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QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

	Occur	rence #:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Statement no.:	<u></u>	Date:
Statement of			•.
Name of witness:	MARTIN, Peter John		
Date of birth:	Age:	Occupation:	Police Officer
Police officer tal	king statement		
Name:			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Rank:		J. J. J.	leg. no.:
Region/Command/Division:		Station:	
Statement:			

Peter John Martin states:-

1. I am an Assistant Commissioner in the Queensland Police Service (QPS). I have approximately 31 years policing experience having joined the Queensland Police Service in January 1980. After being inducted as a Constable in July 1981, I served in a number of uniformed positions within Brisbane before being transferred to Mareeba, Queensland. I served for a number of years in relieving positions in single-officer stations in rural and remote locations before being appointed to Plain Clothes duty in Brisbane in 1986. I have served as a Detective in various locations for approximately 10 years and have worked in education and training roles both at a District and Academy level.

2. I have a broad range of experience as a Commissioned Officer undertaking duties in areas such areas as: Drug and Alcohol Coordination Unit and Staff Officer to the Assistant Commissioner, Operations Support Command. I was promoted to the rank of Superintendent, in the position of Chief of Staff, Commissioner's Office and performed duty as: District Officer at Brisbane West District; Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan North Region; and relieving as the Acting Assistant Commissioner of that Region. I was appointed to the position of Assistant Commissioner, Ethical Standards Command (ESC) in April 2008. After being

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
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promoted to Assistant Commissioner, I have relieved on a number of occasions as the Assistant Commissioner at Operations Support Command and Metropolitan North Region and have relieved on a number of occasions as the Acting Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Operations).

- 3. I was transferred to the position of Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan North Region (MNR) and commenced duty on Monday, 25 October 2010. MNR is a large and complex police region. The geographical boundaries for the region are the Brisbane River to the south; west to Moreton Bay; north to Sandgate and Pine Rivers and west to the areas of Dayboro, Samford and Bellbowrie. In terms of complexity, the region encapsulates the central business district of Brisbane, areas of Fortitude Valley, the Brisbane Airport, State Parliament, Local, State and Commonwealth Courts, Embassies and Consulates and various other critical infrastructure of relevance from a security perspective. This area encompasses 1365 square kilometres with a population of over 656,000 people. There are approximately 1300 police officers and 250 staff members within the Region who report ultimately to me as the Assistant Commissioner.
- 4. On 8 November 2011 by virtue of an instrument signed by the Commissioner of Police under the provisions of section 25 of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* ("the Act"), I was appointed as Chairperson for the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group (DDMG). By virtue of section 25A of the Act, I also assumed the role of District Disaster Coordinator (DDC) for the Brisbane Disaster District.
- 5. As indicated previously, as Assistant Commissioner for MNR I have responsibilities for policing a geographically defined area which includes the CBD and greater north of Brisbane area. The boundaries that I am responsible for as DDC for Brisbane are significantly expanded. They include areas covered by MNR as well as Metropolitan South Region and include the local government areas of all of Brisbane City Council as well as Redlands City Council.



- 6. As Chair of the DDMG, I am responsible for maintaining the functions of the group consistent with section 23 of the Act, which include, but are not limited to the following:
 - to ensure that disaster management and disaster operations in the district are consistent with the State group's strategic policy framework for disaster management for the State;
 - to develop effective disaster management for the district, including a district disaster management plan, and regularly review and assess that disaster management;
 - to provide reports and make recommendations to the State group about matters relating to disaster management and disaster operations in the district;
 - to regularly review and assess the disaster management of local groups in the district;
 - to ensure that any relevant decisions and policies made by the State group are incorporated in its disaster management, and the disaster management of local groups in the district;
 - to ensure the community is aware of ways of mitigating the adverse effects of an event, and preparing for, responding to and recovering from a disaster;
 - to coordinate the provision of State resources and services provided to support local groups in the district; and
 - to identify resources that may be used for disaster operations in the district.
- 7. As the DDC for Brisbane I am responsible for coordinating disaster operations in the disaster district on behalf of the DDMG (s.26A DMA). As the Chairperson of the DDMG, I am responsible for: managing and coordinating the work of the DDMG; that the group performs its functions; and report on the performance of the group to the SDMG (s.26 DMA).
- 8. In response to the written requirement of the Qld Floods Commission of Inquiry dated 28 February 2011, I provide the following information.

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The preparation and planning undertaken by the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group in advance of and/or in relation to the 2010/2011 floods.

