement of operational practices), and developing the Incident Action Plan (IAP) when an emergency does arise.

1. INCIDENT RESPONSE

4.1 Determine Tactical Response

(a) Each swiftwater incident presents many variables (e.g. risks, exposures, available resources). The Incident Controller must adapt knowledge (e.g. pre-incident planning, training, previous experiences and innovative approaches) and obtain incident information to safely resolve the situation with the most effective and efficient use of available resources.

(b) The Incident Controller will determine the appropriate response using RECEO and PACT to continuously identify hazards, assess the risks, prioritise objectives and apply tactics to control and manage the incident (refer Incident Action Guide 1.3).

(c) The Incident Controller will identify the incident objectives, which begins from the initial response, so that the Incident Action Plan can be established, implemented and communicated using the SMEACS briefing format.

4.2 Specific Incident Information

(a) Under the State Rescue Policy QFRS is the lead agency for swiftwater rescue incidents. Depending on the incident circumstances and conditions (e.g. swiftwater, floodwater or floodwater with swiftwater) the Officer-in-charge may either be the Incident Controller or the QFRS Commander.

(b) The following table provides a list of given hazards and other issues associated with swiftwater rescues that may influence tactical priorities.

SPECIFIC HAZARDS FOR: SWIFTWATER RESCUE	
Firefighter Safety and Operational Issues	
1 .	Personnel not trained or equipped to perform rescues safely.
1 .	Structural firefighting gear being worn during rescue.
1 .	Rescuer being secured by tying rope around waist as safety line.
1 .	Debris being swept into rescue area.
1 .	Risk of personnel being swept down stream and becoming a victim during rescue activities.
1 .	Temperature of water - low temperature will restrict exposure time.
1 .	Initiate IAP rapidly due to time restraints.
1 .	Losing sight and position of casualty.
1 .	Electrical hazards (e.g. powerlines being down in storm conditions).
1 .	Double the water speed (e.g. quadruple the force exerted).
1 .	Potential infections from water.
1 .	SES flood boat crews operation.
1 .	Unguarded propellers used on flood rescue boats.
1 .	Rescuers being drowned by panicked casualty climbing on top of them.
1 .	Low light conditions reducing visibility due to night time rescues and storms.
1 .	Weather conditions (e.g. storm activity increasing or tidal effects).
1 .	Immediate medical treatment required for casualty and possibly rescuer.
1 .	Critical incident stress affecting rescue personnel.
1 .	Riverbanks becoming unstable and collapsing.
Community Safety and Environmental Concerns	
1 .	Confusion, panic and curiosity of members of the public trying to gain access and assist rescue.
1 .	Additional rescue due to members of the public attempting rescues.
1 .	Health and safety of non-QFRS support agencies involved in the incident.

4.3 Tactical Implementation

(a) The Incident Controller (or QFRS Commander) will continuously monitor and review the tactics until the incident objectives are achieved and the incident is resolved. The following tactics specifically apply to swiftwater incidents:

- Assess the situation.
- Respond level 2 swiftwater rescue technicians.
- Identify type of swiftwater rescue;
 - Person/persons being swept away by current,
 - Motor vehicle with occupants being swept away into waterways,
 - Person/persons entrapped at a static location.
 - Assess if it is a recovery or rescue mode of operations.
 - Secure any witnesses or responsible parties to provide information.
 - Establish incident control zones and clearly identify the zones with barrier tape (or other visual marker) to restrict the public from entering the water,
 - Determine suitable tactics to effect the rescue with least risk to the rescuer/s (from low to high):
 - Yell - stabilise the situation, i.e. give the casualty instructions that will prevent the situation from becoming worse.
 - Reach - the rescuer is attached to a safety line with quick release mechanism and attempts to use boat hooks, ceiling hooks or ladders to reach casualty and recover.
 - Throw - if victim is out of reach, a throw bag or a secured flotation device is thrown to the casualty and then is hauled in or swung downstream to be recovered.
 - Wade - it is sometimes possible to effect a rescue by a rescuer/s wading out to a casualty and bring them back.
 - Row - if available boat based operations to have boat tethered and anchored on both banks.
 - Go-Tow - a rescuer will approach the casualty with a flotation device and assist the person to be extracted.
 - Helo - direct extraction assisted by crewman and pilot to have final say on use of aircraft given weather conditions and access.
 - All personnel working in the rescue area to wear PPE relevant to swiftwater rescues. Do not wear SCBA when entering the water (refer Incident Directive 5.6) and do not wear firefighting PPE (including boots and helmet). Station-wear is acceptable.
 - Appoint an upstream spotter to warn of any floating debris that may impact entrapped casualties.
 - Appoint a downstream safety spotter as a back up for rescuers and casualty/s.
 - Assess the need for additional resources (e.g. helicopters and flood boats) and anticipate with an early request.
 - If casualties are trapped on or in motor vehicle, stabilise vehicle to prevent any movements.
 - Use of thermal imaging camera to locate persons during low light level operations.
 - Verbal and visual contact with the rescuer to be maintained.
 - Before rescuer enters water to have sufficient personnel suitable equipped to be a safety team.
 - Condition of the rescuer is monitored at all time during the rescue (fatigue and hypothermia).
 - Areas near bridges or roads to have traffic safety measures in place.
 - Instructions are provided to non-QFRS support agencies (including PPE requirements).
 - Continually assess and manage the risks for the duration of the incident.