- 9. On 11 October 2010, I attended the DDMG meeting at Police Headquarters chaired by A/Supt Peter Owens. This meeting was to transition the DDC role to me as at the 1 November 2010. At this point I had not yet taken over my responsibilities as the Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan North Region.
- 10. On 21 and 22 October 2010 the Executive Officer (XO) appointed for the Brisbane DDMG, Senior Sergeant David Morganti, assisted EMQ Local Area Director for Brisbane, Dave Mazzaferri, to deliver training to Brisbane City Council employees. Training related to operation of Local Disaster Coordination Centre (LDCC) including the relationships to the District Disaster Coordination Centre and the overall Disaster Management structure.
- 11. On 26 and 27 October 2010 six officers from across Metropolitan North and Metropolitan South Regions attended the training for Executive Officers facilitated by the Disaster and Major Event Planning Unit, Operations Support Command, QPS. This training was delivered to members state-wide covering the impending legislative, structural and policy changes to be implemented on 1 November 2010.
- 12. On 1 November 2010 the XO at my instruction, delivered an information session to senior management of Metropolitan South Region regarding legislative and policy changes and impacts for their region.
- 13. On 3 November 2010 the XO and I attended desktop exercises run by Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG). Chaired by LDC, it involved activating Brisbane Immediate Action Team (IAT) in a range of scenarios. The IAT is a group of senior executive managers/directors within Council, Chaired by the Chief Executive Officer (Mr Colin Jensen) who take responsibility for planning and responding to critical incidents.

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- 14. On 12 November 2010 the XO and I attended the Commonwealth Pre-season Briefing at EMQ, Kedron. This briefing was critical in setting the scene for the potential for an extreme weather event over the summer season. One component of this briefing was delivered by Mr Jim Davidson from the Bureau of Meteorology.
- 15. On 18 November 2010 the XO and local police members of Redlands LDMG attended a desktop exercise, centred on a Tsunami event, with the Redlands group.
- 16. On 30 November 2010 the XO delivered a training package and exercise to staff drawn from across the two regions. I attended crucial components of this training particularly those relating to the activation of the DDCC. This training involved the following components:
 - Training package was developed specifically for Disaster Management Arrangements – District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC) Familiarisation following the legislative and organisational changes.
 - Training concept lodged through the Queensland Police Service Education and Training Support Program and approved.
 - Lectures and lecture plans developed
 - Lectures delivered to 30 staff from MNR and MSR
 - I attended and participated in the running of the exercise requiring the set-up and activation of a DDCC.
- 17. On 1 December 2010 the XO delivered a lecture to our regional District Duty Officers (DDO) conference regarding changes to Disaster Management and impacts in the operational environment.
- On 9 December 2010 the XO attended a meeting with EMQ, BCC and DOCS to explore identified gaps in evacuation procedures between emergency evacuations and longer term placements.
- 19. On 10 December 2010 the XO and I attended a meeting with EMQ management to discuss information management across the whole disaster management structure and timely activation and communication procedures.

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- 20. On 15 December 2010 the XO and I attended a conference focused on 'flooding' facilitated by EMQ covering flood mitigation through dam management and methodology for flood and inundation predictions. Desktop exercises were conducted regarding how DDCCs across South-East Queensland would respond to a major flooding incident.
- 21. On 16 December 2010, I called an extraordinary meeting of the DDMG to enable me to disseminate all information gathered from all above listed events to all group members. At this meeting I delivered a presentation with the assistance of the XO, in terms of the advice that was provided to me from Mr Jim Davidson at the Commonwealth Pre-season Briefing of the 12 November 2010.

The actions undertaken by the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group in respect of the 2010/2011 floods in relation to immediate management, response and recovery operations.

- 22. Due to continued extreme weather and flooding events occurring across the State of Queensland, I placed the Brisbane DDMG on alert on 20 December 2010. From that time on the group was provided frequent updates through SITREPS distributed at State level as well as daily advice on Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) weather and predicted hydrology reports. From that time, I personally participated in daily state-wide teleconferences regarding flooding issues across Queensland. In some cases these teleconferences were with the State Disaster Coordination Group (SDCG), State Disaster Management Group (SDMG) and with QPS Senior Executive Meetings and other face to face meetings such as the Brisbane Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) and the Brisbane DDMG. I will deal with the issues associated with attending so many daily meetings later in my statement.
- 23. At approximately 0630hrs on Monday, 10 January 2011, I arrived at my place of work which was the Metropolitan North Regional Office. I immediately reviewed the weather situation and accessed the Bureau of Meteorology website and other data sources. I participated in a teleconference at 0730hrs that day with the QPS

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Senior Executive. At 0800hrs that day, I decided that I would activate the District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC), Brisbane.