1. POST-INCIDENT RECOVERY

(a) The Incident Controller (or QFRS Commander) will:

Ensure that overhaul is conducted (refer Incident Action Guide 1.4) and de-mobilisation of resources and de-escalation of the Incident Management System occurs.

Ensure that the integrity of evidence at the scene is preserved and record all relevant information and observations.

Liaise with the relevant agency/s to ascertain the impact of the hazard and if further QFRS involvement is required, before handing the situation to relevant authority (as required).

Conduct an incident debrief and then a post-incident analysis, to identify improvements to procedures, training and equipment (refer Incident Management System 2.10).

Initiate the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) de-briefing process as necessary (refer Incident Directive 13.1).

Ensure that all equipment to be checked for damage cleaned and/or replaced.

1. TACTICAL SUMMARY


TACTICAL SUMMARY: SWIFTWATER RESCUE

- Assess situation (e.g. rescue or recovery mode).
- Request relevant/additional resources including Level 2 swiftwater rescue technicians.
- Establish incident control zones and clearly identify with barrier tape (or other visual marker).
- Identify type of swiftwater rescue:
 - person/s being swept away by current,
 - motor vehicle with occupants being swept away into waterways,
 - person/s entrapped at a static location.
- Determine suitable tactics to reduce risk to rescuers - Yell, Reach, Throw, Wade, Row, Go-Tow, Helo
- Wear assessed level of PPE for water rescue duties
- SCBA and structural firefighting PPE must not be worn when entering the water.
- Appoint upstream spotter to warn of any floating debris.
- Appoint downstream safety spotter as a back up for rescuers and casualty/s.
- Before rescuer enters water to have sufficient personnel suitable equipped to be a safety team.
- If casualties are trapped on or in motor vehicle, stabilise vehicle to prevent any movements.
- Areas near bridges or roads to have traffic control measures in place.
- Use thermal imaging camera to locate persons during low light level operations.
- Verbal and visual contact with the rescuer to be maintained.
- Continuously monitor the condition of the rescuer.
- Continually assess and manage the risks for the duration of the incident.

Queensland Fire and Rescue Service
Operations Doctrine

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"TCD-9"



1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the functional standards for establishing and maintaining a Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC).

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to fire officers required to establish and maintain a ROCC.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

- (a) ROCCs are established to assist QFRS regions with information management from incidents to the State Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC), QFRS Commissioner, Director General and Minister of the Department and others as required.
- (b) The ROCC supports the activities of Incident Management Teams and the region by:
- providing a central location for receiving and collating regional incident information and forwarding to the SOCC; and
 - providing information and resources (on request) for intrastate and interstate operations and assist in managing a range of emergencies in the community.

4. ROCC MANAGEMENT

4.1 General

- (a) The Assistant Commissioner will delegate a person to undertake the role of ROCC Manager for the general management of the ROCC. The ROCC Manager is responsible for the general readiness of the ROCC as per the Regional Plan, which includes maintenance, training and exercises.

4.2 Operations

- (a) When the Assistant Commissioner activates the ROCC it is their responsibility to appoint an appropriately qualified officer as the Regional Coordinator. The Regional Coordinator is responsible for:
- coordinating all of the functions and outputs of the ROCC during activation;
 - providing formal / verbal briefings to the Assistant Commissioner and others as required;
 - assessing requests for support and conducting changeover briefings; and
 - reviewing information provided by the ROCC Planning Coordinator concerning support requirements for regional incidents and state resource requests.
- (b) In some circumstances the ROCC Manager may be appropriate to perform the role of Regional Coordinator.