- 24. I gave the then XO (Sen. Sgt Darren Madgwick) certain instructions with respect to accessing personnel to staff the DDCC and activation of external stakeholders. At 0900hrs, I arrived at the DDCC which is situated at the Ground Floor, Police Headquarters at 200 Roma Street, Brisbane. By the time I had arrived at the DDCC there were a number of police personnel in attendance including the XO and the set up of the Coordination Centre was well advanced. External representatives were also arriving at this time.
- 25. At 1232hrs on Monday, 10 January 2011 advice was received from the Redlands LDMG representative (Mr Mike Morrison) that there had been a partial collapse of a large retainment wall at Wellington Point, which is in the Redlands Local Council Area and that this posed risks to public safety and private property. The risks associated with an escalation of rain in the south east Queensland area, and corresponding likelihood of flooding, were being monitored on a frequent basis.
- 26. After considering all data about the impending weather for the greater Brisbane area I sent an email to all the DDMG members at 2314hrs that evening (Monday, 10 January 2011) advising of my intention to seek the Minister's approval for a Declaration of a Disaster Situation (pursuant to Section 64 of the DMA). I personally telephoned at this time the Deputy DDC (Chief Supt. Kerry Dunn), Mr Mike Morrison (Redlands LDMG); Mr Chris Lavin (Brisbane LDMG) and Mr Shane Wood (Emergency Management Queensland).
- 27. At 0200hrs on Tuesday, 11 January 2011, I received a Situation Report (SITREP) from the Brisbane LDCC advising that based on the BOM and Flood Information Centre (FIC) projections that the Brisbane River could expect a 4,600m3/s flooding situation in Brisbane. Effectively this meant that there would be inundation of a broad range of areas across the greater Brisbane area.

28 At 0600hrs I made a formal request of the Minister for the Declaration of a Disaster Situation which was approved by the Minister at 0700hrs that same day (Tuesday,

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11 January 2011). At about 1000hrs the Premier of Queensland and the Minister make a declaration of a state-level Declaration for a Disaster Situation for a large part of Queensland including the Brisbane Disaster District. The existence of both Declarations is something that was communicated to both LDMG representatives (Brisbane and Redlands).

- 29. These declarations provided me with specific powers as provided under sections 76 to 79 of the Act to manage the disaster and its effects.
- 30. At 1000hrs on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 the first of the daily Brisbane LDMG meetings occurred and these meetings continued up to and including Saturday, 22 January 2011. I personally attended each of these meetings and was provided with an opportunity to provide an overview as the DDC for Brisbane. These meetings were held at Brisbane City Council offices at 157 Ann Street, Brisbane.
- 31. I facilitated and ultimately established the strategic and operational priorities for the DDMG. I would point out however, that this planning and strategy setting was occurring in a highly changing environment due to estimations of rainfall and hydrological estimations of water flow and height were being revised on a regular basis. The strategies for the DDMG were to ensure that human life was preserved; that critical road infrastructure was open and available to essential services; that restoration of essential services occurred expeditiously; and rebuilding of functionality across the community to restore public confidence in our ability to maintain public order and normal services.
- 32. The DDMG monitored and supported the establishment and management of evacuation centres by the LDCC. We supplied support from numerous government agencies to the two official main centres at the RNA Showgrounds, Bowen Hill and QEII Stadium, Nathan. Large numbers were assisted through these centres with 1650 utilising the RNA facility and 700 utilising QEII.
- 33. Several smaller self-activated (unofficial) evacuation centres were initiated in Brisbane. These sprung out of local planning largely by members of the community who self-assessed their local need. There were approximately seven

		
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	Commissioner for Declarations's signature)	preparing statement)

of these centres, of varying size and complexity, also requiring the support of a range of government services from members of the DDMG. I am aware that the unofficial evacuation centres were being monitored by the LDMG and the DDMG and that where necessary these were given support as and when required and able.

34. These arrangements continued throughout the event until I deactivated the DDCC on 21 January 2011

The actions undertaken by the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group in respect of the 2010/2011 floods in relation to resourcing, coordination and deployment of personnel and equipment.

- 35. I called a full meeting of all DDMG members and Chaired such meeting, each morning throughout the activation, to discuss current intelligence in terms of resourcing, coordination and deployment issues.
- 36. Each agency was provided the opportunity to report to the group on current resourcing and strategies in terms of district priorities. In cases where a representative was encountering opposition or difficulty then these issues were raised within the meeting or alternatively dealt with 'out of session'. As an example of this the Energex representative raised concerns about access to locked buildings within the CBD of Brisbane. Access needed to be granted to these buildings to enable large sections of the city to be re-energised. A strategy was developed to given effect to access utilising my authority under the DMA. This is but one of numerous examples of active problem-solving utilising the DDMG meeting. A further example was where I required specialist advice from a Marine Architect and Engineer and received the appropriate support from the Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) representative with this specialist capability.
- 37. The resources of the group were made available to assist where required. The fact that the DDMG was well supported by senior personnel from a range of government entities meant that identified issues were addressed with appropriate resourcing.

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- 38. The positioning of an ADF liaison officer within the DDMG provided much needed technical advice on capability which was also again used to good effect.
- 39. Additional meetings were called where extraordinary circumstances required urgent actions from the DDMG.
- 40. In short, I found that the Brisbane DDMG meetings were extremely efficient in sharing intelligence and information; strategy discussion and development; sharing resources to achieve operational and strategic outcomes; useful in allocating resources efficiently having regard to significant competing demands.

Measures taken by the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group to manage, maintain or reinstate the supply of essential services (water, power and communications) during the 2010/2011 flood events.

- 42. The DDMG was fortunate to have senior representation from a range of local and state government entities (e.g. Energex and Telstra were key advisors to group) as well as community groups (e.g. Red Cross).
- 43. I received daily briefings regarding the status of supply of all essential services from the DDMG advisors as well as through SITREPs from both local and state levels. I ensured that the key messages and issues were major components of all SITREPs received and disseminated from the DDMG.
- 44. At each of the DDMG meetings issues were raised with respect to the status of essential services. This included key roads which were damaged, power outages and areas affected, telecommunications issues, potable water issues, sewerage, etc.) Where issues were identified then the appropriate resources were made available to assist to rectify the situation. In this there was good liaison occurring with the BCC.
- 45. I personally ensured that the resources of the DDCC, was made available to the representatives of the DDMG to ensure that essential services were restored at the earliest opportunity.

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- 46. I ensured re-establishment of essential services was a priority issue for discussion at all DDMG meetings. In fact, it was at one of the DDMG meetings that I sought the assistance of key agency representatives to ensure that the Rocklea Markets were given a greater priority in the recovery effort given that the restoration of fruit and vegetables was important to Brisbane and surrounding areas.
- 47. My role as DDC meant that I was uniquely placed to make an assessment of the status of essential services and therefore could prioritise activity in this regard. This was done in cases where essential services (such as traffic lights at key strategic intersections) were not functioning and the restoration of these services had the potential to impact public safety. There were many instances were such situations were identified and these issues were given high priority by the members of the DDMG. Active problem-solving like this enabled essential services to be restored more quickly, allowed more evidence-based prioritisation of issues and added considerably to ensuring public safety was maintained.

Measures taken by the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group to inform the community about the 2010/2011 flood events and the response thereto.

- 48. Upon activation of the DDCC, Police Media were informed and were engaged in terms of public messaging. This entailed me putting information out into the public domain via a number of means including: live pod casting (media presentation put out on the internet live); pre-recorded messages put out over the internet and ultimately used by a range of media representatives; and media releases.
- 49. Through the coordination of the DDMG, I was alert to the messaging that was being disseminated through the agencies represented and reinforced those messages through my public messages. I developed and cause to be disseminated a number of public messages on issues such as: public safety (not to cross flooded waterways and play in watercourses); traffic management (not to be on the road around flood sites unless absolutely necessary and being careful on roads affected

(Witness's signature)

by damage); personal health (to ensure that cuts and abrasions are treated by disinfectant and health professionals and that volunteers use protective equipment such as gloves and footwear); etc. I am aware that a range of my public messages, as previously discussed has been made available to the Commission of Inquiry.

- 50. I was aware that before the Brisbane Floods the QPS had a 'Facebook' site on the internet. This was used to great effect to disseminate information. In some cases this proved to be a very useful medium to also provide information to dispel myths that were developing. One notable myth related to the failure of the Wivenhoe Dam, which I am aware was causing great community distress.
- 51. Through the information that was disseminated from the DDMG to police at Metropolitan North and Metropolitan South Region, I am aware that police locally were also effective in door-knocking residences and businesses which were likely to be impacted by rising flood waters.
- 52. I was also aware of the public messaging that was being disseminated via the SDMG and the State Disaster Coordinator. The Premier's messaging was also consistent with the messaging being disseminated from Local and District sources.
- 53. The SITREPs that were being provided from the DDCC were being disseminated to the SDCC. Also my participation in teleconferences was also informing Statelevel considerations relevant to the Brisbane flooding. Such teleconferences related to the SDCG and the SDMG. I believe that both the SITREPs and the personal briefing were being used to inform the State-level public messages.
- 54. Through my membership of the LDMG, I was aware of the public messages that the Lord Mayor was disseminating as well as the public messages being disseminated through a range of mediums such as letter box drops, door knocking, publicly accessed posters, etc.
- 55. I also made the offer to the Lord Mayor and the CEO of Council at a LDMG meeting that police officers involved in Operation Safeguard (multi-jurisdiction operation preventing looting in flood affected areas) would be prepared, should we

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Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

get copies of the BCC Newsletter to disseminate these amongst flood affected areas. Arrangements were then made for BCC communications officers to obtain such copies for dissemination.