5. ROCC LAYOUT

- (a) The following information provides the functional standards for a ROCC.

5.1 Building

- (a) Each region will develop and maintain their ROCC in a building appropriate for coordination activities.
- (b) Dependant on the event, the facility must consider the number of personnel required may range from five to thirty personnel.
- (c) Guidelines for ROCC facilities may include and are not limited to:
- Sufficient areas (or rooms) that facilitate the functional roles of the ROCC.
 - Sufficient workstations, desktop computers, access ports for laptop computers and associated infrastructure for these roles, including two (2) non-MOE shared computers.
 - Communications room for briefings and/or conferences.
 - Meal, welfare area, quiet area, toilet / showering.
 - Secure access to facility.
 - Secure parking.
 - Backup electrical supply to be provided at all ROCC locations.

5.2 Floor Plan

- (a) A floor plan for each ROCC will be developed with appropriate signage to identify the coordination roles within the facility.

5.3 ROCC Tabards and Brassards

- (a) The ROCC will have sufficient tabards and brassards for the roles undertaken by personnel functioning within the ROCC (refer Incident Directive 17.4 and the QFRS Procurement Information Catalogue).

5.4 Communications

- (a) *Information Technology and electronic communication* requirements may include and are not limited to; Word-processing capability Microsoft Office (Outlook, Word, Excel, PowerPoint), Electronic Incident Log, ten (10) data quality lines (checked to ensure ability to operate computer systems effectively, five (5) to twenty (20) computers - not including Senior Officers Laptops, Modem/network access, WAN capability to State Headquarters for all incidents, ability for the Planning (Resources) Coordinator to access IRIS, OpsMaps / QFRS Atlas / IMACC, Map coordinates conversion software, Google Maps, a data projector to project OpMapS for room display Designated email address and generic log in capability established for the ROCC for communications with the State Operations Coordination Centre (e.g. brrocc@emergency.qld.gov.au)
- (b) *Telephone communication* requirements for Coordination Centre will vary but may include and are not limited to; five (5) telephone lines in and multiple lines out to approximately twenty (20) telephone extensions (switchboard desirable), 2 facsimile lines (1 line in and 1 line out), assessment of mobile telephone coverage, ICC related dedicated phone lines, teleconference and voice recording facilities.

- (c) *Radio Communication* requirements for Coordination Centre may include and are not limited to; the ability to communicate with the Fire Communication Centre who will provide UHF/VHF radio access to Incident Control Points/Centres (fixed or portable). This will be supported by CAD Access (read only).

5.6 Management Support

- (a) Management support and office facilities requirements for the ROCC will include photocopiers and printers (large capacity, A3 or larger capability), whiteboards (preference for SMART type whiteboards for interaction with WAN) and pin boards for all functional areas, furniture such as chairs desk and large tables adequate for all staff, filing system requirements and document trays.
- (b) To assist with document management and also the identification of Incident Management Team roles within a Level 3 Incident Control Centre, there are room and tray (i.e. in/out trays) labels that can be printed from the Operations Doctrine Incident Management Kit CD.

5.8 Information Management

- (a) Incident and coordination information is to be recorded and stored appropriately in electronic and hardcopy storage files. The ROCC computer drive system should have separate drives assigned for current activations and for incident record storage.

5.7 Mapping

- (a) The ROCC is to have access to A-0 maps of the region (1:25,000, 1:100,000 and 1:250,000) and printed maps from OpMapS should be available. Mapping printing capabilities, e.g. AO plotter for GIS mapping.

6. ROCC PROCEDURES

- (a) Regions are to produce ROCC procedures relevant to regional requirements and capability and should include:
- Activation protocols (refer Incident Directive 7.2).
 - Coordination position descriptions, log-in details and role responsibilities.
 - Regional contact details (maintained and communicated to the SOCC).
 - Business Support Service (BSS) notification and support requirements.
 - Annual training program and familiarisation for operational and administration staff (including major activation exercises).
 - Business continuity plan.

7. QFRS RELEVANCY

IMS 2.7.2	URBAN		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	/Zone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓					
Not Applicable				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
May Apply *								

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.


REFERENCES

The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1970
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides
 QFRS Procurement Information Catalogue

Leo A Johnson AFSM (M) Fire &
 Commissioner



" TCD-10"



1. PURPOSE

- (a) To outline the activation protocols for a Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC).

2. APPLICATION

- (a) Applies to fire officers involved in the activation and operation of the ROCC.