The nature and timing of all communications between the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group and the Local Disaster Management Group and/or the Local Disaster Management Coordinator relative to the 2010/2011 flood event.

- 56. As has been indicated previously, each day I held a DDMG meeting. Such meetings were usually held at 0700hrs each day (there were some exceptions to this early in the event). This was an opportunity for LDCC members to be at the meeting and to provide an overview of any issues of relevance. It offered a useful opportunity for district group stakeholders to share information with the local group representative.
- 57. Upon activation of the DDCC, I appointed a Liaison Officer (LO) to the LDCC. In some cases, particularly when the activity levels were high more than one Police LO was appointed to the LDCC. The role of the LO was multi-faceted. I aimed to provide support to the LDCC by ensuring that information was communicated to the DDCC quickly. The LO also was able to provide technical advice on police process and procedure as well as aspects of the disaster management function.
- 58. As well as general Police LO's to the LDCC, I also appointed a senior officer as LO to the LDCC on matters relating to Evacuation Centres. This person was Superintendent Gayle Hogan of State Crime Operations Command. I also appointed a senior police LO to deal with issues of Recovery. Specifically, this was to ensure that recovery planning was well advanced well before the response phase was concluded. This officer was Superintendent Danny Baade, Education and Training Command. Both these senior officers provided timely advice to me on the level of planning and issues that were unfolding at the LDCC level. The appointment of these senior officers ensured that me as the DDC was being given timely and accurate information with which to assist the LDCC and LDMG.

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- 59. I maintained regular contact with BCC Disaster Operations Manager Mr Chris Lavin at the LDCC officers who is a key member of the DDMG. Mr Lavin was extremely contactable during this operation and on a number of occasions I telephoned him directly on critical and emerging issues and he reciprocated. I also had direct contact with the CEO of Council, Mr Colin Jensen who was similarly available to take calls from me on critical and emerging issues.
- 60. I ensured that there was regular SITREPS being provided from the LDCC to the DDCC and *vise versa*. The DDMG SITREPs were being disseminated to both the LDCC and the SDCC and these were provided in a format requested by the SDCC. The LDCC SITREPs were being provided at a frequent interval. I am aware that these were scrutinised and then disseminated to key representatives. The information from the LDCC SITREP was also used as the basis of briefings to the DDMG members so that all levels of the process (local, district and state) were aware of the latest intelligence.
- 61. I personally attended all LDMG meetings throughout the flood event. These meetings were held at 10am each day. I provided regular briefings to that group and nominated the priorities for action and challenges being encountered by the DDMG. Time was made available on the agenda each day so that I could provide my overview to the group. I engaged in discussion and provided an overview on the strategies, difficulties and challenges as well as progress regarding preparation, response and recovery.
- 62. Each daily DDMG meeting that I chaired would start with a strategic assessment of the best most accurate and up-to-date intelligence available. This would include intelligence gleaned from the LDCC, LDMG and SDCC/SDMG meetings. This was a useful formal way of exchanging information with DDMG members and ensured that each participant was operating on the same intelligence position.
- 63. Although it is impracticable in this statement to outline specifically every piece of information and intelligence communicated between the local, district and state level, I have attempted to provide an overview on how this communication and information process worked. I am aware that the SITREPs from the SDCC,


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DDCC and LDCC will be made available to the Commission of Inquiry. I have also made available other documents and communications such as diary notes, log of events and decisions, emails, etc. which provide the specifics of such communications.

64. I would also point out that this was a fast moving and extremely dynamic situation in which large amounts of information of a critical nature was moving between local, district and state levels.

The nature and timing of all communications between the District Disaster Coordinator and the District Disaster Management Group and the State Disaster Management Group and/or the State Disaster Management Coordination Committee and/or the State Disaster Coordinator relative to the 2010/2011 flood events.

- 65. Please see my comments in the earlier criteria which are relevant to this question also.
- 66. I ensured accurate and timely SITREPs were provided from the DDCC to the SDCC in the timeframes required. Again, I understand that these have been made available to the Commission of Inquiry for reference.
- 67. I ensured any information received outside of those timeframes requiring immediate action was provided to all groups via the established communication networks. At times where situations were changing rapidly or where a request for assistance was considered urgent then I would follow that up with a phone call to emphasise the importance of the matter.
- 68. I participated in regular (at least daily) state-wide teleconferences before, during and after the event. These were both an opportunity to gain knowledge about what was occurring around the state but also to provide an overview on the status of the disaster from a Brisbane perspective.



The availability and provision of services or logistical support within the disaster management hierarchy before and during the 2010/2011 flood events, including an assessment of the adequacy and timeliness thereof.

- 69. I would describe the level of support in terms of services and logistical support to the DDMG as professional and responsive. Almost without exception requests made to the LDCC or the SDCC were met in a timely timeframe.
- 70. The systems and protocols by which requests were made to the DDCC from the LDCC appeared to work effectively. Large amounts of requests were processed expeditiously. Similarly the process by which requests for assistance were made to the SDCC were also processed professionally and in a timely fashion. In cases were a request needed to be clarified this was done and resubmitted.
- 71. Although there were times where requests for resources (e.g. ADF aerial assets) went unfulfilled, it should be kept in mind that such situations were not common and there were significant other competing interests that were occurring at the time.
- 72. There are many examples of where requests were made to both the local level and the state level for assistance which were met in a timely fashion. One of the notable examples is the Rocklea Markets in which Police, BCC, ADF, QFRS, Engergex, Volunteers and others combined to facilitate the repatriation of this large and complex site. Without the provision of resources and logistical support generally then this would not have been facilitated so quickly. Other examples include the energising of the large areas of Brisbane (including the CBD), through the good will and industry of a range of stakeholders.

Any involvement with Commonwealth agencies, including but not limited to Emergency Management Australia or the Australian Defence Force, in relation to the provision of emergency response measures, personnel, equipment or services, including an assessment of the adequacy and timeliness thereof.

(Witness's signature)

- 73. The DDMG and DDCC were advantaged by having an ADF liaison officer within the structure. Further assistance was provided by an ADF liaison officer situated at the Police Operations Centre (POC) located also at Police Headquarters.
- 74. There were a number of occasions where ADF assets were requested and assets made available to assist. Examples include: provision of aerial assets to deliver personnel and a 1.5 tonne anchor to the Moggill Ferry; provision of vehicles (Unimogs) and aerial assets to reprovision food, medicines, etc. to the communities of Bellbowrie/Moggill/Karana Downs/Mount Crosby; provision of Navy Clearance Divers to give a capability (should the need arise) to sink watercraft on the Brisbane River; Navy assistance to reprovision fuel to a vessel in difficult circumstances.
- 75. There were some occasions where requests for assistance were not met due to competing demands for scarce resources. One such example was where the LDCC requested the use of an ADF aerial platform to conduct aerial surveillance to assist in the recovery effort. In this case the BCC utilised a private contractor to facilitate this request.
- 76. Generally the assistance of the Commonwealth was responsive, measured and to a high standard. In one case which has been previously discussed, the tasking of the ADF to the Rocklea Markets enabled significant repatriation of this complex and allowed fruit and vegetables to flow back on to Brisbane shelves in a very timely fashion. Without ADF assistance this may have not occurred for many additional weeks and caused significant problems for the community.

An assessment of the adequacy of equipment and communications systems in the District during the 2010/2011 flood events.

77. The support for the DDMG and the DDCC operations, relied largely on equipment and communications systems made available through the Queensland Police Service. There were no significant issues identified with respect to both the adequacy of equipment or communications systems. The DDCC (which was operating within Police Headquarters) to my knowledge did not lose power or

(Witness's signature)

experience any severe communication problems. I am aware that Police Headquarters did experience some minor disruption of their non-essential telephone lines to police headquarters.

- 78. The debrief conducted for the DDMG operation has identified some minor technological enhancements that can be made in terms of interoperability of internet and email service for external stakeholders. Currently work is being progressed to examine the feasibility of a range of options to facilitate this.
- 79. I have indicated previously that prior to the Brisbane Floods the QPS had a 'Facebook' site on the internet which was used to great effect to disseminate information before, during and after the flood. I commented previously that this was a very useful medium to also provide information to dispel myths that were developing. I used 'Facebook' through the assistance of personnel from Police Media, effectively. As has been indicated previously, I put out a range of messages over this period on such issues as: public safety (not to cross flooded waterways and play in watercourses); traffic management (not to be on the road around flood sites unless absolutely necessary and being careful on roads affected by damage); personal health (to ensure that cuts and abrasions are treated by disinfectant and health professionals and that volunteers use protective equipment such as gloves and footwear); etc. I am aware that a range of my public messages, as previously discussed has been made available to the Commission of Inquiry.

An assessment of the adequacy of the community's response in the District during the 2010/2011 flood events.

- 80. I am aware that at the LDMG meetings a strategy was developed to engage community volunteers and to put such volunteers to good use in affected areas. There was a significant amount of work undertaken by a range of entities, particularly Council, to facilitate the volunteering effort.
- 81. On the weekend of 15 and 16 January 2011, the BCC have advised that over 23,000 individuals registered through local government processes to provide

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assistance to affected residential areas. In many instances these individuals were equipped with their own protective equipment, tools and other equipment such as plant and machinery (e.g. bobcats, backhoes, and other earthmoving equipment) to assist in the effort.