3. GENERAL

- (a) The ROCC is essential to maintain a strategic overview of the emergency response capability and resources utilised and available across the Region and also the availability of resources from intrastate and interstate deployments.
- (b) When the ROCC is activated to assist with intrastate and interstate deployments, it will ensure that appropriate mobilisation, accountability, well-being maintenance and demobilisation of all resources is efficient and effective.
- (c) When required, the QFRS will provide a QFRS Liaison Officer to any other agency involved in managing the incident and specifically the District Disaster Management Group (if activated).
- (d) The functional standards for a ROCC are detailed in Incident Management System 2.7.2.

4. DIRECTIVE

4.1 Activation

- (a) The activation of the ROCC and the level of activation will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner after an assessment of the incident or emergent situation. For wildfire incidents, the Assistant Commissioner will consult with the Regional Manager Rural Operations in determining the level of activation and taking into consideration the Wildfire Alert Level for identified areas.
- (b) When the Assistant Commissioner activates the ROCC it is their responsibility to appoint an appropriately qualified officer as the Regional Coordinator as required. Note: for minor incidents and activations, the ROCC Manager may be appropriate to perform this role (refer Incident Management System 2.7.2).
- (c) Upon activation of the ROCC, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will notify the State Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC) and the regional Fire Communications Centre of the activation.

4.2 Stages of Activation

- (a) The activation levels of the ROCC include the following:
- Watching brief
 - Alert
 - Standby
 - Activation
- (b) **Watching Brief** - involves monitoring the warnings about a potential incident that may require activation of all or part of the ROCC. During the *watching brief* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) monitors the developing situation/s during normal business hours and under normal operating conditions, and regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events. The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC during the *watching brief*.
- (c) **Alert** - involves ensuring the ROCC is ready to be activated. During *alert* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
- Check, prepare and verify the ROCC can be activated, e.g., check phone lines, faxes, and emails.
 - Continues to monitor the developing situation/s during, either on site or off site.
 - Regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events.
 - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC.
- (d) **Standby** - involves the preparation of the ROCC to enable full activation within one (1) hour. During *standby* the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
- Monitor the developing situation/s during all hours.
 - Identify staff who can attend the ROCC within one (1) hour.
 - Regularly inform the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations unfolding events.
 - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is required to be in the ROCC during all hours.
- (e) **Activation** - involves expanding the functional roles and staffing of the ROCC to meet the current and projected situation.

4.3 Stand Down (Partial and Full)

- (a) The full or partial stand down of the ROCC will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner on advice from the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) considering the size and scale of the operations.
- (b) Stand down of the ROCC may be staged by functional area at the discretion of the ROCC Coordinator (or ROCC Manager).
- (c) Debriefing of the ROCC operational activities will follow the full stand down of the ROCC.

4.4 Relationship with Incident Control Centres and SOCC

- (a) The ROCC is responsible for effective and efficient management of information from all Incident Control Centres and Incident Control Points across the region.
- (b) The ROCC does not make decisions that are directly involved with operations at an incident however the ROCC may:
 - make decisions concerning resource availability which may affect operations at an incident; and
 - monitor ICC activities and provide guidance and assistance to the ICC in meeting operational standards.
- (c) The ROCC is responsible for communicating relevant incident information to the SOCC by following the reporting protocols and timing requirements (e.g. summary of all Incident Control Centres/Point to the SOCC, etc).
- (d) A ROCC will generally not communicate with another ROCC, however it is the responsibility of the SOCC to coordinate support and information between ROCCs as necessary.

4.5 Reporting Requirements

- (a) The first report from the ROCC to the SOCC must be generated within the first two hours using the Regional Incident Summary (INCFORM 16). An Incident Action Plan or a Situation Report (INCFORM 15) received by the ROCC may also be attached.
- (b) After the first report, ongoing Regional Incident Summary Reports are required to the SOCC:
 - Every four hours; or
 - More frequently if a major change has occurred or a notifiable event such as significant injuries, fatalities, service vehicle accidents, significant structural loss, and/or stock loss.
- (c) The Regional Incident Summary Report need to indicate if the region requires additional resources, for example 4 to 48 hours in advance.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

INCDIR 7.2	URBAN		RURAL OPERATIONS	RURAL FIRE BRIGADES				
	Full time	Part time	Full time	Special	IZone	Village	Rural	Primary Producer
Applicable	✓	✓	✓					
Not Applicable				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
May Apply *								

* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES

The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
 QFRS Training Material
 QFRS Operational Guides