- 82. For every registered volunteer it is conceivable that there were many others who did not register but volunteered in an informal way. There is no reliable way to gauge the numbers who volunteered assistance without registering. There is strong anecdotal evidence to say that the informal (unregistered) volunteers were operating immediately as flood waters started to subside and were large in terms of number.
- 83. The following weekend (22 23 January 2011) a further coordinated volunteer effort was mounted on a targeted basis to, amongst other things, clear and clean parks and recreation facilities. Although I am unsure of the numbers of volunteers for this weekend, I am aware that there was significant volunteering occurring which was concentrated in public spaces.
- 84. Although there was a significant effort by local, state and commonwealth agencies to further the recovery effort, the repatriation of such areas would not have been so advanced had it not have been for the volunteer effort which I regard as potentially international best practice.

The circumstances of any human fatality within the District, including the measures taken to prevent and/or respond to any such fatality, during the 2010/2011 flood events.

- 85. There are two deaths which have been attributed to the Brisbane flood event.
- 86. The first such death occurred at Sherwood Park Brisbane at about 1130 hrs on 20 December 2010. At this time and location, a 20 year old man who is alleged to have had hearing and psychological problems has jumped into the Brisbane River at Sherwood Park to 'cool down'. This young man was quickly swept down stream and was reported to have gotten into difficulties and was observed by a



(Witness's signature)

(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/ Commissioner for Declarations's signature) (Signature of police officer preparing statement)

friend to go underwater and not resurface. The male person was subsequently located deceased.

- 87. The second such death occurred at Bowhill Road, Willawong at about 0720 hrs on 13 January 2011. On this occasion it is alleged that a male person has driven around road closure signs before parking his motor vehicle. The male person then was seen to walk into a flooded roadway before losing his footing or being sucked under water. The male person was later located deceased.
- 88. In both circumstances these matters are subject to coronial investigations.
- 89. In the case of the death at Sherwood Park on the 20 December 2010, I hold the view that this is outside of the primary flooding event that occurred in Brisbane given that it was some weeks later that Brisbane experienced significant flooding.
- 90. With respect to flood-related deaths, I am aware that regular and consistent community warnings were issued from both State and district level, warning all persons of the danger of entering flood waters. The media and public messaging was intensive over the lead up and during the flood event. Similarly, my public messaging reinforced safety information such as not entering flooded roadways, etc.
- 91. Coordinated decisions were made in the operational environment to close roads and areas where there was deemed to be any threat to members of the public. I am aware of many road closures that occurred across Brisbane to enhance the safety of both pedestrians and road using public. Unfortunately such warnings are not always heeded and it is impossible given the size and scale of the situation to have police staff every possible area of concern.

The measures taken within the District to protect private and public property and/or preserve vital infrastructure in connection with the 2010/2011 flood events.

(Witness's signature)	(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/ Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

- 92. As the DDC it was important for me to reinforce to the membership of the Brisbane DDMG my priorities. These were articulated personally to the DDMG on a number of occasions.
- 93. The first priority was for the preservation of life and second was the protection of property. Concerning the protection of property it was stated that our principle goal was the protection of critical infrastructure and thereafter other property such as private homes and commercial businesses.
- 94. In terms of preparation for the flood event, this entailed obtaining the best most updated information on the magnitude and extent of the flooding and ensuring that messaging was being delivered to the community. I was aware that this was being done through various means such as public messaging from the Chair of the LDMG, letterbox drops, door-knocking of potentially affected areas by a range of local and state government entities including Police. I formulated and promulgated public messages advising people in potentially flood affected areas to take personal precautions to ensure their safety and those of their family and the general community.
- 95. In the lead up to the flood peak and while the flood event was ensuing, I made a number of operational decisions. These decisions related to infrastructure such as the Drift Restaurant, The Island, Moggill Ferry, damage to CityCat Terminals, Floating Walkway, Dockside Marina and others which had the potential to negatively impact public safety and preservation of property (including critical infrastructure and private property). In each case no people lost their lives or were seriously injured nor was critical infrastructure damaged as a result of my decision-making. This decision-making at all times attempted to keep preservation of life foremost followed by protection of property as a priority.
- 96. When the flood waters were peaking and then commencing to fall, the work of the DDMG was directed at response and recovery. I recall leading discussions and strategy setting within the DDMG and articulated our operational goals as being to: (1) open road infrastructure to allow access by emergency responders and essential services responders; (2) to restore power, water, sewerage,

(Witness's signature)

telecommunications and other essential services; and to (3) restore infrastructure critical to the well-being of the community (e.g. Rocklea Markets).

- 97. This strategy was communicated to the LDMG by way of the daily meeting that I would attend. The strategy was supported by LDMG who I noted had a range of complimentary strategies to give effect to these priorities.
- 98. A further strategy which was utilised in the immediate aftermath of the flood event was referred to as Operation Safeguard. This Operation was a multi-jurisdictional policing operation aimed at utilising police from other jurisdictions (e.g. New South Wales, Victoria & South Australia) who were recruited to Queensland, sworn in as Special Constables and were placed with QPS officers to engage in high visibility anti-looting patrols of flood affected areas. This strategy saw an additional 200 or so officers (100 interstate Police and 100 Queensland Police) ostensibly working within the greater Brisbane area on such duties. This strategy was very effective in both acting as a highly visible deterrent to offending but also to support communities who were comforted in seeing police returning quickly to devastated areas. This strategy was in place for approximately three weeks and ran from 17 January 2011 to 6 February 2011.

Any special considerations that should be given to the District by reason of particular regional or geographical differences.


- 99. The Brisbane DDC area is large and complex. Naturally, given the dynamics of Brisbane City Council and Redlands City Council, the areas can be categorised as highly developed and densely populated urban areas. Much of the state's critical infrastructure exists within the greater Brisbane area and therefore falls into my area of responsibility from a disaster perspective.
- 100. The preparation and response to the Brisbane Flood of 2011 was such that I would describe it as a multi-dimensional event, which was rapidly developing and fast moving requiring a high degree of critical decision-making over a reasonably prolonged period.

(witness's signature)

101. The size and scale of the event and the length of time that the event occurred over (from preparation to recovery) meant that there were significant challenges in terms of information flow, quantity of critical and emerging issues, staffing, etc. None of these issues were unexpected and I would regard these as minor given the aforementioned issues previously discussed. It is impossible for me to attempt to explain this event accurately, and convey the tempo of operational decision-making and demands upon my me as DDC, that were occurring.

Any feature of the disaster preparation and planning stages or the disaster response and recovery operations which, in the opinion of the District Disaster Coordinator, presented particular difficulty or may require practical or legislative change to improve future disaster management in the district.

- 102. The new provisions of the DMA came into effect only shortly prior to the Brisbane Flood event occurring. Despite this, the work that was done towards the latter part of 2010 in terms of training, capacity building, information sharing and relationship building proved to be critical to sound outcomes in terms of preparation, response and recovery.
- 103. A particular challenge was the number and frequency of daily meetings that I was expected to attend either personally or via teleconference. To highlight this point in most cases there was the following meetings: DDMG, LDMG, SDCG, SDMG, QPS Senior Executive Meetings. In some cases these meetings occurred twice daily.
- 104. My personal view is that there was a great degree of synergy of effort around the DDMG and this was also evident in the operation of the DDCC. I believe that the cooperation and industry that occurred, enhanced public safety and the protection of property while advancing considerably the recovery effort.
- 105. There are no legislative impediments that were detected as a result of this matter and therefore I am unable to offer any suggestions in this regard.



- 106. In conclusion, I wish to state that the Brisbane Flood event created a significant disaster situation which posed unique challenges in terms of preparation, response and recovery. I am pleased to say that from my perspective, the local, district and state systems to respond to the disaster worked effectively. I also hold the view that the DDMG members worked very collaboratively and efficiently to respond to the disaster and I received significant support from them. I feel privileged to have had the opportunity to have Chaired the DDMG and to have supported the DDMG members.
- 107. I would also point out that the tempo of the disaster event was incredibly high. This necessitated high levels of decision making at times with very little time and with available information and intelligence. In terms of my decision-making my priorities were focused on the preservation of life. Despite these critical decisions and the amount of such decisions, no person was killed or seriously injured and no critical infrastructure was destroyed as a result of my decision-making.
- 108. The information contained in this statement is provided on the basis of the knowledge, information and material currently available to me and my interpretation of the information sought by the requirement at this point in time.

Dated at Brisbane this 9th day of March 2011.

OATHS ACT 1867 (DECLARATION) y declare that: I Peter John MARTIN do sole dated 9 March 2011 and contained in pages numbered 1 to 24 is true to the best of my (1)This writte knowledge ng that if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating in it (2)I make this anything I sly believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act 1867 and I make this solemn declar Signature Taken and declared before me at ______ALDERLEY_____ THE PEACE this MINCH day of MARC Witness Justice of the Peace / commissioner of Declarations (Witness's signature) (Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/ (Signature of police officer Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

QP 0125 Statement of Witness

Peter John MARTIN

preparing statement)